This paper investigates the interaction between trade unions and technological change in Australia in the period 1978 to 1996. The principle aim of the paper is to explore the ways trade unions have responded to the adoption of technology in Australian workplaces. It does so by examining the interplay between unions, employers and governments over the use of new technology in the later part of the twentieth century and the wider legislative framework that has codified such interplay. In particular the paper considers the extent to which notions of management prerogative have prevented unions and workers from having a voice in the development and utilisation of technology in Australian workplaces.

Introduction

Technological change is amongst the most significant forms of change at the workplace level. The selection, introduction and adoption of new technology has historically effected types of employment, levels of skill, rates of pay, hours worked, union density, numbers of employees and the types of work carried out in a particular workplace. Given the scope of its impact upon the nature of work and work organisation, technological change could be regarded as a key issue for trade unions, as representatives and advocates of working people. The nature and effect of technological change has elicited an array of responses from trade unions that vary from outright opposition to uncritical acceptance and active promotion. The choice of responses available to trade unions has been determined in part by employers, governments and the legal system. The notion that selection and implementation of new technology is a management prerogative has been central in restricting the range of options available to unions and workers. Marsh and Evans define managerial prerogative as the assertion of exclusive managerial rights and functions free from union or employee influence where as Yerbury and Karlsson note that in Australia managerial prerogative is limited by the power of industrial tribunals.^[1]

     Sorge and Streeck have noted that technological change or 'technical change' has traditionally been regarded as something external to and independent of industrial relations.^[2] They argue that trade unions have contributed to this situation through their willingness to limit themselves to negotiating wages and conditions and only dealing with questions of technology when it impacts upon these core concerns.^[3] In order to contest the notion of technology as a management prerogative and pursue their 'core concerns', Australian unions have focussed their efforts on guaranteeing that in the event of technological change workers and their unions are notified and kept informed of the new technology to be used and the likely effects of this new technology. The right to actively and genuinely participate in the selection and adoption of new technology, a right unions in Scandinavia have enjoyed for almost 30 years has been something Australian unions could aspire to but not effectively pursue. The period under consideration, 1978 to 1996, is book-ended by the Telecom dispute over telephone exchange technology in 1978 and the enactment of the Workplace Relations Act in 1996. In order to appreciate the importance of the Telecom dispute we need to consider the preceding thirty years of the post war period.

Post-war period, 1945-1977

In studies of technological change in Canada and Western Europe, several authors noted an absence of union resistance to the high level of technological change that occurred in the 30 years that followed the Second World War. This they attributed to the period being one of economic growth and higher living standards for workers through out the industrialised world, Australia included.^[4] A number of Australian authors have argued that in this period of high employment and a buoyant economy, Australian unions had little interest in intervening over the question of technological change, as workers made redundant by the introduction of labour saving technology were generally reabsorbed into the workforce.^[5]

     A notable exception to the apparent disinterest of unions in the effects of technological change prior to the late 1970s, was the Waterside Workers Federation's (WWF) involvement in an agreement covering the introduction of containerisation to the Australian waterfront in the mid-1960s. The shift from the manual loading of ships to crane loaded containers greatly reduced the need for stevedoring labour. The introduction of containerisation on Australian waterfront ultimately led to a halving of the waterfront workforce in the space of a decade. The number of stevedores went from 20,000 in 1967 to approximately 10,000 in 1977.^[6] Taking from the experiences of stevedoring unions in North America, the leadership of the WWF recognised that containerisation was inevitable and that an agreement covering the introduction of the new technology was necessary in order to secure the best outcome for Australian waterside workers.^[7] In 1965, in pursuit of a series of demands, which included job security for waterside workers, a pension scheme and a mechanisation fund, WWF members embarked on a campaign of intensified industrial action.^[8] In a three-month period between July and September 1965 some 561,000 hours were lost through unauthorised fortnightly stoppages. In response the Federal Government convened the National Stevedoring Industry Conference, composed of the Federation, Stevedoring employers, the ACTU and itself in October 1965.^[9] After eighteen months of negotiations the parties reached an agreement which provided for decasualisation of waterfront employment and improved redundancy payments in return for the union's complete acceptance of the new technology. By taking the initiative on the question of containerisation combined with the militancy and strategic location in the Australian economy of its members, the WWF was able to challenge management prerogative in relation to the introduction of new technology and secure greater job security and redundancy entitlements for its members.

1978- 1983

The mid to late 1970s saw the introduction of labour saving technologies most notably in the form of computerisation in a range of manufacturing and clerical industries. There was also a sharp rise in the level of unemployment in Australia from 4.5% in 1975 to 6% in 1979. These developments had two effects. Firstly, it prompted fears of mass unemployment on the scale of the Great depression. In 1978 The Australian predicted that new technology would replace so many workers that by 1984 there would be an unemployment level of 31%.^[10] In Britain in the same year the Guardian newspaper declared 'Technology could put 5M out of work'.^[11] The second, and for our purposes more significant effect of this extensive technological change was that it forced trade unions to rethink their attitudes to the introduction of new technology and its impact upon the workforce.

     Fear about the effects of new technology were highlighted by a series of major industrial disputes in a series of industries that occurred during the later half of the 1970s. The most notable of these was the 1978 telephone exchange technology dispute between Telecom and the Australian Telecommunications Employees Association (ATEA), the union representing skilled technicians employed in Telecom. The dispute's significance came from manner in which the ATEA challenged management prerogative in relation to the selection and application of new technology. In 1977 Telecom sought to introduce the ARE 11 computer controlled exchanges into the telephone network and announced that in order to maintain the 'integrity' of new technology it was necessary to centralise the maintenance functions in 'Exchange Maintenance Centres' (EMCs). The ATEA did not oppose the introduction of ARE 11 technology, rather it was opposed to the centralisation and specialisation of maintenance staff. The ATEA's response to Telecom's proposal was to put forward an alternative proposal in the form of decentralised 'Exchange Support Centres' (ESC), which used the ARE 11 technology but spread technical staff throughout the network thereby maintaining their career opportunities, skill levels and job satisfaction. Telecom rejected this proposal and a four-week national strike of technicians resulted in 1978.

     The matter then went before the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The arbiter's solution to the 1978 Telecom dispute was as ingenious as the dispute itself. The matter went before Mary Gaudron who proposed a simultaneous trial of the ESC and EMC systems on the basis of six criteria: efficiency of operation, standard of service achieved, maintenance of technical standards and retention of expertise, job satisfaction, career opportunities and the public interest. Both parties accepted this solution. The eighteen-month trials concluded in June 1980 and were then evaluated by two independent experts: Professor Antoni Karbowiak chosen by Telecom and Peter Robson by the ATEA. In his evaluation Robson found that ESC system was superior to the EMC system on all criteria.^[12] The reports of the findings were then to be given to the Commission, which would make a decision. In the end Telecom chose a three-tiered system of maintenance in preference to EMC and ESC.^[13] The dispute and the trial of the two systems challenged the technological determinism of Telecom management and established the notion that unions possessed the knowledge and competence to take part in processes surrounding changes to technology and work organisation. The superiority of the ATEA developed system of maintenance demonstrated that there was no inherent requirement in the ARE 11 technology that necessitated the centralisation of Telecom's exchange maintenance systems.

     The dispute at Telecom and wider concerns over the effects new technology was having on the employment and conditions of Australian workers placed technological change firmly on the union movement's agenda. The result was the adoption and amendment of a technological change policy at each biennial ACTU conference from 1975 to 1983. The main focus of the technological change policy revolved around notification of proposed change and union involvement in the selection of appropriate technology that maximised the benefits for workers and the community and minimised the social costs of such technology. The policy called on governments to create legislation which would require employers to prepare 'Technological Impact Statements'. Such statements would outline the objectives of the technological change, any alternatives, the effect on the workplace and on the overall levels of unemployment and the costs to the community and employees of any redundancies stemming from the change. The technological change policy also promoted the establishment of a 'tripartite committee with adequate full-time facilities' and called for increased severance payments for works made redundant as the result of technological change. The policy advocated that unions challenge management prerogative in relation to the introduction of new technology through either award prescription, legislation or agreement that placed obligations on employers to consult and negotiate on 'various issues arising from technological change'.^[14]

     In line with the ACTU's technological change policy, a number of unions had by the early 1980s negotiated agreements with employers dealing with the introduction of new technology. In this area the ATEA maintained its role as a pacesetter with a comprehensive technology agreement that included information sharing. The 1980 agreement on 'Consideration of the Introduction of Technological Change' involving Telecom, the ATEA and the other telecommunication and clerical unions, came out of the 1978 dispute discussed earlier. The document provided for information sharing from the contemplative stage and joint consideration of any proposed changes in technology, prior to any decision to adopt such changes. Telecom was to provide unions with an economic analysis of the proposed changes indicating the full range of costs and benefits derived from the new technology. Assessment of the proposed changes was to take account of its effects on employment levels, the level of service to customers, availability of qualified staff, job satisfaction for Telecom workers as well as including standard technical and monetary considerations. The timetable for the introduction of the new technology was also the subject of joint consideration. The agreement was silent on the question of job loss as a result of technological change however it committed the company to adopt policies, which would lead to 'the creation of additional productive and economic jobs within Telecom and associated Australian industries'.^[15] While the agreement did not give unions the right to determine the technology purchased it formalised the right of unions to act as the voice of employees in the process. The agreement challenged notions of management prerogative in that Telecom was required to share information, consider the full effects of technological change on Telecom employees and consult over the process of its introduction. As the assistant Federal Secretary of the ATEA noted,

In the past, prior to 1978, management had the view that in a range of areas connected with the introduction of new technology it had the sole prerogative to decide how issues were determined…We now have a sharing of information from the contemplative stage. The information to be provided to employees through their unions is quite extensive and management now longer regards issues such as the organisation of work as its prerogative.^[16]

The ACTU's technological change policy and the technology agreements negotiated by a number of unions were a reaction to the unwillingness of many employers to either consult or share information with employees and their unions. National surveys revealed the degree of employer resistance to sharing information or consulting with unions and workers over new technology. In 1979 a national survey investigated the consultative processes in 165 companies that had undergone technological change in the five years between 1974 and 1979. It found that in 27% of cases of technological change no information was provided and in 46% of cases information was provided but employee's opinions were not sought.^[17] In only 9% of cases of technological change had there been a joint decision making process. A 1980 study by the Australian Bureau of Statistics revealed that of twelve hundred companies reported as having introduced new technology between 1976 and 1979, only 5% of respondents stated that they had consulted with their employees and unions prior to introducing new technology.^[18] 

     The unwillingness of employers to inform and consult with workers and unions over new technology was compounded by the absence of a wider legislative framework that would compel employers to provide information about proposed technological change or create a basic entitlement for workers made redundant as a consequence of major changes in technology. Australian workplaces were governed by national and state based industrial relations legislation. Prior to the Victorian Liberal Government's abolition of state based common law awards and referral of its industrial relations powers to the Federal Government in March 1993, all states had their own industrial relations legislation and industrial tribunals. However until 1983, the only states that had legislated on the issue of redundancy resulting from automation or technological change were New South Wales and South Australia. In News South Wales, state tribunals, upon union request, could insert into state based awards or agreements clauses that provided for three months notice to employees made redundant through technological changes. There was no automatic entitlement and by 1980 only 20% of New South Wales State awards, covering 30-35% of the workforce, contained the notification provision.^[19]

     At the federal level, the restricted jurisdiction of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission provisions and the wider unwillingness of the commission and High Court to infringe upon management prerogative meant that provisions relating to redundancy and notification of technological change were largely absent. Under section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution, the Federal government has the power to conciliate and arbitrate in order to prevent and settle industrial disputes 'extending beyond the limits of one state'. Under this constitutional authority and by way of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the Federal parliament had established the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and vested it with the authority to deal with disputes over 'industrial matters' defined as those "pertaining to the relations between employers and employees"'.^[20] However the Court, latter renamed Commission, had traditionally been reluctant to circumscribe managerial prerogative in relation to technological change. Henry Bournes Higgins, second president of the Court and the person responsible for the Harvester decision, encapsulated such sentiments in 1915 when he wrote:

The Court leaves every employer free to carry on the business on his own system, so long as he does not perpetuate industrial trouble or endanger industrial peace; free to choose his employees on their merits and according to his exigencies; free to make use of new machines, of improved methods…free to put the utmost pressure on anything and everything except human life ^[21]

Besides traditional authority weighing in favour of managerial prerogative, Higgins' roles as a member of the bodies that wrote the Constitution and a founding judge of the Conciliation and Arbitration and Court reinforced doubts about whether the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission could legitimately hear and rule on issues such as technological change or redundancy. In several important decisions the High Court had on appeal ruled that particular matters such as technological change did not directly relate to 'relations between employers and employees' and therefore lay beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.

1984-1988 Codification and Cooperation

The notion that technological change was the exclusive province of management to the exclusion of industrial tribunals and trade unions was fundamentally challenged by the decision that came out of the ACTU's test case on job security that the ACTU. The Termination, Redundancy and Change Decision 1984 established requirements covering the fairness of termination, redundancies and consultation with unions and workers in relation to major changes in a company's structure, production methods or technology used. Where an employer had decided to make changes that would have a significant effect on employees, they were required to consult with the employees affected and their unions on the introduction and effect of such changes and measures to minimise or avoid any adverse effects of such changes. The decision established a process of consultation in relation to redundancy as well as setting minimum standards of severance pay. Clauses dealing with redundancy and notification of change were subsequently incorporated into most federal awards. The termination change and redundancy decision was significant because it created a system of employee and union entitlements to notification and consultation in the event of technological change.

     The union movement's legal challenge to management prerogative in relation to technological change was further strengthened by the High Court's decision in the Federated Clerks Union versus the Victorian Employers' Federation Case (1984). In its decision the High Court ruled that the Victorian Arbitration Commission had the authority to insert a clause concerning consultation in relation to technological change into the state based Commercial Clerks Award. The clause in the Commercial Clerks Award required that when an employer 'instructs, commissions or commences an investigation of the feasibility of technological change' they were to notify the Federated Clerks Union and any employees whose employment would be materially affected by such changes and inform them of 'the principal objectives of the investigation'.^[22] The employer was to consult with the union in relation to the technological changes being investigated and furnish it with sufficient technical information as to allow the union to evaluate the likely effect of such technology on employment in that enterprise. In the event that the employer decided to implement the technological changes, the union and employees concerned were to be notified and informed of the likely effects on employment. They were also to be informed of any alternative proposals that might reduce or eliminate the material effects of such technological change.^[23] The significance of the High Court's decision was that a matter previously regarded as falling under the "management of an enterprise" could now be considered within the scope of the various state and Federal arbitration commissions.

     In comparison to the termination change and redundancy decision, the technological change clause in the Victorian Commercial Clerks Award provided for a more extensive consultation process especially in relation to the point at which employees and unions were to be informed of technological changes and the amount and type of information provided. However there were fundamental limitations to the impact of both decisions. Neither decision fundamentally challenged the ability of employers to select and introduce new technology. Nor was there any provision in either decision enabling employees or their unions to veto the changes proposed by the management. Only when management had made a definite decision to make the significant change did the termination, change and redundancy decision require it to notify the affected employees and their unions While employers were expected to give 'prompt consideration' to matters raised by workers and unions in relation to the changes, there was little scope for active union involvement in the process.^[24] Nor did the technological change clause in the Clerks Award facilitate any union participation in the decision making process in relation to the introduction of new technology or the type of technology selected. In both decisions, unions were assigned ostensibly reactive roles in that their participation in the process of technological change was restricted to the effects of the changes in technology rather than participating in the process itself.

     While the termination, change and redundancy decision was a substantial legal victory for the union movement on the issues of notification of workplace technological change, its impact was reinforced by changes in government policy on technological change brought about by the election of the Hawke government in 1983. The Fraser Government had responded to the 1978 Telecom Dispute by establishing the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia later known as the Myers' Committee in December 1978. The three person committee chaired by Professor Rupert Myers involved Bill Mansfield, Federal Secretary of the ATEA. The committee's terms of reference were to 'examine, report and make recommendations on the process of technological change in Australian industry in order to maximise economic, social and other benefits and minimise any possible adverse consequences'. Delivering its report in April 1980, the Committee recommended that the Federal Government run a test case on notification requirements in the event of technological change as well as a compensation scheme for workers made redundant through such change. While broadly welcoming the Myers Committee's report with its thirty recommendations, the Fraser Government rejected the notification and compensation proposals. Taking up key recommendations of the Myers Committee, the ALP opposition supported the establishment of the right for employees to be informed and consulted of intended technological change and the right to fair redundancy protection. Accordingly, the Hawke Government supported the ACTU's job security test case. In addition, the 1983 Prices and Incomes Accord between the ALP and ACTU contained training and occupational health and safety provisions to deal with the effects of technological change. It also established industry level sectoral councils and the employer-union Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) that was intended to advise government on planning procedures and policy.

     In the 1970s and 1980s ideas about workplace decision making or industrial democracy overlapped with ideas of notification and union involvement with technological change. Both concepts challenged the ability of managers to arbitrarily make decisions on the organisation of work. There was also a shared emphasis on the notion that workers and unions should have an increased influence in decision making within a workplace. Given the marked unwillingness of employers to consult with employees and unions over technological change, employer organisations did not embrace industrial democracy and instead advocated the concept of employee participation which avoided a direct challenge to management prerogative and sought to foster a greater sense of employee identification with the aims of an organisation.

1988-1996: Post – Fordism or Post – Accordism

In spite of the gulf that existed between ideas of industrial democracy held by unions and the concept of employee participation advocated by employers, there was sufficient common ground for the ACTU and CAI to issue a joint statement on Participative Practices in April 1988. The statement included a section on 'Communication and Information Sharing' which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the Guidelines for Information Sharing. The statement reaffirmed the parties' commitment to employers sharing information with their employees and acknowledged that new technology and new work practises could provide for more interesting and skilled work, but that the new technology should only be introduced to improve productivity rather than eliminate jobs development.^[25] Quite separately there was renewed emphasis on the need for workplace consultation from the Federal Government although the emphasis was on financial incentive through 'best practice' grants program designed to promote 'world's best practice' enterprises rather than legislative compulsion compelling employers to share information with their employees or to consult with them or their unions over workplace change.

     The joint ACTU and CAI statement reflected the apparent progress achieved by the union movement around the issue of technological change. Many of the goals of the ACTU technological change policy had been achieved through the termination, change and redundancy decision. Union involvement in the Accord and the various tripartite bodies appeared to give unions' greater influence over public policy relating technological change. Given that consultation and information sharing were central tenets of the ACTU's policy, the apparent commitment of government and employers to such concepts could be read as something of a victory. As part of the tripartite process unions were expected to cooperate with employers in relation to workplace modernisation and rationalisation and to facilitate the introduction and application of new technology. Conversely such cooperation allowed unions to negotiate arrangements which minimised or protected workers from the effects of such technological change. It might also be argued that a number of unionists had come to share the view that technological change and adoption of new forms of work organisation were prerequisites for Australia's economic prosperity and central to the nation's international competitiveness. The ACTU policy on training and skill development adopted at the 1989 Congress noted that new technology and the need for 'world class enterprises' meant that significant change in work organisation, training and skill development were required.

     Beyond the notion of international competitiveness, a number of figures within the union movement had come to see technological change as means of freeing workers from the regimentation of Taylorist work organisation. Reflecting their own experiences as well as the influence of writers such as Harry Braverman, many unionists hoped that the new technology and 'post-Fordist' forms of work organisation would create jobs that were higher skilled, better paid, less monotonous and more participatory. Laurie Carmichael, then ACTU assistant secretary, summed up such sentiments when he declared:

The new technology makes possible a different kind of workforce, comprising fewer and fewer human robots, with multi-skilling replacing the infinite division of labour in order to handle efficiently and service real robots and highly automated multi-staged machines, processes and administration. A more highly skilled workforce is required, with a greater sophistication and inter-activeness of functions and work processes.^[26]

In spite of the apparent consensus amongst the ACTU, the peak employer bodies and the Federal Government on the benefits of cooperation and information sharing, such practices were occurring in a minority of workplaces. The 1991 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey involving 2004 workplaces with twenty or more employees found that 34% of workplaces had experienced the introduction of new technology in the two years preceding the survey.^[27] However it also noted that management in 47% of surveyed workplaces had never consulted with unions over the introduction of new technology.^[28]

     The late 1980s and fist half of the 1990s saw a shift from centralised wage fixation to enterprise-based bargaining. Employer bodies, most notably the Business Council of Australia, argued that enterprise bargaining would promote mutual trust and interest between employers and employees in an enterprise as well as increasing productivity. The ACTU regarded enterprise bargaining as a way of giving workers a greater voice in workplace decision making. In the 1988 National Wage Case Decision, the Industrial Relations Commission established a structural efficiency principle which encouraged decentralised bargaining to improve efficiency in return for better paying, more fulfilling and varied working conditions. Subsequent National Wage Case Decisions in April and October 1991 linked wage increases to enterprise based 'consultative mechanisms and procedures'.^[29]

     This shift to enterprise bargaining was strengthened by the 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act which amongst other things provided for non-union enterprise agreements between an employer and a group of employees. The amendments included a requirement that for an agreement to be approved by the Industrial Relations Commission 'reasonable steps' had to be taken to consult with affected employees and inform them of the various aspects of the agreement and the effect of the agreement being approved during the course of negotiations. Further reforms to the Industrial Relations Act in 1994 required enterprise agreements to establish a 'process for the parties to consult each other about matters involving changes to the organisation or performance of work in any place of work to which the agreement relates' for certification to take place. This included technological change. By 1995 60% of workers covered by Federal Awards were under enterprise agreements.^[30]

1996 – Back to the Future

In March 1996, the Liberal-National Coalition was elected to office. Within several months of taking office the Howard Government introduced its industrial relations legislation, the Workplace Relations Act, to the parliament. With the support of the Australian Democrats, the Workplace Relations Act passed through the Senate and became law. The Act allows for individual contracts known as Australian Workplace Agreements and removed the need for consultative mechanisms during the life of collective agreements.

     A key aspect of the legislation was a process of award simplification that restricted the number of matters that could be included in Federal awards to twenty so-called 'allowable award matters'. The Termination, Change and Redundancy provisions in most Federal awards requiring an employer notify and consult with affected employees and their unions in the event of significant workplace change are a non-allowable matter and have been removed. Under section 89A of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission is restricted to 'industrial disputes' related to these twenty allowable matters and as a consequence the Commission cannot deal directly with the introduction new technology as a matter. So-called non-allowable matters can be included in certified agreements, however it seems that having been freed from an award based requirement to consult with unions over technological change, there has been a reluctance to include it in enterprise agreements. A survey in 2001 found that of the enterprise agreements certified in the federal system since 1997, only 10% contained provisions requiring employers to consult with trade unions in the event of workplace change.^[31] In effect the Workplace Relations Act has negated the consultative aspects of the 1984 Termination, Change and Redundancy decision and in the process taken the legal situation surrounding notification and consultation over technological change back to where it was in 1978.

Conclusions

Some months after she had developed an inventive solution to the 1978 Telecom dispute, Mary Gaudron addressed a conference of the Australian College of Education on the 'Changing World of Work'. In her address, Gaudron dealt with the hostility of Australian unions to technological change. She attributed much of this hostility to the unwillingness of employers to give unions advance warning of technological change or to involve them in the selection and adoption of new technology. She said:

Even when employees have gained information in advance of the introduction of new technology, their requests for involvement in the decision-making process have been met with the response either of managerial prerogative or of higher engineering and/or technological knowledge. This too has contributed to the suspicion and opposition of trade unions and unionists to the introduction of new technology.^[32]

It could be argued that in the period 1978 to 1996 Australian unions on the whole adopted a reactive role in relation to adoption and implementation of new technology at the workplace level. Unions have assumed a role akin to that of fire fighters, becoming involved in the process of technological change when the alarm bells ring. In large part this reflects the options offered by the other actors in the industrial relations system. Employers have resisted greater union and employee involvement in the selection and implementation of new technology on the basis of management prerogative. Industrial tribunals have been restricted by law and custom in their right to regulate such a prerogative. And governments have steadfastly avoided legislating for greater workplace decision making. Unions must also bear some responsibility for this situation. Where unions like the WWF and ATEA have taken the initiative they have ensured a greater 'voice' for their members and themselves in the adoption and utilisation of new technology. A process that has proved cyclical in the eighteen years under consideration.