The crisis of industrial and political labour in Australia and the record of the federal ALP in power from 1983 to 1996 encouraged renewed analysis of ‘labourism’ by Australian historians. To some the policies of the ALP in office were a rejection of Labor traditions. Others, such as Neil Massey, defined labourism in terms of a process: the ‘special relationship’ between the ALP and the unions. Massey argued that on this definition labourism had survived after 1983 despite the ALP’s reversal of many traditional policies. Terry Irving took a middle ground, he drew on the work of Geoffrey Foote, to argue that there had to be ‘certain common ideas, policies and practices that distinguished the [Labor] party’. In this paper I examine an example of labourism through a focus on the policies and practices of Labor in government. The case I chose is the preparation and content of the NSW Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 1931. In the words of Bede Nairn, the bill ‘was a virtual summary of all that New South Wales unions demanded of state and society’ and a Comintern analyst identified it as a key component of Lang’s political strategy.1

The preparation of the Bill and its content provide an example of labourism in practice, and sheds light on the individuals and organisations that made labourism possible, such as trade union officials and Labor ministers. The individual I focus on is Jack Baddeley, first national president of the Miners Federation and a NSW Labor MP 1922-49. Baddeley served as deputy Labor leader 1927-49 and as Minister for Mines 1925-27, 1930-32 and 1941-49 and as Minister for Labour and Industry 1925-27 and 1930-32. These portfolios made Baddeley a central figure in the legislative programs of successive Labor governments, but he has received little attention from historians compared to his more idealistic colleague Albert Willis. Unlike Willis, who had been his colleague as first national secretary of the Miners’ Federation, Baddeley faithfully followed the ruling group in the NSW ALP during his career. In 1933 he campaigned against his former friend and close ally Willis in the Bulli by-election, when Willis nominated for election against the Lang-endorsed candidate. Like many miner MPs Baddeley was keen to avoid a return to the pit. However Baddeley made a significant contribution to Lang’s legislative programs in the areas of coal industry policy and industrial relations. Lang was disinterested in these areas and left the legislative running in this area to Baddeley. The institution I focus on is the Trade Union Secretaries and Organisers Association (TUSA). About 1913 union officials formed TUSA to facilitate work within the arbitration system. Associations of trade union office bearers existed in Victoria, as the Trades Hall Council Salaried Officers’ Association, and there was a local association in Newcastle. Unfortunately no records survive for TUSA unlike its Victorian equivalent. This may account for its neglect by historians.2

In the early 1920s the influence and profile of TUSA was bolstered by the leftward shift of the Labor Council after the appointment of Jock Garden as secretary in 1917. Although the Council continued to provide advice on arbitration, despite the revolutionary commitment of Garden, many pro-arbitration unionists were disenchanted with the Council. To a degree in the early 1920s TUSA functioned as a rival body to the Labor Council. In the factional struggles that racked the ALP TUSA aligned unions together with a majority of Labor MPs and the Miners’ Federation were on one side against the alliance of the Labor Council leadership and the AWU. Lang’s first term as Premier from 1925 to 1927 plunged the ALP into upheaval but also brought about a realignment of trade union opinion. Lang’s energetic program of industrial reform was welcomed by moderate unionists as showing that an appropriately led Labor government could deliver for the workers. Meanwhile Garden and his allies had jumped on Lang’s bandwagon. Oscar Schreiber, an officer of the Furnishing Trades Society and secretary of TUSA, took a leading role in rallying union opinion behind Lang.3

Despite their political congruence TUSA and the Labor Council continued to function separately after 1927. This perhaps reflected a distrust of Garden, both his Communist past and his personal style. Certainly the self-effacing Schreiber, whose style was summed up by his injunction to Labor conferences delegates not to ‘vapourise’, was very different from the flamboyant Garden. TUSA and the Labor Council refused an invitation from Nationalist Premier Bavin to discuss unemployment in 1930, but at least TUSA gave the courtesy of a formal refusal. TUSA had a wider range of members than the Labor Council; such as the Railway and Tramway Officers’ Association.4

Political context and industrial context

The 1925-27 NSW Labor government had been wracked by bitter conflict between supporters and opponents of party leader and Premier Jack Lang. In his struggle to retain the party leadership Lang had relied heavily on trade union support. Unionists that had formerly been in opposing camps came together to support Lang, including former Communists such as Labor Council secretary Jock Garden, and moderate pro-arbitration unionists such as Schreiber. Lang’s opponents complained that ‘industrialists’ had taken over the party. Later historians were more sceptical. Miriam Dixson argued that although Lang had wooed unions with his legislative program during 1926 from about December 1926 the government’s reformist enthusiasm ebbed as Lang sought to appease swinging voters and conciliate rebellious Labor MPs. She argued that by 1927 former radicals such as Garden had so tied their political fortunes to Lang, that despite their dominance in the party organisation they were now ‘fairly innocuous as power factors within the ALP’.5  In 1930 Lang came to power with a secure majority and the legislative record of the government provides a test of political effectiveness of Lang’s industrialist allies. I will argue it demonstrated Lang’s continued receptiveness to trade union opinion.

In 1926 Lang’s first government, with Baddeley as responsible minister, implemented a major reform of the state industrial relations system. It established a two tier system of Conciliation Committees and an Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission was constituted by a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In session the Commissioner sat with employer and employee representatives selected from a panel. Beneath the Industrial Commission were about 300 Conciliation Committees. In 1927 six of the eight Conciliation Committee chairs came from a union background. The Industrial Commission set the state basic or ‘living’ wage and heard appeal from the Committees. The Committees were responsible for promulgating awards and in particular margins above the living wage. Committee chairs had a casting vote if the two sides were unable to reach agreement. Employers complained that the chairs were biased towards the workers’ side and contributed towards uncompetitive wage
levels in NSW.6

Employers grumbled about the Committee chairs but the centre of debate was Industrial Commissioner Albert Piddington. Lang had wanted George Beeby, a former Labor and Nationalist minister. The unions however insisted on Albert Piddington, barrister and former Interstate Commission, who was viewed with deep suspicion by employers and conservative politicians as biased. As Industrial Commissioner Piddington opposed wage reductions and defended the sanctity of the living wage.7

In 1927 the Bavin government restructured the Industrial Commission to comprise three legally qualified members. Piddington remained President, but was frequently outvoted by the two new appointees. The government also removed the casting vote of conciliation committee chairs. In 1929 rural employees were removed from the jurisdiction of the system and in 1930 the government legislated to increase the standard working week for state award employees from 44 to 48. Statements by government ministers suggested a further reform of the state industrial relations system on the lines of the Victorian wages board system. At the 1930 state election Lang pledged to ‘restore arbitration’.8

The Coalition’s legislative offensive took place against the backdrop of a rapidly worsening labour market position. Unemployment in NSW rose from 11.8 per cent in the first quarter of 1928 to 26.3 per cent in the last quarter of 1930 and the per centage of wage disputes across Australia resolved in workers’ favour fell from 96 per cent in 1927 to zero in 1930.9 The Coalition’s policies cemented the alliance between the ALP and the Labor Council leadership and impelled Jock Garden into a leading role in the ALP.

Preparation of the legislation

In anticipation of a Labor victory union activists had already begun to discuss industrial legislation before Lang’s election victory in October 1930. Baddeley advised union deputations shortly after taking office that he intended to recast all industrial legislation and he proposed the formation of a committee representing the Labor Council, ALP executive and TUSA to formulate industrial legislation,  Baddeley declared that suggestions by employers would be considered, but complained that unlike the workers employers had not had to struggle for the good things in life.10

It was a group of TUSA members that took emerged as the government’s interlocutors on industrial relations reform. Nationalist leader Bavin claimed the group was convened by Schreiber and that other members were Oscar Bryant, Emil Voight, Jack Hooke and Garden. Hooke later claimed that Colin Tannock, from the Ironworkers’ Association, and Schreiber had prepared the bill with the assistance of parliamentary draftsmen. Schreiber reported to his own union on the progress of the bill whilst Garden reported to the Labor Council. TUSA and in particular Schreiber personally was the main conduit between the unions and the government. Unions left TUSA to handle general discussions on the bill but continued to make representations on particular issues of concern. Some union representations were also conveyed via Charles Bellemore, manager of the State Labor Exchange and also via the Industrial Register. The Crown Employees Protection Committee operated independently of TUSA, but found Baddeley unsympathetic.11

At the same time that TUSA worked on the arbitration bill it was also assisting the government to secure union acquiescence to an increase in the unemployment relief tax. The opposition claimed that TUSA was given free hand on Bill in exchange for consent to the increase in the unemployment relief tax.12

Despite the overlap between the office bearers of the Labor Council and TUSA the principle of separation was maintained. In April 1931 Hooke refused to report from TUSA to the Labor Council as he considered TUSA to be a separate body from Council. In October 1931 the Labor Council, following complaints from the Clerks’ Union (whose secretary was a supporter of Federal Labor), resolved that TUSA should not be involved in industrial matters that came within the scope of the Council, that officers of the Council should not sit in Conference with officials of unions not affiliated to the Council, that Council should establish a committee to deal with industrial legislation and the Council refute via the press that any officer of Council was a member of TUSA.13

In this period Lang’s opponents within the labour movement were Communists or supporters of the pro-Scullin Federal Labor Party. Between them these two groups were a minority of the Labor Council and this suggests broader concerns about TUSA among delegates who would otherwise count as supporters of the Garden leadership. However the campaign against TUSA was not supported by unions. Only three of 44 unions supported the resolutions. Union support for TUSA was influenced not only by Lang’s industrial legislation but also the success of the government in preventing reductions in the state living wage.14

The status of TUSA rose throughout 1930-32. A visit to TUSA was an early assignment for the new Under-Secretary of Labour and Industry in April 1932. Unions not previously involved joined. The press and Lang’s critics also condemned its role. Employers considered it the controlling group at Trades Hall. 15

The Lang government moved quickly to implement TUSA’s agenda.  By late January 1931 although TUSA had not finalised its proposals the parliamentary draftsman had begun work on preparation of the Bill. Cabinet discussed the Bill in late January and early February and requested that Baddeley meet with TUSA to clarify some aspects of their proposals. On 16 February 1931 it was approved for submission to caucus. There is no record that it encountered any difficulties in caucus.16

The Bill entered parliament in March 1931. It passed the Assembly without difficultly but received a more hostile response in the Council. In the immediate aftermath of Lang’s election victory the Council had accepted the repeal of much of Bavin’s 1929-30 reforms to industrial arbitration on the grounds of Labor’s mandate.

But by March Council gave no credence to Labor’s argument that the Bill merely amounted to the restoration of arbitration promised in Lang’s policy speech. It was referred to a hostile Select Committee (which Labor boycotted) and then unacceptably amended and seemed doomed.

The fortunes of the Bill were revived by the November 1931 appointment of 25 Lang Labor MLCs were appointed to the Legislative Council. This left Federal Labor with the balance of power. The government found to its frustration that Federal Labor MLCs, with the exception of AWU federal president Edward Grayndler, voted down key clauses of the Bill.

The government refused to accept Federal Labor’s amendments but as the political position of the government worsened trade union opinion shifted towards compromise. In February 1932 it appears that caucus rejected a proposal for a compromise, but in mid April 1932 TUSA requested that the government ‘accept those portions of the Bill which are acceptable to the Labor movement in general and are approved by the Committee of the Association’. At this time however the government appears to have believed that it would be able to force more of the original clauses through and it had not responded to this request by the time of its dismissal on 13 May.17

Selected aspects of the Bill

The Bill proposed substantial reforms to almost all aspects of industrial relations. Only a few of these can be discussed in this paper. I focus on proposals to extend the coverage of the arbitration system and to increase the powers of the Industrial Commission to investigate the operations of employers.18

The Bill specifically included outworkers, insurance agents, canvassers and commercial travellers, timber cutters and taxi drivers (s5). Baddeley justified this on the grounds that the device of an independent contract was frequently employed to remove workers from the protection of the award system. Employer and opposition critics argued that the wage relationship was not appropriate to workers whose activities could not be closely supervised.19

The proposal to extend award coverage was in part a response to the experience by many self-employed of work intensification and greater competition from the newly unemployed. Many who lost their jobs tried their hand at self-employment, but the portion of self-employed in the workforce actually fell from 1921 to 1933 which suggests how difficult it was to sustain self-employment.20

Commercial travellers exemplified the difficulties of the self-employed. In the late 1920s employers forced many commercial travellers off wages and onto commission systems. In 1926 70 per cent of Commercial Travellers’ Association (CTA) members who voted in an internal ballot opposed the pursuit of an industrial award for commercial travellers, but by 1929 72 per cent were in favour.
The Association’s NSW president Charles West, although politically conservative, moved to register a travellers association for industrial purposes. Some more radical commercial travellers formed the Commercial Travellers’ Guild, which admitted women as members, unlike the Travellers’ Association, and sought industrial registration. There were further attempts to form unions of the self-employed such as taxi drivers (which pledged support for the Lang Plan) and canvassers.21

However at a time of mass unemployment many self-employed feared that arbitral regulation threatened their employment. The CTA was confused on this issue. West appeared before the Legislative Council Select Committee and accepted their argument that the definition of commercial travellers as employees imposed unreasonable constraints on their employers. Concerns about the employment consequences of regulation were echoed by Federal Labor’s parliamentary leader Joseph Coates, a former commercial traveller and he led Federal Labor to support exclusion of commercial travellers from the definition of employee under the bill. However the CTA then requested Coates to reverse his position and Federal Labor then voted to include commercial travellers in the Bill. Federal Labor initially supported the inclusion of taxi drivers as employees under the Bill but after receiving a deputation of drivers supported their exclusion from the category of employees on the grounds this would safeguard their employment.22

The Bavin Government had legislated to exclude workers in managerial positions, except on the railways, and those receiving more than £15 weekly or £750 annually from access to arbitration. Labor proposed to reverse this.23

Labor’s explicit appeal to private sector non-manual workers was a feature of 1929-30 election campaigns, and the Bill can be seen as continuing this appeal. Employers and their advocates presented the inclusion of managerial and higher-paid employees as a plan to force technical and supervisory staff, ‘who are really the representatives of the employers’, into unions and destroy managerial authority. The Merchant Service Guild argued it would reduce the division between higher-paid workers and other wage earners and encourage them to reveal how capitalists hid profits. However Baddeley could suggest only mine managers as an example of those who might seek award protection. Federal Labor supported the removal of the income limit but it still wanted to exclude directors, managers and executive officers. Lang Labor was willing to concede directors but argued managers of small companies were employees.24

The Bill also sought to extend the scope of arbitral regulation to all aspects of business operation.
In the definition of ‘industrial matter’ it included a long list of aspects of business operation and then included the very general clauses of ‘any matter whatsoever which in the opinion of the commission or committee has been, is, or may be a cause or contributory cause of a dispute’ and ‘control in any industry of methods of management affecting employment’ (s5). If this was not enough the Commission was also granted very broad powers to enquire into the operations of industry (s35).

Unions welcomed the expansion of the Commission’s powers but critics of the bill argued that these clauses gave the Commission power to pry into any aspect of the firms operation and effectively abolished managerial prerogative and so broke with previous arbitration law. In the Harvester Judgment Higgins had declared that he sought to leave ‘every employer free to carry on the business on his own system’. There also appears to have been some doubt about these clauses within the Department. A document prepared within the Department reviewed proposed changes to industrial law (perhaps as referred from TUSA) and described the proposed expansion of the definition of industrial matter to be ‘too wide’ and ‘opposed to all previous judgments of the Court’ and as interfering in the business of the employer. Employer concern about Commission was heightened by its reorganisation under the Bill to consist of one member: Piddington.25

Although the proposed expansion of Commission powers evoked substantial opposition Labor was unclear as to what these powers would mean in practice. Some MPs believed investigations would flush out concealed profits but a few went further to suggest that many companies were poorly managed. Labor’s attitude to industrial efficiency was ambiguous. The Labor Council had argued that rationalisation could only benefit workers under socialism. But with employers pleading inability to pay and blaming workers for inefficiency Labor had an interest in showing that employers were responsible for inefficiency. Baddeley hinted that some firms were poorly managed, but pressed by the opposition as to the consequences of a finding of poor management, he could only suggest only it would be up to the company’s board.26

Conclusions

In this paper I have focused first on labourism as process: how a Labor party governs? Lang’s demagogy and Baddeley’s opportunism notwithstanding, the example of the Bill reveals Lang’s second administration as one which worked very closely with unions. I have focused then on labourism as policy: the content of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Bill itself. Union support of compulsory arbitration depended on what form of compulsory arbitration was proposed.27 Through their support for Lang former radicals such as Baddeley and Garden, and even self-professed moderates such as Schreiber, sought to fashion an industrial relations system that directly challenged employers’ property rights in the means of production.