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An
Australian socialist in England: Kim Mackay, the British Left,
and European federalism, 1934-601
Keith
Gildart
University of Wolverhampton
Kim
Mackay was an Australian socialist who spent the greater part
of his life involved in radical politics in Britain. As a member
of the Labour Party and Common Wealth he cut a rather curious
figure on the left of the 1940s-50s. On election to the House
of Commons, he concentrated his energies on campaigning for
European Federalism. This paper highlights the importance of
Mackay in the context of factionalism within the British left
in the post-war period. It argues that Mackay’s position on
Europe was conditioned by his commitment to Australian and American
federalism. Moreover, Mackay’s politics represent a socialist
identity that has been neglected in existing accounts of the
British Labour Party.
Kim Mackay was an Australian socialist who played an important
role in the British Labour Party, Common Wealth Party, and
the movement for a federal Europe. His political trajectory highlights the links between the labour
movement in Australia and Britain. He is a novel example
of a socialist who moved in the opposite direction to the
radical pioneers who left England to spread the gospel of
labour politics to the United States, Canada and Australia.
Mackay’s socialism was forged in Australia and reached maturity
in a Britain that was undergoing social and political transformation
as a result of the rise of Fascism in Europe and the outbreak
of World War II. His most significant contribution to British
politics was his advocacy of European federalism at a time
when many on the left within the British labour movement
were opposed to such a policy. It is argued that Mackay’s
particular brand of Australian socialism allowed a greater
doctrinal flexibility that remained absent from the politics
of his contemporaries on the parliamentary left. Mackay
produced an array of books and pamphlets, but his work merits
little attention in the literature on the British Labour
Party.
Ronald William Gordon Mackay, commonly known as ‘Kim’,
was born in Bathurst, New South Wales, Australia, on 3 September 1902, the fifth
child of Alexander William Gordon Mackay and his wife Mary
née Knight. Both parents came from strongly Methodist families.
His father was the Irish born governor of Bathurst gaol
and his mother was the Tonga-born daughter of J.E. Moulton,
who had been a Methodist missionary in the South Pacific.
After showing early educational promise, Kim Mackay attended
Sydney Grammar School 1915-19 and later the University of Sydney where he gained his LL.B in 1926 and an MA with honours in Education
in 1929. He was admitted to the Supreme Court of New South
Wales in 1926 and worked as a member of the law firm Sly
and Russell, in Sydney. He married Mary Barker Hassall
on 21 February 1928 at the chapel of St Paul’s College,
the University of Sydney; the marriage produced two children but ended in divorce. While
completing his education, he founded the New Outlook,
a fortnightly publication of politics and economics. Mackay
wrote articles attacking, amongst other things, militarism
and the Versailles Treaty.2
Mackay seemed set for an academic career when he gained
a part-time post as a lecturer in History at St. Paul’s College (1926-32), but he continued to practice law. However,
his greater interest was in the field of economics and he
developed a keen mind for business and an acute sense of
the problems of political economy. He steadily built up
a publication profile beginning with The Industrial Arbitration
Act of the Commonwealth of Australia (1928) and Some
Aspects of Primary and Secondary Education (1929). In
1932 he helped establish the Australian Institute of Political
Science (AIPS). Through this body Mackay argued for reform
of the Australian Constitution. The AIPS held numerous summer
schools and founded the journal Australian Quarterly.
Mackay became an active figure in the Australian labour
movement, and after a business trip to Britain, retained links with labour activists that he had met on his
visit. He was particularly close to Sir Stafford Cripps
and other figures on the Labour left. After some persuasion
by Cripps, Mackay arrived in England in 1934, establishing
a reputation as a practising lawyer and socialist. He was
part of a thriving law firm operating under the name of
Oppenheimer, Vandyk, and Mackay. He immediately involved
himself in the Labour Party in the Frome division of Somerset.3
His organisational ability was recognised by party notables,
when he successfully managed to develop a very active and
efficient Labour machine in the constituency. He was selected
to fight the seat for the party in the 1935 General Election.
He campaigned for a strong League of Nations and an end
to conflict between states. His ambition was the creation
of a world government based on the principles of the League,
which would act as its protective force. He also advocated
a socialist programme calling for common ownership of key-industries,
land, and the productive resources of the country. The local
press appealed for voters to support the government by voting
for Mavis Tate, the National Conservative candidate. An
editorial in the Somerset Standard, claimed that
Mackay was an extremist ‘… he is the terror and despair
of even the fastest shorthand writer. But that he is an
extremist is proved, not only by his own political utterances,
but by the fact that his political debut in England was
made under Sir Stafford Cripps, of whom many members of
his own party are distinctly afraid’.4 Yet Mackay was a
critic of the Soviet Union and the British Communist Party.
He came second to the Conservative who took the seat with
a slender majority of 994.
In the late 1930s, Mackay became disillusioned with the
timidity of the Labour Party and the electoral truce that
was agreed at the outbreak of war. He remained close to
Cripps who had been expelled in 1939 for advocating a Popular
Front. He kept close council with others in the Labour Party
through his work as a member of the Advisory Committee of
the Fabian Colonial Bureau, which had been established in
1941. With the outbreak of war, Mackay was posted to a position
in the Ministry of Aircraft Production. This post took him
on a number of trips overseas, including the United States,
where he advocated an increase in war production. This direct
role in the war effort led Mackay to criticise the electoral
truce and the willingness of Labour to conceal its criticisms
of Government policy. He resigned from the Labour Party
and searched for a left-wing alternative that could harness
the popular radicalism that had been generated by concern
for a more egalitarian society. Yet Mackay retained his
links to the Labour party through his active membership
of the Clerical and Administrative Workers’ Union. He was
also busy securing his role in the world of business, taking
positions on the boards of a number of large firms.
In 1942, he unsuccessfully contested the Llandaff and Barry
by-election as an independent socialist spending £1200 of
his own money. The vacancy followed the death of Patrick
Munro and the 1941 Committee invited Mackay to stand. The
1941 Committee started as a discussion group led by J.B.
Priestley. The group merged with Forward March to form the
Common Wealth Party.5 The Llandaff and Barry Labour Party
also supported Mackay. Explaining his reasons for resigning
from the Labour Party to the local press, he argued that
the electoral truce must be terminated in order to ensure
that the war could be prosecuted more effectively. Nonetheless,
there were tensions within the left relating to his candidacy.
At a meeting of the Communist Party in Llandaff, Arthur
Horner, the south Wales miners’ leader, attacked the role
of independents in by-elections claiming that all National
Government candidates must be supported. The Communists
felt that unity was paramount to maintain maximum production
during hostilities.6 The Conservatives used the press to
highlight Mackay’s business concerns and distributed a number
of leaflets that they hoped would deter Labour voters from
supporting such an extravagant candidate.
During the campaign, Mackay espoused his ideas on a new
Europe that he hoped would emerge when the war was over.
In a letter to the Prime Minister, he claimed that he stood
‘not for a return to a national sovereignty, but for a federation
if possible of Western Europe, as a first step towards world
peace; the second step is World Federation’.7 The issue
of Europe was to be his main political interest throughout
his career. His book Federal Europe (1941) was read
widely. To Mackay, the dilution of sovereignty in a context
of developing federation was an environment that could facilitate
socialism. In a letter to the Manchester Guardian
in August 1941, he set out his beliefs.
A federation of Europe
would abolish the national economic policies of 25 states,
and would make it possible to plan production and distribution,
and to provide improved standards of living and social security
for the European peoples …if we want peace, extend the territory
of organised liberty at the end of the war, by creating
… a federation of states, like the United States of America,
with plenty of force to preserve.8
In 1942, he contributed financially to Tom Driberg’s campaign
in the Maldon by-election. It was in this context of emerging
radicalism expressed through a variety of initiatives that
the Common Wealth Party appeared. Mackay had no doubt been
attracted to the 1941 Committee’s policy on a federation
of European states. Desmond Donnelly, an early supporter
of Common Wealth and later a Labour MP, viewed the party
retrospectively as a combination of ‘leftist militants and
middle class do-gooders’.9 Mackay probably represented both
wings; a respected intellectual, independently wealthy,
with a commitment to democratic socialism. Richard Acland
was the figurehead of the new organisation and it went onto
to enjoy electoral success in Eddisbury, Skipton, and Chelmsford.
Although Mackay had resigned from the Labour Party because
of its stance on the electoral truce, he never lost his
commitment to its democratic socialism. He joined Common
Wealth in 1943, and as national Chairman, he transformed
its chaotic organisation. On arrival, he found that the
office staff was largely incompetent. He quickly developed
a re-organisation plan. The task was to streamline the internal
structure and transform the party from an idealistic pressure
group into an efficient electoral machine. He wanted a tightly
run organisation that would co-ordinate the various branches
of the party to ensure that it could maximise its challenge
in by-elections when they arose. Mackay advocated a coherent
system of thorough door-to-door canvassing and the development
of detailed records.10 This system provided the foundation
for what would later be called the ‘Reading system’, which
Mackay developed with Ian Mikardo when they were neighbouring
MPs for Reading in the early 1950s.
According to Angus Calder, in his thesis on Common Wealth,
Mackay had the total support of Acland, but raised the suspicion
of others in the party. Acland expressed his belief in Mackay’s
abilities in a diary entry in April 1943: ‘Thank God Mackay
has come and I can give up worrying about organisation,
and get back to my job of propaganda’.11 The newspapers
often referred to Common Wealth’s by-election campaign as
‘Acland’s circus’, but the resources and planning that went
into the party’s organisation were essentially down to Mackay.
Members of the election team were nicknamed ‘Mackay’s Trained
Seals’; they took their tactics from a pamphlet that he
produced in 1943 titled Common Wealth Election Handbook.
In a further publication, Coupon or Free?: Being
a Study in Electoral Reform and Representative Government
(1943), Mackay promoted his arguments for proportional representation.
Throughout the book, he criticised Conservatives, Socialists,
and Liberals for failing to reform the undemocratic structures
British government.
Mackay might have transformed the organisation of the party,
but he was causing tensions within some branches. The London
Region was critical of his affluent lifestyle, and felt
that he was merely a careerist, who was ultimately set on
gaining a prominent position in the Labour Party after the
war. This view was reinforced by Mackay’s association with
Alan Good, a wealthy businessman, who, along with Acland,
supplied the party with the bulk of its finances. Good was
a director of numerous firms amassing a six-figure personal
fortune by the age of 35. His money was almost solely responsible
for bankrolling Mackay’s grand plans for the national office,
although Mackay himself personally rented premises he owned
in Bloomsbury to the party for a nominal sum.12 Sybil Wingate,
a member of Common Wealth’s national committee, claims that
factionalism within the party stemmed from the different
directions in which individuals wanted to push the organisation.
Mackay was convinced that the overtly Marxist posturing
associated with Joe Thomas of the London Region, merely
led to the restriction of the organisation’s popular appeal.
He outlined his reservations concerning Marxism in a revised
edition of Federal Europe.
However cogently the Marxist
may argue, it is difficult to accept the proposition that
a change in the economic system must come before a change
in the political system. However bad he may argue capitalist
democracy in Britain is, it is nevertheless a democracy
which can be converted from capitalism to socialism, if
the people of Britain desire to convert it.13
Amongst the prominent figures in the party, Mackay was
seen as the most efficient. Wingate felt that others such
as Acland and Tom Wintringham were no match for his superior
debating skills and powers of persuasion. Mackay saw Common
Wealth as a vehicle for socialism, but as only one component
of a broad coalition of progressive forces. According to
Calder, the three principal figures in Common Wealth viewed
the party differently. Acland felt that it was a distinct
party. Wintringham saw it as an organisation of different
classes working together in a popular front. Mackay felt
that it provided a temporary repository for radicalism while
the Labour Party adhered to the electoral truce.14 The policies
that Mackay had promoted in Common Wealth stayed with him
through his years as a Labour MP, notably proportional representation,
federalism, devolution, and the abolition of the House of
Lords.
Despite the factional criticism that Mackay often faced,
he was re-elected chairman in 1944. C.A. Smith, who replaced
Mackay after he rejoined the Labour Party, felt that there
was a certain resentment on the national committee towards
Mackay’s superior organisational and intellectual ability,
but remembered him as always sincere: ‘unlike Acland who
was a chronic poseur … always thinking of his own image
… Mackay was, in my experience frank and business like,
easy to get along with. He was rich, lived well, and had
some unconventional luxuries of the type that aroused envy
masked as disapproval’.15 Attacks on Mackay were just one
symptom of the developing factionalism. The party became
weakened by attacks from disgruntled members. Eric Troward
accused the party of being a communist organisation. Perhaps
more damaging was the perception of Fascist involvement.
This was difficult to substantiate, but John Beckett of
the British Union of Fascists had joined one of the London branches on release from prison.16 Mackay himself came under
pressure from the Christian wing of the party, which felt
that he was diluting the moral streak of its programme in
favour of electoral opportunism. He had already offered
to resign from the chairmanship in November 1943, complaining
to friends that he was receiving no loyalty or co-operation
from other members of the national committee, but was dissuaded
from doing so by Wintringham. It was clear to both Acland
and Wintringham that Mackay was holding the party together
through his organisational expertise.
The idealism that Mackay initially espoused when first
joining Common Wealth, was frustrated, when it became clear
that the Labour Party was unwilling to accept amalgamation.
Mackay worked for a closer link with the Fabians and then
the Communist Party, but discussions led to nothing. A more
successful partnership was worked out with the Independent
Labour Party, who themselves had tried to broker a third
way between social democracy and communism since their break
with Labour in 1932. The debate on closer links with the
Labour Party led to Mackay gradually distancing himself
from Common Wealth. In October 1944, Mackay attacked the
anit-affilationists and argued that: ‘ Hugh Dalton, Herbert
Morrison, Jim Griffiths and others were all better Socialists
and more capable leaders than most of the people in Common
Wealth’.17 In an attempt to pave the way for Common Wealth
affiliation to Labour, Mackay arranged a meeting with Sir
Stafford Cripps and Ellen Wilkinson in November. Mackay
was told that the only option available to Common Wealth
members was to join Labour as individual members. He now
worked to convince the more obdurate members of Common Wealth
that it was political power that mattered. He grew gradually
more impatient with those on the left of the party who wanted
autonomy. In the Common Wealth Review, he argued
that:
Democratic politics was
a slow process. The alternative was revolution. In democracy
you had to learn to suffer fools gladly … you have first
to convince the country before you introduce changes … Don’t
slate the Labour leaders and say they’re all a bad lot …
surely our job was to bring more democracy into the Labour
Party and help to make it clearly socialist.18
Mackay argued at successive Common Wealth conferences for
closer ties with Labour. On numerous occasions, he had stated
that the party only existed because the Labour Party was
not providing effective opposition to the Government. Nonetheless,
until his resignation in 1944, he worked hard for the party
in producing propaganda. He envisaged a broad coalition
of left forces that would come together to ensure that the
Conservative Party was seriously weakened by the end of
hostilities.
The Tories must go! And
let the forces of the left, the Labour Party, the ILP, the
Communists and Common Wealth, and any other socialists that
there are, come together by affiliation or otherwise, and
create a united socialist movement which, when the war is
over will secure a socialist House of Commons.19
The party showed no animosity towards Mackay on his departure
and he left the Gower Street premises to the party free of rent
for a year. All his energies were now directed in working
for Labour success in the General Election of 1945. He was
selected as a candidate to fight for the constituency of
North West Hull, where he successfully gained the seat.
In his maiden speech to the Commons, he called for United Nations
control of strategic locations such as the Suez and Panama canals.
He felt that Britain had a role to play in spreading democratic
ideals as opposed to territorial conquest:
It is the contribution
in political ideas which this country can make to the world
which makes its greatness, and the contribution this country
is making is the contribution of showing, that by powerful
change, it is possible to secure a real Socialist Government.20
Mackay was a very effective speaker in the House and used
his intellectual ability and oratorical skills in defending
the policies of the Government. Nonetheless, he remained
a critic of the Government’s moderation. Early in 1947 he
became a member of the Keep Left group. When he signed the
Keep Left pamphlet in 1947, he did so from a third-way
position attacking the politics of both the USA and the
USSR.
Mackay was a keen advocate of the nationalisation and aligned
himself with the left on economic issues. His grasp of economics
and the fact that he was managing director of a business
that employed 3000 workers strengthened his credibility
in debate. However, he directed most of his energies in
campaigning for his long-term commitment to a federal Europe.
Mackay pressed his colleagues in the House to campaign for
a policy of federalism to advance socialist ideals across
the globe. He felt that European unity would ensure independence
from the superpowers.21 He broke with Conservative federalists
when he realised that they merely viewed such a policy as
a tool to suppress the Soviet Union.
Federalists across Europe had come together in the European
Union of Federalists under the leadership of Winston Churchill
in 1946, a body that was superseded two years later by the
European Movement. The Labour Party was not as enthusiastic
about Europe as other socialists on the continent, much
to the dismay of Mackay. He was elected Chairman of the
Europe Group of the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1947.
Crossman and Foot were also members. The group contained
over 80 members at its peak. Along with Mackay, John Hynd
was Vice-Chairman and Christopher Shawcross was secretary.
Divisions soon appeared within the group. The federal issue
was difficult for British socialists, as Mackay was to find
when he canvassed MPs on the left of the Labour Party. Some
felt that it would weaken the Soviet Union and force Europe
into a closer alliance with the United States. Others such as Tom Braddock, felt the project would
merely perpetuate capitalism and were reluctant to support
any initiative that was promoted by the Conservatives.22
Indeed the federalist movement in Britain was a cross-party
group consisting of Socialists, Liberals, and Conservatives.
Mackay remained determined to promote the European ideal
and the issue dominated his politics. In May 1948, he delivered
a lengthy speech on the subject to the Commons.
Surely, the time has arrived
for people in this country and in Europe to realise that
democracy in a small area where there are a lot of democracies
is an unstable form of government … A common European currency
would remove all problems of foreign exchange, import licences
and balance of payments.23
Throughout 1948 divisions within the Labour Europe Group
hardened, on amongst other things, the situation in Eastern
Europe, particularly the communist coup in Czechoslovakia. The final straw was when Churchill established the
Movement for a United Europe. Mackay faced the wrath of
the PLP, when he attended the Interlaken and then the Hague
Conference on federation; both meetings were criticised
by the party leadership, who felt Churchill and the Conservatives
would dominate the agendas. The Europe Group of Labour MPs
dissolved, but Mackay continued to campaign for cross party
support for federalism.24
The Council of Europe that finally emerged was a toothless
body that frustrated the federalists. Mackay wanted to create
a Federalist Party to convert the assembly that had been
formed by the Council into a legislative body. He again
called on old friends such as Alan Good to raise funds for
his European project. Mackay himself donated over £1000
and wanted some ‘private Marshall Aid’ to ensure that a
federal union would stop communist expansion.25 He also
felt that Europe needed to provide an alternative to Soviet
communism and American capitalism. The battle for Mackay
was between communism and social democracy. This could only
be won through a formal policy of federation. He outlined
his thinking in a number of speeches throughout his time
in the House.
The prosperity of the
United States comes not primarily from her large resources
or the intelligence of her population but from her large
markets. Europe has comparable resources if the 17 states
receiving Marshall Aid were taken as one area and not as
17 independent states … if there were a common currency
for Europe … trade in Europe would be much freer.26
In 1949, Mackay was one of the British delegates to the
European Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg. His commitment
to the federal ideal ensured that he was the choice of chairman
for the European Parliamentary Union. The weakness of the
federal movement was that its aims were contested, with
only Mackay having little reservation about the policy.
The Conservative MP, Duncan Sandys, felt that the initiative
should be primarily directed towards inhibiting the Soviet
Union. Mackay had worked closely with Sandys, and confided
in him his frustration with Labour’s aversion to the European
project. In one letter, he told Sandys, that ‘there was
such hostility to Europe in the Labour Party that it was
becoming a difficult subject to raise’.27 Nonetheless, he
later broke with Sandys when it was clear that the Conservatives were not totally committed
to the project and merely viewed it as a strategic option
to ensure co-operative defence strategies amongst European
states. Although Mackay was no fan of the Soviet regime,
he did feel that if a federal Europe was to be successful
it needed the co-operation of Communist countries. He argued
that the Soviet Union should be allowed to enter a federation
once the country had embraced democratic ideals.
Within the House of Commons, Mackay increasingly cut a
figure concerned with one issue. The Conservative MP, Peter
Macdonald referred to him as the ‘fanatical federalist’.28
In 1949, his aims and ambitions for Europe were given more
publishing space in his book Western Union in Crisis:
Economic Anarchy or Political Union? With the intensification
of the Cold War, Mackay felt that federalism would provide
the best guarantee against future wars. He held a pragmatic
view that ‘the purpose of federation is to bring together
people of diverse types in such a way that they can keep
their diversity in matters which are not common to all the
peoples, and give it up in matters which are’.29 He became
impatient with Labour Party suspicions of federalism and
argued that they would not be able to deliver socialist
policies if they continued to believe that the British economy
could withstand the booms and slumps of global capitalism.
To Mackay, the improved standard of living that the British
were beginning to enjoy could only be maintained if European
states merged their resources and planned their economies.
In 1950, Mackay drafted his plan for Europe in which he
envisaged a strong Assembly and Committee of Ministers.
He called for a transfer of powers covering defence, foreign
affairs, and currency. This to Mackay was to be the ultimate
aim of federation. He formulated a similar plan for Africa,
which was viewed as unworkable by both left and right, although
it did gain the support of Fenner Brockway. Rita Hinden
felt that the Mackay’s naivety on African matters did not
bode well for his policy of federation. As she pointed out
to him in a number of letters, Africa contained regions at different stages of development, with many
parts of the country having no tradition of democratic politics.30
For all his intellectual training, Mackay’s views on world
government were seen in some quarters of the labour movement
as rather simplistic, but he remained committed to the project
that increasingly came to dominate his political persona.
Following the redistribution of constituencies in 1950,
Mackay became the MP for North Reading, where he worked closely with Ian Mikardo. Mikardo later
remembered Mackay as a ‘left-wing socialist, a technocrat,
generous spender and generally a marvellous man’.31 Mackay
contested Reading again in 1951 but was defeated.
Mackay’s allies in the labour movement felt that his political
career was hindered by his preoccupation with the European
issue. His position within the Labour Party was also perhaps
weakened by the criticisms he attracted because of his business
interests and lifestyle. In 1953, he retired from the political
scene due to ill health. He continued to write articles
and books and provided a state of the nation address in
his pamphlet Whither Britain. He again saw the only
solution to Britain’s economic problems as the need for
federalism:
Today there is no happy
future for any small country, either politically or economically;
politically because it cannot defend itself without external
help – and that applies most of all to Great Britain; economically
because a decent living standard means higher real wages,
an increase in productivity and raw materials which we cannot
provide on our own.32
He eventually came to the view that the European issue
was not one that should have divided the parties. Ultimately,
he optimistically felt that the British people would vote
for a federal Europe in a referendum.33
Mackay enjoyed the good life and was a committed socialist
with brilliant organisational skills. As a wealthy individual,
he was not opposed to people making money, but supported
high taxes to support social services. Mackay appeared prosperous
and self-confident with his silvery grey hair and his intellectual
ability to talk at length on many subjects. His life was
largely focused on politics although he did find time for
the odd game of golf and a drink in the Reform Club. He
had married again on 15 August 1946, 28-year-old Doreen
Mary Armstrong. A series of heart attacks eventually led
to his death on 15 January 1960. Mackay left an estate valued
at £7449 19s. 1d. He was survived by his wife and the son
and daughter from his first marriage.
Mackay was the leading figure in the first generation of
European federalists within the Labour Party. His interest
in economics and his experiences in both Australia and the
USA convinced him of the viability of a federal system of
government that would reduce the power of the nation state
and therefore avert future wars. His preoccupation with
the viability of the European project was seen by some of
his contemporaries as naïve, but was understandable in the
context of the rise of Fascism and the conflicts between
East and West in the post-war period. Through his writings
and speeches Mackay emerges as a mixture of the pragmatic
and the utopian. As an Australian he did not carry the baggage
of some of his contemporaries on the British left concerning
cross-party alliances and an impulsive anti-European mentality.
His belief in European federalism was no doubt influenced
by his commitment to the Australian system of government.
In essence, Mackay was an Australian socialist who had to
develop a position within the confines of British Labourism.
He remains one of the few examples within labour history
of an outsider importing a particular brand of Australian
socialism into British political culture.
Notes
1. Material in this paper has also been used for the
entry on Mackay in Keith Gildart, David Howell, and Neville
Kirk (eds), Dictionary of Labour Biography Volume XI,
Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2003.
2. Australian Dictionary of Biography vol. 15 194-1980,
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2000.
3. Biographical material in Mackay Papers, Common Wealth
Collection, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. I have so far found little material
on Mackay’s involvement in Australian politics.
4. Somerset Standard, 8 November 1935.
5. For details of Common Wealth see Angus L. Calder,
‘The Common Wealth Party 1942-45’, DPhil, University of Sussex, 1968.
6. Barry Herald, 22 May 1942.
7. Mackay Papers 24/23, London School of Economics (LSE), United Kingdom.
8. Manchester Guardian, 19 August 1941.
9. Donnelly interview with Calder, Common Wealth Papers
14/113-6, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
10. Common Wealth Papers 14/4-10, University of Sussex.
11. Calder, ‘The Common Wealth Party’, p. 150.
12. Calder, ‘The Common Wealth Party’, p. 57.
13. R.W.G. Mackay, Federal Europe: the Case for Federation,
revised ed., Micheal Joseph, London, 1941, p. 68.
14. Calder, ‘The Common Wealth Party’, p. 2.
15. Calder interview with Smith, Common Wealth Papers
14/388-9, University of Sussex.
16. Calder, ‘The Common Wealth Party’, p. 193.
17. Ibid., p. 288.
18. Common Wealth Review, 1, 9, November 1944.
19. News sheet of Merseyside Region of Common Wealth,
Common Wealth Papers 4/114, University of Sussex.
20. Parliamentary Debates, 7 May 1946, cols. 874-8.
21. Jonathan Schneer, Labour’s Conscience: The Labour
Left 1945-51, Routledge, London, 1988, p. 65.
22. Braddock to Mackay 1 April 1948, Mackay Papers 7/1,
LSE.
23. Parliamentary Debates, 5 May 1948, cols. 1280-92.
24. Schneer, Labour’s Conscience, pp. 66-72.
25. Mackay to Alan Good, 11 May 1949, Mackay papers 8/1,
LSE.
26. Draft speech, Mackay papers 7/2, LSE.
27. Mackay to Sandys, 14 December 1950, Mackay papers 9/9, LSE.
28. Mackay press cuttings file, 9/12 LSE.
29. R.W.G. Mackay, Western Union in Crisis, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1949, pp. 84-5.
30. Hinden to Mackay, 15 September 1950, Mackay Papers
15/2, LSE.
31. Calder interview with Mikardo, Common Wealth Papers
14/147-8, University of Sussex.
32. R.W.G. Mackay, Whither Britain, Federal Education
and Research Trust, London, 1953, p. 41.
33. The Times, 16 January 1960.
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