Between 1945 and 1952, Australians participated in the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) in Japan, based in the Hiroshima prefecture. Among those Australians were members of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and fellow travelers, who made contact with members of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). This paper seeks to explore the attitudes of the CPA towards Japanese labour and communist activity, and the interactions between Australian and Japanese communists. These attitudes and relationships reflected the CPA’s desire to aid the radical transformation of the Asia-Pacific region in the postwar era, and reveal a little-known aspect of Australian grassroots participation in the Occupation of Japan.

After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Communist Party of Australia (CPA)1 changed its policy from one of condemning the war as ‘imperialist’ to one of support.2  The Communist Review informed CPA members in 1942 that ‘[i]n the prosecution of a just war, a people’s war … it is obvious that the working class must become the leading force’[original emphasis].3  Australian communists joined the armed forces to fight fascism and conduct political activity amongst the troops.4  However, these roles did not end in August 1945 with VJ Day, when the allies celebrated victory over Japan. Many Australian communists and fellow travelers went directly to Japan with the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF), and the aims for fighting the ‘people’s war’ were revived to wage the ‘people’s Occupation’. While many publications on the CPA give at least some attention to the uniformed communists of the Asia-Pacific War, those who went to Japan after hostilities ceased remain invisible. This paper, based on the early stages of current research, intends to examine CPA attitudes and practice towards Japan and its labour movement during the Occupation. Textual sources, including CPA publications and archival records, will primarily be used, supplemented by oral histories from Japanese communists. These sources indicate that there were interactions between Australian communists in the Occupation forces and Japanese communists, though, as with domestic CPA policies and activities, they were greatly impeded by the developing cold war.

W.J. Brown, is his account of communist soldiers in the Asia-Pacific War, asserts that it ‘is a rich part of CPA history that has largely been neglected. A more widely cast record of the many valuable experiences of Australian communists in the armed forces remains to be written’.5 This assertion can be extended to include those communists who joined BCOF. Occupation historiography remains largely centered on the United States, as not only did the United States dominate Occupation policies and practice, they have extended that dominance into the scholarly domain. This means that Australians and Australian policy in general rate little mention or analysis. There are only two main studies in Occupation literature that focus solely on the Australian experience. Of these, neither Davies’ The Occupation of Japan6 nor Wood’s The Forgotten Force7 mention communists or sympathisers in the Australian forces. In relation to the CPA, Wood does acknowledge that ‘Lance Sharkey, who was identified with meetings of communists in Asia, claimed later to be instrumental in the upsurge of communist success in Asia’.8 However, no mention is made specifically of Japan. Rather, communism is linked either to attempted Soviet interference in the Occupation, or to the Japanese communist movement. For example, Wood relates that

Thus, the Occupation forces are portrayed as a defence against communism in Japan, not as a possible source of communist activity.

In Australian communist historiography, the Occupation of Japan does not make an appearance. Japan is only mentioned in terms of its militarism, ‘fascism’ and subsequent defeat. Discussions of the postwar period are preoccupied with domestic issues and the domestic decline of CPA influence within the context of the cold war.

The exception to this rule is coverage of CPA and trade union support of Indonesian independence. As Damousi states, after the glorious days of the war, CPA

The CPA’s, and individual communists’, commitment to the Occupation of Japan has never had the chance to be forgotten – it was and remains generally unknown. This neglected history forms part of the story of the CPA’s postwar difficulties, and also helps illuminate CPA policies beyond the domestic sphere, giving substance to claims it attempted to aid postwar movements in the Asia-Pacific region. It can be seen as an extension to the research conducted on the Asia-Pacific War by such persons as Johnston11 and Symons12 by extending research on uniformed communists beyond VJ day.

The CPA found itself in a relatively positive political environment during and after the Asia-Pacific War, one where it could pursue its internationalist ambitions. As Symons et al have stated,

CPA attitudes towards Japan in the immediate post-hostilities period shared some characteristics with those of the Chifley government. Both, for instance, exhibited elements of duality. On the one hand, both wanted retribution for war atrocities; on the other, each wanted to encourage ‘democratic’ forces in Japan. In the rhetoric of communism, the former required the defeat and punishment of the ‘ruling class’ or ‘Japanese fascists’; the latter in giving support and encouragement to the Japanese working class and other revolutionary forces.

As in other sections of Australian society, the CPA viewed Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal and demanded his removal: ‘either the Emperor goes, or in years to come Japan will make the whole democratic world a Pearl Harbor’.14 R. Dixon, Assistant General Secretary of the CPA, in a speech delivered in Sydney on 11 August 1945, claimed that the ‘Son of Heaven is the highest representative, the symbol of that monstrous system of militarist-feudalist-fascism, that is characteristic of the Japanese ruling class. He must bear the responsibility for all the crimes perpetuated’.15  Many published articles called for retribution for the treatment of diggers, and attacked the zaibatsu, the ‘monopolistic capitalist super-trusts’ for their role in the war.16  Thus, there was both a parochial nationalist and internationalist ideological basis to the CPA’s attacks on Japanese ‘fascism’. There was also an orientalist undercurrent: in an April 1945 article, Rupert Lockwood wrote an article entitled ‘Why are Japanese So Backward?’17 The article paints the Japanese peasantry as flesh-eating, Emperor-worshipping, head chopping peoples who sell their daughters into prostitution.18  Lockwood claims in this article that the ‘Japanese workers offer more hope than the backward peasants, but they need a separate article’.19

Despite Lockwood’s position on the Japanese peasantry, the CPA placed some hope in the capacity of workers and peasants to act as a revolutionary force in Japan, and indeed throughout the colonial territories of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In February 1945, Dixon declared:

The theme of the ‘unleashing of great forces of democracy and progress in Asia’, as engendered by the war, occurred with regularity in CPA speeches and articles in the communist press throughout 1945.21  Australia, especially the CPA and trade unions,22 could nurture and guide the great unleashing. This scenario included Japan, but the great threat to CPA ambition was the United States:

The point we are concerned with here is not vengeance in itself. Above all, we are concerned that American policy hinders the unleashing of genuine democratic forces in Japan; it helps the continued suppression of Japanese workers and peasants – the only classes who can make for a democratic Japan living at peace with her neighbours.23

Concurrent, then, with the spectre of Japanese militarism/fascism/imperialism, was a sense of paternalistic hope in the possibility for democratic change. The April 1945 Communist Review carried an article on Japan by P. Mortier, which explained:

There is a sense that the articles were trying to convince membership of the viability of radical change in Japan. The Tribune published excerpts from the London Daily Worker that demonstrated Japan had previously possessed trade unions and communist activity, but these had been suppressed by ‘military fascism’.25  Earlier, an Australian sergeant submitted to the Tribune his personal story of a Japanese soldier. As the sergeant was escorting the captured soldier along a track, he stopped occasionally to offer items to him, such as a cigarette or piece of PK chewing gum, which were gratefully received. Suddenly, the Japanese soldier ‘stood up, tore off his cap, threw it on the ground, stamped on it and said, “Me-Australia!” as much as to say, “What the hell have we been fighting you for?”’26  The sergeant’s story goes on to suggest: ‘Surely … this proves that the ordinary Japanese soldier and civilian could be taught to live along democratic lines if they were not shackled by a militaristic and blood thirsty caste’.27

Armed with this sense of missionary zeal and belief in the revolutionary potential of ‘ordinary’ Japanese, CPA members and sympathisers made their way to Japan to contribute to the great unleashing of democratic forces and counteract the effects of US policy. Over the next couple of years, the early CPA paternalistic, orientalist, vague sense of hope and encouragement towards the Japanese labour movement transformed into a sense of awe and admiration. The Tribune regularly carried articles to keep readers informed of events in Japan. For instance, it carried an article challenging the legitimacy of the first post-war elections in April 1946, claiming it was too early – ‘had the elections not been held prematurely, both the Socialists and the Communists would have gained formidable strength to fight the reactionaries in the Diet’.28  The article also alleged that ‘several Communist candidates were attacked and beaten up during the election campaign’.29  The perceived moral superiority of communists was also highlighted. When Japan Communist Party (JCP) leader Tokuda Kyuichi attended a political luncheon organised by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, he refused to eat the lavish meal. When queried over his behaviour, Tokuda was reported to have replied: ‘I am always in support of any good government measure. But in the midst of the current food crisis, may I enquire as to where all this rich food came from?’30

After May Day 1946, CPA concern began to grow over the Occupation’s treatment of Japanese workers. The term ‘kamikaze’ was given a new meaning – it emerged as a label to describe the activities of strikebreakers, who were ‘crashing picket lines of Japanese workers fighting for better wages and the right to organise’.31  These ‘new kamikaze’ began to appear, it was claimed, during and after the infamous Yomiuri dispute.32  A clear line was being drawn between Western icons of Japanese militarism and anti-labour actions. The article also reflected a common emerging theme – concern at the apparent US policy of turning Japan into a cold war ally against the Soviet Union. ‘Japan’s workers’, the article concluded, ‘allowed to develop democratically and to build their own free unions, would not support a war’.33   Encouragement of the labour movement was equated with the pursuit of peace.

In the lead-up to the planned general strike of 1 February 1947, the Tribune exuded admiration for the Japanese labour movement, and it represented the height of optimism for change in Japan from the CPA. ‘Japanese labour leaders’, asserted one article, ‘say that trade unions here reached the level of workers in more advanced countries in their recent strike struggles’.34 Detailing the struggles of the electrical workers, Japanese communist Shiga Yoshio claimed it ‘raised the Japanese labor movement to a new stage’. This was because it was not the fight of an individual enterprise-style union, but ‘the All-Japan Electrical Workers Union stood for struggle on a national scale’.35  It was precisely this development in the union movement, and its successful application, that inspired the fear amongst Occupation authorities and Japanese conservatives that led to the notorious general strike ban. After the general strike ban, obviously deplored by the CPA, Tribune articles and CPA speeches were increasingly imbued with fear and anger at the detour apparently imposed upon Japanese labour. One May 1947 article details the increasing censorship of leftwing, especially communist, publications, and alleges the attendance of US and Japanese ‘spies’ at communist meetings.36  On May Day 1947 in Ōsaka, the same article claimed, red flags were seized from demonstrators and replaced with white ones.37

As the so-called ‘reverse course’ in US policy became further apparent, Tribune coverage of Japan became even more nationalistic, anti-US and anti-Australian government in flavour. When MacArthur approved the sailing of Japanese whaling fleets in 1947, security and racial fears ran hot. Japanese whaling, and possibly pearlers, would ‘drive Australians out of the industry’ and would ‘be a definite danger from a military point of view’. Further, ‘poaching in Australian territorial waters and the abduction of aboriginal [sic] women are mathematical certainties if this Jap fleet is allowed to operate’.38  Economic revival of Japan was heavily criticised:

The statement exudes economic nationalism, quickly taking precedence over comradeship with Japanese workers. Criticism of ‘Emperor MacArthur’40 became more obvious, and is best exemplified by the following joke that appeared in the Tribune in December 1947:

For the remainder of the Occupation, CPA publications regularly ran stories detailing the repression of workers and communists by Occupation authorities and the Japanese government. Stories of police bashings, raids on the JCP organ Akahata, and ‘persecution’ of Japanese POWs returning from the Soviet Union all made appearances.42  The removal of communists from many sectors of the Japanese workplace was especially newsworthy, for example the purge of the film industry, ‘modeled on the Thomas-Rankin Un-American Committee’s “red” probe’,43 and the proscribing of communists from government employment, headlined as ‘Japs Return to “Thought Control”’.44  The removal of the right to strike and bargain collectively for government workers was described as a ‘New Fascist Terror’,45 but there was some hope with the 1949 elections. The JCP won 36 seats (they previously held four), which had been ‘won in the face of every kind of persecution and terror by the US occupation forces and the Japanese secret police’.46  In a letter to the editor, L. Murphy complained:

Australian troops were being used for an agenda that was anathema to CPA views. Despite Murphy’s appeal, Australian workers remained rather reticent on the issue.

Economic nationalism and security issues were also exacerbated by the trajectory of US policy in the latter part of the Occupation. Of concern was the dumping of cheap Japanese textiles and other goods onto the Asian market (which would affect the growing textile industry of Australia), and proposals to settle Japanese in New Guinea and the Pacific (ostensibly to relieve overcrowding, according the Tribune, but actually ‘to provide the imperialists with “reliable” fighting forces against democrats and militarists in Southern Asia and Australasia’).49  CPA publications, therefore, reflect the duality of its approach towards Japan throughout the Occupation period: supportive of their Japanese comrades and appropriately outraged at their treatment by Occupation authorities and the Japanese government, while at the same time fearful of Japanese militarism and economic competition, combined with a level of orientalist mistrust and suspicion. Additionally, a sense of the moral superiority of the communist was maintained. An article in the Communist Review criticised the Reverend Frank Coaldrake, an Australian Anglican missionary in Japan, for riding in a rickshaw. Comparatively, ‘when he was in the East recently, our [CPA] General Secretary, Lance Sharkey, wouldn’t ride in a rickshaw. He said he couldn’t bring himself to use a man as an animal’.50

CPA members made direct contact with JCP members while part of BCOF. Considering the influence of the emerging cold war and bipolar world on Occupation policies, this had to be done with the utmost secrecy. J.B. Miles told the Central Committee Plenum in 1947 that

The CPA made donations to the Hiroshima District Committee of the JCP. For example, on 22 June 1946, ¥1765 was given, another ¥2100 on the 22 July 1946, and ¥1000 on an unspecified date.52  Despite their eager intentions, there were many barriers for Occupation comrades to overcome. Language was the major obstacle, both for verbal communication and reading of written materials, including Japanese newspapers for the Australians, or material in English for the Japanese. Additionally, Akahata was continually getting its circulation reduced via ‘newsprint restrictions’. Comparatively, the larger, non-left newspapers, ‘so fantastically pro-American and anti-Russian that they were generally regarded as unreliable’, were busily increasing their circulation levels.53

Similar stories emerge from the Japanese side. Okamoto Kazuhiko, now 87 years old, joined the JCP in 1945. Despite the language barriers, Okamoto-san came to know a few of the Australian soldiers, in particular a man named ‘Sam’, whose family had a property somewhere near Sydney. Sam was part of a group of about six BCOF soldiers who were members of the CPA, and who asked Okamoto-san if they could hold their meetings in his home. Okamoto-san obliged, and around ten such meetings were held there. Okamoto-san also received a copy of ‘an Australian Communist newspaper’ from the group. Unable to read English himself, he sent the copy on to the head JCP office. Strict censorship made it difficult for the JCP to gain access to international communist newspapers, so the grateful head office wrote a letter of thanks to Okamoto-san ‘for the valuable information’.54

Okamoto-san also remembers the same six Australian communists giving money to the local JCP to help fund a communist candidate for the general elections in 1946. He was given a cake tin filled with rolled-up ¥1000, or possibly ¥10,000, notes.55  According to Okamoto-san, the JCP needed ¥2,000,000 to fund a candidate, and the Australian communists provided ¥300,000. Apparently, they gave similar amounts of money to the local JCP around ten times. The funds were also used for office-keeping expenses, and the making of leaflets and posters.56  If correct, this is quite a remarkable level of financial assistance, and says something about the number of CPA members or sympathisers who must have been present in BCOF.

Watanabe Rikito, now 77 years old, also remembers Australian communist soldiers. Watanabe-san joined the JCP in October 1946. Often, when Watanabe-san was making speeches on the street, Australian soldiers on motorbikes would pull up, take a red handkerchief out of their back pocket, and wave and cheer.57  Australian soldiers also visited the JCP office in Hiroshima but, due to language difficulties, little interaction could take place: ‘we basically sang L’Internationale together, shook hands, they gave us money and then we parted’.58

Like Okamoto-san, Watanabe-san remembers a fairly sustained effort by CPA members of BCOF to aid the JCP financially. While at first they visited the JCP office directly, the cold war and subsequent clampdown on communist activity in Japan made this increasingly difficult. By 1949, Australian communist soldiers would drive a jeep up to the JCP office, slow down without stopping while driving past, throw in a piece of cloth wrapped around stones and money, then drive off. By 1950, even this practice had become too dangerous and donations ceased. Watanabe-san remembers these donations being used for election campaigns, production of leaflets, Party activities, and, since the full-time JCP members received little in wages, items such as commuting expenses.59

The CPA’s policies towards Occupied Japan, and the direct contact between Australian and Japanese communists,60 demonstrate the seriousness with which the CPA took its role in nurturing the ‘great unleashing’ of revolutionary forces in Asia and the Pacific, leading them to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Allied Occupation. Beginning as uncertain and paternalistic, CPA media coverage quickly turned to one of admiration for the struggles of Japanese labour.

At the same time, a level of suspicion was maintained towards non-working class Japanese, especially in relation to war guilt, economic and security issues. Contact between Australian communists in BCOF and Japanese communists was done at great personal risk – not only did they have to deal with anti-communist offensives, they also had to violate BCOF’s non-fraternisation policy.61  Additionally, there were language and cultural barriers, and the recent memory of being wartime enemies. The discourse of communism and class allowed for a ‘dialogue’, at least temporarily, that transcended issues of race and other difficulties. Additionally, both optimistically shared, as Symons once described, ‘a deeply felt desire for a better postwar world’,62 and believed their actions would contribute to its creation.

However, CPA involvement in and attitudes towards the Allied Occupation of Japan were as nationalist as they were internationalist. As Gollan has asserted, the ‘greatest significance to be attached to the idea of the ‘people’s army’ [applicable also to the ‘people’s occupation], and the propaganda surrounding it, is that it was an incident in the growing claim of communists to express the genuine interests of the Australian nation’.63  Whether attempting to help forge a strong labour movement in Japan, or funding communist candidates in Japanese elections, or criticising  economic practices and security issues in Occupation policies, the CPA was ultimately concerned with an Australian future and Australian workers. Overall, CPA involvement in the Occupation forms an integral part of the Party’s postwar experience from the early euphoria to the rapid decline in a bipolar world. Contact between Australian and Japanese communists also reveals the multifaceted nature of the Occupation experience – that aside from the ‘big players’, the governments of Japan, the United States and allies such as Australia, other groups participated in the Occupation at a grassroots level, attempting to pursue an independent agenda and forging their own postwar connections with like-minded Japanese. The Allied Occupation of Japan was a forum for the intersection of contesting ideas, each competing to influence the postwar trajectory of Japan’s reformed modernity and identity. The CPA, in its own minor way, contributed to this historical episode.