Arbitration has often been accorded a higher influence in shaping the employment relationship than other factors such as product and labour markets. For example, it has been argued that employers, until recently, adopted a passive approach to industrial relations and abrogated their responsibilities to employer associations who would argue their case before arbitral tribunals. Plowman is most commonly associated with this view. He argues that arbitration is largely responsible for employers adopting a reactive approach to policy making, and consequently playing a limited role in structuring the industrial relations system in Australia. The popularity of the labour process approach in the 1980s challenged this interpretation and highlighted the importance of management strategy in structuring the employment relationship, as did Wright’s important history of management in Australia. Wright drew on the work of Gospel to demonstrate the complex and contradictory strategies of management and their influence on the employment relationship. Within this tradition, product and labour markets are accorded greater importance in shaping labour management strategies. Gospel argues competitive or volatile product market will encourage management to externalise control and employment issues. In contrast, management are likely to internalise control and employment issues when this will prove a more efficient regulator than the market. In other words, technical and bureaucratic forms of control are more likely in large organisations which have greater control over their product markets and a more complex division of labour requiring more sophisticated employment policies.¹

In Australia, market orientated control methods dominated the late nineteenth and early twentieth century workplace, a result of the limited size of the domestic market and small scale of production. Various studies have shown arbitration actively encouraged the reorganisation of work through mechanisation and task fragmentation, however, until after World War II, the actual use of internal control methods was restricted to a small number of large organisations, such as the New South Wales Railways. The more short-term impact of arbitration on traditional labour management methods is less clear and more open to debate.²

The purpose of the paper is to explore and compare the influence of product and labour markets and arbitral regulation on labour management practices at Mort’s Dock and Engineering Company. Mort’s Dock began when a partnership of Captain T.S. Rowntree, T.S. Mort and J.S. Mitchell built a dry dock in Balmain in 1954. Over time the business grew into a large engineering and ship repair establishment with Mort taking full control and formally establishing the Mort’s Dock and Engineering Company in 1872.³ By the time arbitral regulation was introduced in New South Wales a stable pattern of labour management practices existed at Mort’s. The paper follows the development of labour management practices for Mort’s metal workers from the earliest years of the firm until the 1920s. The first section examines the industry environment and how this shaped Mort’s response to labour management issues. The method of labour hire and use of overtime distinguished Mort’s approach and ensured labour management was largely externalised. The subsequent sections explore the impact of arbitral regulation on these issues, first dealing with NSW arbitral and wages boards’ regulation and finally exploring the influence of the Commonwealth arbitral system. As the discussion below will show, the awards of the various Wages Boards and Arbitration Courts placed constraints on the management of labour but it was the firm’s business strategy and positioning within the product market, as well as the ability of workers to take advantage of their labour market power that had the greatest impact on the changing worker-management relations at Mort’s.

Labour management and workplace regulation prior to arbitration

Mort’s Dock quickly became one of the largest engineering establishments in the Australian colonies, with extensive facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair, as well as all other types of general engineering. Ship repair and marine engineering dominated the work of the Dock but facilities for general engineering provided Mort’s with flexibility when shipping was quiet. Throughout the period under review, Mort’s expanded its facilities by extending existing docks, building or acquiring new docks, and extending the engineering works. Mort’s extensive facilities for ship repair provided a clear advantage over its much smaller competitors. For the international shipping companies who were forced to overhaul ships at the end of a long journey, facilities rather than costs were main issue. Mort’s faced stiffer competition in marine and general engineering where overseas imports dominated. Mort’s main line of work, docking and associated ship repairs, placed the firm in an unstable business environment. The docks could be empty for several months of the year but when a ship came in the works became a hive of activity, operating around the clock. Much of the work was essential repair work that had to be done within a limited time to allow ships to sail to their timetable. This irregularity and instability in the market caused employment levels to fluctuate greatly from day to day.⁴

The concentration of Mort’s business activity in ship repair raised specific labour problems for management. In contrast to many employers, the minimisation of per unit labour costs was not the main concern of the firm as Mort’s could pass on increased costs to shipowners. For Mort’s, the main labour issue concerned ensuring an adequate and adjustable supply of labour, engaging labour at short notice and dispensing with it when the job was complete. Strong union organisation of the workforce also put Mort’s in a vulnerable position as industrial action while a vessel was waiting for repairs could cause the firm serious financial loss. In this sense, securing an adequate supply of labour and avoiding industrial disputes were far more important than minimising per unit labour costs.

Top management at Mort’s operated at a distance from the general workforce. While the owner-manager was a common figure in engineering firms, Mort’s employed a specialist manager. Thomas Mort appointed the young James P. Franki to the position of general manager in 1869 and he held this position until his retirement in 1923. Although Franki lived in Balmain, and occupied a prominent position in the local community, he had little contact with general run of workers that made up Mort’s workforce. Indeed, according to Wyner, upper management considered the mass of workers, both tradesmen and labourers, to be mere ‘hands’ rather than ‘employees’. For these workers, contact with management came through the works superintendent and the foremen, who handled the bulk of day to day employment relations issues such as hiring, allocating work and discipline. The firm reserved the title ‘employee’ for the foremen and leading hands who occupied a special place at the firm.⁵

More than half of Mort’s workforce comprised skilled metal trades’ workers, predominantly boilermakers and fitters, and their assistants. Mort’s workers were active union members, with a long history of spearheading industrial campaigns. The achievement of the eight hour day in the metal trades owed much to workers at Mort’s. Both the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and the Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders (FSB&IS) had good membership at Mort’s, including union officials of the FSB&IS. The assistants also had a long history of militant organisation beginning with the Balmain Labourer’s Union before it split into the separate Ship Painters and Dockers and the Amalgamated Ironworkers’ Assistants Union at the instigation of Mort’s workers.⁶

Unable to avoid unions, management embraced them. The firm’s need to minimise disputation called for a stable and consistent approach to wage determination. Unions provided an acceptable channel for workplace conflict, with the firm demonstrating a distinct preference for dealing with workers collectively, and if possible, external to the workplace. Thomas Mort took a leading role in forming the Iron Trades Employers Association (ITEA) and Franki, maintained a prominent role in the affairs of the association and occupied the position of president for several years. In keeping with this, wages and working conditions at Mort’s conformed to industry wide standards. Management kept abreast of the standard rates paid in other large engineering establishments, exchanging information regarding the level of wages paid. In some cases Mort’s conditions were better than the industry standard, and the various unions appear to have had few problems maintaining union conditions at the works.⁷

While the majority of the workforce suffered intermittent employment, a small number of workers obtained regular, ongoing employment. These permanent workers, known as ‘royals’ by the other workers, acted as leading hands and remained at work even during slow periods. The core workforce obtained privileges unavailable to the rest of the workforce, such as first preference for overtime. In the 1870s, Mort sold shares in the Company to foremen and leading hands in order to encourage the formation of a core workforce of loyal and committed employees. The strategy was relatively successful, with a number of foremen and leading hands taking up the offer. The majority of the workforce experienced irregular and unstable patterns of employment. The short nature of most ship repair jobs, some lasting a few weeks but many only a day or two, meant Mort’s hired and dismissed labour on a daily basis. The practice at Mort’s was to hire men for a particular job and terminate their employment at the end of the job. The men would then have to reapply for work again. As such, even a regular supply of work at the Dock did not guarantee workers constant employment.⁸

It was the method of engagement which most distinguished Mort’s and other repair shops from inland metal trades employees. The selection of men followed the traditional maritime practice of a line up. Workers lined up in a row in the morning and the Assistant Superintendent, or a foreman, selected the men needed for the new jobs that had come in, a practice the boilermakers termed ‘toeing the line’.
A separate line existed for each trade, including a separate line for tradesmen’s assistants. Only ‘royals’ avoided ‘toeing the line’. First preference was given to those men who followed Mort’s regularly, and made themselves available throughout the day. In this way Mort’s encouraged loyalty to the firm and ensured a regular supply of labour.⁹

Overtime compensated workers for the irregular nature of work. With ships sailing to timetables, and limits to the number of vessels that could be docked at one time, marine repairs relied heavily on overtime work, especially by fitters and boilermakers. Overtime added considerably to workers’ earnings, though not all workers made high wages. Unions claimed the firm distributed overtime unevenly and a small number of workers, most commonly the ‘royals’, received preference. These men could work up to 60 or 70 hours per week while others were turned away in the morning line-up. Union action to force Mort’s to distribute work more evenly proved ineffective with the firm punishing workers who refused overtime by refusing to rehire them. Overtime was a reward to workers to encourage them to follow Mort’s regularly. It lured workers to the dock, compensating for intermittent employment and ensured a large pool of labour remained unemployed and hungry for work.¹⁰

Prior to the introduction of arbitral regulation Mort’s adopted a labour management strategy similar to other employers. This strategy relied on the labour market to control and discipline workers and externalised industrial relations issues. While the method of hiring and use of overtime was specific to waterfront employers, the main thrust of the strategy was the same. The reliance on a continuous and ready supply of skilled workers was a significant weakness in the strategy, and as the labour market for skilled metal workers improved this weakness become more apparent.¹¹

Labour shortages and the breakdown of management strategy

The introduction of arbitral regulation in the NSW metal trades coincided with a surge in economic activity. Industrial tribunals, labour shortages and workforce pressure combined to reduce management control over the distribution of overtime at Mort’s and forced management to spread employment among a wider workforce. Improved economic conditions highlighted Mort’s vulnerability to workplace action as workers took advantage of their strong labour market position to improve wages. In contrast, the ironworkers’ assistants continued as before, and, in some cases, became worse off under the award system, with waterfront workers particularly hard hit. Any gains achieved by assistants were the result of combined action with skilled workers, not arbitration.

The firm had limited options for dealing with the shortage of labour. Attempts to import tradesmen faced union opposition and in any event were prevented when World War I ended immigration to Australia. While the NSW Arbitration Court and the various wages boards showed a favourable attitude to the reorganisation of work to accommodate new technology and simplified work processes, the jobbing and repair nature of ship repair prevented this at Mort’s. For example, the 1908 Engineers’ Award allowed an employee to work more than one machine but at Mort’s there was only one automatic machine. Similarly, Mort’s could not take advantage of a clause enabling piecework. Although Franki had pushed for piecework for years, unions did not report any attempt to introduce piecework at the firm.
Even during the Commonwealth government’s shipbuilding scheme which pushed for dilution and piecework, Mort’s continued to accept craft standards while government-run shipyards and other private shipyards carried out contracts under the scheme. Afraid of antagonising the unions while labour shortages persisted, the most common and most effective means by which Mort’s and other employers coped with labour shortages was through overtime and the employment of more apprentices.¹²

Systematic overtime became a regular feature of employment among Mort’s workforce. Unions continued to complain about the unequal distribution of work and memories of depression and unemployment stimulated action designed to spread employment opportunities more broadly.
While liberal apprenticeship clauses enabled Mort’s to take on a greater number of apprentices, particularly under the Engineers’ Award, award restrictions placed limits on the use of overtime by the firm. The 1908 Engineers’ Award limited engineers to 24 hours overtime per week, with the 1911 Engineers’ Award reducing this to 20 hours per week When the Engineers’ Wages Board further tightened overtime restrictions in 1915, reducing the limitation from 20 hours per week to 24 hours per fortnight, this exacerbated Mort’s labour problem. Led by Mort’s, the ITEA successfully appealed this decision in respect to marine engineering. Judge Edmunds concluded that the evidence on the unfair distribution of overtime was inconclusive and the limitation was causing serious delays to ships which increased costs and made Sydney less attractive as a site for marine repairs. The result was the reversion to a limit of 20 hours overtime per week for maritime shops, as opposed to 24 hours per fortnight in general engineering.¹³

The Boilermakers’ Award did not restrict overtime until 1915. In the absence of arbitral support, Mort’s boilermakers attempted to use their labour market strength to gain more control over hiring, and sought to emulate a successful overtime ban by the Ship Painters and Dockers Union which had forced Mort’s to employ casuals rather than resort to overtime. On several occasions, boilermakers at Mort’s sought to collectively impose a ban on overtime on Friday night. Initially, management responded by dismissing the men concerned. Moreover, the FSB&IS refused to endorse the action of Mort’s workers, claiming that they could individually refuse to work on Friday nights but not collectively. Despite the Society’s position on the matter, it became standard practice at Mort’s for overtime to be worked Monday to Thursday. In a further effort to limit overtime at Mort’s, Falkingham, the Vice President of the FSB&IS and a casual at Mort’s, organised for the men to ‘toe the line’ three times a day. Through this method the Society sought to ensure a regular supply of labour was always available, eliminating the need to work overtime. This action also eliminated the need for workers to hang around the works during the day waiting for work, as was the practice.¹⁴

Even with award-imposed restrictions, the unions had to police overtime and ensure employers adhered to the law and both the ASE and the FSB&IS had problems with Mort’s. In both cases, union officials had to keep a keen eye on members at Mort’s to ensure that they did not exceed their overtime limit. In 1914 a large number of ASE members at Mort’s flouted the 20 hour overtime limit, claiming they thought the award exempted transport work but close attention by the ASE Organiser put a stop to the excessive overtime.¹⁵

Labour shortages, and restrictions on working overtime forced Mort’s to employ a wider range of workers. By 1916, over half the fitters employed by Mort’s were constant hands. While not permanent, these men assumed the status of ‘first preference’ men, that is, they formed a separate line from which management made the first selections. These constant workers averaged ten months employment a year, while the casual workers averaged between six to ten days a fortnight. While the ASE and the FSB&IS continued to complain about the unequal distribution of overtime and the victimisation of members who refused to work overtime, the curtailing of systematic overtime undermined management’s main labour control strategy, at least with regard to tradesmen.¹⁶

In contrast to the skilled workers, the position of ironworker assistants did not improve during the War. While there was strong demand for craftsmen, unemployment continued to exist amongst unskilled metal workers. Consequently, ironworker assistants lacked the ability to influence their working conditions and arbitral and wages board decisions failed to compensate for this lack of bargaining power, with employers, including Mort’s, often ignoring award conditions. The position of the assistants did not improve until they took direct action, causing Mort’s maximum discomfort when they left work while boats were in dock undergoing repairs. The firm was forced to halt operations when allied trades ceased work in support of the assistants. Continuing to support external regulation and loyal to ITEA policy, the firm refused to negotiate, insisting the matter go before the New South Wales Arbitration Court. The strike lasted three weeks, before the assistants returned to work on the understanding employers would meet the union in conference. As a consequence the ironworker assistants obtained a separate wages board and a new award followed in 1915.¹⁷

Despite this success, ironworker assistants at Mort’s were not happy with the efforts of their union, the recently constituted Federated Ironworkers’ Association (FIA). During 1915 and 1916, the Sydney Branch of the FIA lost many of its members in Balmain to the Ship Painters and Dockers Union. In response, the FIA established a separate branch at Balmain. While there is no clear evidence as to what caused this discontent, it is likely to have been prompted, in part, by features of the 1915 Ironworkers’ Assistants’ Award. Under the award, assistants received allowances for dirty work and working in confined spaces only if the tradesman being assisted was entitled to the same allowance. This issue particularly affected waterfront workers who were prone to working in dirty conditions onboard vessels while the tradesman worked in the open air. For example, when riveting on the ship’s bottom, the boilermaker worked in the open air while the assistant worked in the ship’s ballast tanks. The issue prompted much dissatisfaction with assistants at Mort’s who refused to hold rivets in confined spaces unless the firm paid the confined spaces allowance. However, the FIA refused to support the men and an official of the Balmain Branch convinced them to continue to work under the award. It was not until after the War, when the ironworkers’ assistants joined industrial action led by skilled workers, that their conditions improved.¹⁸

The combination of boom conditions and a shortage of skilled labour put Mort’s in a vulnerable position, a situation its workers zealously exploited to cause considerable disruption to Mort’s business activity. With award wages stagnating during the War, unions sought wage increases outside of arbitration. Efforts by metal unions to obtain a general wage increase moved to the workplace after the ITEA refused to negotiate with the unions. Towards the end of the War the ASE and the FSB&IS imposed an embargo on overtime and night shift in the Sydney district until employers conceded a wage increase. Despite misgivings, Franki held the ITEA line and refused to negotiate with the unions, insisting the matter be dealt with by the ITEA and the NSW Arbitration Court.¹⁹ The ITEA strategy centred on forcing unions to the Arbitration Court, correctly surmising that the Court would constrain wage increases. The Court fined both the ASE and FSB&IS for participating in an illegal strike. Despite protestations from both unions that the action at Mort’s was locally based and initiated, the Court, in both disputes, found the action was part of a general wage campaign that had the full support of officials of both unions.²⁰

The intervention of the Court served only to provoke further action by the unions. By the end of the War union opposition to the New South Wales Arbitration Court was running high among unions. The erosion of real wages during the War and the actions of the Court in the aftermath of the 1917 General Strike when it deregistered numerous unions had alienated the union movement and prompted several unions to question past tactics that had relied heavily on arbitration. Also, with the ASE deregistered at the time, it had little alternative to direct action. The penalties imposed by the Arbitration Court did not lead to a cessation of the overtime embargo and the bans continued into 1919. While the Sydney District Committee of the Engineers’ Society organised the embargo, as time passed the men at Mort’s became more persistent. Although they agreed to leave the matter in the hands of the District Committee, they insisted that the Committee approach Franki again. Eventually, the action of the workers forced employers to concede a wage increase.²¹

The ITEA’s handling of the wages dispute highlighted the conflicting interests of inland engineering employers and marine engineering shops and led to Mort’s resignation from the ITEA. In its decision to withstand the overtime embargo the ITEA caused Mort’s considerable inconvenience and financial expense, hampering operations and causing ships to be delayed in the docks. From the beginning of the dispute, Franki advocated acceding to the wage claim of the engineers and boilermakers. Nevertheless, he abided by the decision of the ITEA. The unsatisfactory outcome led Franki to sever Mort’s long association with the ITEA and turn to the NSW Employers Federation for industrial support.²²

With inflation continuing to erode wage gains, and the success of the unions’ tactics in 1919, the unions imposed further overtime bans in early 1920. The ASE led the way, with an overtime ban operating in all engineering shops in the Sydney district. Other metal trades unions soon followed suit.
Free from the constraints of the ITEA, Mort’s entered into negotiations. Under pressure from shipping companies, Mort’s offered an 8s.6d. per week increase to tradesmen, and 6s. to the ironworkers’ assistants, in return for unions giving an undertaking to remove all restrictions on overtime. Initially, ASE members at Mort’s rejected the offer and demanded more money but were overridden by the ASE Sydney District Committee. All metal trades unions eventually accepted the offer, and entered into written agreements. These over award payments spread to metal workers in other waterfront shops, and become known as the ‘waterfront loading’.²³

Overall, the second decade of the twentieth century had represented a period of change in labour management at Mort’s. The decade opened with Mort’s control over hiring and the allocation of overtime providing management with powerful weapons to control and discipline the workforce. By 1920, economic conditions had eroded management’s position of authority, a situation taken full advantage of by Mort’s skilled workers. Awards had a limited impact on this development. Even where provisions were favourable, such as the restriction on overtime, strong workplace action by workers was required to uphold the award. Moreover, though the NSW Arbitration Court punished unions for industrial action, this failed to curb independent action by workers. Despite the gains made by the workforce during the decade, depressed economic conditions and a change in business strategy by Mort’s encouraged further changes during the 1920s.

Changing employment practices and a new business strategy

Two important changes occurred in the 1920s which affected workplace industrial relations at Mort’s. First, Mort’s business strategy changed, with general engineering becoming far more important than had been the case in earlier periods. This had implications for the structure of employment and the firm’s attitude to industrial relations, with labour costs becoming a more important consideration. Second, arbitral regulation shifted from the New South Wales system to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, introducing a major innovation – weekly and daily hiring.

The distinction, in the 1921 Engineers Award, between two methods of engaging labour, weekly hiring and daily hiring, had a major impact on employment relations at Mort’s. Although this distinction paralleled the practice at Mort’s to employ constant and casual hands, the new award categories introduced new payment structures depending on the type of employment. Weekly hiring guaranteed workers a full week’s work or payment in lieu and provided payment for gazetted public holidays and absences due to sickness. While Higgins anticipated weekly hiring becoming the norm, he provided casual employment for situations where weekly employment was not practical. The award specifically acknowledged the particular situation of Mort’s Dock, and other waterfront firms, and made provision for casual employment at one-sixth of the weekly wage plus ten per cent to compensate for the absence of holiday and sick pay. The introduction of daily hiring was itself an innovation. Previously, employers engaged labour by the hour and only paid for the time worked. The award’s daily hiring provision required Mort’s to pay workers for a full day, regardless of their starting time. This ended the practice of ASE men waiting around the Dock while a ship came in without being paid.²⁴

The Court extended the weekly hiring provision in the ASE award to the Australasian Society of Engineers and the Blacksmiths’ Society in 1922. However, when the boilermakers and moulders came before the Court in 1924 Justice Quick refused to grant weekly or daily hiring, instead adopting a wage loading, compensating for holidays and absence through sickness, paid to all workers irrespective of their security of employment. The following year, the FIA registered a consent award with the Court which provided for a wage loading in lieu of weekly hiring despite the union’s attempts to gain weekly hiring from the New South Wales Arbitration Court in 1922. It was not until the Metal Trades Award in 1930 that the Court extended weekly hiring to these other branches of the metal trades.²⁵

Alongside these regulatory changes, Mort’s changed business strategy, shifting the emphasis from ship repair to general engineering. While ship repair remained an important and significant part of the firm’s business, from the early 1920s management became more focused on obtaining general engineering contracts. The substantial protection introduced by the Greene Tariff for general metal working and machinery provided an incentive for the firm to improve this side of the business. More importantly, changes in shipping, such as larger vessels and improved design, reduced the demand for ship repair while increased competition from the government dockyards, which were being leased to private operators, also influenced the change in direction. Mort’s redirection gained a further boost when Franki retired as Managing Director in 1923, after 54 years at the helm. The new manager, Thomas Silk, a marine engineer, had extensive experience in the shipbuilding industry in Great Britain. Against this background, Mort’s works, which had experienced spasmodic investment in plant and equipment, would have looked small and outdated. Despite his background in marine engineering, Silk continued to redirect Mort’s business to general engineering. He also set about updating the plant and machinery, improving Mort’s competitive position.²⁶

The economic downturn and Mort’s changing business strategies produced a new, more intransigent managerial style. General engineering established a new set of priorities at the firm. While repair work continued, and industrial disputation remained a major concern, labour costs also became more relevant and managerial style changed accordingly. Mort’s treatment of workers hardened during the 1920s. The firm stopped paying the waterfront loading to metal workers, raising the ire of the tradesmen, particularly the boilermakers, and unions also began reporting more breaches of awards. While in the proceeding decade the Engineers’ Society had seen Mort’s as a good employer, during the 1920s the union repeatedly dealt with complaints by Mort’s workers and breaches of the award. In several cases Mort’s management responded slowly to the union’s complaints, forcing the union to threaten action to enforce a change.²⁷

Offsetting these changes was the increased incidence of permanent employment at Mort’s. As the amount of work done in the workshops increased, so did the number of permanent workers. At the time of the hearing of the Engineers’ Case in 1921, Mort’s employed 25 fitters in the workshop and 217 fitters on outside work. During the 1924 Engineers’ Case the number employed in the workshop exceeded the number employed outside and from the mid-1920s until the onset of the Depression in 1928, the number of constant engineers employed at Mort’s averaged 120. Other trades experienced a similar increase in constant employment. At the time of the Boilermaker’s Case in 1924, Mort’s employed 80 boilermakers, of whom only around 20 were casual. Despite this, ship repair continued to be performed by casual workers and size of the workforce increased dramatically if a ship
came in for repair.²⁸

Upper management rather than shopfloor management pushed for the conversion of constantly employed men to weekly hiring. Almost a year after the introduction of the award the central office drew the attention of the Works Superintendent, Wilkinson, to the position of ten fitters employed as casuals but who had been employed constantly since the September 1921, and inquired if these men should be put on weekly hiring. Evidence before the Court in 1924 suggested that Mort’s continued to employ a number of workers who received fairly constant work on a casual basis. While head office focused on financial matters, shopfloor management focused on maintaining control and clung to their traditional externally oriented strategies. In the ship repair side of the business the majority of those employed on repair work continued to be casual and continued to ‘toe the line’. The daily hiring provision in the Engineers’ award did improve the position of engineers who ‘toed the line’ only once a day, unlike the boilermakers and ironworkers’ assistants. When daily hiring was restored in the 1927 Interim Engineers’ Award, Mort’s workers strongly and successfully resisted management’s attempt to reintroduce hourly hiring.²⁹

Conclusion

Mort’s Dock developed a labour management strategy compatible with the volatile market within which it operated. Mort’s used hiring and overtime to ensure market mechanisms operated to discipline metal workers and maintain control. Mort’s preference for dealing with trade unions though an employer association predated arbitration and was part of a broader strategy to externalise labour management to the market. In this respect, Mort’s labour management strategy was similar to that of many other Australian manufacturing firms in the late nineteenth century. The introduction of award regulation in 1908 challenged the firm’s traditional mode of control, but product and labour markets were more important in explaining the changes in labour management strategy.

Labour market conditions were central in limiting the firm’s control and necessary to enforce award conditions. Encouraged by the nature of the ship repair product market and the added industrial strength the severe shortage of skilled labour provided, Mort’s skilled workforce took a leading role in workplace campaigns organised by their unions to secure general wage increases throughout the engineering and allied industries. In this respect, Mort’s commitment to the external determination of wages and employment conditions through the ITEA proved problematic and led to a reconsideration of this approach to the management of industrial relations.

Arbitral regulation further challenged Mort’s method of employment through the introduction of weekly hiring in the 1921 Engineers’ Award. However, here too other factors appear equally as important in raising the number of permanent workers employed by the firm, particularly the shift in product market conditions as Mort’s management redirected the firm’s business strategy towards general engineering rather than ship repair. The loading for casuals did not deter the firm from continuing its traditional labour management strategy with respect to men employed on ship repair work. Thus, while award regulation of labour hiring and overtime curtailed managerial freedom, product and labour market conditions appear more influential in changing labour management practices.