Theodore (Ted) Binnema

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Theodore (Ted) Binnema | Allegiances and Interests: Niitsitapi (Blackfoot) Trade, Diplomacy, and Warfare, 1806–1831 | The Western Historical Quarterly, 37.3 | The History Cooperative

Allegiances and Interests: Niitsitapi (Blackfoot) Trade, Diplomacy, and Warfare, 1806–1831

Niitsitapi (Blackfoot) foreign policy from 1806 to 1831 shows that the Niisitapiksi dealt with all of their neighbors according to careful, consistent, and rational calculations of their self-interest. This suggests that historians need to pay more attention to multilateral Indian-Indian relations even when they attempt to understand bilateral native-newcomer relations.

MEMBERS OF MERIWETHER LEWIS and William Clark's expedition had only one military confrontation with Indians between 1804 and 1806. That came on 27 July 1806, when they killed two Piegan men, including He-that-looks-at-the-Calf (O-nie-strucks-sunny), along the Marias River.¹ It was an inauspicious beginning for United States-Niitsitapi (Blackfoot or Blackfeet) relations.² And things got a lot worse. By 1830, many Americans believed the "Blackfeet" were inveterate foes of Americans but allies of the British traders on the Saskatchewan River. At the time, and afterward, Americans struggled to explain these perceived facts.³ Their conclusions are unsatisfactory because they explain bilateral American-Niitsitapi relations without seeking to understand the Niitsitapi place in the volatile military circumstances of the northwestern plains more generally, and because they rely on fragmentary evidence. This study contributes to the debate by tackling that broader historical puzzle by incorporating evidence from unpublished documents of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC). Unused for this purpose until now, these voluminous records are rich with evidence pertaining to the question. The evidence reveals that the differences between Niitsitapi demeanor toward the Americans and British between 1806 and 1831 were more apparent than real. The Niitsitapi bands were less hostile to Americans and less friendly to the British and Canadians than most Americans believed at the time, and most historians have assumed since.⁴ More broadly, the most convincing interpretation of the evidence suggests that the Niitsitapiksi dealt with all of their neighbors according to careful assessments of their own self interest. They had incomplete information of course, but the Niitsitapi bands responded rationally and strategically to improve their rapidly changing, but generally deteriorating circumstances. Most broadly, the evidence suggests that bilateral aboriginal-newcomer relations in most places were heavily influenced by each indigenous community's place in complex networks of trade, warfare, and diplomacy about which Europeans may have had only fragmentary knowledge.

By conflating the Niitsitapiksi and Gros Ventres (A'aini) Americans exaggerated the aggressiveness of these "Blackfeet." The Niitsitapiksi consist of three groups—the Siksikas, Bloods, and Piegans—who speak an Algonquian language known as "Blackfoot" (Niitsipussin). (See Figure 1.) At least until 1831, however, Americans often used the term "Blackfeet" not only to refer to the Niitsitapiksi collectively; they also generally included the Gros Ventres among the "Blackfeet." Thus, many "Blackfeet" attacks, especially south of the Missouri River Basin, were actually mounted by Gros Ventre warriors—not Niitsitapiksi at all.⁵ The Gros Ventres are a separate group who speak an Algonquian language similar to Arapaho and who share a common ancestry with the Arapaho. They were not confederated with the Niitsitapiksi. Gros Ventre bands sometimes cooperated with Niitsitapi bands against common enemies, but they faced a different set of military, diplomatic, and economic challenges and opportunities. But by referring to the Gros Ventres as "Blackfeet" American documents make the Niitsitapiksi seem more relentlessly hostile to Americans than they were. The Gros Ventres were also more aggressive toward British and Canadian traders than the Niitsitapiksi were, and between 1806 and 1831 the Gros Ventres—reflecting their more precarious circumstances—probably attacked Americans on the Missouri more often than the Niitsitapiksi did. Because they traveled and visited with more southern communities—the Arapaho and Cheyenne—they were more likely than the Niitsitapiksi to encounter and attack Americans south of the Missouri Basin. The unique policies of the Gros Ventres deserve separate treatment, but they are discussed here only insofar as their behavior sheds light on the Niitsitapiksi.

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