|
|
|
REVIEWS
AMERICA'S NUCLEAR WASTELANDS: POLITICS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CLEANUP
|
by Max S. Power
|
| Washington State University Press, Pullman, 2008. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, index. 216 pages. $19.95 paper. |
| At the Hanford site in Eastern Washington, cleaning up chemical and radiological contaminants produced over four decades of plutonium production has replaced production itself as an economic and moral engine. During the past decade, Hanford's annual "Health of the Site" meeting has featured profound differences over how to go about the task. Should limited funds be spent on the remediation of radioactive liquid waste held in rusting storage tanks, or on epidemiological studies in search of past effects on Hanford's downwinders? (Contractors tended to favor the first, most vocal "stakeholders" groups, the second.) In this slim volume, Max S. Power draws on his own experiences as a policy adviser for Washington's state government and aims to provide a manual for citizens engaged in disputes such as these. Those who want to influence the process of cleaning up the nuclear industrial sites that are part of the United States' Cold War legacy will find this book a useful reference; historians will find it an interesting primary source concerning the disputes of the past two decades. |
1
|
|
The book is thematically organized, beginning with three chapters devoted to foundational information: some historical background on the American nuclear complex, an overview of the concept of risk as it is perceived and measured, and a summary of the legal architecture that surrounds the clean-up process. Power frames his treatment of this subject around four main questions: how clean should a nuclear industrial site be, should chemical and radiological contaminants be left in place or moved elsewhere, how should the potentially dangerous materials resulting from clean-up efforts be shipped, and how are the standards structuring all these activities to be established, especially with the input of those around the site? Power believes that the third problem — transportation — has proven to be manageable and that the first two can be dealt with in a responsible way with community participation. He argues that to accomplish this, it is necessary to recast the fourth question. What constitutes risk should be seen as socially constructed in terms of community concerns, rather than as a measurable quantity based on more narrowly technical assessments. The perception of risk, he asserts, even by outsiders without technical training, should be weighed in the decision-making process. |
2
|
|
After this background material, six further short chapters deal with the topography of the policy landscape in practice: the tensions between public interest in environmental safety and economic interests, mediated by politics; the "geographic chess game" of establishing the sites for long-term waste storage; and case studies of successful clean-up efforts with public participation, both those that resulted in the removal of wastes and those that involved keeping it in place (p. 91). Power makes the point that successful remediation can result in a landscape that is "clean" in the sense that it is suitable for a residential neighborhood, or one that is "clean" in the sense that it is suitable for dedicated open space only. As a volume dealing with policy more than history per se, although one based on the author's own experiences, the topical organization of the work may be appropriate. But if risk is a matter of perception as much as measurement, then a thorough understanding of history is central to a satisfying understanding of risk as Power describes it. A more personal narrative might have exemplified this while being more engaging and more useful to historians than the relatively bloodless presentation made here. Power notes that the history of each nuclear site, to a very great extent, has determined the model its staff chooses to adopt for the clean-up process. |
3
|
|
While the book's final chapter deals with the concept of stewardship — based on the fact that sites, after remediation to the negotiated state of cleanliness, will remain the responsibility of the surrounding communities —America's Nuclear Wastelands refers in its subtitle, instead, to accountability. The idea of stewardship seems to ratify the collaborative process that Power espouses here. But it contrasts with the idea of accountability, which presupposes the ability to add up the consequences of past actions and charge them to the appropriate actors. Given that epidemiological efforts to measure the consequences of nuclear history at both Hanford and Chernobyl have failed to achieve consensus about the medical consequences of each site, a fact this study elides, it seems that accountability is an elusive target. Power's work is one of a number that call for openness and democracy — albeit democracy that favors the claims of downwinders over those of resident workers' communities, another local population — as the antidotes to high-handed management by federal agents who insist on secrecy, justified or not. If accountability is a crucial component of such an effort, the consequences of past policies, while contributing to the perception of risk, should themselves be measured. Power's work gives little idea about how to do so. |
4
|
|
|
| BRUCE HEVLY
|
| University of Washington |
|
Content in the History Cooperative database is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the History Cooperative database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.
|