H. Lloyd Keith

"Adventure" of the Colonel Allan

Coats of mail? Women's hosiery? Military shoes? At a fur-trading post? One can imagine the astonishment of the new manager at Fort George in 1822 as he discovered these items and more among the trade goods left behind by the previous proprietors. Chief Factor J.D. Cameron of the Hudson's Bay Company arrived at the former Astoria near the mouth of the Columbia River on November 8, 1821, to assume command of the old trading post. When his canoe pulled alongside the rain-washed wharf, he noticed a crane for landing and loading goods. Amenities such as this were uncommon at his previous postings. Looking landward through misting clouds, a few hundred yards away he saw for the first time an imposing palisade some twelve or fifteen feet high enclosing nearly an acre of ground. Two bastions protected the fort's walls with four- and six-pound cannon, and loopholes were provided along an interior gallery for muskets and swivel guns. Inside he would find two eighteen-pound cannons. All this armament protected a bevy of buildings, large and small, and an inventory of trade goods second in value only to those at Fort William, the old North West Company headquarters on the western shore of Lake Superior. ¹

Following the merger of the North West and Hudson's Bay companies in 1821, Cameron assumed charge of the newly acquired Columbia Department. This vast trading area spilled over the Columbia River drainage to the Thompson River in the north, southward as far as the Spanish territories, and extended from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. After completion of a thorough inventory of goods on hand at Fort George (the erstwhile Astoria and department headquarters), Cameron wrote a withering letter acquainting the Hudson's Bay Company officers of the status of their new acquisition: "The stock of goods [are] very great, and among the Number of articles tho' very expensive, yet are very useless articles in this Country." ² He had never before seen such items among the goods of a fur-trading post, and he was appalled. There were four coats of steel-wire mail; ostrich and hackle feathers; hand grenades; men's, women's, and children's fine hosiery; men's military shoes; fine corduroy jackets and trousers; and fine gingham and silk umbrellas. ³ There were also two eighteen-pound cannons, cannon carriages, and 240 rounds of ammunition. George Simpson, Cameron's superior and the Hudson's Bay Company's field governor in western North America, complained that "everything appears to me on the Columbia on too extended a scale except the Trade." ⁴

At the time of the Colonel Allan's visit in 1816, Fort George was an enclosure of nearly an acre with fifteen-foot pickets. By 1845, when Henry James Warre traveled to the site and made the drawing on which this lithograph was based, the former headquarters of the Columbia Department had been reduced to these few bucolic structures.

OHS neg., OrHi 35111

To understand how and why such items appeared in the inventory at Fort George, one must look to the adventure of the North West Company's brig Colonel Allan. The story surrounding that venture also offers insights into the Company's effort to diversify its trading strategy by plying goods in South America, California, and the Sandwich Islands (now Hawai'i) as well as offering its Columbia furs for sale in Europe rather than China.

Following the merger of the North West Company and the Hudson's Bay Company in 1821, the Columbia Department eventually experienced one of the greatest financial turnabouts in fur-trade business history. It had been a constant financial drain for the Montreal-based North West Company between 1813 and 1821, but by the end of the decade the Columbia Department had been transformed into a vital economic enterprise. ⁵ Much of this financial turnaround has been attributed to the reforms introduced by HBC Governor George Simpson as a consequence of his 1824–1825 visit to the Columbia as well as to the Company's earlier decision to market Columbia pelts in Europe instead of China. ⁶ Simpson recommended cutting provisioning costs by increasing local production; increasing returns and eliminating American competition by extirpating all beaver in the Snake River country; and creating greater efficiency by strengthening leadership. These measures, he believed, would eliminate losses if not increase profits in the Columbia Department. ⁷

It was a change in markets, however, rather than Simpson's reforms that proved pivotal in the Columbia Department's remarkable transformation; and even there, timing was of greater importance than the change itself. All of the reforms introduced by the Company and Governor Simpson would have had relatively insignificant consequences were it not for the propitious conditions in world markets, especially those in London, during and after the 1820s. To illustrate the point, one need look no further than the 1815–1817 voyage of the brig Colonel Allan, which marked an early but disappointing attempt by the North West Company to market Columbia pelts in London and presaged the Hudson's Bay Company's successful implementation of a similar trading strategy. The North West Company received only twelve to twenty-five shillings a pound for Columbia River beaver carried on the Colonel Allan, with the average of about eighteen shillings a pound. In the years following the merger of the two companies in 1821, prices on the London market were consistently higher. ⁸ The price of beaver began to rise rapidly in the London market by 1825, and by 1830 it had almost doubled. The economic failure of the voyage of the Colonel Allan can be attributed to the low prices received for pelts on the London market compared to those obtained just a few years later or even a few months before. The Nor'Westers' timing was off. ⁹

The North West Company dominated the beaver trade on the Northwest Coast of America between 1813 and 1821. After purchasing the assets of the American-owned Pacific Fur Company in 1813, the Nor'Westers set out on what they styled an "Adventure to the Columbia" by employing their own vessels to supply their settlement on the Columbia River with trade goods and provisions and to deliver pelts gathered from the area to market in Canton or London. In order to trade in China, British merchants were required to purchase a license from the East India Company, which had been granted a monopoly on Asian trade by Queen Elizabeth. This irksome hurdle entailed so many restrictions that it became economically impossible to conduct business. ¹⁰ For instance, the North West Company was not allowed to trade for goods in Canton to sell in London. As the American John Astor explained, "the China trade was not profitable unless the return voyage could be part of the enterprise." ¹¹ That is, the real profit lay in selling China goods in Europe or America, not in plying peltry to the Chinese. To make matters worse, the Nor'Westers were not allowed to transport specie out of Canton, which would allow them to take advantage of the favorable rate of exchange in London, but rather had to accept bills of exchange on the East India Company on what was called 365 days sight. ¹² That is, they would present the bills of exchange, or drafts, to the East India Company in Europe upon their return and would receive payment a year later. These and other costly restrictions would prove intolerable, and after 1816 the North West Company opted to sell pelts in China through Americans, who did not have to face the limitations imposed by the East India Company. ¹³

This drawing of a brig shows the two masts and square rigging characteristic of such vessels. No actual drawing of the Colonel Allan is known to have survived.

From Twenty-Sixth Annual List of Merchant Vessels of the United States, 1894, courtesy Columbia River Maritime Museum, Astoria

Prior to entering into these arrangements with the Americans, the North West Company sent out three of its own ships to engage in the trade. Much is known of the first two, the Isaac Todd and the Columbia, both bound for Canton, but little is known of the third, the Colonel Allan, which delivered its cargo to London. ¹⁴ The only published eyewitness account of the Colonel Allan's visit to the Columbia River is provided by Alexander Ross in Fur Hunters of the Far West. ¹⁵ Acting as chief clerk and second-in-command at Fort George during the summer of 1816, Ross should have been in a position to provide reliable and detailed information about the Colonel Allan and its cargo. Unfortunately, he was remarkably vague, and those details he did provide are sometimes inaccurate. The story of the Colonel Allan, then, can be found only by bringing together bits and pieces of clues found in a variety of documents dispersed among several repositories. This account is the result of that search.

At the annual meeting held at Fort William on Lake Superior in July 1814, agents of the North West Company announced a new plan to address the uncertainty and high costs involved in sending their own ships to supply the Columbia Department and to carry off that department's returns to the Canton market. After full discussion, the wintering partners and their Montreal agents agreed that "if a favourable connection could be made with an American House ... it should be adopted for facilitating the Business in China." ¹⁶ Simon McGillivray — the brother of William McGillivray, the Company's chief agent in Montreal — was given the responsibility for negotiating with different American shippers. He would not be able to make arrangements in time for the 1816 season, however, and the agents decided to outfit another company ship for that season. The ship was the Colonel Allan.

Final arrangements concerning the Colonel Allan lay entirely with Edward Ellice, one of the North West Company's agents in London. Although he did consult with the North American capitalists of the North West Company, Ellice's business and political connections were instrumental in obtaining ship, cargo, and crew. Representing the Montreal agency McTavish, McGillivrays and Company, Simon McGillivray and a new partner, Thomas Thain, arrived in London in November 1814 to help arrange the outfitting for the voyage. Over the next several months, these two men, along with Ellice, put together a mixed private and company cargo that would become the adventure of the Colonel Allan. Early in the spring of 1815, Thain returned to Montreal while Simon McGillivray departed for the United States to begin the search for an American company to help transport company furs from the Columbia River to Canton.

Robert Irvine painted this watercolor of Fort William, the North West Company's North American headquarters, in about 1811. In 1816, Fort William and Fort George were similar in size and extent of inventory.

Fort William, N.W., watercolor on wove paper by Robert Irvine [Andrew Crookshank] (1792–1823). Courtesy Fort William Historical Park, an attraction of the Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation. Peter Winkworth Collection of Canadiana, Library and Archives Canada, Acc. No. R9266-290.

Early in the spring of 1815, Ellice purchased a French-built hull for fifteen hundred pounds on behalf of Inglis, Ellice and Company and offered the ship to the Company for the 1816 season voyage. ¹⁷ The ship would require an extensive overhaul and outfitting, which Ellice admitted would cost in the neighborhood of eight to ten thousand pounds. "However," Ellice informed the Montreal partnership, "all possible œconomy shall be used & she will get away by 1 July." ¹⁸ Ellice considered the Colonel Allan, although costly, a superior vessel to either of the Company's previous ships, the Isaac Todd or the Columbia. Built of Italian oak, the three- to four-year-old brig weighed some 310 tons and carried stores for a four- to five-year voyage. ¹⁹ The final cost of the Colonel Allan amounted to £11,692 Sterling.

On the 1815–1816 voyage to the Columbia, the brig carried a mixed cargo consisting of goods intended as provisions and for the fur trade at Fort George as well as a private assortment of dry goods and munitions for trade in South America. The invoice value of the trade goods destined for the Columbia amounted to £13,023 Sterling. Carrying the logo "I.E.C.," the private venture of Inglis, Ellice and Company was valued at £14,058, £300 of which was intended for trade in the Sandwich Islands. ²⁰ The North West Company had the option of investing in these trade goods or allowing them to remain a separate venture of the London agency. The first opportunity for the North West Company's agents to discuss the issue would have been at their annual council in the summer of 1815 at Fort William. Although minutes from that meeting have not survived, the Memoranda Book of the Nor'Westers' partner in charge at Fort George, James Keith, makes it clear that the partnership consented to participate in the private trade venture. Keith shipped goods aboard the Colonel Allan for South America and the Cape of Good Hope "on a/c and risk of the North West Company of Canada" that were invoiced at £7,341 Sterling. To cover shipping costs, general merchandise was marked up 30 2/3 percent, while guns and gunpowder were marked up 65 percent. This cargo included £3,771 in dry goods, cutlery, clothing, and so on; £3,068 in arms; and £502 in liquor. ²¹ Keith also listed £4,840 in goods charged to the Columbia Department "assumed" from I.E.C. These goods remained at Fort George, possibly for trade with the Spanish in Monterey. ²²

American ports of call of the Colonel Allan

Dean A. Shaprio, cartographer

The Colonel Allan's Ports of Call

Port	Cargo off-loaded	Cargo taken aboard
Lima^a	Muskets and gun powder	Specie, coffee, sugar, tobacco, and rum
Fort George^b	Dry goods, cutlery, clothing, ironware, cannonry, and gun powder	Fur returns for London as well as muskets, gunpowder, cannonry, and liquor for South America
Monterey^c	Dry goods, artificial flowers, spices, glass, ironware	Provisions such as flour, tallow, corn, pease, barley, etc.
Buenos Aires^d	Dry goods, cutlery, clothing, muskets, cannonry, gun powder, liquor	Cash sale
London^e	Columbia Department fur returns consisting mostly of beaver and muskrats	Origin of the Colonel Allan cargo delivered to Fort George

^a. It can only be presumed that muskets and gunpowder were traded at Lima for specie and other items. See Baby Collection, u/3989; NAC, James Keith Papers, A-676, Memoranda Book, p. 46; and Ross, Fur Hunters, 59.

^b. NAC, James Keith Papers, A-676, Memoranda Book, p. 31; HBCA, F.4/7, pp. 45–54.

^c. HBCA, F.4/7, p. 73; NAC, James Keith Papers, A-676, Memoranda Book, p. 33.

^d. HBCA, F.4/7, pp. 62–4. Apparently, there were no goods purchased at Buenos Aires in exchange for the cargo traded there. Remittances from this account were made from Buenos Aires in 1818 and 1823. See also HBCA, F.4/33, pp. 141, 143.

^e. HBCA, F.4/11, p. 63.

While Ellice, McGillivray, and Thain were laying the foundations for the voyage of the Colonel Allan over the winter of 1814–1815, the Treaty of Ghent had been negotiated, ending hostilities between the United States and Great Britain. Astoria, or Fort George, was not mentioned in the treaty, but Americans claimed it should be returned under the provisions of the first article, which stipulated that "All Territory, Places, and Possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other during the War ... shall be restored without delay...." The British argued that the fort had been legally purchased by the North West Company, not taken as a prize of war, and that it consequently did not fall under Article 1 of the treaty. ²³

While this dispute was simmering, the United States and Great Britain entered into a commercial "reciprocity" treaty in July 1815. ²⁴ The treaty provided for "most favored nation" status between "His Britannic Majesty's territories in Europe" and the United States:

The inhabitants of the two countries respectively shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports, and rivers in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come.... ²⁵

Neither nation was to impose duties on the other's commerce that were higher than or in addition to those imposed on other foreign nations. The treaty said nothing about liberalizing trade between the United States and Canada, so the intent was to remove transatlantic barriers to trade that had arisen during the late war and earlier but not to promote intracontinental trade in North America. Ellice feared that this "most favored nation" convention might prove contrary to the North West Company's economic interests if the tariffs protecting British interests in the London fur market were to be withdrawn. Ellice also feared that British subjects would be prohibited from trading with Indians who resided in the Columbia Department or elsewhere in North America under the terms of the treaty. ²⁶

In addition to the uncertainties related to the treaties, Ellice remained distrustful of Americans and the U.S. government. Throughout the summer of 1815, Inglis, Ellice and Company inquired repeatedly of the British government whether or not it would protect their investments on the Northwest Coast from American depredations. "We are now assured," they wrote, "that that property is subjected to the risk of forcible seizure by American citizens or the American government." ²⁷ Their concerns were not unfounded. Early in 1815, agitation had begun in Congress to reoccupy the Columbia Department. Later in the summer, Secretary of State James Monroe informed the British that "measures will therefore be taken to occupy [the post on the Columbia River] without delay." That autumn, plans were laid to send U.S. naval ships to the Northwest Coast, but the plans were cancelled when crises elsewhere intervened. ²⁸

These American actions caused the London agents some anxiety in planning for the adventure of the Colonel Allan. Because the British government did not respond to requests for clarification and protection, Inglis, Ellice and Company deemed it prudent to protect British interests on the Northwest Coast themselves, as Simon McGillivray had encouraged the British government to do even before the war. ²⁹ As late as August 1815, McGillivray, writing from New York, warned Ellice that "violent proceeding against the Colony might have been taken either by the American Government or American speculators." ³⁰ Consequently, two eighteen-pound cannon, weighing some two tons each, were ordered for shipment to Fort George along with an unspecified number of twelve-pound cannon, adding another twenty-eight hundred pounds to the cargo. ³¹ No doubt it was this awesome display of firepower that led the Hudson's Bay Company's Governor George Simpson, several years later, to exclaim that Fort George has "an air or appearance of Grandeur & consequence which does not become and is not at all suitable to an Indian Trading Post." ³²

As the Hudson's Bay Company was later to do, North West Company capitalists attempted to diversify their investment by taking along a variety of trade goods. In addition to the goods and armament destined for Fort George and the goods for the Sandwich Islands, one thousand muskets and one hundred barrels of powder were included to allow the Colonel Allan's Captain McLennan to take advantage of "the peculiar circumstances [then] agitating South America." ³³ The Spanish colonies there were in the throes of revolution, and Ellice, no doubt, thought it a propitious opportunity to profit from the arms trade. In addition, a wide array of piece goods, wearing apparel, and similar items suitable for the Spanish South American market were stowed in the ship's hold. ³⁴ Among these articles were fine hosiery, corduroy jackets and trousers, gingham and silk umbrellas, and military boots. (It is not known whether the four coats of steel-wire mail were included in this shipment, but they would not have been out of place.) As Ellice complacently stated: "altogether, the ship will have a full load." ³⁵

After more than a month's delay, the Colonel Allan sailed from the Company wharf in London on August 5, 1815, destined for the Columbia River. ³⁶ "She will go as fast as she can out without touching anywhere except for water," Ellice wrote, "but McLennan thinks of trying Lima with his goods on his way up the Coast." ³⁷ Apparently, at least part of the muskets and powder were traded in Peru for specie, because Alexander Ross mentioned that he and his colleagues were annoyed to have to guard it. ³⁸ Not all trading in South America was done for specie, however. In Lima, McLennan purchased supplies of coffee, sugar, tobacco, and rum for use at Fort George for less than they would have cost in London. ³⁹ It may be that these were the luxuries that later Hudson's Bay Company critics such as George Simpson so often mentioned as indulged in at Fort George. In any case, the journey took some ten months to complete, perhaps because of the delay caused in selling arms to the South Americans. Alexander Ross reported the arrival of the Colonel Allan at Fort George a few days after the appearance of the spring brigade on June 7, 1816. ⁴⁰

Initially, Captain McLennan remained at Fort George for about two months. The only activity that occupied the captain and his crew, besides unloading and loading the ship, was a survey of the mouth of the Columbia River. ⁴¹ When Alexander Ross finally got around to writing The Fur Hunters of the Far West, his thirty-nine year-old notes must have failed his memory when he reported that "the Colonel Allan after a short stay at Fort George sailed for California and South America on a speculating trip, and returned again with a considerable quantity of specie and other valuable commodities consigned to some of the London merchants." ⁴² As Marion O'Neil has pointed out, "it was not possible to make a trading trip to California and South America, and a three weeks survey of the [Columbia] river, between June 7 and an August sailing [for London]." ⁴³ The lighter and swifter schooner Columbia took forty-seven days — nearly seven weeks — to make the trip north from the equator to Cape Disappointment in 1814. ⁴⁴ About three weeks were required to sail south to Monterey in this period. ⁴⁵ An 1817 trading excursion to Bodega Bay (the Russian Fort Ross) by the schooner Columbia left Fort George on July 12 and did not return until October 10, a total of three months. ⁴⁶

In any case, it would have been curious for the Colonel Allan to have made a special trip to California during the summer and to have called there again in the fall on its way back to London. That the brig did call there in the fall is apparent from O'Neil's report that Spanish records reveal "the arrival at Monterey on August 29, 1816 of the 'Allan, Captain Mr. Danials, supercargo D. Dunc McDougall,' and her departure on October 12." ⁴⁷ While at Monterey, the ship traded with the Spanish missions for flour and fresh produce. The reference to "Captain Mr. Danials" is obviously in error, but it is interesting to note that Duncan McDougall was on board. In April 1817, McDougall would depart from Fort George for Fort William with the spring brigade. ⁴⁸ If the California records are accurate, then the Colonel Allan must have returned to Fort George with McDougall sometime after completing the trading mission to California in October, or else McDougall found some other way to return to Fort George. He could not very well have taken passage aboard the schooner Columbia, because it was laid up at Fort George from August 1816 until the following January, after which it sailed directly for the Sandwich Islands. ⁴⁹ Perhaps O'Neil was right when he speculated that the Colonel Allan returned to the Columbia from its trading mission to California and embarked for London from Fort George in November 1816 instead of August, as Ross reported. A seven-month voyage between the Columbia and England would not have been unprecedented, even allowing for time trading in South America or at the Cape of Good Hope. ⁵⁰ There is no evidence that the brig called at the Sandwich Islands, and there was little time to have done so. Unless the goods destined for barter in the islands were delivered on the way in, they must have been taken there by the Columbia in 1817.

An account book for the North West Company for 1815–1817 includes this inventory of goods on the Colonel Allan.

Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Archives of Manitoba, HBCA F.4/7 fo. 45 (N15767)

The goods aboard the Colonel Allan were the private adventure of Inglis, Ellice and Company, and any assumption of risk or profit on the part of the North West Company remained optional with the Company. ⁵¹ James Keith, acting as the Company's representative on the spot, made the final decision. This is made evident in a letter from William McGillivray to James Keith dated July 26, 1817, and written from Fort William. McGillivray wrote: "The arrangement with Captain McLennan and your assuming for the North West Company the remaining goods of the private adventure by the Colonel Allan— we approve of as well as your shipment of goods by that vessel which has enabled you to get rid of so many superfluous articles." ⁵² It may be that these "superfluous articles" were included in the items traded to the Spanish for "flour and produce" in the fall of 1816. Keith assumed for the North West Company I.E.C marked goods valued at £4,840 Sterling, which he kept for his stores at Fort George, and sent goods valued at £7,340 on board the Colonel Allan for sale in South America and the Cape of Good Hope on the return to London in 1816. ⁵³ The I.E.C. goods that remained at Fort George were, no doubt, intended for trade on the California coast. At the time, the North West Company schooner Columbia conducted a desultory trade with the Spanish at Monterey. The goods shipped for sale included cutlery, drapery, and an assortment of dry goods such as "corded shawls, vandyke hose, olive velveteens, and warped lace." In addition, Keith shipped weaponry (including four four-pound brass guns and fifteen cases of muskets) as well as 1,136 gallons of liquor for sale at the same ports. ⁵⁴ These invoices carried the mark "<CR>," presumably for Columbia River, to distinguish them from the Inglis, Ellice and Company stock. The Columbia River goods were "consigned for sale and returns for account of the North West Company."

Late in 1815, when Simon McGillivray was in New York negotiating an arrangement with American shippers, an agreement was reached with J. and T.H. Perkins and Company whereby they would ship supplies delivered to them at Boston (up to one hundred tons per vessel) to Fort George and would market the fur returns in Canton. ⁵⁵ Perkins would use the proceeds from fur sales to purchase Chinese goods such as teas, nankeens, and silks to be sold in Boston, and the North West Company would receive three-quarters of the profits. The Perkins concern would receive the remaining quarter of the net proceeds and the right to be the only company to ship skins collected by the North West Company from the trade of the Columbia. ⁵⁶

Simon McGillivray, a North West Company agent, worked with Edward Ellice to arrange the outfitting and select the cargo of the Colonel Allan. His arrangements with American shippers made future voyages of the brig to the Columbia Department unnecessary.

Oil on canvas,ca 1824, by Richard Ramsay Reinagle (1775–1862). Courtesy Fort William Historical Park, an attraction of the Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation. Collection of Library and Archives Canada, Acc. No. 1956-8-1

With no ship due in 1816, Keith saw an opportunity to advance the interests of the Company by shipping lower-grade skins to London, where he presumed the market to be no better than in Canton. ⁵⁷ The China market attracted luxurious sea otter pelts, of which there were very few remaining near the Columbia in 1816. Land furs, however, especially low-quality Columbia beaver, were little in demand in China and, Keith believed, could best be gotten rid of in the London auctions. ⁵⁸ While Keith had authority to make decisions regarding the North West Company's involvement with the I.E.C. venture and was lauded by William McGillivray for the choices he made, when he decided to send the previous winter's returns to London for sale, he ran the risk of exceeding that authority. In the same letter in which McGillivray congratulated him for his handling of the I.E.C. goods, the agent expressed concern about sending the returns to London. "We are fearful," McGillivray wrote, "that your shipment of Skins by the Colonel Allan to England may be considered by the House in Boston as an infringement of our arrangement with them...." ⁵⁹ Nothing more was said, because J. and T.H. Perkins and Company's first ship did not reach Fort George until June 1817, when their first vessel, the Alexander, arrived a few days after the appearance of the annual brigade from the interior and over six months after the departure of the Colonel Allan. Consequently, no umbrage was taken, but McGillivray's mention of it suggests that Keith acted on his own regarding the returns.

After several months of unloading and loading the ship, surveying the river's mouth, and taking time for a trading voyage to Monterey, the Colonel Allan was ready to embark for England. The most probable date of departure was late October or November 1816. In addition to the specie obtained in South America and the arms intended for sale in South America and the Cape of Good Hope, the ship's cargo included skins from 6,403 beavers, 10,993 muskrats, 17 bears, 62 martens, 345 minks, 80 fishers, 26 foxes, and 12 swans. ⁶⁰ No mention is made in surviving documents regarding the fate of the £300 in goods consigned for the Sandwich Islands. Presumably, those goods remained at Fort George for future sale upon the sailing of the Columbia for the Sandwich Islands. Whatever goods were acquired from the £300 consigned to the Sandwich Islands trade is unknown, as are the proceeds from the "private adventure" referred to in McGillivray's July 26, 1817, letter to Keith. In addition to the Columbia Department's returns, the Colonel Allan's cargo included the North West Company's share in the South American venture, which was valued at £7,340 and included dry goods, cutlery, clothing, muskets, swivels, small cannons, gunpowder, and liquor. ⁶¹

Unlike the voyage out, the Colonel Allan made a speedy return to London, arriving by May 28, 1817 — a trip of some seven months, assuming it departed in November. Because of the prevailing winds south of Cape Horn, east-to-west passages required lengthy tacking into a headwind, while on the return the trailing winds could help shorten the voyage by up to a month and a half. Anticipating this ahead of time, Captain McLennan would call at Buenos Aires to trade in munitions and still arrive in London at an early date.

According to historian Gordon Davidson, the furs the North West Company imported from the Columbia River to London in 1817 were valued at a little more than £1,458, a figure that reflects the amount upon which duty was paid, not the actual market value. ⁶² Keith gave an invoice value to the cargo of the Colonel Allan as £9,407, reflecting perhaps the difference between what was told to the insurance company and what was told to the customs agent. ⁶³ Citing a Customs House document, Davidson also reported that a little more than £347 Sterling in duty was charged. Unaccountably, the accounts signed by Inglis, Ellice and Company stated that 103 bales of furs carrying the mark "15/NW" per the Colonel Allan were charged only £315 in duty.

The accounts of Inglis, Ellice and Company are not always consistent. For example, while duty was paid on 10,993 "musquach" in May, the account of the August 21, 1817, sale shows 11,110 musquach off the Colonel Allan fetching prices that ranged from 9 1/2 to 11 pence per skin. Duty was paid on 6,403 beavers, yet the sale of these items on August 4 totaled 6,425 skins and brought between 12 and 25 shillings per pound. Twenty-six fox pelts were brought in but only 20 were sold at the August 21 sale. Three hundred and twenty-seven of the 345 minks were sold on that date, as were most of the bears, martens, and fishers. At the same sale, 18 swans were sold (duty was paid on only 17), as well as 4 cats and 1 wolf, of which no previous mention had been made.

After discounting 2 1/2 percent for insurance, the beaver pelts carried on the Colonel Allan brought a few shillings over £8,085. All the other furs brought in an additional £623 or so, again after discount. ⁶⁴ Not all of the Columbia River returns were sold in 1817, and items from the voyage continued to be offered for sale over the next few years. In the fall sale of 1818, for instance, an additional £387 was brought in from the bear skins delivered aboard the Colonel Allan. ⁶⁵ As late as November 30, 1819, an additional £541 was added to the account for the sale of unspecified items. ⁶⁶ It is impossible to say with any precision what the final figure of profit or loss was on the adventure of the Colonel Allan, but for the investors there was no question that the voyage was considered a total loss. ⁶⁷

A rough accounting of expenditures and income estimates a combined loss on both the fur trade and the South American speculation of over twenty-one thousand pounds.


Expenditures ⁶⁸		Income ⁶⁹

Cost of Colonel Allan	£11,692	London fur sales	£ 7,774
Value of South American		South American sales	8,346
and Sandwich Island goods	14,758	Colonel Allan valued at end of voyage	2,000
Value of Fort George goods	13,023	Estimated loss on both ventures	21,353
Total	£39,473	Total	£39,473

These figures are, of course, incomplete. The North West Company's accounting system was very rudimentary and did not always include costs such as commissions, insurance, payroll, or inventories. Compounding the inevitable inaccuracies in an imperfect accounting system was the mental instability of the company's chief accountant. In 1825, Thomas Thain, the North West Company's longtime accountant in Montreal, would sail for England to seek medical advice regarding what he called "brain fever." He left the company's accounts in such disarray that no one was ever able to sort them out. Committed to an asylum in Scotland in 1826, Thain died, quite mad, six years later. ⁷⁰

Because the stated quantity of imported goods varies from source to source, the actual number of pelts carried aboard the Colonel Allan may never be known with any precision. We also do not know whether or not they were all sold and at what prices. In fact, whether or not the brig was ever actually sold and its value realized remains a mystery. The last mention of the ship came from the pen of Simon McGillivray, who wrote James Keith informing him that the Colonel Allan had sailed from London before McGillivray's arrival from Montreal sometime during the winter of 1817–1818. McGillivray left unsaid for whom the brig sailed and its destination. What is known is that the Colonel Allan delivered up a cargo of Columbia furs to the London agents of the North West Company by May 1817 and that the agents considered the subsequent sales insufficient to cover expenditures.

Although the North West Company suffered a loss insofar as fur sales were concerned, the financial results of the "private venture" entered into by them and Inglis, Ellice and Company is somewhat more ambiguous. The Nor'Westers' share of the goods sent aboard the Colonel Allan for trade at the Cape of Good Hope and in South America was valued at about £6,548 Sterling. ⁷¹ The ship did not call at the Cape of Good Hope, but it did deliver the goods destined for South America to Buenos Aires in care of a certain John Faire early in 1817. As late as November 30, 1821, no remittances had been received since 1818, and £6,548 Sterling was written off as a total loss. ⁷² As definite as this stated loss is, however, it should not be taken at face value. A subsequent account, dated November 29, 1823, reveals that Delisle and Company and John Faire remanded funds totaling a little more than £544 along with goods (dry ox hides) valued at nearly £592, both in Sterling, so £1,136 should be subtracted from the presumed loss. ⁷³ It is not unreasonable to assume that other accounts, now lost, would alter the final accounting still further.

In any case, the North West Company considered the overall adventure a loss, in an amount probably in excess of twenty-one thousand pounds Sterling. The average prices received in London of eighteen shillings per pound were roughly equivalent to the prices that beaver skins went for in Canton. ⁷⁴ The change in markets did them little good. Yet, the idea of trading lower quality beaver in London and reserving fine beaver for other markets was sound, as the marketing strategy of the Hudson's Bay Company would later prove. The problem Edward Ellice and his Montreal colleagues faced was that the London market had not yet recovered sufficiently from the unsettling times resulting from the Continental and American wars. Their timing was off. They entered into the London market at a time when the prices paid for beaver were low. In addition, the Nor'Westers and their agents worried that the 1815 treaty between the United States and Britain, which reduced tariffs, would increase the supply of furs on the London market without creating a concomitant increase in demand. This would impair their trading advantage. In 1817, it was too early to know what the impact of this agreement would be on trade, and this uncertainty discouraged them from risking further experimentation in sending Columbia furs to London.

Had they persisted, the Nor'Westers might eventually have succeeded. The distrustful and unsettling residue left over from the war with the United States soon dissipated, and the increased American access to British markets proved of little consequence. Unfortunately for them, by the time the Colonel Allan reached London, the agreement with J. and T.H. Perkins and Company of Boston was a fait accompli. They had already committed themselves to supplying the Canton market using American shippers. The losses sustained on their two previous adventures to Canton led the Nor'Westers to offer the Boston company the value of one-fourth of the proceeds for freighting Columbia goods to Canton, purchasing China goods with the proceeds and then selling those goods in New England. That was a good deal for J. and T.H. Perkins and Company, for they were guaranteed a profit on each voyage while the Nor'Westers ran all the risks. The high price the Canadians were obliged to pay for freighting and marketing their furs succeeded in curtailing costs but not to the extent where they ever made a profit. When they entered the China market, the Nor'Westers anticipated prices of $5 or more per pelt but averaged only $3.50 over the eight years trading in Canton. ⁷⁵ The shipping agreement ran through 1822, however, and there was no way out. They had locked themselves into a losing proposition. As a consequence, the North West Company was never able to earn a profit from its "Adventure to the Columbia." In 1821, the Company was on the cusp of cutting its losses by withdrawing from the Columbia Department entirely when the Nor'Westers' merger with the Hudson's Bay Company intervened.

Notes

^1. The best description of Fort George is found in Peter Corney, "Narrative of a Voyage from London to the Columbia River ... ," London Literary Gazette, August 4–October 6, 1821, 481–3, 505–7, 522–4, 537–8, 551–2, 583–5, 600–601. The most recent edition is Peter Corney, Early Voyages in the North Pacific, 1813–1818 (1896; reprint, Fairfield, Wash.: Ye Galleon Press, 1965). See pp. 175–7 for Corney's description of Fort George. See also Ross Cox, The Columbia River, ed. Edgar I. and Jane R. Stewart (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), 70; and T.C. Elliott, "The Surrender at Astoria in 1818," Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 19:4 (December 1918): 271–82. For Cameron's arrival at Fort George, see D.4/116, fos. 49-50 and 56-57d, Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Winnipeg, Manitoba [hereafter HBCA].

^2. J. D. Cameron to The Governor and Council of the Northern Department, Rupert's Land, Fort George, Columbia River, April 3, 1822, HBCA, D.4/16, fos. 49-50d. An excerpt is in Frederick Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire: George Simpson's Journal ... 1824–25, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 176–7.

^3. There are two distinct inventories of the goods left at Fort George, Columbia River, by the North West Company in 1821. Two versions exist of the first, taken in the spring of 1821 by wintering partner James Keith. One, in HBCA, F.4/39, pp. 186–234, seems to have been a preliminary list and does not include values of the goods. The final Keith inventory with values added is in HBCA, F.4/54, pp. 1–55. A later inventory was taken in November 1821 by Archibald McDonald and John Lee Lewes of the Hudson's Bay Company without values stated. It is in HBCA, B.76/d/2, fos. 3d–32d. Although not as complete as Keith's final inventory (and considered by Chief Factor Cameron as "altogether a useless trouble to them"), this second accounting of the Columbia Department goods on hand does provide information on the amount sent to interior posts by the North West Company in the spring of 1821. Many of the goods complained of remained on hand through 1822 and probably longer. See HBCA, D.4/116, fo. 49d, B.76/d/6, fo.29. Just how long they remained in Columbia Department inventories remains uncertain.

^4. Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire, 71.

^5. See Richard Somerset Mackie, Trading beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific 1793–1843 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 251–2 for the improved returns from the Columbia between 1821 and 1843.

^6. See, for instance, John S. Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821–1869 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 82, and Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire, liii.

^7. Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire, xx–xxvi.

^8. Collection François-Louis-Georges Baby, Archives de Université de Montreal, Quebec [hereafter Baby Collection], g1/147, u/5943.

^9. See James L. Clayton, "The Growth and Economic Significance of the American Fur Trade, 1790–1890," in Aspects of the Fur Trade: Selected Papers of the 1965 North American Fur Trade Conference (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1967), 62–72. Although the North West Company had received congratulations from their London agents for the high prices brought in by the spring sale, by the time the Colonel Allan's furs reached the auction house in August 1817 prices had fallen and the furs were sold at a loss. Even in 1816, parchment beaver from other North West Company departments in North America had brought prices that ranged between twenty-seven and thirty-five shillings, although these prices were received in the spring when sales were typically higher. Inglis, Ellice and Company, the London agents for the North West Company, cautioned the Montreal fur traders "against forming too high expectations for your shipments of this year [1817]: unless some unlooked for occurrences should again happen to affect the market, we should think your calculations should not exceed 30/ for fine beaver." See Baby Collection, u/5937.

^10. In all, there were twenty-two restrictive clauses in the East India Company license. See National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC], Ellice Papers, A-19, 54, No. 19. In 1818, a ship named the Columbia in which the North West company had a partial interest carried supplies and provisions to Fort George. Because it had the same name and the same captain and was about the same size as an earlier Columbia, all deliberate coincidences, the company was able to avoid purchasing an East India Company license. See Baby Collection, u/5943.

^11. John Denis Haeger, John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1991), 101.

^12. During early negotiations with the East India Company over terms of the license, William McGillivray, the North West Company's principal agent in Montreal, wrote the wintering partners: "... the East India Company appear to be still favorably disposed — the certainty of getting Dollars in Canton for our Beaver Skins removed a Barrier which last year I thought unsurmountable" (William McGillivray to the Gentlemen Wintering Partners of the North West Company, London, April 9, 1812, NAC, Selkirk Papers, MG 19, E1, vol. 31, 9121–6). McGillivray was premature in making this judgment, as Article 8 of the license (signed the following January) makes clear. According to this restriction, the beaver skins could be sold only for bills of exchange at 365 days sight. (See NAC, Ellice Papers, A-19, 54, No. 19, pp. 1–2.) Consequently, an unprofitable arrangement was made even more unprofitable by keeping capital out of circulation and not earning interest. McGillivray's unfounded optimism misled at least one historian to assume this apparent concession was a fait accompli. See Barry M. Gough, The Northwest Coast: British Navigation, Trade, and Discoveries to 1812 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1992), 189 and n61.

^13. William McGillivray to James Keith, Fort William, July 26, 1817, James Keith Estate Papers, (MSS Davidson and Garden), 2769/I/57-1-4, University of Aberdeen Special Collections Library, Aberdeen, Scotland [hereafter UA, James Keith Papers].

^14. On the Isaac Todd, see L.R. Mason, Les Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Nord-Ouest, vol. 2 (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1960), 43–50; on the Columbia, see Corney, "Narrative," 481–3, 505–7, 522–4, 537–8, 551–2, 583–5 and 600–601.

^15. Alexander Ross, The Fur Hunters of the Far West, ed. Kenneth A. Spaulding (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 59–61. American historian Hubert Howe Bancroft wrote that "McTavish [J.G.] this year [1816] visited San Francisco and Monterey in the company's schooner Colonel Allan, lately arrived from London. On the coast of California he drove a lucrative business, selling English goods for needed supplies." See Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, vol. 1 (New York: Bancroft Company, n.d.), 264–5. Bancroft took this from Ross Cox, an apprentice clerk stationed in the interior at the time. What Cox actually wrote was, "Our friends at Fort George were all in prime health, and had weathered out the winter in a much more comfortable manner than we had. Mr. M'Tavish had made a trip in the Company's schooner to the southward, and touched at the Spanish settlements of Monterey and St. Francisco..." See Cox, Adventures on the Columbia River, vol. 2 (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831), 31. Cox does not name the vessel, something Bancroft apparently inferred, but does refer to it as a "schooner." The Company's "schooner" was the Columbia, which visited the California coast over the winter of 1815/16 and before the arrival of the Colonel Allan, which was in fact a brig. Bancroft went on to write: "The Colonel Allan sailed from the Columbia for China with furs and specie in August" (Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, 1:266). He apparently gleaned this from Alexander Ross, who himself was in error. The Colonel Allan never sailed for China, delivering its cargo in London in May 1817. See Baby Collection, g1/147.

^16. W. Stewart Wallace, ed., Documents Relating to the North West Company (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1934), 283.

^17. This arrangement was unique to the Colonel Allan. Two previous company vessels, the Isaac Todd and the Columbia, were purchased on behalf of the North West Company, and a subsequent vessel, the second Columbia, was owned by its captain, Anthony Robson, in which the London agents purchased a partial interest in the cargo for the North West Company. F.W. Howay stated that the first vessel named Columbia was also owned by Inglis, Ellice and Company, but it was purchased by them on behalf of the North West Company, as their account book for 1814 makes clear. See F.W. Howay, A List of Trading Vessels in Maritime Fur Trade, 1785–1825, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada, 1930–34; reprint, Kingston, Ont.: Limestone Press, 1973), 98; HBCA, F.4/4, p. 53.

^18. NAC, James Keith Memoranda Book, James Keith Estate Papers, A-676, A3, 31; Baby Collection, u/5929. It is necessary to distinguish between the James Keith Papers kept at the National Archives of Canada and those found in the Special Collections Library of the University of Aberdeen (UA). At some unknown time prior to my visit at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, in 1987, David Duniway of Salem, Oregon, the Oregon state librarian, microfilmed part but not all of the James Keith Estate Papers, a copy of which was deposited with what was then the Public Archives of Canada. Subsequently, the Keith Papers in Aberdeen were "disturbed," and a number of items, including the Memoranda Book, are now missing. The consequence is that some of the Keith Papers missing in Aberdeen are found on microfilm in Ottawa and some that Mr. Duniway failed to microfilm are found in Aberdeen.

^19. Baby Collection, u/3988; u/5929. Edward Ellice may have simply offered an estimate of the ship's size. Davidson claims that British Customs House records list a weight of 335 89/90 tons. See Gordon Charles Davidson, The North West Company (New York: Russell and Russell, 1918), 166.

^20. At this time, there were two London firms acting as agents for the North West Company: McTavish, Fraser and Company and Inglis, Ellice and Company. The former firm had been associated with the North West Company from its inception, and the latter, Ellice's firm, became involved when the North West Company merged with Sir Alexander Mackenzie and Company in 1804. With the merger, Sir Alexander Mackenzie and Company retained one-fourth interest in the newly formed company and Inglis, Ellice and Company acted in their behalf in London.

^21. HBCA, F.4/7, pp. 55–64; F.4/33, p. 141.

^22. The figures in this paragraph can be found in NAC, James Keith Papers, Memoranda Book, 31; Baby Collection, u/5929, u/3989; HBCA, F.4/7, p. 64.

^23.Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States of America, 1814–1925 (Ottawa: F. A. Acland, 1927), 1; Katharine B. Judson, "British Side of the Restoration of Fort Astoria," Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 20:3 (September 1919): 252, 259–60.

^24.Treaties, 9–12.

^25. Ibid., 10.

^26. Katharine B. Judson, "British Side of the Restoration of Fort Astoria — II," Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 20:4 (December 1919): 305.

^27. Ibid., 306.

^28. Ibid., 250–2; Frederick Merk, The Oregon Question: Essays in Anglo-American Diplomacy and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 10–12.

^29. See Judson, "British Side" 20:3 (September 1919): 254–60. Simon McGillivray's lobbying activities were influenced by a pamphlet titled "On the Origin and Progress of the North-West Company of Canada," first published anonymously in London in 1811 but written by his brothers Duncan and William. See Marjorie Wilkins Campbell, McGillivray, Lord of the Northwest (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1962), 163–5.

^30. Baby Collection, u/5929.

^31. Ellice was left with the responsibility of finding gunners competent with such weaponry, to which end he used his contacts in the army to procure two men with appropriate experience and who could double as clerks while assigned to Fort George. See Baby Collection, u/3990; u/3989.

^32. Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire, 65.

^33. Baby Collection, u/5929. The captain's name is sometimes spelled McLellan.

^34. While a complete manifest has not been found, a partial inventory of goods remaining at Fort George from the original invoice of the Colonel Allan can be found in HBCA, F.4/7, pp. 45–54.

^35. Baby Collection, u/3989.

^36. Ibid., u/5929.

^37. Ibid., u/3989.

^38. Ross, Fur Hunters, 59.

^39. NAC, James Keith Papers, Memoranda Book, 46.

^40. Ross, Fur Hunters, 59. The Tonquin took just under seven months to make the voyage in 1810–1811. See Gabriel Franchére, Journal of a Voyage on the North West Coast of North America during the Years 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814, ed. W. Kaye Lamb (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1969), 49, 72–3.

^41. Ross, Fur Hunters, 59; NAC, James Keith Papers, Memoranda Book 27, 31.

^42. Ross, Fur Hunters, 59.

^43. Marion O'Neil, "The Maritime Activities of the North West Company, 1813 to 1821," Washington Historical Quarterly 21 (1930): 264.

^44. Corney, Early Voyages, 108-11.

^45. Ibid., 118.

^46. Ibid., 162–73.

^47. O'Neil, "Maritime Activities," 264. Perhaps the first name of the Colonel Allan's captain was Daniel, resulting in the reference to "Captain Mr. Danials."

^48. Jennifer S.H. Brown, "Duncan McDougall," The Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 526.

^49. Corney, Early Voyages, 41–2.

^50. The North West Company's account books referred to Atlantic seaboard South American ports as "the Brazils," irrespective of the actual colony in which they were located.

^51. Initial approval for the North West Company's assuming a share of the risk in this venture was made by the partners when they met at Fort William in July 1815. See Baby Collection, u/5929. Final implementation, however, had to be left to the wintering partner on the spot at the time of the arrival of the Colonel Allan.

^52. McGillivray to Keith, July 26, 1817, UA, James Keith Papers. McGillivray added, "The purchase was certainly the cheapest ever made by the North West Company — but it will not be regretted by the shippers considering who the purchasers were — more particularly as much handsome profits had been made by the sale of other goods." The "other goods" may very well have been the muskets and powder sold in South America. The shippers, no doubt, refer to Inglis, Ellice and Company and the purchasers to the North West Company, for whom they were the London agents.

^53. HBCA, F.4/7, pp. 55–61. The legacy of this adventure of the brig Colonel Allan survived for years. The inventory at Fort George taken by the Hudson's Bay Company in 1821 upon its merger with the North West Company included an assortment of goods carrying the I.E.C. logo, such as table forks and, of course, the two eighteen-pound cannon with 120 rounds of shot and 120 rounds of canister shot. (See HBCA, F.4/39, pp. 191, 209–34, and F.4/55, pp. 1–55.) Perhaps the suit of mail armor found in the same inventory and so much ridiculed by servants of the Hudson's Bay Company was part of this consignment.

^54. HBCA, F.4/7, pp. 62–4.

^55. Exactly when in 1815 the agreement was finalized remains unclear. As late as November 14, the Americans hinted at some equivocation when they wrote William McGillivray, "Upon reflecting upon the subject we concluded that if we undertake the business in question we should, after landing your goods, proceed to the North for Sea-Otter, & return at an appointed time, to take y'r investment" (emphasis added). An excerpt is in L. Vernon Briggs, History and Genealogy of the Cabot Family, 1475–1927, 2 vols. (Boston: Charles E. Goodspeed and Co., 1927), 549.

^56. McGillivray to Keith, July 26, 1817, UA, James Keith Papers.

^57. Whether Keith had the authority to determine the Colonel Allan's destination is problematical, but he certainly must have been aware, as was his predecessor, J.G. McTavish, that there was no chance of any other ship calling at Fort George that year to dispose of the previous winter's returns. See William McGillivray to James Keith, Fort William, July 28, 1816, James Keith Papers, University of Aberdeen (MSS Davidson & Garden) 2769/I/57/4. Without specific directions and being the only partner on the spot, he made the decision to involve the North West Company in Ellice's scheme and to send that year's returns to London.

^58. As an example of the prices for various furs on the Canton market, see the letter from Perkins and Company of Canton to J. and T.H. Perkins and Company of Boston, February 28, 18