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The Numbers Game:
Health Issues in the Army that Burgoyne Led to Saratoga
Paul Kopperman, Department of History, Oregon State University, Corvallis
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Surgical field case used during the American Revolution. Courtesy of the Armed Forces Medical Museum of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C.
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| During 1776, Lieutenant General John Burgoyne played a significant role in the campaign to drive from Canada the remnant of the American army that had invaded the year before. Burgoyne then spent the winter in London, promoting a plan to lead an army from Canada through the Hudson Valley to Albany. If successful, his enterprise would drive a wedge between New England—the core of the American rebellion—and the other colonies. Similar expeditions had been proposed before, and Sir Henry Clinton, second only to Sir William Howe in the British chain of command, traveled to England that winter to promote a similar scheme, with himself at the head. Burgoyne preceded Clinton to London, however, and won the command. His expedition was to be part of a three-pronged enterprise. A force of about two thousand men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger, was to create a diversion by marching through the Mohawk Valley as Burgoyne moved south. At Albany, the two armies would join. A much more powerful army, commanded by Howe, was to move up through the Hudson Valley and likewise meet Burgoyne at Albany. |
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Burgoyne returned to Canada in early May. On June 15, the main body of his army departed St. Johns, and by evening advanced units were making camp at the northern end of Lake Champlain. Burgoyne was optimistic, and his mood was shared by many officers and men who served under him. John Macnamara Hayes, a hospital surgeon, wrote that the general would "doubtless ... meet with his Wish'd for Success."1 |
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At first the enterprise proceeded smoothly. After an easy passage down Lake Champlain, the army gathered in late June at Crown Point, which the small American garrison had abandoned as the British approached. On July 2, Burgoyne's army moved to invest Fort Ticonderoga, which was much more heavily manned, but there was little fighting, and the Americans slipped out at night on July 5, as the siege was tightening. A detachment then pursued the retreating Americans southeast, and the first major fighting of the campaign took place on July 7, at Hubbardton, where a British force of 750 men, later reinforced by a German contingent, defeated and scattered the Americans after sharp fighting. The next day, at Fort Anne, about 550 Americans attacked a detachment of the 9th Foot, 190 strong, but were repulsed. After this early action, however, the fortunes of Burgoyne's army changed decisively for the worse. At Bennington, on August 16, a large detachment that he had sent out, composed primarily of Germans, was heavily defeated. September 19 saw Burgoyne's forces engage the Americans at Freeman's Farm. Although the affair was indecisive militarily, it was bloody, and Burgoyne's losses could not be replaced. The move south for the British forces now became a desperate race toward Albany, but after the Americans inflicted a crushing defeat at Bemis Heights, on October 7, Burgoyne turned back. The enemy pursued, surrounding the British at Saratoga. There, a council of officers agreed on October 12 to negotiate terms of capitulation with the commander of the American forces, Major General Horatio Gates. The result was the Convention, signed on October 17. Burgoyne and his men now marched into captivity. The effect of Burgoyne's surrender—he himself rejected the term—so harmed the British cause that it has prompted a modern biographer to characterize him as "the man who lost America."2 |
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While reviews of the military progress of the Burgoyne expedition are legion, little has been written about the medical history of the enterprise.3 This gap is significant, because it may well be argued—and I, indeed, will argue—that health considerations were pivotal in the defeat of Burgoyne. Furthermore, the history of this expedition provides insight into the difficulties of maintaining an eighteenth-century army on the march.4 |
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Burgoyne's advance over Lake Champlain led southward to Forts Crown Point and Ticonderoga, following the invasion route of 1776, when the British had defeated a rebel fleet at the battle at Valcour Island before being forced by cold weather to withdraw back to Canada.
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After capturing Crown Point and Ticonderoga, Burgoyne planned to advance over Lake George to the Hudson Valley.
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Sickness, Injury, and Eroding Numbers | |
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It was not inevitable that Burgoyne would lose his army. At least until mid-September, when he crossed the Hudson, he could at any time have withdrawn to safety. Nevertheless, by the beginning of September, if not indeed a month earlier, he had little real prospect of achieving his objective of splitting the colonies down the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River corridor. The reason lay in numbers: his and his enemy's. |
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Until shortly before he turned over his army at Saratoga, Burgoyne never imagined that he would face the Americans alone. However, contrary to the plan that had been formulated in London, neither St. Leger nor Howe joined forces with him. In finalizing that plan, Lord George Germain, secretary of state for the colonies, neglected to tell Burgoyne that he had already approved of Howe's plan to move on Philadelphia. On May 18, he wrote to Howe, to urge—not order—the general to complete his enterprise in time to meet Burgoyne. The letter, however, was not delivered until August 16, when Howe was about to embark, and he did not choose to alter his plans in order to accommodate Germain.5 For his part, St. Leger started late, and although in August he attempted to wrest two strongholds from American control he failed in both efforts. Soon afterwards, he returned to Canada.6 |
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Despite the withdrawal by St. Leger, Burgoyne continued to believe that help was on the way. As late as October 3, he informed his men, "There is reason to be assured, that other powerful Armies are actually in cooperation with these Troops."7 Nevertheless, as the situation of his army degenerated, he became anxious that relief come promptly. On September 28, he dispatched a message to Clinton, who had remained in New York with a small force when Howe moved on Philadelphia. Pleading for assistance, Burgoyne insisted "that he would not have given up his communications with Ticonderoga had he not expected a cooperating army at Albany." Clinton responded by leading a force up the Hudson in an attempt to draw off American forces. He succeeded in seizing two forts from the Americans, but with his limited manpower he could go no further.8
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While Burgoyne waited in vain for relief, Gates's army grew rapidly. At the time that the Convention was sealed, the American force included more than 14,500 regulars and militia, outnumbering its enemy by more than three to one. During much of the campaign, however, it was Burgoyne who enjoyed a superiority in numbers. Only during the final two months did the Americans come first to match, then exceed, and finally gain a great advantage over their enemy.9 This development came mainly because the American force was growing, but Burgoyne's army, particularly the portion that could bear arms, was progressively shrinking. |
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The army that originally left Canada was formidable. On March 26, Germain prepared a list of instructions for Sir Guy Carleton, the governor of Canada and commander-in-chief of the army there. He directed Carleton to hold 3,770 troops in Canada, while Burgoyne took southward an army of 7,173 men, most of them British regulars and German allied troops. Carleton came through, especially in providing regulars. The army that encamped before Ticonderoga on July 1 included 3,724 British troops, 3,016 Germans, and roughly 250 Canadians and Provincials and 400 native warriors.10 Seven full regiments were assigned to Burgoyne's army: the 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 47th, 53rd, and 62nd Foot. These were supplemented by the elite flank companies (the grenadiers and light infantry) of the regiments that remained in Canada.11 |
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After Ticonderoga was taken, Burgoyne felt compelled to leave the 53rd behind to garrison it. He hoped that forces would soon arrive from Canada to assume this duty, so that the 53rd could rejoin his army, but Carleton declined his request, noting both his own manpower needs and a lack of authority to order forces out of Canada.12 Furthermore, on September 18, the Americans captured four companies from the 53rd, an event that compelled Carleton to employ whatever manpower could be spared by reinforcing Ticonderoga, rather than Burgoyne' s army.13 During the balance of the campaign, detachments would drain the regiments that remained with Burgoyne, and especially so the 47th, which had only two companies available to fight at Saratoga, the rest having been left behind on garrison duty or to protect the supply lines.14 Other men were detailed as officers' servants or were sent on command.15 The various subtractions, particularly the removal of the 53rd and most of the 47th, deprived Burgoyne of more than one-third of the British forces that had departed from Canada with him. |
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Beyond these cuts, however, the erosion in numbers came primarily through either sickness or injury. To judge the proportion of cases in each category, it is useful to divide the expedition into two chronological periods, before and after the crossing of the Hudson by Burgoyne's army, on September 13–14. |
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The initial health status of Burgoyne's army appears to have been relatively good. A number of sources indicate that the men who would accompany Burgoyne on his march had enjoyed a quiet winter in 1776–77. The weather was mild, by Canadian standards, and the regiments appear to have had adequate provisions, accommodations, clothing, and fuel. As one reporter, evidently a British officer, later recalled: "The Winter passed in the most profound tranquillity."16 |
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The period in winter quarters was a time for healing, but also for sickness. According to Captain Georg Pausch, who commanded an artillery regiment from Hanau, a number of his men were hospitalized for dysentery and some suffered the emotional distress of homesickness, as well. Many of men in the Brunswick regiment commanded by Colonel Johann Friedrich Specht were suffering from scurvy as they arrived from Europe, and some had died in passage. Furthermore, the disease continued to be a problem through the winter. The British likewise suffered, as scurvy afflicted men of the 20th and 21st Foot, but these troops were cured by fresh provisions and spruce beer.17 |
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The state of Carleton's army on the eve of Burgoyne's departure appears to have been moderately good, but there is evidence of lingering health problems. In his journal entry of June 2, Pausch noted that on some days he had a dozen men confined to barracks with diarrhea.18 A return often British regiments under Carleton's command as of May 1, 1777, provides a total of 4,425 men fit for duty, 377—8.01 percent of the total—sick. In the seven regiments that Burgoyne would take with him, the proportions were similar: 3,205 fit and 270 (7.77 percent) sick.19 For men fresh from winter quarters in Canada, these numbers were just fair, but Burgoyne himself commented, shortly after returning from Britain: "The troops are in a state of health almost unprecedented."20 |
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Regardless of unit, the men who were too ill to march were left behind in hospital. Other men who were sickly, but who at the time did not require hospitalization, were assigned to additional companies, to be held in reserve and called up if needed. In a letter that he wrote to Germain on May 22, Carleton reported that the men who composed these companies were "the sick, infirm, and such as the Regiments usually disburthen themselves of, in like occasions."21 Five weeks later, Major General William Phillips, Burgoyne's second-in-command, advised Carleton to send the companies from six regiments—for some reason, not including the 24th—to Montreal, where the hospital was centered and there were good barracks, for they were "composed of the sick of each of the Six Regiments."22 |
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On June 22, Burgoyne reported to Germain from River Bouquet that despite the delays associated with difficulties in transport, "The health and zeal of the army afford a fair promise of compensating all deficiencies."23 It does appear that the troops that Burgoyne had taken with him enjoyed good health during the first weeks of the march. A monthly return, dated July 1, at Ticonderoga—before the fort was invested—reflects an army that was still healthy, having just recently divested itself of sick men. Among the British troops, 3,252 were categorized as fit for duty, as opposed to 40 men sick in hospital, 87 sick in quarters.24 Of a total of 3,379 men, only 3.76 percent were sick. |
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Three later returns, however, depict an army that was declining in both health and numbers. The first, prepared at Fort Edward on August 4, specifies 2463 British soldiers as fit, 284 in hospital, 148 sick in quarters; of the 2,895 total, 14.92 percent were sick or wounded. Another return, completed at some point in early September while the army was based at Duer's House, continues the trend down in numbers, up in illness and injury: 2,308 British troops fit, 180 in hospital, 294 sick in quarters, 17.03 percent of the total (2,782) sick or wounded. On September 15, after Burgoyne's army had crossed the Hudson, a return was prepared at Saratoga. The numbers were in this case somewhat better: 2,565 fit, 249 in hospital, 152 sick in quarters, 13.52 percent sick or wounded among the total of 2,966.25 The army had recently been augmented by troops from additional companies—new recruits from Britain—and this in part accounts for the slight increase in size, though perhaps detached units had rejoined as well. The return does, however, suggest that the army was somewhat healthier. It also indicates that troops that were seriously ill were hospitalized and left behind as Burgoyne prepared to cross the Hudson.26 |
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Certainly the wounds of battle account in part for the decline in health and numbers. The British units that were involved at Hubbardton, their grenadier and light infantry battalions, lost 23 officers and men killed and 127 wounded.27 The fighting near Fort Anne left 38 officers and men killed or wounded.28 At Bennington, both the intensity of combat and the casualties were far higher, as Burgoyne's army lost 205 killed or wounded and 700 captured.29 Almost the entire loss in this case was among German troops, who comprised the preponderant majority of the force dispatched by Burgoyne. |
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Even including casualties suffered in a few skirmishes, however, the evidence suggests that prior to September 15, the British component of Burgoyne's army lost no more than 180 wounded. Some men would also have been hurt in accidents. Nevertheless, a sizeable majority of those tended by medical staff during this period were treated not for wounds but for disease. It appears that two epidemics were responsible for most of the sickness that required medical attention. At Ticonderoga, a fever, probably malaria, decimated the garrison, especially the 53rd Foot and the hospital at Mount Independence. Robert Knox, the physician on site during the early stages of the outbreak, observed that "fortunately the fevers were generally not fatal."30 It is uncertain whether the epidemic followed Burgoyne's army, but given the swarms of mosquitoes that afflicted the forces—undoubtedly including vectors for malaria—it is probable.31 Like malaria, dysentery was a constant problem and occasionally a killer. According to an unidentified German soldier, during August "dysentery raged among us."32 Diarrhea, which had afflicted the army for months, was probably a third disease that required treatment and in severe cases hospitalization. |
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After crossing the Hudson, Burgoyne's army endured two very costly battles within three weeks. At Freeman's Farm, the 20th, 21st, and 62nd bore the brunt of the fighting, while the 24th, the light infantry, and the grenadiers were somewhat less involved, and the Germans remained largely out of the action because of their situation relative to the battlefield. Burgoyne's army suffered roughly 160 dead, 364 wounded, and 109 missing.33 Captain John Money later asserted that in the wake of battle the 62nd reportedly included "not 100 rank and file."34 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kingston, who had served as adjutant general on the expedition and also as Burgoyne's secretary, reported in 1779 that entering the action at Freeman's Farm, the four line regiments (the 9th, 20th, 21st, and 62nd) had totaled only about 1,100 men, of whom 76 were killed in the battle, 240 to 250 were wounded, and 28 to 30 went missing or captured. The 20th, he reported, had been much thinned in the battle, while the 62nd was left with only 50 to 60 men. The return for September 15 found about 1,200 men fit in the advanced corps, which consisted primarily of the 24th, the light infantry, and the grenadiers. Kingston recalled being told by a surgeon that in the wake of action on September 19, more than 500 men were in the hospital.35 It appears that in early October some men who had been wounded at Freeman's Farm rejoined their units, though the number, or even whether it represented a significant augmentation, is unknown.36 This quick turnaround—wounded troops released after only about two weeks of treatment—may suggest that hospital staff or the line command saw a need to reclaim for service every man who was not obviously incapacitated. In any case, a return of Burgoyne's forces, perhaps the last drawn before the Convention, reveals an army significantly eroded in numbers, particularly of soldiers fit for duty: 2,126 British soldiers fit, 534 hospitalized, 160 sick in quarters, 2,820 total, 24.61 percent sick or wounded.37 This return was prepared at Freeman's Farm on October 7, prior to Bemis Heights, which took place that afternoon and was the most lopsided battle of the campaign. Burgoyne lost 184 killed, 264 wounded, and 183 taken prisoner, while American losses were about 30 killed, 100 wounded. Of the total casualties, which included many Germans, British losses were 90 killed, 197 wounded.38 Even beyond the cost of that battle, more than a week of heavy exertion and incessant bombardment remained before the Convention was concluded, and undoubtedly many soldiers fell ill or were wounded during this time.39 Quite possibly, one-third, perhaps two-fifths, of the British regulars were incapacitated by illness or injury at the time of Burgoyne's surrender. |
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Burgoyne reported his total casualties as of October 12 to be 353 killed, 802 wounded, 59 captured. German casualties for the campaign he then totaled as 29 killed, 98 wounded, 211 captured. Both sets of figures appear to be too low, and dramatically so in the case of the Germans. Burgoyne noted that many men were lost during the few days between October 12 and the Convention, owing to casualties and desertion.40 The total number of British dead over the course of the march, including deaths from disease, probably exceeded 500, and it certainly did so if the number of soldiers who died subsequently of diseases or wounds incurred on the march is figured in. |
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Medical Services | |
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The medical men who tended sick or wounded soldiers on the Burgoyne expedition were of two kinds. Highest in status were the senior officers—physicians, surgeons, apothecaries—of the general hospital. Hospital personnel were typically assigned the care of seriously ill or wounded patients. Senior staff also supervised the activities of hospital mates, nurses, and assorted servants and laborers. In a broad sense, they were expected to initiate and coordinate medical policy in the zone where the hospital was established. How much influence they had outside the hospital, however, and to some degree inside it as well, depended on the amount of support provided by general and field officers in their theater. If these officers cooperated, senior hospital personnel enjoyed considerable influence over the other class of medical men who routinely served on expeditions: regimental surgeons and mates. With some special cases aside, during the Revolution the establishment allowed for one surgeon and one mate per regiment of foot, but one post or the other, usually that of mate, might be vacant for an extended period. |
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Carleton allowed Burgoyne a free hand in planning the medical aspect of his expedition.41 It appears, however, that the latter exceeded the bounds that he considered reasonable, for on July 28, 1777, Carleton wrote to him: "I just learn ... that you have ordered the only surgeon which remained for the hospital in Canada, and four mates, to join your army; I thought that matter had been quite settled before you left the province, I therefore must imagine that some mistake has been made, or that your occation for them has been very urgent, in which case I hope you will send them back as they can be spared."42 |
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At the time of the expedition, the hospital in Canada was headed by a triumvirate: Hugh Alexander Kennedy, physician to the hospital and inspector of regimental infirmaries; Robert Knox, physician as well as inspector of the hospitals; and William Barr, hospital purveyor and surgeon. Knox and Barr generally served at the main hospital facility, in Montreal, while Kennedy remained at the other major one, in Quebec. Each of the three was contentious, and each was jealous of his authority and vied with the others to control the hospital. But when Knox gained his second commission, as inspector, in February 1777, "He took the lead," in Barr's estimate.43
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Knox organized the hospital that accompanied Burgoyne and he placed himself at the head. Barr attended, but he appears to have turned back at some point and did not accompany the army to Saratoga. Knox also designated for duty two surgeons, John Weir (who was attached to Burgoyne's staff) and John Macnamara Hayes; two apothecaries, Vincent Wood and Richard Monington; and fourteen mates.44 |
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There is no reason to believe that the medical staff that accompanied Burgoyne was not in general competent. In the days after the Convention had been sealed, James Thacher, a Continental surgeon, observed a number of operations by British and German medical officers, and he commented, "the English surgeons perform with skill and dexterity."45 The staff was led by experienced officers. Wood and Hayes were young (as were almost all of the mates), but both had served the hospital throughout the campaign of 1776. Knox, Barr, Weir, and Monington had already attended the army in some medical capacity for at least fifteen years. As a group, the men also had a commitment to medicine as a profession. Hayes would go on to have a long and distinguished career as a surgeon and a physician, both in the army and in civilian practice. Almost all of the medical officers whose careers were not cut short by death would continue to serve for the balance of the Revolution, and a majority—at least eight, perhaps ten—of those still alive in 1783 would continue in service or would return to duty during the French wars toward the close of the century. While Knox was the only officer in Burgoyne's hospital to hold an M.D. at the time of the expedition, Hayes would later acquire one, as would Weir, Monington, and two mates, Andrew Mackenzie Grieves and Charles Kerr. |
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In late July, Knox was taken by the fever that was sweeping Ticonderoga and, after battling the disease for several weeks he asked for and received Burgoyne's permission to return to Montreal.46 Wood assumed the rank of acting physician in the general's staff, probably after the departure of Knox.47 Nevertheless, it was Hayes who came to dominate the hospital. He may have had an advantage over Wood, and likewise Wier (who was also detached to the staff), in that he had headed Burgoyne's hospital during the campaign of 1776.48 |
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Seven surgeons and seven mates who served Burgoyne on a regimental level were present with the army when it was turned over at Saratoga. An eighth surgeon, Henry Seeley of the 9th, had been captured as he tended to a wounded officer on the battlefield at Fort Anne.49 It appears that his regiment either lacked a mate or that he did not accompany the march. Quite possibly, after the capture of Seeley a hospital mate was detached to act in his place, just as one of them, William Burke, served as surgeon to a brigade of grenadiers and light infantry. Of medical personnel listed in the Convention, each of the five surgeons attached to a foot regiment had at least six years of experience in the army, and three had ten or more. Most of the mates were young and four of the five had assumed their post only in 1776, though the fifth had been in place since 1769. All but two of the ten men would serve at least fifteen years and half more than twenty-five.50 The patterns suggest that the surgeons at least were experienced and the regimental staff at large saw army medical service as a long-term commitment, rather than as a way-station on the path to private practice. |
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On June 26, a hospital facility was established at Crown Point, but by July 3 the hospital was based at Three-mile Point, near Ticonderoga, and was intended to remain there until further orders.51 On the tenth, after the taking of Ticonderoga, a branch opened there, and a 230-bed facility—ironically, constructed by the Americans—was opened soon afterwards on Mount Independence, overlooking the fort.52 During August and early September, while Burgoyne was headquartered at Duer's House, the army maintained a hospital facility at Fort Miller, which was nearby. At least some of the Germans who were wounded at Bennington were treated there.53
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After Burgoyne crossed the Hudson, it became impossible to send sick or wounded troops back to a fixed hospital facility. Instead, as a German soldier observed, "Our hospital had to follow us, else it would have been captured by the enemy."54 Nevertheless, when he moved to Saratoga, Burgoyne gained some advantage. On the orders of Philip Schuyler—the village was also known as Schuylerville—a number of large, good structures had been built, and as Burgoyne's army approached they had been deserted by their occupants. One, a former barracks for Schuyler's workers, was a natural hospital facility and was so employed, as were several houses, during the last phase of the expedition.55 |
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In siting facilities, the hospital was not restricted to fixed structures. On marches or when base facilities were too distant or were overflowing with sick or wounded, it routinely made use of large tents, each of which was capable of accommodating twenty patients. Ten of these tents were taken by Burgoyne and some at least were used, for as the German surgeon Julius Friedrich Wasmus noted during the siege of Ticonderoga: "The English field hospital consists of very large tents."56 These tents were lost when Burgoyne capitulated, leaving a shortage in Canada that apparently was never rectified.57 |
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By contemporary standards, Burgoyne's army was well supported by medical personnel. Roughly speaking, there was one hospital or regimental medical officer per one hundred infantrymen. The number and proximity of fixed facilities was about what might have been expected, and tents allowed for emergency use in the field. Nevertheless, every battle in the campaign was the occasion for a breakdown in service. |
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In the wake of battle at Hubbardton, two hundred wounded men were left behind on the battlefield, with orders to surrender if the Americans attacked them. For these men, there was little shelter or medical assistance.58 On learning of the action, Hayes rode alone through the wilderness for twenty-five miles. He arrived on July 8 and five days later described to a correspondent the state of wounded troops there.
The Most of them are in sheds made of Boughs, which are no defence from rain, now wch unfortunately set in these three or four days past almost constantly. I have not a pleasing prospect of their recovery, and as Opportunity & their Situation admits, I send them to Mount Independant.... I never experienced more uneasiness at seeing the Wounded Suffer, nor do I wish ever to be in so disagreeable a Situation again, had I the Common Necessaries for their relief, I shd. not Complain, but without them, how great must Man's feelings be;—My hands embrued in Blood, My face as dirty & my beard as long as a Capuetien fryar with every thing filthy on me is my prest. Situation, nor can I help it, as my things are 25 Miles off.59 |
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The medical services at Fort Anne were no more effective. As has been noted, the 9th Foot, which bore the brunt of the fighting, had no surgeon's mate, at least in the field. Therefore, when Seeley was captured early in the action, the regiment was deprived of professional medical assistance. In the army, however, it was not unusual to find officers and soldiers filling the breech when medical staff were not present or were overwhelmed by circumstances. Sergeant Roger Lamb of the 9th, the noted chronicler of the war, recalled that during the action at Fort Anne,
It was a distressing sight to see the wounded men bleeding on the ground, and what made it more so the rain came pouring down like a deluge upon us; and still to add to the distress of the sufferers., there was nothing to dress their wounds, as the small medicine box which was filled with salve, was left behind with surgeon Shelly.... The poor fellows earnestly entreated me to tie up their wounds. Immediately I took off my shirt, tore it up, and with the help of a soldier's wife (the only woman that was with us, and who kept close by her husband's side during the engagement,) made some bandages, stopped the bleeding of their wounds, and conveyed them in blankets to a small hut about two miles in our rear.60 |
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It was only after several days that the wounded were removed to receive professional treatment. Some men were apparently carried by litter to Ticonderoga on the tenth, but it was not until the twenty-sixth that Burgoyne ordered a party of two hundred men to be sent out to remove the wounded to the facility at Mount Independence. Luckily, only three of the wounded died before they could rejoin the army.61 |
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During the last days of the campaign, the medical services were overwhelmed. After Freeman's Farm, the wounded were carried into a nearby valley and placed down next to a stream. A German soldier later recalled, "There were no houses to receive them, nor hands enough to bandage them all. So they had to lie in the open all that night, during which it was already bitterly cold and freezing, till one could put up tents for them next day."62 Thomas Anburey, an officer in the 24th, observed soldiers lying wounded in the field, "without any comfort, or a hospital to remove them to!"63 The day after the action he led a party to the battlefield to bury the dead and retrieve the wounded. Of the latter, he wrote,
They had remained out all night, and from the loss of blood and want of nourishment, were upon the point of expiring with faintness; some of them begged they might lie and die, others again were insensible, some upon the least movement were put into the most horrid tortures, and all had near a mile to be conveyed to the hospitals; others at their last gasp, who for want of our timely assistance must have inevitably expired. These poor creatures, perishing with cold and weltering in their blood, displayed such a scene, it must be a heart of adamant that could not be affected at it.64 |
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As of September 28, according to Baron von Riedesel, commander of the forces from Brunswick, Burgoyne's medical facilities were crowded with more than eight hundred British and German soldiers, most of them admitted for wounds, rather than disease, and this was in addition to "the sick who were with the regiment."65 The house occupied by his wife and children was filled with wounded and, apparently more numerous, with men who were ill with "camp sickness"—probably dysentery.66 |
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On October 8, after Bemis Heights, Burgoyne felt obliged to fall back toward Saratoga. In so doing, he left behind 460 sick and wounded men—a "very unhappy necessity," in the words of Anburey. He also left a message, which Hayes carried to Gates under a white flag: "Sir, the state of my hospital makes it more advisable to leave the wounded and sick officers whom you will find in my last camp than to transport them with the army. I recommend them to the protection which I felt I should show to an enemy in the same case." Of the response, Anburey wrote, "great praise is due to the humanity of General Gates, for upon the very first intelligence of it, he immediately sent forward a few light horse, to protect [the sick and wounded] from insult and plunder."67 Hayes himself was somewhat more measured. On October 9, he wrote to Burgoyne from Stillwater: "It is with pleasure I can assure your Excellency, that the Hospital has met with every Civility and Attention that I could possibly wish.... With respect to the Sick & Wounded, [Gates] has Order'd the Director General to furnish the Hospital, with every Assistance, that it may want, upon my Application to him." He added, however, that Gates also insisted that such assistance would be provided only if Hayes had the money to pay for it. On another issue, as well, Gage was adamant. It appears from Hayes's letter that Wood and Jonathan Potts, who directed the hospital that served Gates's army, had agreed that neither medical officers and nor hospitalized soldiers would be taken prisoner by the enemy. Nevertheless, Hayes reported to Burgoyne: "Agreeable to your Instructions, I explained to the General the predicament, Hospitals in all Country's ever were, when left for their protection, And that the Surgeons were not Considered as prisoners of War, but the Officers & Soldiers likewise; As also the Convention of Mr Wood with Dr Potts.—The General has given me for Answer, that it is his wish, a Cartel of that kind should take place with You & General Howe, And until such Cartel is fixed, he cannot help Considering the whole as prisoners of War."68 |
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The medical services were not equal to handling the burden they faced during the retreat to Saratoga. Reidesel observed: "Even for the wounded, no spot could be found which could afford them a safe shelter—not even indeed for as long a time as might suffice for a surgeon to bind up their ghastly wounds ... the sick men and wounded would drag themselves along into a quiet corner of the woods, and lie down and die upon the cold damp ground."69 Despite having left many sick and wounded troops behind when he retreated, Burgoyne had, by one report, 598 sick and wounded in camp, and many of these were being treated primarily if not entirely by nurses, the Baroness von Riedesel being the most prominent among them. The American assault continued. Some cannon shots came close to the hospital tents, which were pitched in an open field, and the British, thinking the enemy was mistaking the facilities for Burgoyne's quarters, felt compelled to move them. Several seriously wounded soldiers died during the relocation.70 |
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Conclusions: Health Issues in the Equation of Defeat | |
The medical record of the Burgoyne expedition was fair at best. As we have seen, the numbers of men who comprised the army and were fit to serve eroded rapidly, not just in the last weeks but across the summer, and the wake of every battle found the medical staff unable to cope with the predictable influx of wounded troops. Nevertheless, such data as exists regarding personnel—notably, dates and duration of service—suggests that both hospital and regimental staff were experienced and were dedicated to the service. Individually, they appear to have been capable. Nor was Burgoyne's army short staffed; on the contrary, the ratio of medical officers to troops was rather generous. The problem was not the quantity or the quality of personnel, but rather the nature and capability of medical services of the period. Even the most capable, best-equipped staff was likely to be overwhelmed by a severe epidemic or a major battle.
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It was inevitable that Burgoyne's men would sicken during the course of the march, and although various diseases appeared in epidemic form in armies of the period, the identity of the complaints that prevailed in his army was to be expected. Dysentery, which hit Burgoyne's army hard during the summer of 1777, was the classic "camp disease," and large forces on the march seldom completed a campaign without enduring at least one outbreak. Diarrhea was another constant. In June 1777, before the army left Canada, Pausch complained that many of his men were sick with "the bad, and in this country, the ever prevalent diarrhea."71 As for the malaria that decimated the forces at Ticonderoga in July and August of 1777, Knox wrote, "scarce one of fifty of the troops has escaped that disease in 12 months in any one period."72 |
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At first glance, it might appear that Burgoyne's army, as contrasted to the forces commanded by Gates, suffered sickness disproportionately. According to a return of October 16, the American army included 13,216 rank and file fit for duty, 622 sick-present, and 731 sick-hospital, the total of sick and wounded representing 9.29 percent of the whole.73 While the totals for Burgoyne's army as of that date would have been considerably worse, a high proportion, perhaps a majority, of the Americans had only recently joined the effort, and in general they had started out healthy as they moved to join Gates. By contrast, Burgoyne's forces had endured four months on the march. Furthermore, they had suffered far higher casualties than had the Americans at Bemis Heights and had lost still more men killed or wounded during the climactic bombardment of Saratoga. |
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Years later, Lamb recalled the Burgoyne expedition as an episode "perhaps unequalled in the military, that notwithstanding so long and continued a scene of unceasing fatigue, hardship and danger, finally ending in general ruin and captivity, not a single voice was heard throughout the army, to upbraid, to censure, or blame their general."74 If he underestimated criticism of Burgoyne, he did so only slightly.75 It is indeed remarkable that a campaign that failed so dramatically and was attended by so much death and hardship should not have turned more men and officers against the officer in command. But there seems to have been sincere affection between Burgoyne and the officers and men who served under him. |
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Burgoyne appears to have cared deeply about the medical needs of his troops. He took care in setting up his hospital, and issued orders encouraging personal and camp hygiene.76 When on July 23 he ordered his army on, he left a 150-man detachment at Skenesborough, including men with flux.77 He tended to cooperate with hospital staff. On July 18, he ordered: "The Inspector of the Hospital [i.e. Knox] having represented that two women from each Battalion of the Army will be absolutely necessary to take care of the Sick and Wounded, the Commanding Officers of Corps will give their Directions accordingly."78 On September 6, responding to a request from the hospital surgeons, he ordered that ten provincials be detached as hospital storekeepers.79 He also showed his solicitousness toward the sick by ordering that they receive a half-pound of meat daily.80 As the campaign progressed, both the British and the Americans made prisoners of enemy sick and wounded, then treated but did not release them.81 In early September, Burgoyne requested that a British medical officer of Gates's choosing be allowed to visit sick captives at Stillwater. On September 7, under a flag of truce, Wood undertook the mission, then remained behind to treat the men.82 |
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Many officers who served under Burgoyne shared his concerns for sick and wounded troops. In August, Anburey defended his decision to wait for supplies, rather than move quickly to Albany, and noted, "the army could no more proceed without hospital stores than it could without provisions, for depend upon it, the general who carries troops into fire without precautions to alleviate the certain consequences is sure to alienate their affections and damp their ardour."83 According to William Digby, an officer in the 53rd Foot, in the wake of Freeman's Farm, "Some few thought we should be ordered to retreat suddenly under cover of some dark night, but that was not thought probable, as it would be cruel to leave the great numbers of sick and wounded we had in such a situation."84 |
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Even in the best of circumstances, marches meant exposure, and Burgoyne's expedition scarcely represented the best. It was first delayed by incessant rain, which made available roads impassable.85 Heavy rain likewise fell at intervals throughout the march.86 Alternately, the weather was so hot that some men undressed and were badly sunburned.87 Whatever the weather, the troops were often exposed to it. The forces that pursued Americans who had retreated from Ticonderoga left their tents behind in order to move faster, and in consequence endured at least one night of lying out in the rain. During the chaotic final days at Saratoga, they again abandoned their tents.88 Just as it was likely that troops on the march would be exposed to harsh weather, so was it the case that many men would break down from exertion. British soldiers on the march were routinely burdened by about sixty pounds of accouterments and provisions, the Germans even more. According to Anburey, Burgoyne's men often discarded provisions, to lighten the load.89 |
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While it was inevitable that the men would suffer significant fatigue, Burgoyne may have made the problem worse. He was widely blamed for taking along too much artillery, which both slowed the march and inflicted fatigue.90 Possibly, too, he made poor choices in determining the route for his army. On the way to Ticonderoga, he ordered that the men be transported by water as much as possible, but this proved to be the only phase of the expedition that the troops would have found easy.91 After taking Ticonderoga, Burgoyne opted to order that the troops march to Fort Anne and then Fort Edward. The route was arduous, for as Burgoyne himself reported to Germain on July 11, the men had to undertake "clearing of fallen trees, sunken stones and other obstacles, to give passage to batteaux carrying artillery, stores, provision, and camp equipage. These are laborious works."92 Some observers were later to criticize him for this decision, arguing that he could have fallen back to Ticonderoga, then taken his army down Lake George to Fort George, and proceeded from there to Fort Edward by a wagon road. Burgoyne defended his decision, asserting, first, that moving back to Ticonderoga might have been interpreted by the troops as a retreat, and this would have demoralized them. He further claimed that it was preferable to keep pressure on the Americans, and a retrograde move, even though temporary, would have enabled them to rally. As proof that his decision was wise, Burgoyne noted that the Americans chose to abandon Fort George and burn their fleet on the lake, rather than offer resistance.93 |
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The difficulty of passage was exacerbated by the retreating Americans. Burgoyne observed to Germain, "The country being a wilderness, in almost every part of the passage the enemy took the means of cutting large timber trees on both sides the road so as to fall across and lengthways with the branches interwoven. The troops had ... layers of these to remove in places where it was impossible to take any other direction."94 Nor was this burden the only way in which the Americans contributed to British fatigue. Defending himself before the House of Commons in 1779, Burgoyne observed that while his army moved little September 20 through October 7, the inactivity was far from restful, for "not a night passed without firing ... it was the plan of the enemy to harass the army by constant alarms, and their superiority of numbers enabled them to attempt it without fatigue to themselves."95 In his testimony before the House, the Earl of Harrington, an aide-de-camp during the campaign, asserted that after the men arrived back in Saratoga on October 9, they "certainly must have been much fatigued, from the length of time they had been under arms, and more particularly so from the badness of the roads occasioned by the rains."96 Burgoyne even justified his decision to surrender in part on the "exhausted situation" of his troops.97 As he reported to a political ally back in Britain, he had himself dictated the Convention after seeing "the troops ... exhausted with watchfulness of many days and nights under arms."98 |
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Aside from short marches, the core of Burgoyne's army remained almost stationary during much of the summer. It was encamped at Fort Edward from July 30 to August 13 and then at Duer's House until September 10, when Burgoyne prepared to cross the Hudson. Eighteenth-century armies tended to move slowly but, even by the standards of the time, Burgoyne's progress was glacial. Charles Stedman, an officer who served in America but not under Burgoyne, complained, "If general Gates himself, it was said, had directed his operations, he could not have planned measures more conducive to the completion of his own views."99 That Burgoyne proceeded so slowly is primarily to be explained by his efforts to relieve a chronic shortage of provisions. Ultimately, therefore, a health consideration determined the pace. |
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Supply problems were nothing new to the British, and to some degree they were an issue in every major enterprise, but planning for the supply of Burgoyne's army was almost remarkably poor. It was only a few weeks before the march began that the army began to contract for provisions. Furthermore, Burgoyne proceeded on the assumption that he could acquire the horses and wagons needed to transport supplies when he was in New York. In point of fact, he obtained neither wagons nor horses in sufficient numbers, and many of the horses were weak. His men were consequently forced to carry or drag supplies, a process that both slowed the march and increased fatigue.100 |
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Supply was a concern almost from the outset. When the army seized Ticonderoga, it gained, according to Burgoyne, "provision and military stores to a very large amount." But the windfall in supplies did not follow Burgoyne's forces as they pursued the Americans, and in the wake of Hubbardton he found the army "much fatigued, many parts of it having wanted their provisions for two days."101 Continuing supply problems prompted one of Burgoyne's most controversial and pivotal decisions: the attempt to seize provisions from the Americans. As he explained to Germain in a letter written August 20, even after the heavy exertions by his troops in early August, "there were not above four days provision beforehand nor above ten batteaux in the Hudson's River." Rather than further deplete an army that was already small by detaching men to guard extended supply lines, he had then determined to raid the American camp at Bennington, where the enemy kept their cattle, as well as grain and carriages. The disastrous conclusion of the enterprise led Burgoyne to observe: "The chief cause of regret on our side, after that which any loss of gallant men naturally occasions, is the disappointment of not obtaining live cattle and the lapse of time in bringing forward the magazines."102 |
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At Fort Edward, the army was painstakingly supplied. By an order of August 18, all transport was given over to bringing in provisions. By September 13, Burgoyne was confident that about thirty days of provisions were on hand, and the army proceeded.103 But he may have miscalculated. Already on September 20, a German grenadier complained that the army was "lacking supplies."104 On October 3, Burgoyne ordered a reduction in rations.105 Compounding earlier difficulties, Burgoyne had, by crossing the Hudson, seriously compromised his supply lines. Increasingly, the batteaux that were transporting supplies came under fire from the Americans.106 |
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Just as the American strategy of blocking Burgoyne's route with felled trees intensified fatigue, so were the Americans effective in exacerbating the supply problem. In a letter written to Germain on July 30, Burgoyne ridiculed as "an act of desperation and folly" the Americans' practice of driving cattle before them as they retreated. Yet, by implication he acknowledged the success of that strategy. Loyalist refugees in the area were coming to the British for food, and he was having difficulty in supplying them. He concluded, "I can only hope that when I penetrate into a country better adapted to manoeuvre I may obtain a supply that shall answer the purposes of army and inhabitants."107 In the end, Burgoyne recognized the American strategy as so successful that he conjectured that even if his army had reached Albany, "the enemy finding the British army unsupplied, would only have had to compel the Tories to drive the cattle and destroy the corn or the corn mills, and the convention of Albany instead of Saratoga must have followed."108 |
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By the modest standards of men who commanded British armies during the Revolution, Burgoyne was aggressive. He ordered the raid on Bennington, while many subordinate officers opposed the move, and he did not seek counsel from other officers before directing his army to cross the Hudson.109 Both decisions—as well as others—were questioned at the time and have been since. Both risked lives when the odds against success were considerable. Paradoxically, however, Burgoyne was a compassionate commander who genuinely cared about the health and well-being of his troops. It is therefore ironic that he saw an army beset by disease, death, and collapsing numbers. His strategic decisions contributed to the problem. So did the Americans, not only on the battlefield but through practices that exacerbated fatigue and supply problems. So did the disease-related issues inherent in a campaign, and especially in a long march through wilderness. The health problems that Burgoyne faced were to be expected. But this does not lessen their role as a central determinant in his defeat. |
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1. Hayes to Sir Charles Mellish, Montreal, June 8, 1777, University of Nottingham [hereafter, "UN"], Hayes Letters, Mellish Papers, 172/111–4. On army morale and Burgoyne's own attitude, see Richard J. Hargrove, Jr., General John Burgoyne (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press; London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1983), 121.
2. Several of the key battles involving Burgoyne's army are known by alternate names: Hubbardton is sometimes called Skenesboro, and Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights are alternatively designated Saratoga I and II (Freeman's Farm is also known as Stillwater). Many studies, including the books by Hargrove (n. 1), Nickerson (n. 5), and Mintz (n. 28), provide accounts of the Burgoyne expedition that are detailed and scholarly.
3. The only published piece that focuses on the medical history of the expedition is R. M. Gorssline, "Medical Notes on Burgoyne's Campaigns, 1776–77," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 6 (1929): 356–63; 360–63 deal with the 1777 campaign. More useful, though likewise brief, is the survey by Sir Neil Cantlie, in A History of the Army Medical Department (London and Edinburgh: Churchill Livingston, 1974), 1:145–47. Several works that deal primarily with the medical history of the American forces during the campaign provide bits on British health issues; note especially Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution, Army Medical Service Bulletin, no. 25 (Carlisle Barracks: Medical Field Service School, 1931, repr. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1970), ch. 4.
4. Although I will refer to the German allied forces that served under Burgoyne, my focus in this article will be on the British component of his army. Canadian and Provincial militia and native warriors will be noted only in passing. These limitations reflect not only considerations of length, but also the fact that Burgoyne's hospital and his medical policies were directed primarily toward serving his British regulars.
5. The fullest and best account of the planning of the Burgoyne expedition is provided by Hoffman Nickerson, The Turning Point of the Revolution: Or Burgoyne in America (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), ch. 3. Nickerson quotes at length an extract of Germain's orders to Carlton, 91–94, and discusses his letter to Howe, 222–23.
6. Nickerson provides a fine study of the St. Leger expedition: Turning Point, ch. 7 and 269–76. Despite the retreat, Carleton planned to send St. Leger's army down Lake Champlain to reinforce Burgoyne. In the end, however, the need to reinforce Ticonderoga, compounded by a lack of transports, aborted the effort: Carleton to Germain, Quebec, Sept. 20, 1777, Documents of the American Revolution 1770–1783 (Colonial Office Series) [hereafter, "DAR"], ed. K. G. Davies (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1976), XIV, 187 (#xcvii); Brig. Gen. H. Watson Powell to Carleton, Mount Independence, Sept. 29,1777, ibid., XIII, 193 (#1118i); Brig. Gen. Allan Maclean to Carleton, Ticonderoga, Sept. 30, 1777, ibid., XIII, 182 (#1061). Pausch learned on Sept. 24 that St. Leger had returned to Canada, but hoped he might still join through Lake Champlain and Lake George: Georg Pausch, Journal of Captain Pausch, Chief of the Hanau Artillery during the Burgoyne Campaign, trans, and ed. William L. Stone (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1886, repr. Arno Press, 1971), 152–53.
7. John Burgoyne, Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct., 1777, ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany, N.Y.: J. Munsell, 1860), 125.
8. The exchange between Burgoyne and Clinton is printed in DAR, XIV, 191–92 (#ci). Clinton provides some coverage of his move up the Hudson (which had been planned for some time, but was delayed until reinforcements arrived from England) in The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775–1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1954), 72–78.
9. By far the best analysis of trends in the size of both armies is provided by Nickerson, Turning Point, 435–51. Nickerson compares and analyzes a number of conflicting sources of data.
10. John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, as Laid Before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne (London, 1780, repr. New York: Arno Press, 1969), 12; a fuller breakdown is ibid., l-li. Burgoyne's British artillery totaled 257 men.
11. The composition and organization of this army is discussed by Nickerson, 106–07.
12. Carleton to Germain, Quebec, Aug. 11, 1777: DAR, XIV, 157–58 (#lxxxiv). Carlton enclosed an extract from a letter dated Skenesboro, July 11, in which Burgoyne requested troops to garrison Ticonderoga: ibid., XIII, 152 (#894.i). Germain was apparently unaware that Carleton would interpret his orders as preventing him from sending reinforcements; on Sept. 15, he wrote to Carleton, "As you make no mention of the means which you have adopted for securing the possession of your conquests, I conclude that you have pursued the idea of garrisoning Ticonderoga from Canada": ibid., XIV, 185 (#xc). In a letter to Germain, dated the camp opposite Saratoga, Aug. 20, Burgoyne expressed regret over Carleton's decision, but he added that he understood the reasoning behind it: ibid., 167 (#lxxxviii).
13. Brig. Gen. Henry Watson Powell to Carleton, Ticonderoga, Sept. 18: ibid., 185 (#xcvi); in a letter to Germain dated St. John's, Sept. 28, Carleton enclosed a return of the men taken prisoner: ibid., XIII, 181 (#1051.v).
14. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 83.
15. For example, a return of Burgoyne's British rank-and-file, prepared on Oct. 12, showed 1905 fit for duty, 180 on command or guarding provisions, 96 serving as rangers, and 201 employed as officers' servants: DAR , XIII, 212–13 (#1240.iii).
16. For Want of a Horse: Being A Journal of the Campaigns against the Americans in 1776 and 1777 conducted from Canada, by an Officer Who Served with Lt. Gen. Burgoyne, ed. George F. G. Stanley (Sackville, N.B.: The Tribune Press Ltd., 1961), 94; the same source (93–94) also specifies where the various British regiments were quartered. On May 12, 1777, Specht wrote Carl I, Duke of Braunschweig and Luneburg, "All the regiments of the army have been in their quarters in undisturbed quiet since the 6th of Dec," when they had moved into new quarters: Johann Friedrich Specht, The Specht Journal: A Military Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign, trans. Helga Doblin, ed. Mary C. Lynn and Donald M. Londahl-Smidt, Contributions to Military Studies, #158 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 39. Pausch praised the generosity that Major General William Phillips displayed in providing the Hanau Artillery with clothing, accommodations, and food: Journal of Captain Pausch, 92–93.
17. Hayes to [Mellish], Quebec, April 16, 1777, UN, Mellish Papers, 172–11 l/3c; Thomas Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec. An Account of the Life at Quebec and of the Famous Battle at Saratoga, ed. Sydney Jackman (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), 72; Specht to Carl I, Lively near Quebec, Sept. 20, 1776, Specht Journal, 1; Journal of Captain Pausch, 95–96.
18. Journal of Captain Pausch, 108.
19. House of Lords Record Office, ms. 6.5/6. A set of returns purportedly from June 1777 includes the 8th Foot, which is omitted from the H. of L. returns, and suggests a healthier army: 6236 fit, 393 (5.93 percent) sick. This set is drawn from the August 1777 volume of the North Books, monthly abstracts of forces that date from the ministry of Lord North (several sets of North Books are extant; I have used the series at the Clements Library). The returns in the North Books, however, are often problematic and tend to portray lower rates of sickness than do fuller sets. Furthermore, for the ten regiments that are listed in both the North and the H. of L. returns, the numbers reported as sick are identical, suggesting that the North set is in fact the May 1 returns, the number of "fit" augmented by adding in troops on command or otherwise detached.
20. Burgoyne to [Lieut. Gen. Edward] Harvey, Montreal, May 19, 1777: Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, lvi. Similar observation in Clerke to Polwarth, Montreal, May 19,1777: "Letters to Lord Polwarth from Sir Francis-Carr Clerke, Aide-de-Camp to General John Burgoyne," ed. Ronald F. Kingsley, New York History 79 (October 1998), 416.
21. Library and Archives of Canada (Ottawa) [hereafter, "LAC"], Colonial Office 42, "Q" series (TS of originals in the Public Record Office, London), vol. 13, f. 156. On the composition of the companies, see Specht Journal, 42.
22. LAC, CO 42, "Q" series, vol. 14, f. 248.
23. DAR, XIV, 121 (#lxii).
24. For Want of a Horse, 171. There were several variant returns, as reported in Charles W. Snell, "A Report on the Strength of the British Army under Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, July 1 to October 17, 1777 and on the Organization of the British Army on September 19 and October 7, 1777" (typescript; Stillwater, N.Y.: Saratoga National Historical Park, 1951), 8. Snell's work is highly useful, but he was apparently unaware of the returns that would later be published by Stanley in For Want of a Horse; these returns are of particular value because of the data that they provide on rates of sickness.
25. For Want of a Horse, 171–72. Cf. Snell, "Report on the Strength of the British Army,"15. The figures in Stanley include only men who were present and bearing arms or were sick or wounded, and not troops who were on command, guarding provisions, serving as batmen, or in other, smaller, categories. The return of Oct. 12 provides for 477 men in these other groupings: DAR, XIII, 213 (#1240iii). Despite the fact that many men were incapacitated by disease and wounds, Philip Skene wrote the Earl of Dartmouth on Sept. 23, from Saratoga, "we are in high health and Spirits and have no doubt of succeeding to our hopes": Benjamin Franklin Stevens, B. F. Stevens' Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives relating to America, 1773–1783 (London: [Maltby and Sons], 1892), vol. 18, #1693.
26. Burgoyne hinted at the shift to the hospital in orders issued at Duer's House on Sept. 6: Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 94–95. A return of the additionals, dated July 1, 1777, is extant: House of Lords, 6.5/5. On July 19 Carleton informed Burgoyne that he had ordered these companies to join him: DAR, XIII, 153 (#854ii). They did not in fact march from Quebec until Aug. 12; the men arrived in camp on Sept. 3 and were promptly distributed among the battalion companies of the regiments that each additional company was respectively attached to: Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 91 (order of Sept. 2, Duer's House), 92 (order of Sept. 3, same); Specht Journal, 74 (entry for Sept. 3), 132 (nl09).
27. Specht Journal, 54. Specht reports total losses, including Germans, as 32 killed, 140 wounded (ibid., 55). Hadden claims that the total killed and wounded was 126: A Journal kept in Canada and upon Burgoyne's Campaign in 1776 and 1777, by Lieut. James M. Hadden, Royal Art.; Also Orders kept by him and issued by Sir Guy Carleton, John Burgoyne and Major-General William Phillips, in 1776, 1777, and 1778, ed. Horatio Rogers (Albany, N.Y.: J. Munsell, 1884, repr. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 88.
28. Max M. Mintz, The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne & Horatio Gates (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 154. A return for the week July 2–8, 1777, signed by Burgoyne and summarized by Snell ("Report on the Strength of the British Army," 9) lists casualties of 42 killed, 156 wounded; Snell also notes German losses. The return covers action at Ticonderoga, Hubbardton, and Fort Anne. Burgoyne later reported that casualties at Fort Anne included 12 dead, 22 wounded: ibid., 90.
29. For Want of a Horse, 174. Burgoyne at first estimated killed and captured at Bennington at c. 400, but later, as missing soldiers returned to camp, he revised downward. American deserters and prisoners, he reported, estimated their killed and wounded to be double those in his army; Burgoyne to Germain, camp opposite Saratoga, Aug. 20: DAR, XIV, 164 (#lxxxvii).
30. Knox to Barrington, Montreal, Sept. 20, 1777: Public Record Office (London), War Office 1/10/179; [August Wilhelm] Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant, in the Service of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776–1778, ed. Charlotte S. J. Epping (New York: D. Appleton, 1911), 102.
31. Julius Friedrich Wasmus, An Eyewitness Account of the American Revolution and New England Life: The Journal of J. F. Wasmus, German Company Surgeon, 1776–1783, trans. Helga Doblin, ed. Mary C. Lynn, Contributions in Military Studies, #106 (New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1990), 52 (entry for June 15), 55 (June 24); Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec, 121.
32. Letter written in captivity, Cambridge, Nov. 15, 1777: Ray W. Pettengill, trans., Letters from America. Being Letters of Brunswick, Hessian, and Waldeck Officers with the British Armies During the Revolution (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1924, repr. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1964), 97. Specht noted on Sept. 5 that "dysentery and flux ... had not yet abated and from time to time, people were still dying": Journal, 74.
33. Mintz, Generals of Saratoga, 196. Burgoyne estimated his losses at 500–600: forwarded to Germain by Howe on Oct. 21: DAR, XIV, 191 (#ci).
34. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 57.
35. Ibid., 82–83, 103–04.
36. Ibid., 50, 82, 85.
37. For Want of a Horse, 172–73.
38. Snell, "Report on the Strength of the British Army," 90.
39. A cessation of arms was agreed to on Oct. 14, then extended on the 15th, as negotiations proceeded: Francis Napier, "Lord Francis Napier' s Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign," ed. S. Sydney Bradford, Maryland Historical Magazine 57 (1962): 323.
40. DAR, XIII, 212, 213 (#1240ii, 1240iii). By another accounting, produced in association with the inquiry by the Commons, Burgoyne reported totals of 261 men and officers killed, 634 wounded, 488 captured: State of the Expedition, li. An account apparently prepared after the Convention was drawn provided totals of 493 men and officers killed, 611 wounded: noted in Wasmus, Eyewitness Account, 92 (entry for Nov. 10). These figures may include Germans.
41. Capt. Edward Foy to Brig. Gen. Allan MacLean, Quebec, July 28,1777; British Library [hereafter, "BL"], Additional Mss. 21,699, f. 153.
42. BL, Add. 21,699, f. 152. Carleton was also upset that Cole had taken a mate away from St. John's, where he was much needed: Foy to MacLean, Quebec, n.d., ibid., f. 154.
43. Barr to Sir William Haldimand, Montreal, Jan. 28, 1779, BL, Add. 21,853, f. 38. I hope to deal more fully with the history of the Canadian hospital in a book that is currently in the writing stage, Lancet and Lance: Medicine, Heath, and Sickness in the Eighteenth-Century British Army, with Particular Reference to Army Service in North America and the West Indies, 1755–1783. Sketches of the careers of Barr, Knox, and Kennedy appear in William Johnston, comp., Roll of Commissioned Officers in the Medical Services of the British Army ... 20 June 1727 to 23 June 1898, ed. Harry A. L. Howell (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1917), repr. in A. Peterkin, William Johnston, and Robert Drew, Commissioned Officers in the Medical Services of the British Army 1660–1960, vol. 1. Publications of the Wellcome Historical Medical Library, Historical Monograph Series, no. 14 (London: The Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1968), 25 (#447), 33 (#598), and 36 (#656).
44. Knox apparently first drew his list of dispositions for the campaign of 1777 on May 26: LAC, CO 42, "Q" series, vol. 13, f. 256; War Office 28/6/5. A similar document dates from July 1: WO 28/6/6. These documents do not provide names of the individuals slated for service under Burgoyne; however, it is possible to infer with reasonable certainty the identity of almost all of them through other documents that relate to the expedition; references to hospital officers held prisoner after Saratoga; and lists of individuals left in Canada after Burgoyne's march began, especially WO 28/6/8. Mates who definitely attended the march were: William Burke, John DeCourcey Gill; Alexander Grant, Andrew Mackenzie Grieves; Charles Kerr; Robert Kerr; William Menzies; John Parks, Thomas Pendergast; Edward Salmon; George Shepherd; Benjamin Shields; and Richard Woodthrope. Essex Bowen probably served, but cannot be confirmed as having done so. Information on Burgoyne's medical personnel, both hospital and regimental, is drawn from the data base that I will publish with Lancet and Lance.
45. Military Journal, 112. By contrast, he found the Germans to be "uncouth and clumsy operators," who were devoid of sympathy for their patients.
46. Knox to Barrington, Montreal, Sept. 20, 1777: WO 1/10/179.
47. Wood is noted as acting physician in the list of Convention prisoners: Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 179.
48. In a memorandum, undated but probably prepared in Nov. 1779, Major John André reported, "Mr Hayes was Senior Surgeon in Gen: Burgoyne and as the Head of the Hospital of that Army He Served in the Campaign 1776": Clements Library, University of Michigan [hereafter, "CL"], Clinton Papers, 82:25.
49. Seeley's capture is referred to in William Digby, The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776–1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53d, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot, ed. James Baxter. Munsell's Historical Series, #16 (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1887), 221–22; Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec, 149; For Want of a Horse, 116.
50. The personnel who entered captivity at Saratoga were: 20th, Matthew Cahill, surgeon / Michael Bush Carroll, mate; 21st, William Pemberton / Charles Watson; 24th, Samuel Sone / Colin McLarty; 47th, Leonard Dobbin / Price Walker; 62nd, Alexander Moodier / Joseph Alder; Artillery, Gervase Wilde / Alexander Melville and William Browne; grenadiers and light infantry, William Burke / (no mate): Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 179.
51. Burgoyne to Germain, Skenesboro House, July 11: DAR, XIV, 134 (#lxii); Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 26.
52. Knox notes the capacity of the hospital in his letter to Barrington (cf. n. 30).
53. "A Brunswick Grenadier with Burgoyne: The Journal of Johann Bense, 1776–1783," trans. Helga B. Doblin, introd. Mary C. Lynn, New York History 66 (October 1985): 432.
54. Pettengill, Letters from America, 99.
55. William L. Stone, The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, and the Expedition of Lieut. Col. Barry St. Leger (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell, 1877), 38n; a hospital burial ground was also at the site: ibid. On the scene at Saratoga at the time of the British arrival, note Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec, 170; Wasmus, Eyewitness Account, 68–69 (entry for Aug. 11).
56. Wasmus, Eyewitness Account, 58 (entry for July 3).
57. Barr to Haldimand, Three Rivers, Sept. 8, 1780; BL, Add. 21,853, f. 103. Kennedy further reduced the hospital's store by letting tents to serve as regimental infirmaries. Barr criticized him for this (ibid.), expressing the opinion that the tents would mainly be used for parades. Haldimand agreed that regiments should not receive tents: Genevay to Barr, Quebec, Sept. 12, 1780; Add. 21,853, f. 105.
58. Digby, British Invasion, 213; Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec, 146.
59. UN, Mellish Papers, 11 l/5a-b.
60. Lamb, Original and Authentic Journal, 143.
61. Ibid.; Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec, 146; Journal of Du Roi the Elder, 173.
62. Journal of Du Roi the Elder, 101–02.
63. With Burgoyne from Quebec, 175.
64. Ibid., 176–77.
65. Friedrich Adolf von Riedesel, Memoirs, and Letters and Journals, of Major General Riedesel, during His Residence in America, trans, and ed. William L. Stone (Albany, N.Y.: J. Munsell, 1868), I, 158; Digby found the facilities "much crowded" when he visited on Sept. 23: British Invasion, 279.
66. Frederika Charlotte Louise von Riedesel, Baroness von Riedesel and the American Revolution: Journal and Correspondence of a Tour of Duty 1776–1783, trans, and ed. Marvin L. Brown, Jr. (Williamsburg, Va.: Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1965), 51–52. It is unclear from the text whether the residence that she is describing was Taylor House, which was fairly large, or a log cabin that was constructed for her: ibid., 49, 50; however, an entry by Friedrich von Riedesel strongly suggests that it was the cabin: Memoirs, I, 167 and 167n.
67. Anburey, With Burgoyne from Quebec, 190; Cantlie, History of the Army Medical Department, I, 146; Digby, British Invasion, 296.
68. New-York Historical Society, Gates Papers.
69. Riedesel, Memoirs, I, 174.
70. Digby, British Invasion, 293; Baroness von Riedesel and the American Revolution, 58; Cantlie, History of the Army Medical Department, I, 146.
71. Journal of Captain Pausch, 108.
72. WO 1/11/179. Of 396 American patients hospitalized in the general hospital in Albany as of Aug. 20, 1777, 221 (55.81 percent) were suffering from dysentery, diarrhea, or intermittent fever (malaria): Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department 1775–1818 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1981), 96.
73. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 110. Burgoyne was also taken aback by the size and quality of Gates's army. By the time that the Convention was signed, the American force included 13,000–14,000 men, exclusive of troops across the Hudson. After surrendering, Burgoyne observed the troops, and he wrote to Germain, "The corps I have seen are disciplined. I do not hazard the term but apply it to the fundamental points of military institution, sobriety, subordination, regularity and courage. The militia are inferior in method and movement but not a jot less serviceable in woods.": Burgoyne to Germain, Albany, Oct. 20, private: DAR, XIV, 236–37 (#cxvi). Not all of the British officers were as impressed as was Burgoyne by the quality of the troops. Lord Balcarres noted in his testimony to the Commons that in the wake of Burgoyne's surrender he had at first felt humiliation, in consideration of the nature of the enemy, but that he had concluded that the American victory had resulted from the "nature of the country": Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 50.
74. Journal of the American War, 183.
75. Most criticism of Burgoyne came from men who did not march under him. Napier criticized some of his decisions, but mainly he blamed Germain for the ultimate defeat, and in any event Napier's comments were not published in his lifetime: "Lord Francis Napier's Journal," 325, 328.
76. Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 4 (order of June 20, 1777).
77. Ibid., 48.
78. Ibid., 45.
79. Ibid., 94.
80. Cantlie, History of the Army Medical Department, I, 145. Similarly, on July 25, Phillips ordered, "From the present scarcity of Cattle it will be impossible to issue fresh Provisions to all the Hospital, it will therefore be proper to divide the Sick into classes, and in the Return sent to the Commissary to marck the number for whom it will be necessary to provide fresh provisions every day. Whenever the Cattle arrives which is expected the whole Hospital shall be provided with fresh provisions": Journal of Du Roi the Elder, 171.
81. Wounded Americans who were captured were transported to the hospital at Ticonderoga for treatment; note Wasmus, Eyewitness Account, 62 (entry for July 15).
82. For Want of a Horse, 141.
83. Letter of Aug. 24, 1777, camp at Batten Hill: With Burgoyne from Quebec, 165. On Anburey's defense of Burgoyne, cf. His letter dated Fort Edward, Aug. 8: ibid., 159–61.
84. British Invasion, 279.
85. Burgoyne to Germain, Montreal, May 19,1777: DAR, XIV, 86 (#xli); Clerke to Polwarth, Montreal, May 19, "Letters," 416.
86. Burgoyne to Germain, camp opposite Saratoga, Aug. 20: DAR, XIV, 162 (#lxxxvii).
87. Wasmus, Eyewitness Account, 57. The heat is also noted by Specht, Journal, 65 (Aug. 7, 1777); Clerke to Polwarth, Ticonderoga, July 5, "Letters," 419.
88. "Journal of Johann Sense," 430, 432, 433 (entries for July 8, Sept. 18, and Oct. 7 and 9).
89. With Burgoyne from Quebec, 159–60.
90. Hugh Finlay to Anthony Todd, Quebec, Nov. 24, 1777: DAR, XIV, 262 (#cxxix). An artillery officer in Burgoyne's army asserted that the size of the artillery was what Phillips desired: Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 88; In the final retreat to Saratoga, Burgoyne was forced to leave his heavy artillery behind, and at the end he had only 12-pounders and two 24-pounders: ibid., 43–44, 79.
91. Burgoyne to Germain, Montreal, May 19, 1777: DAR, XIV, 86 (#xli).
92. DAR, XIV, 139 (#lxxi).
93. Burgoyne to Germain, near Fort Edward, July 30: ibid., 153 (#lxxx). Burgoyne repeated his defense in a letter to Howe, Fort Edward, Aug. 6: ibid., 156 (#lxxxiii). Stedman notes Burgoyne's defense, but dismisses it: Charles Stedman, The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War (London: for the author, 1794, repr. Arno, 1969), I, 327.
94. Burgoyne to Germain, near Fort Edward, July 30: DAR, XIV, 153 (#lxxx); cf. Clerke to Polwarth, Skeensboro, July 17, "Letters," 421.
95. State of the Expedition, 166. He added (ibid.) that the men became habituated to gunfire.
96. Ibid., 73.
97. Burgoyne to Germain, Albany, Oct. 20 (private): DAR, XIV, 236 (#cxvi).
98. Burgoyne to Col. [Richard Burton] Phillipson, Albany, Oct. 20, 1777: The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty 1771–1782, ed. G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen, Navy Records Society, Publications, 1932, I, 309.
99. History of the American War, I, 356; general criticisms of Burgoyne's pace, ibid., 353–56. Stedman had served in America under Howe, Clinton, and Cornwallis.
100. Wasmus, Eyewitness Account, 58. On the issue of the horses, note Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 56–57. R. Arthur Bowler examines the supply problems that beset Burgoyne's army, and the poor planning that prompted them, in Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775–1783 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 225–30.
101. Burgoyne to Germain, Skenesboro House, July 11: DAR, XIV, 133, 140 (lxxii). Wasmus was impressed by the provisions at Ticonderoga: Eyewitness Account, 59 (entry for July 6).
102. DAR, XIV, 162–65 (#lxxxvii); quotations 162, 164. In a second, private, letter, Burgoyne assured Germain that if the fighting at Sainfoin (Bennington) had gone the other way, his army would already be in Albany: ibid., 165 (#lxxxviii). On Aug. 12, at Cambridge, Baum had overwhelmed a small party of American troops and had seized 150 head of cattle: Lamb, Journal of the American War, 151–52. Burgoyne acknowledged the consequences of Bennington in an order delivered at Duer's House on Aug. 17: "It was endeavoured ... to provide such as supply of Cattle as might have enabled the Army to proceed without waiting the arrival of the Magazines. That attempt having failed ... the Troops must necessarily halt some days for bringing forward the Transport": Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 76.
103. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 21, 43, 61.
104. "Journal of Johann Sense," 433.
105. Ibid. The order is published in Burgoyne's Orderly Book, 125.
106. Burgoyne to Germain, Albany, Oct. 20, 1777: DAR, XIV, 233 (#cxv).
107. Camp near Fort Edward, July 30: ibid., 154; cf. Clerke to Polwarth, camp near Saratoga, Sept. 10, "Letters," 422.
108. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, 151.
109. Napier asserted that the Bennington raid rested "solely" on Burgoyne's decision, "tho' contrary to the advice and opinion of every General Officer and Brigadier in the Army": "Lord Francis Napier's Journal," 325. In his letter of Oct. 20, Burgoyne informed Germain that in choosing to cross the Hudson he did not "call any men into council when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the season of the year admitted no alternative": DAR, XIV, 233 (#cxv). |
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