|
|
|
REVIEWS / COMPTES RENDUS
| Jeremy Nuttall, Psychological Socialism. The Labour Party and Qualities of Mind and Character, 1931 to the Present (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2006)
|
| THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIALISM" at the centre of this new study of the Labour Party's political thought is ambiguous in character. Partly it connotes an interest in the new twentieth-century discipline of psychology and in the insights it was held to offer the democratic politican. Mostly, however, it is employed in a more colloquial sense, as a synonym for the "qualities of mind and character" to which the book's subtitle refers. Counterposing mental and material factors rather after the fashion of Peter Clarke's distinction between moral and mechanical reformers, Nuttall's contention is that non-material factors have been neglected in Labour historiography and by not a few Labour politicians. |
1
|
|
In seeking to make good this shortcoming Nuttall gives centre stage to revisionists and proto-revisionists such as Evan Durbin, whom in an earlier article he had already characterised as Labour's "Psychological Socialist." Arguably it is as a vindication of this centrist or revisionist narrative of Labour's thinking that this fuller exposition works best. Durbin is one major protagonist; Tony Crosland, the subject of Nuttall's PhD, another; and a wide cast of lesser revisionists is handled with both insight and undisguised partisanship. With the ascendancy in recent years of Labour's latterday hyper-revisionism, the recovery of these lineages has become a relatively well-worked field. Nuttall's account can thus be grouped with studies like Radhika Desai's Intellectuals and Socialism (1994), which also discusses revisionism in a longer-term context and does not overlook issues of mind and character. Even so, Nuttall offers something distinctive. Essayistic in treatment, his arguments are presented vigorously, sometimes provocatively, and his aim is what he calls a "big-picture" or framework study. Some may nevertheless feel that his arguments work best when they are most focused – for example, in the recurring theme of Labour's educational policy – and supported by a wide reading of archives and political texts, as in the case of revisionism. At times, though, Nuttall seems to have taken on rather a lot, and he may have been better served by a thematic structure, or one focusing on key thinkers or debates, than the chronological arrangement he actually uses. |
2
|
|
One danger with such a structure is that of a sort of teleological temptation, culminating in this instance in a robust and somewhat inexorable defence of New Labour. Linked with this, Nuttall's distinction between moral and material factors needs handling with considerable care. Going back at least to the early socialists' campaigns for the eight-hour day, "material" reforms have repeatedly been promoted by them and other social reformers as preconditions or facilitators of the moral and cultural improvement with which Nuttall is concerned. Even the Fabian bugbear of "efficiency," apparently the epitome of an arid and technocratic materialism, was shaped and legitimized by a moral, often moralizing, discourse of improvement as well as functionality. "Let it not be forgotten," the quintessential mechanician, Sidney Webb, said, "that what we are in pursuit of is not the better housing, feeding and clothing of the people except as a means to an end – the development of individual character." Nuttall is unsparing about what he regards as material "proxies" for moral reform. There is a big difference, however, between a proxy and a precondition. Moreover, not infrequently, as in Clarke's work, a stark counterposition of mechanical and moral factors can lend itself to too easy dichotomies. There may be a case instead for thinking in terms of environmental factors, in which both the fluidity and the interdependency of the moral and material – for example, in the nurturing and educative qualities of kinship networks and a humane educational system – are a good deal more evident. Typically, Labour thinkers and activists thought in precisely this way; and it was just this appreciation of environmental factors, which included but were not reducible to "material" or institutional factors, that made them socialists of some sort and not just moral reformers. |
3
|
|
The present reviewer leans towards the "pathological dissenters" (in Roy Hattersley's phrase) with whom Nuttall (who cites it) is evidently not much in sympathy. As such I found Nuttall's attempt to recognize nuance not altogether equal to the challenge posed by these issues. "A moral and mechanical vision of socialism could logically be combined," he notes in relation to the "Bennism" of the 1970s and 1980s, "but what arguably could not be was a moral vision and an extreme mechanical vision." (129) The suggestion here of some sort of inverse correlation between moral and mechanical visions is problematic. At the very least, the extremism of "mechanical" or structural reform may reflect a sense, not so much of the self-sufficiency of structures in themselves, as of the perceived institutional obstacles to a new moral order, which might range from capitalism itself to excessive working hours. Few would fail to recognize such a position in relation to authoritarian regimes, in which in many cases only "extreme" or even revolutionary mechanical reform may be consistent with the moral vision Nuttall evokes. Nuttall himself recognizes it in respect of what appear to be intractable social problems. Thus, when he prefers the "toughness" of New Labour towards the criminal to the "lazy sentimentality" of progressives, he appears to have in mind extreme mechanical measures such as longer prison sentences, higher fines, and the possible withdrawal of state benefits. |
4
|
|
Appreciation of these complexities is not assisted by Nuttall's third, looser usage of "psychological socialism" to designate the qualities of mind and character of the Labour Party itself. Championing revisionism and its culmination in New Labour, he stresses what he sees as a growing recognition of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship along with an ability to synthesize competing social and political values. Regarding these as signs of Labour's maturation, he ascribes deficiencies in the party's moral outlook to its youth, impetuosity and "sentimentality"– which again he identifies predominantly with the left. Nevertheless, the connection with his other usages of psychological socialism is not always self-evident. Realistic assessment, not just of "mental" qualities, but of fiscal constraints and the limits of government, is thus described by Nuttall as representing the quality of mind required for effective government. "Responsibility" is identified with political realism, moderation, and the reconciliation of conflicting pressures. This seems a very traditional emphasis, and Nuttall's main objection to the "fixerist realism" of a figure like Harold Wilson appears to be its lack of inhibition, as compared with the high-minded scruples of Wilson's revisionist colleagues. Qualities of mind and character thus turn out to have some decidedly mechanical means of expression. It is defensible, for example, though contestable, to regard opposition to bellicose foreign policies as a sign of immaturity. On the other hand, to allow foreign policy "realists" a particular purchase on moral discourse, on grounds of their "shared realism about prevailing levels of 'mental progress' in the world," (16) risks obscuring such decidedly mechanical supports as NATO, nuclear arms programs, and the massive material interests which had a stake in these. Perhaps the distinction between moral and merely sentimental qualities also needs clarifying. |
5
|
|
Nuttall sometimes stretches his arguments further than the evidence he produces will really support. Nevertheless, his book is to be wholeheartedly recommended. It fully meets his aim of stimulating discussion; anybody seeking to convince students of the interest and continuing relevance of these issues will be glad of it. If his categories of "mind and character" in my view need firmer theoretical moorings, the questions he opens up are important ones and he makes a serious contribution to the literature. |
6
|
| | |
KEVIN MORGAN
University of Manchester |
|
|
Content in the History Cooperative database is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the History Cooperative database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.
|