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Reviews / Comptes Rendus

Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House 2005)

TREMENDOUS CHANGES have taken place in the publishing industry and especially in academic publishing over the past decades with the "publish or perish" mentality causing the production of half-researched pot boilers, and publishers swinging books into print with barely an editorial glance. It was with interest, but disappointment, that I read Professor Robert Pape's book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism published by Random House (2005). The topic seemed timely, but, as it turns out, Pape only spent two years on the research and publication of this book with a team of graduate students at the University of Chicago in the "Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism" which he established. Despite the rather rapid transition to print, Pape grandly claims this book is the first "universal" study of the topic. (3) Prior to this project Pape was teaching air strategy at the US Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies. So say no more.

Pape is an advocate of "offshore balancing," which is a strategy of securing US oil interests by building alliances with pro-western allies in the Middle East. In order to prevent further attacks on US interests, he argues for the withdrawal of land troops from the Arabian Peninsula but the retention of a US Navy presence and strategic air attacks in the region coupled with a homeland security policy of completing the 1,951-mile Border Fence across Mexico, and bolstering immigration controls and background checks. (240) Pape seems to have peddled his book to both the American right and left presumably with each side hearing what they want to hear. The "offshore balancing" strategy is nicely contained in the final chapter, and so possibly the peace activists who have spoken with him have forgotten to read Chapter twelve entitled "A New Strategy for Victory." (237–250) Pape says he has studied 315 international suicide missions between 1980 and 2003. He classifies them into thirteen major campaigns, including those of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE], the PKK, independence fighters in Chechnya, Kashmir, the Punjab, as well as al-Qaeda and the current war in Iraq. In this book, however, he appears to be primarily focusing on the campaigns in the Middle East in order to address current American military priorities in that region. For historical background, Pape opens with a short history of suicide missions as part of war strategy from the time of the Zealots and Sicarii in the 1st century, to the Ismaili Assassins in the 11th and 12th centuries, and the Kamikaze fighters in World War II. (33–37) The most useful information I learned in this brief history is that the word "terrorism" is derived from the "Reign of Terror" in France (1793–1794). Pape claims that between 1948 and 1980 there were no further suicide attacks; rather, a series of self-immolations and hunger strikes by assorted Buddhist monks and nuns. It is worth mentioning that there are large swathes of the world that Pape doesn't mention, such as the international suffragette campaign, Ireland, the revolution in Russia, and independence movements in India, Africa, and Asia where suicide missions, hunger strikes, and assorted other techniques were also employed over a long period of time. Pape's analysis of suicide missions begins with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1983 because, for political reasons, he is more intent on focusing on the Middle East. He firmly states his book is placed in the context of 9/11. (7)

Pape has two underlying enquiries: the first is to understand the motivations of suicide missions; the second is to suggest a political strategy to prevent further attacks and to protect US strategic interests. He begins by saying that there is a myth being perpetuated that all modern-day suicide bombers are Islamic fundamentalists. Of the 384 attackers on which Pape says he has data, he says only 43 per cent were religious and the remaining 57 per cent were secular. (210) In Hezbollah, he says he found that of the 41 attackers, 30 were affiliated with groups opposed to Islamic fundamentalism. (129) He states the obvious, that attacks are occurring wherever there is an American troop presence or the presence of their allies. Ninety-five per cent of attacks are associated with organized campaigns of national liberation movements. (50,104) He says the idea that Islamic fundamentalism is on the verge of world domination is a fantasy. Pape doesn't deny that religion plays a role in half the cases, but he says that it is largely used as rhetoric to mobilize people. He points out that within Islam there is a major debate about the morality of suicide attacks. (195)

Pape argues that the purpose of suicide attacks is to get American troops out of a region. He argues that suicide bombing has emerged in places where traditional standing armies and guerrilla warfare have failed and that in seven of the thirteen major world campaigns since 1980, they have achieved either limited or significant concessions. That is roughly a 50 per cent success rate compared to the less than 30 per cent success rate of traditional military campaigns. (64–65)

Pape argues that suicide bombers are not lone, isolated, or psychologically deranged individuals but fit the profile of traditional fighters. They work in joint teams, often crossing national boundaries and have a high level of community support. The reason they are often not detected is at least partly because of language differences, but mostly because they are protected by the community. The organizations they belong to actually require a relatively high profile in order to get walk-in recruits and so they have embedded themselves in social institutions. (81) They run schools, charities, orphanages, medical clinics, vocational centres, libraries, banks, sports clubs, religious congregations, and sometimes police and judicial systems. He gives the examples of the LTTE and Hamas (191–192) and says that Hamas has been running 40 per cent of social welfare institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. He points out that Osama bin Laden founded groups named "Human Concern International," "Third World Relief Agency," "Mercy International," and the "Islamic International Relief Organization. (195–196)

Pape's concluding chapter and argument for a strategy to defend American oil interests is for the US to withdraw its land troops from the Arabian Peninsula. He recommends depriving al-Qaeda of its Afghan bases, making quick concessions to cut off popular support, and bolstering homeland security, partly through border and immigration controls and the erection of a wall across Mexico. He supports the idea of regime change, but says that the current strategy is faulty and that the US should engage in "offshore balancing" by using foreign assistance to build alliances with local states so that US combat forces can be deployed quickly should a crisis emerge. The purpose for Pape is to preserve US oil interests. (247) He warns that should the US invade Iran, there will be a massive retaliation in the region. As almost a light digression at the end of the book he suggests that the US might wish to pursue "energy independence." (250)

This is an appalling book, full of fatuous argument and contradictory statements. Pape's arguments are hardly rocket science and I didn't feel he actually needed to do any research to write this book. He does not mention the real, live workers of the Third World and how American foreign policy is affecting them. Nor does he analyse solutions for these workers through mass action and solidarity campaigns. One presumes he accepts the logic that their only option is to be slaughtered in suicide missions or by American troops. Neither is there a political dimension to the book beyond that of defending US interests and there is certainly no moral condemnation of what is happening to the workers of the world, including those in the US who are being used as economic and military cannon fodder for the current US regime.


Ellen Ramsay York University

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