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Reviews / Comptes Rendus
| Colin J. Davis, Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers, 1946–61 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press 2003)
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| FOR HISTORIANS who have studied labour relations on the New York and London waterfronts, this book tells a familiar tale, albeit one enlivened by a wealth of new material from union sources and primary interviews. For historians unfamiliar with previous studies of conflict on the waterfront, this book is as good as any that you will find. |
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In Waterfront Revolts, Colin Davis offers a more refined analysis of time (1946–61) and place (the great city ports of New York and London) than many earlier accounts, using the comparative method to identify the structural and cultural forces that lay behind the emergence of rank-and-file dockworker movements. Instead of "US exceptionalism" and "British peculiarity," it is the joined experience of New York longshoremen and London dockers that informs the comparative study. As Davis points out, "Sharply delineating connections and differences provides a clear sense of both historical congruence and specificity. This is how both comparative and new institutionalist histories can merge." (4) |
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Historical congruence is very much to the fore in the early chapters on "The Men" (Chapter 1), "The Work" (Chapter 2), and their "Estrangement" (Chapter 3) from the trade union leadership of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU). The complex interactions between race and ethnicity, class and religion, are systematically analyzed to construct a detailed profile of the men in both ports. Segmentation by race and ethnicity was far more important in New York, and Davis returns to the issue of racist hiring in Chapter 8. Black and Hispanic longshoremen were typically forced to "shape" as extras, rather than gangs, which severely limited their work opportunities, as did the inability of the Jim Crow Local 968 to secure its own pier. |
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Hiring practices dominated the daily lives of both New York longshoremen and London dockers, and in different ways proved to be the root cause of estrangement. Many jobs on the waterfront were highly skilled, or at least "required an intricate interplay of abilities that were learned by doing. It took months and even years to acquire the rhythmic motion needed to handle a huge variety of goods efficiently and quickly." (36) These jobs, which were far better paid than the 'bull work' also found on the waterfront, were allocated to the "favored" gangs. |
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In New York, the shape-up system was not simply a source of insecurity and subservience, but a mechanism of ILA control over its membership. As Davis clearly demonstrates, "The murderous image of the mobster and union officials was based on a violent reality ... longshoremen both obtained employment and worked in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation." (63, 65) In London, unlike many other British ports, casual hiring practices (the daily "free call") persisted in the early post World War II period, despite the introduction of a statutory employment scheme. Through a combination of skill, collective organization, and familial control, many gangs enjoyed the "freedom" to work when, for whom, and on whatever cargoes they chose, but such freedom jarred with the regulations of the National Dock Labour Scheme (1947) which imposed regular attendance on the dockers and obliged them to accept whatever work was on offer. More importantly, strict disciplinary sanctions were meted out in any cases of non-compliance by the London and National Dock Labour Boards. Union officials shared joint representation with employers on these Boards and regularly approved harsh disciplinary sanctions against their own members. In the eyes of rank-and-file dock workers, their union leaders were in the employers' camp. "Paradoxically, what some New York dockworkers yearned for — stable, institutionalized union-employer relations — was resented by their London counterparts."(79) |
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The shared but distinct experience of these transatlantic workers informs the core chapters of Waterfront Revolts, which focus on major strikes in both ports in 1949 and 1951. What emerges from Chapters 4–7 is the intense resentment of New York longshoremen and London dockers towards their trade union leaders, albeit for different reasons. Estrangement led to confrontation in both ports, not only with the respective union hierarchy but also employers and the state. It is here that the narrative succeeds where many other accounts fall short. Throughout these chapters, Davis weaves together the complex interaction of human agents — rank- and-file dockworkers, union officials, port employers, state representatives, and "outside" groups such as the church, communists, and lawyers — with the underlying forces of structural impulsion. The end result is a compelling account of how dignity became the watchword of both New York longshoremen and London dockers. "Whether they wanted to reform or dismiss these union leaders was not the critical point. Rather, the goal was to be heard and recognized as workers and above all as union members." (240) To be sure, the struggle was more organized and self-directed in London than New York, where longshoremen turned to outside allies for succour. But the elements that united the two groups were more important: "The job, and its attendant group identification, nurtured and encouraged resistance." (239) In both ports, dock workers "believed they could only rely on one another.... It was only the work gang, and by extension the port-wide labor force, that could be trusted." (240) |
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With any study of such international comparative ambition there are bound to be questions that demand further scrutiny (e.g. the influence of an industry-specific as opposed to a general union structure on democracy, decision-making, and rank- and-file action) as well as calls to extend the comparative historical method to other ports and other periods. For example, London was Britain's most strike-prone port during the early post-World War II period but conflict subsequently abated and the metropolis was usurped by Liverpool as the nation's most strike-prone port. Dockers in London resolutely defied the obligations of the National Dock Labour Scheme from 1946 to 1961, but dockers elsewhere (cautiously) welcomed state regulation. The replication of cases from both countries over the same or subsequent periods would add immeasurably to our understanding of industrial conflict on the waterfront, especially if such research could match the standards set by Colin Davis. |
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Peter Turnbull Cardiff University |
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