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Controversies /
Controverses
"Nina Ponomarevas Hats":
The New Revisionism, the Communist
International, and the Communist Party
of Great Britain, 1920-1930
John McIlroy and Alan Campbell
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DESPITE ITS DESCENT into barbarism and
catastrophic political failure, official Communism constituted
one of the major social movements of the 20th century. It remains
of engrossing interest to historians, particularly to scholars
who, despite everything that has happened since 1917, still aspire
to understand and learn with an eye to the troubled future of
human emancipation. In both Europe and North America, studies
of Communist parties flourish and their relationship with the
USSR and the Communist International (Comintern)
the subject of this paper remains a major historiographical
issue. In itself an important historical problem, it touches on
issues at the heart of comprehending Communism. Interrogation
of centre and periphery, dependence and autonomy, can enrich our
understanding of discipline and democracy in international ideology
and organization as well as desired outcomes, the replication
of the USSR across the globe or more democratic
national variants, political responsibility, the complicity or
otherwise of foreign Communists in the crimes of Stalinism, and
the relationship Comintern affiliates had to their national polity
and national cultures.
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The literature is extensive, burgeoning,
and contested. It is most developed in the USA.
From the 1950s, the work of "the traditionalists" (among
which the studies by Theodore Draper, and Irving Howe and Lewis
Coser are of enduring interest) depicted the American party as
undemocratic, subordinated to Stalinism, and incapable of relating
creatively to American society. Exploiting the opening of the
archives in Moscow, Harvey Klehr and his colleagues vigorously
affirmed Russian domination.
1
In contrast, from the 1980s, "revisionists" sought
to transcend the institutional frame of earlier work. Utilizing
social history they presented a homespun Communism aligned with
a positive view of the work of activists in community, trade union,
and cultural struggles in studies that often decentred Stalinism
and the Soviet connection. Among notable work is Maurice Issermans
account of the party 1939-46, Mark Naisons study of Communists
in Harlem, and Edward Johanningsmeiers biography of party
leader William Z. Foster.
2
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In Canada, there has been less
polarization and polemic. The traditional approach is represented
by William Rodneys study of the first decade of Canadian
Communism which follows Draper in its "top down" treatment
of a party brought to heel by the Comintern, Stalinized by 1930,
and thereafter "a mere satellite in the orbit of the CPSU
[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]."
3
Neither Ian Angus in his Trotskyist-inflected examination
of the early years of the party, nor Ivan Avakumovic substantially
dissented. The focus of these studies was on the party leadership
and high politics, and both emphasized Comintern control over
party policy. Norman Penners Canadian Communism took
the story into the 1980s but did not transcend these parameters.
4
There has been some reaction, as researchers such as Ruth
Frager, Mercedes Steedman, and John Manley have repaired the absence
of party activists and their struggles from broader histories,
but without challenging their political conclusions.
5
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There have been similar tendencies
in Britain. More than 40 years ago, Eric Hobsbawm chided partisan
party historians for diminishing the role Moscow played in British
Communism.
6
His insistence on the need to balance international and
indigenous factors was echoed by Perry Anderson. Anderson emphasized
that membership of the Comintern, a world party strikingly more
centralist than democratic, entailed compliance with its directives:
each national branch "lacked ultimate political autonomy
in its major strategic orientations." Latter day celebrations
of national identities ensured that "some of the official
histories have been tempted to play down massive interventions
by the Soviet bloc in the early life histories of these parties."
Conversely, some Cold War monographs presented each party as if
it were "just a puppet whose limbs were manipulated mechanically
by strings pulled in Moscow."
7
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As in Canada and the USA,
the early academic work focused upon the formal policy of the
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)
and demonstrated its subordination to Russian imperatives.
8
Later work shifted to "history from below" and
the social and cultural aspects of Communist activity.
9
As in Canada and the USA, compartmentalization
and relative lack of synthesis is noteworthy. If early work neglected
the experience of "ordinary" members, later work tended
to neglect the broader context, the politics on which activism
was based, and the supervisory role of a leadership committed
to those politics. What is different in Britain is that the latest
work largely eschews "history from below" in favour
of revisionist political history. It returns to an examination
of "the line" and reinterprets its provenance. Unlike
social history approaches which, through focus on local narratives
and individual biography, avoid or downplay Moscow control, this
is a distinctive project which explicitly confronts and revises
the relationship of Moscow and London through the prism of formal
policy.
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In a series of papers, an edited
collection, and a monograph, Andrew Thorpe asserts that the opening
of the Moscow archives justifies revision of existing accounts.
It permits "a clearer focus on the exact relationship between
these bodies" and reveals an alternative to the orthodox
conclusion that Moscows politics were the decisive influence
on CPGB policy. Thorpes central thesis
is that the "Cominterns influence over the development
of British Communist politics has been exaggerated by most observers."
Rather, "the party was, to a large extent, the master of
its own fate." The conventional picture is mistaken. The
Comintern "did not hinder [the CPGB]
too much, most of the time, in providing its own solutions to
the problems it faced."
10
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Matthew Worley endorses Thorpes
political analysis and conclusions: "International policy
was regularly adapted to suit national conditions and for the
most part the CPGB was indeed the
master of its own fate." Worleys main concern
is with the Third Period, between 1928 and 1934, when the Comintern
broke from the United Front and espoused predictions of capitalist
crisis, impending revolution, and ultra-left politics. Almost
all historians in Europe and North America have seen this as a
disastrous imposition by Moscow. Worley, in contrast, emphasizes
its indigenous roots and its relative success, portraying the
Comintern as "sensitive to national circumstances."
11
Thorpe in turn echoes Worley: the new line was ratified
by British considerations, it was far from a disaster, and "would
probably have come about
regardless of orders from
Moscow."
12
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The value of this work lies in
its rehabilitation of the primacy of politics in analyzing a political
party and its deployment of new evidence. Failing to adequately
appreciate existing research, it undervalues and at times caricatures
its conclusions. Consequently, its own interpretations and judgements
are flawed. Any analysis of "centre-periphery" relationships
must accord due emphasis to domestic factors, particularly in
the implementation of policy if it is to provide a nuanced account.
In these studies, the nuances, the adaptations, and the impediments
to realization of Comintern policy are inflated, the big picture,
the dominance of the Comintern, blurred. The evidence presented
fails to justify revision of conventional verdicts. Critique of
this literature is essential if we are to properly comprehend
Communism; it also provides a cautionary study in revisionist
methods.
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The following account should be
of interest to students of Communism in Canada, the USA,
and other countries where similar historiographical trends prevail.
Because of the importance of providing a detailed, properly furnished
critique, it is restricted to examination of the first ten years
of British Communism. It is divided into four sections. The first
provides an overview of existing literature. This is followed
by critical examination of the new revisionisms estimation
of the literature and a critique of its model of the relationship
between the Comintern and the CPGB. A third
section discusses that relationship between 1920 and 1930. A brief
conclusion provides an overall assessment.
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The Comintern and the CPGB in the Literature
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In August 1956, the year of Khrushchevs secret speech, the
invasion of Hungary, and turmoil in the CPGB,
the Soviet athletics team withdrew from the White City Games in
London in protest against the detention of Nina Ponomareva, a
Russian discus thrower. She had been arrested for stealing hats
from a store in Oxford Street. In a path-breaking verdict, the
Daily Worker condemned the decision to withdraw from the
games as "regrettable." It was the first time the paper
had ever editorially criticized a Soviet action. Hobsbawm complained
in relation to the party crisis: "We tell them that we do
not give the USSR uncritical support,
but when they ask us when we disagreed with its policy, all we
can point to is Nina Ponomarevas hats."
13
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The conclusion that the CPGB
only ever differed from the Russians on the minor and the inessential
characterized the first wave of writing about British Communism.
Henry Pellings pioneering work, published in 1958, reflected
its time and its authors values. In a "top down"
engagement with Communist politics, Pelling conceived the CPGBs
acceptance of international democratic centralism as the decisive
factor in its policies. Accepting that decisions of the Comintern
were binding, "the British party gave up its political initiative
to the International." As Russian dominance of the Comintern
became institutionalized, "blind loyalty" to the socialist
fatherland and the party which had created it ensured willing
compliance in every change of line. Each new strategic phase of
policy, from United Front, to Third Period, to Popular Front,
was initiated in Moscow and accepted in London, regardless of
its application to British problems. Pelling registers differing
degrees of Comintern intervention in different periods, although
he concludes that by 1930 the CPGB "was
reduced to an almost slavish submission to Moscow."
14
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At times Pellings emphasis
on political subservience leads to excess, as when he writes of
the CPGBs "transformation into
a military apparatus of the USSR,"
or when, striving to assert the partys foreignness, he exaggerates
the cosmopolitanism of its founding cadre. He wrote as a political
historian and social democrat, and within firm constraints as
to primary sources. To describe him simply as a "Cold War
historian" is to overlook both the troubling complexities
of the Cold War and the enduring democratic critique of the CPGB
espoused on both the left and right of the British labour movement.
Against the suggestions of at times intemperate criticism, which
rarely burdens itself with citation or quotation, his healthy
suspicion of Stalinism falls within the bounds of historical probity.
15
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Pellings account is not without
nuance. He notes the difference between establishment of policy
by the Russians, its transmission to the party leadership, and
its problematic implementation so remarked upon by later writers:
"instructions were passed down but they were not effectively
obeyed."
16
He registers internal dissent. He observes in relation
to the Third Period: "there was opposition among the British
leadership to the line of the Comintern," and he documents
the heresy of the Miners leader Arthur Horner. Pelling also
touches on the mechanisms of Comintern control. It is mistaken
to state that he ignores the raison dêtres
of British Communists, however unsatisfactory his explanation
of their motivations. He places responsibility for failure not
in Moscow but in Britain: "the major responsibility must
rest with those who, though actually facing objective circumstances
which had no comparison with those in Russia, still attempted
to impose on those circumstances an alien code of political action."
17
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The main problem with Pelling is
his one-sidedness. His emphasis is almost completely on formal
policy and the leadership: the membership is reproduced, as Leslie
Macfarlane remarked, one-dimensionally, as simply soldiers in
the service of Stalinism. This leaves out their struggles against
British capitalism, struggles with which many ordinary socialists
could identify. But, Macfarlanes examination of the CPGB
in the 1920s does not disturb Pellings estimate of subordination:
where there was significant disagreement, the British party was
"required to conform." But he insightfully emphasizes
that the majority of members did not perceive the Comintern as
a foreign, external controller. They conceived it as a wise, experienced
guide whose decisions were "in the main accepted by the British
party without question."
18
The Comintern relied on authority not coercion. Macfarlane
expands Pellings canvas, chronicling the interaction of
the Comintern and the CPGB and problems
in applying Communist policies in the unions and the Labour Party.
He demonstrates empathy with CPGB members,
who were, he believes, neither puppets nor dupes. Workers joined
the party for the same reasons they joined the Chartists. Many
of their struggles were exemplary and kept alive the spirit of
anti-capitalism. Nonetheless, his verdict is unequivocally negative.
By 1924, an initially relatively relaxed if ultimately dominant
Comintern was becoming more directive. The Third Period reflected
Stalinism in Russia and Stalinized the CPGB.
By 1929, "the direction of the Communist Internationals
policies was largely determined by the internal needs of the Soviet
state." The "tragedy of the Communist Party" was
that while it stimulated struggle, it "misdirected"
it.
19
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This was emphatically the position
of Walter Kendall, who painstakingly documented the role the Comintern
played in terms of prestige, ideology, and money in establishing
the CPGB and developing its politics. There
is no need to accept Kendalls conclusions as to the potential
of the pre-CPGB revolutionary tradition
nor his belief that the destiny of the party was determined in
1921 to agree, as his sharpest critics have, that the Comintern
was decisive in realizing British revolutionaries desire
for a Communist Party.
20
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Other historians turned towards
the application of Communist strategy in the trade unions. In
his study of the CPGB-sponsored Minority
Movement (MM), Roderick Martin evoked the
tensions inherent in collaboration between Communist and non-Communist
activists, and the problems party members experienced when union
responsibilities conflicted with political goals. But, he concluded
that "ideological, organizational and emotional pressures
were strong enough to enforce Communist conformity to the Comintern
policy ...."
21
Writing from a Trotskyist perspective, James Hinton and
Richard Hyman corrected earlier work in this vein. They demonstrated
the extent to which the CPGBs application
of United Front tactics in the mid-1920s veered to the right of
Comintern prescriptions and, in contrast to Pelling and Macfarlane,
they questioned the efficacy of Comintern policy from a revolutionary
perspective.
22
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Stuart McIntyres studies
of revolutionary autodidacts, Marxist philosophy and pedagogy,
and the development of local Communist strongholds reflected the
impact of "history from below." Within the constraints
of conventional political history and party orthodoxy, Noreen
Bransons third volume of the official history of the CPGB
represented an advance on James Klugmanns earlier volumes.
Where Klugmann downplayed the political impact of the Comintern,
it was a major, if fleeting, presence in Bransons work.
Its primary and deleterious influence in the Third Period was
given full weight; but once the Popular Front liberates indigenous
factors, it receded, re-emerging only in 1939.
23
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Without questioning the formal
domination of Comintern politics, Kevin Morgan insists on going
beyond official pronouncements to integrate orthodox political
history and "history from below." Scrutinizing the period
1939-41, he usefully documents the reticences, evasions, and silences
of CPGB activists in implementing the anti-war
line and depicts the concessions made to economism, pacifism,
and populism. Morgan observes that "the broad lines of Communist
policy were determined not by a rational appraisal of what was
possible in British conditions but by the erratic directives of
the distant heads of world Communism who could not have cared
less about the British working class ...." He provides a
formally balanced view of international and national pressures:
"if the CP [Communist Party] was unquestionably
a genuine British working-class party responsive to the British
political situation, it was also, from another aspect, an agent
of Soviet foreign policy: possibly the main problem in writing
Communist Party history is to comprehend the sometimes complex
relationships between the two."
24
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Allowing for complexity, the fundamental,
if difficult, historical question remains and is evaded here:
which was primary in the partys policies, the national
or the Russian? The extent to which the CPGB
could be a genuine British party and respond effectively and authentically
to the situation in Britain was restricted by Comintern hegemony
of its politics: deviations from policy in practice were never
sufficient to challenge that judgement. The changes in line which
Morgan chronicles are explained by pressure from Moscow, not pressure
from British workers. What unified the national and international
moments of British Communism and resolved the tensions between
defence of the "workers state" and the struggle
for its extension to Britain was, as Macfarlane demonstrated,
the legitimacy of the Russian leadership as the final arbiter.
The record discloses that, at every conjuncture, Russian considerations
came first. This was appreciated by contemporary workers if not
modern academics. It generated the CPGBs
justified reputation as the "zig zag party," the "picture
palace party" (where the programme changed twice weekly)
and "not a party of the left."
25
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Limited refusal by members to implement
party policy was an impediment on policy, not a positive alternative
to it. Morgan is documenting fragmented resistances, not principled
political opposition to the Comintern line. The CPGBs
acceptance of Moscows insistence that it oppose the war
in 1939-1941 is more remarkable than the fact that, given its
unpopularity, some activists failed to implement it. Yet without
reaching any explicit resolution of the tensions between Comintern
and national pressures, Morgan emphasizes the latter. Where Macfarlane
connected admirable struggles with their ultimate subordination
to the Russian state and returned a negative verdict, Morgan,
neglecting to adumbrate the criteria he is utilizing, passes a
positive judgement: the Stalinized CPGB,
which enthusiastically responded to every disturbing twist and
turn of Soviet policy, is favourably contrasted with the rest
of the British left.
26
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A similar emphasis on indigenous
factors pervades much of Nina Fishmans study of the CPGB
and the unions between 1933 and 1945. Against the weight of evidence,
British leaders are depicted as steering the CPGB
away from the excesses of the Third Period, espoused only by a
coterie of zealots, and empowering the native pragmatism of the
party cadre. Once the Third Period is negotiated, the Comintern
and even the party become peripheral actors: the Moscow trials,
the Gulag, and the Hitler-Stalin pact, cast no shadow. The emphasis
is on autonomous activists whose primary loyalty is to trade unionism.
There are few connections or tensions in this text between the
Comintern, the party, and the unions. Relying heavily on testimony
from participants, the book purveys a novel, cosy, and very British
"model of democratic centralism ... highly derivative of
working-class non-conformism. It relied on individual consciences
to interpret the real world."
27
Real sources of motive and constraint, the class-struggle
in workplace and union, the temptations of economism, are highlighted.
But other significant sources of motive and constraint
the Stalinist party, its discipline, its leadership, and its policies
are under-investigated and under-emphasized. The Popular
Front period permitted a relative flowering of "national
Communism;" but there were always limits.
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Predilection for the Popular Front
and emphasis on the relative autonomy of party activists imbues
Willie Thompsons The Good Old Cause, its title assimilating
the CPGB to the British republicans of
the seventeenth century. Thompson writes political history, but
the partys politics are at their healthiest the further
they travel from the original revolutionary imperatives and the
more they adapt to the national terrain. The Comintern is viewed
in Thompsons text as an episodically intrusive and usually
malign influence on the politics of British Communism. The CPGBs
dramatic moves to the left, at Moscows behest and in Moscows
interests, as in 1928 and 1947, are portrayed as "reversals"
of the partys natural trajectory towards the mainstream
of bourgeois politics in Britain.
28
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In contrast, McDermott and Agnews
The Comintern, the first work by British historians to
explore the newly opened archives, corroborates the primacy of
Moscow while taking cognisance of the impact of "history
from below." The Comintern, they conclude, was transformed
into "a bureaucratic mouthpiece for the Soviet state"
and after 1929 "whoever controlled the Russian party apparatus
controlled the Comintern." Over the Cominterns history
"the tension felt by foreign Communists attempting to balance
fealty to Moscow with responsiveness to indigenous realities was
invariably resolved in favour of the former."
29
A weakness of social history is its "propensity to
underestimate the mechanisms of control employed by the Comintern
... and by the party leaderships at national level." After
1929, "Stalinist discipline demanded that members loyally
fulfil the party line, deviations were rarely tolerated for long
and space for debate and discussion was severely restricted. While
scope for regional, local or industrial initiative and adaptation
did exist and should be recognized, it must be treated with a
fair degree of circumspection."
30
Overall, the Comintern has to be evaluated negatively in
relation to the Third Period, "social fascism," the
Stalinist terror, and the Nazi-Soviet pact.
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On the whole, the literature affirms,
although it expands and nuances, Pellings judgement that
the CPGB surrendered its political initiative
to the International. To emphasize local struggles and committed
lives in particular countries, divorced from the political framework
which governed them, and on this one-sided basis, to treat the
movement with approbation, is to write Communist history with
the Communism left out.
31
There were conflicting interpretations of the line propounded
by the Comintern. The strategic axes determined in Moscow required
adaptation when inserted into the different political formations
of Canada, China, the USA, and Britain,
or even the different Labour parties in Manchester or Glasgow,
the miners union in Wales, and the engineering union in
Liverpool. It is commonplace and commonsense that there was debate
and dissension. What remains striking is the enduring conformity
of the CPGB to Comintern directives, despite
differences in the degree of intervention in different periods.
It is important to document national adaptations inherent in the
nature of an international project. To suggest that such secondary
factors equalled political autonomy or qualified loyalty to the
Russians is to trivialize politics and fail to do justice to Communists
grievously mistaken commitment to internationalism.
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The literature demonstrates that
the CPGB was always subordinate and that
control sharpened in the Third Period. Even when the Comintern
was at its most extreme, after 1928 and in 1939-41, there was
only fleeting, individual defiance. There was no sustained political
opposition of any scale and the evanescent individual resistances
of Arthur Horner, 1929-1931, and the party leaders Harry Pollitt,
J.R. Campbell, and Willie Gallacher in 1939, were swiftly followed
by recantation and self criticism. In sharp contrast with other
Comintern affiliates, in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Canada,
or the USA, and this point is often
evaded this was, from the beginning, a distinctively conformist
party: there was no factionalism with the solitary exception of
the tiny Trotskyist Balham group. All we can find is a handful
of protests like the CPGBs criticism
of the Colonial Thesis at the Cominterns 1928 World Congress
"which could not be maintained once the decision had been
taken."
32
If the socio-historical approach enriches our knowledge
of how Communists thought and worked, and suggests the limits
of a not very democratic centralism and the problems the CPGB
confronted in implementing agreed policies, it does not change
this assessment. Finally, although the criteria for judgements
are sometimes unclear, the majority verdict is that with some
differences over the early period 1920-23, the Comintern exercised
a detrimental impact upon British revolutionary politics.
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The New Revisionism and its Methods
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With different emphases and qualifications, this verdict has hitherto
gone unchallenged, although some have urged that greater weight
be accorded to the social and cultural aspects of CPGB
activities in view of its political weaknesses.
33
Thorpe, whose approach is commended by Worley, has now
sought to categorize British historiography, following the American
example, as justification de texte in respecifying the
relationship of the Comintern to the CPGB.
He delineates "three main schools." The first, "associated
particularly with Henry Pelling," argues that the CPGB
"rapidly became the slaves of Moscow." It is peopled
by Cold War warriors and Trotskyists, but, apart from Pelling,
the only other author cited is Hugo Dewar. The second school,
"the revisionists," are influenced by the "new
labour history" and end up "dismissing the importance
of what might be called the high politics of the International
and its parties." The only British scholar cited as revisionist
is Macintyre. The third school, the "post-revisionists,"
are defined with imprecision as rejecting on the one hand, the
idea that British Communists were "slaves of Moscow"
and, on the other, the view that they were "utterly unaffected
by the Comintern and the leaders of their national parties."
34
Despite the fact that most would commend this proposition,
if question its crippling inexactitude, no British writer is cited
as a member, although Thorpe clearly sees his own work as governed
by this rubric.
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This categorization is artificial,
yet it pervades Thorpes work, much of which is dominated
by a synthetic contest with the "slaves school." The
idea "that a flick of the lever in the Kremlin led to immediate
and complete changes" in CPGB policy,
he tells us, is the product of "myths and legends."
At the Congress which established the CPGB,
"the mood was not slavish." In 1921 the party was not
"cravenly submissive"; by 1923 "the party was not
slavish to Moscows every whim"; Communists were not
"marionettes being manipulated by a Kremlin puppet master";
"the characterization of British Communists as slaves
of Moscow during this period is utterly misleading."
35
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This contestation is a central
organizing device for Thorpes analysis. Yet it is based
on caricature as the absence of citation suggests. He claims,
in prose parading as precise but which is in fact parodic, that
this school posits a model "whereby an order was made in
Moscow; was then transmitted with total clarity; and was then
followed with complete obedience by the party leadership. The
latter, in turn, transmitted the order to its members, again with
total clarity; it was then followed, again with complete obedience,
by party members."
36
Such exact characterization surely merits specific reference
to the work of those so characterized, particularly in the case
of Pelling who, as we have seen, recognized the problems of implementing
Comintern directives. Yet in Thorpes extensive oeuvre
there is only a single quotation from Pelling, his reference to
Comintern control in the Third Period assuming a "quasi-military
character."
37
At the highest, this is metaphoric exaggeration. It is
relevant that Thorpe nowhere quotes Pelling on slavery, for in
the almost 200 pages of Pellings book there is only one
such reference. Pelling writes that at the zenith of the Third
Period, the CPGB was "reduced to an
almost slavish submission to Moscow." Pellings image,
which impressionistically but effectively evokes one facet of
the CPGBs predicament, is translated
by Thorpe so that "almost slavish" becomes "the
epitome of slavishness."
38
There is a difference and an infidelity to the sources
being criticized. If in the most rigorous terms, "almost
slavish" still smacks too much of coercion when the CPGBs
subordination was self-willed. Thorpe is constructing and demolishing
a straw man based on one sentence in a pioneering text 40 years
old, a text long supplemented by other work which vindicated its
message of Comintern domination of the CPGB.
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"Many historians," Thorpe
insists, "have seen the British party as the epitome of slavishness
to Moscow."
39
The only one of the "many" he mentions in addition
to Pelling is Dewar. But, if we read Dewar we find no reference
to "slaves of Moscow," "marionettes," or the
rest of the paraphernalia of automaticity. Dewar insists upon
the hegemony of the Comintern while distinguishing different degrees
of intrusiveness from Moscow at different times: "The rein
may have at first not been tight, not even felt by the members
but it was nonetheless there."
40
Until the Third Period, Dewar stresses, the Comintern took
account of indigenous factors and problems of implementation.
In the early years "there was exhaustive discussion"
and "national peculiarities were recognized and tactical
flexibility accepted within the framework of the strategic general
line."
41
Both Pelling and Dewar suffer from imperfections but they
deserve considered criticism not caricature.
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Similar weaknesses inform Thorpes
construction of the revisionist school. The one British writer
who has explicitly aligned herself with American revisionism,
Fishman, is not included. Instead the burden falls completely
on Macintyre. Yet if, as Thorpe suggests, "the new labour
historians have suggested that we should not get interested in
this relationship [between the Comintern and the CPGB]:
it made no real difference to what Communists did in their daily
lives," then Macintyre is an unlikely and unwitting revisionist,
for he has nowhere asserted this. When Thorpe inveighs against
revisionists: "it will simply not do to argue that we can
take the politics out of political history,"he is ascribing
to Macintyre arguments the latter has never made.
42
The work Thorpe refers to is focused on CPGB
ideas and activists: it nowhere dismisses the importance of "high
politics." Macintyre seeks to go beyond political history,
not replace it; he is extending and supplementing political history,
not rejecting it. His analysis of the transformations in Marxist
thought in Britain, for example, takes full account of the influence
of "official Communism" and the CPGBs
active attempts to impose a new order in revolutionary philosophy
and pedagogy. Macintyre, moreover, has written elsewhere, and
in some detail, about the institutional politics of Communism
and the relationship between the Australian party and the Comintern.
43
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Thorpes final category, "the
post-revisionists," is embarrassed by the absence of a single
British historian. The only exemplar cited is Maurice Isserman,
conventionally considered a leading light of American revisionism.
This categorization of the literature is brittle. It provides
a fragile basis for the re-examination of issues. If Thorpes
work is to proceed on this flabby basis "the CPGB
was not a slave of Moscow; but neither was Moscow completely irrelevant"
and is to assert its novelty by its distance from two parodic
"slaves" and "anti-politics" schools, one
approaches it with trepidation. Moreover, while the only basis
for a serious post-revisionism is the very difficult project of
a total history, which yokes together history from above and history
from below, Thorpe is resolutely wedded to "high politics."
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Nevertheless, he states that he
wants not only to add detail to existing knowledge but "to
do much more than that
to address the nature of the relationship
between the CPGB and the Comintern"
and "explain how power was negotiated and shared out in the
Communist movement during the Comintern period."
44
This would suggest the need for explicit formulation of
the factors involved, of the power, interests and motivations
of the parties, their goals when pursuing key issues, an account
of outcomes, what influenced them, and how they changed in different
periods. It would benefit from some comparisons between the relationship
of the Comintern and the CPGB and that
which Moscow enjoyed with other parties. Yet despite his dissatisfaction
with existing work and ambitious desire for greater exactitude,
Thorpe elaborates no alternative model. On the contrary, his account
of relationships is narrative, empirical, and impressionistic.
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Characterization of the institutional
relationship between the Comintern and its constituents is an
essential beginning in determining how power was shared out. For
it demonstrates that, formally, the CPGB
was not independent. Through 250 pages of his monograph, Thorpe
makes only two brief references to this. He tells us, somewhat
haltingly, that the CPGB was "part
of a worldwide network of Communist parties; indeed the CI
[Comintern] was conceived as a world party of which the national
parties were only branches." Twenty pages later, he briefly
rehearses the 21 conditions of membership which subordinated the
CPGB to the Comintern.
45
Thorpes lack of emphasis contrasts with that of the
CPGB itself, which stressed proudly and
publicly, at least before 1935, that it was a subsidiary unit
in an international party. Throughout his book, moreover, there
is no analysis of the decreasing democracy in the Comintern and
the increasing formal powers of its executive (ECCI)
which by the end of the 1920s had the right to ensure that its
decisions were "promptly and strictly" carried out by
all sections, cancel or change national decisions, dissolve national
parties, expel their members, even fix their contributions. By
that time, the practice and culture of the Comintern was rigidly
centralist, not democratic centralist.
46
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In terms of formal legitimacy,
this is important to the negotiation of power. But it is subsidiary
to the actors ability to mobilize resources, sanctions,
and ideology. Here we must add to the calculus the overwhelming
resources the Russians could deploy in Comintern transactions.
From 1920, the Russian partys wielding of state power, its
prestige as maker of the revolution which eluded other parties,
and its relative monopoly of material resources, ensured an undemocratic
disequilibrium within the Comintern. This must surely qualify
Thorpes idea of negotiation, certainly if the term carries
connotations of even a rough balance of bargaining power. If it
suggests, rather, dependence on the part of the national branches,
then the increased tempo of "Bolshevization" from 1924
sealed the fate of the ECCI as an instrument
of the Russian party. Reviews of the literature conclude that
even in the early 1920s "any major decision" was taken
by the Bolshevik leadership: "The ruling would be communicated
to the Russian party delegation to the ECCI
which then ensured its passage through the Comintern executive.
This practice evolved under Lenin, was consolidated during the
interregnum and became set in stone under Stalin."
47
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The assimilation of the Comintern
into the Russian state decisively aligned Comintern directives
with Russian foreign policy. This is central to any assessment
of the centre-periphery relationship. It is simultaneously an
essential explanatory device for understanding Comintern decisions,
an important qualification of the idea of negotiation, and an
indispensable starting point for assessing "how power was
shared out in the Communist movement." Yet these developments
are scarcely touched upon: in the whole of Thorpes lengthy
monograph, there are only a handful of scattered and superficial
references to political changes in Russia. Thorpe provides no
explicit assessment or periodization of the Comintern, apart from
vague references to intervention in national parties being greater
in one period than another. The rich literature, which, for example,
in one strand distinguishes a primitive period, 1920-23; the Zinoviev
period, 1924-27; the increased tempo of intervention in the Third
Period; and the more controversial changes from 1935, is not deployed.
48
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Rather than inserting the CPGB
into this kind of analytical framework, Thorpe opts for a relentlessly
British approach. His unstated but pervasive model focuses largely
and empirically on the CPGB and its responses
to Comintern decisions. He has little to say about CPGB
initiatives on issues outside its own province of Britain and
the colonies. That these were negligible, even in comparison with
other national parties, is very clear. By the end of 1924, the
CPGB was being lectured: "The Communist
Party of Great Britain should follow actively and discuss systematically
the problems of the Communist International and of brother parties.
Previously that had not been done in a satisfactory manner."
49
Zinovievs subsequent commendation of the CPGBs
position on the controversy in the Russian party is well known.
It is also instructive that Comintern representatives found party
leaders understanding of the issues questionable and were
directly involved in drafting the CPGB
resolution condemning the Russian Opposition.
50
The CPGBs neglect of the,
admittedly and increasingly circumscribed, democratic moment in
world democratic centralism, the fact that even in the 1920s its
positive input into Comintern decision making was derisory, bespeaks
insularity and deference: it therefore requires registering.
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Instead, Thorpe concentrates upon
assessing dependence and independence through the prism of decision
making inside the CPGB. If he dispenses
with the essential Comintern context, his analytical framework
is also devoid of criteria of measurement. He provides not even
a rudimentary means of ranking political issues and their significance
to the two parties. He provides no criteria at all for distinguishing
the depth and quality of disagreements or failures by the CPGB
to meet Comintern imperatives. Yet we need to weigh very differently
a vote against an issue at a Congress and sustained opposition
by the party leadership to the Comintern position. We need to
discriminate between a simple omission to raise something in a
union branch through lack of conviction or fear of criticism and,
further up the line, protest and the formation of a faction. We
need to differentiate refusal to send a delegate to a not particularly
important Comintern meeting through lack of funds, at one extreme,
from opposition to a new strategic line, motivated by political
disagreement, at the other, if we are to arrive at a sharper estimation
of the relationship. We need to know how, in whose favour, disputed
issues were resolved. In the absence of such yardsticks, conflation
of a wide range of issues and disagreements can lead to judgements
that magnify independence, even though in reality it is matters
such as Nina Ponomarevas hats that are contested while important
issues such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary are accepted.
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So, for example, Thorpe asserts
sweepingly, "British Communists approaches to politics
varied to such an extent that the idea of party members simply
following orders from Moscow is untenable. At every
turn of the line there was dissent and this did not disappear
once the line had been changed."
51
We have to ask: what was the nature, quality, and depth
of the "dissent" to each major strategic orientation,
how many people were involved, who were they, how long did their
disagreement last and how were matters concluded? Thorpe provides
four examples of dissent: when the embryonic party moved towards
parliamentary action and affiliation to the Labour Party, at the
inception of the United Front, during the move to the Third Period,
and during the Popular Front. In the first case, Thorpe provides
no evidence. There was vocal opposition over these issues
but it was defused by the Comintern and really belongs to the
partys pre-history. While problems continued several
branches in Glasgow left the CPGB in 1922
over the decision to withdraw Communist candidates, an incident
Thorpe omits to mention opposition was transitory and small
scale.
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The only evidence produced for
dissent over the United Front and the Popular Front is that in
the first case twenty per cent of the votes at the 1922 Congress
were cast against it; and in the second case that Pollitt had
to stress that, in espousing the Popular Front, the party was
not rejecting socialism.
52
(We deal with the Third Period later.) Twenty per cent
of delegates voting against the United Front as part of the policy
process in the partys second year is mild dissent. No organized
opposition emerged and the strategy was strongly supported, despite
differences over tactics, until 1927. Thorpes evidence for
his assertion of differences over the Popular Front raises fundamental
questions as to his methodology. He cites only one example of
dissidence without quotation or paraphrase. The conscientious
student who follows up this solitary reference it is to
the London District Congress of 1938 will find only a bare
statement from Pollitt that the Popular Front represented no retreat
from socialism. There is no reference to dissent. There is no
evidence in the report that Pollitt made this statement because
he was facing opposition. Thorpe imaginatively, but in terms of
historical method, illegitimately, infers discord. In this
specific case, Thorpes data is non-existent.
53
Overall, he inflates minor into major disagreement and
provides slender and superficial evidence for his sweeping revisionist
conclusions.
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Demonstrating similar lack of proportion,
he cites a number of minor omissions by the CPGB
to carry out Comintern directives: such as failure to donate £50
to Inprecorr, or send a delegate to a farmworkers
conference, as well as a "strongly worded" protest over
Comintern criticism. On this tenuous basis he again concludes
sweepingly: "The party clearly believed that CI
decisions were negotiable, therefore."
54
The distinctions between a farmworkers conference
and the strategic political line, between protest and opposition,
between major and minor, are dissolved by a non sequitur.
Thorpe goes on to assert "[the party] extended this even
so far as to call for Radeks inclusion in the British Commission
at the time of the fifth world congress despite the fact that
he was now falling out of favour in Moscow."
55
His unwitting juxtaposition of this respectful request
to overlook Radeks political unreliability, given his knowledge
of Britain (written at a time when the CPGB
failed to understand the seriousness of the factional struggle
in Russia), with "on the other hand, the party and Moscow
were at one over Trotsky" highlights the problems with Thorpes
lack of discrimination between issues. The Radek letter, a relatively
minor entreaty, is conflated with what for Zinoviev and the Russian
leadership of the Comintern was a life and death issue of primary
significance.
56
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Analytical promiscuity can only
produce inexact and unbalanced judgement, a problem emphasized
by the absence of international comparisons in Thorpes work.
Yet, such comparison over an issue such as the factional struggle
in Russia can provide the beginnings for developing at least a
rough and ready calculus of conformity and independence. The CPGB
in 1924-25 Thorpe tells us there were "a handful of
expulsions," when there were none, might be usefully contrasted
with other national parties. The Belgian party, where the leadership
carried on a sustained opposition to the Comintern, might be fruitfully
compared with the Polish party, where the leadership sought to
intervene to support Trotsky but were quickly and coercively quashed;
and both might be usefully compared with the French party, where
prominent leadership figures were expelled; and with the Canadian
party which refused to condemn Trotsky; and finally with the CPGB
where, if we dispense with the magnifying glass, dissent from
the leaderships loyal support for the Comintern anathema
was negligible.
57
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Finally, in suggesting the limits
of the Cominterns dominance of the CPGB,
Thorpe provides a list of alternative influences: "Pressure
from below, factional and individual rivalries, the stance of
the State, the Labour Party and the trade unions, and working
class responses, all played their part in determining party strategy."
58
Once again this is evasive. It unhelpfully conflates different
kinds of factors, and different orders of explanation as well
as strategy and its tactical adaptation. Moreover, Thorpe once
more fails to provide even a rudimentary ranking of these factors.
Is he arguing that the policies of the British state or "pressure
from below" took precedence over Comintern policy in determining
CPGB strategy? How do we rank "pressure
from below" against the policy of the state and the Labour
Party? Thorpe does not even begin to separate out and assess the
influence of different factors from Comintern policy to trade
union pressures and to differentiate the primary from the secondary.
His only essay in asserting the predominance of indigenous factors
relates to the Third Period to which we return below.
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Mechanisms of Control
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Any model seeking to transcend existing literature would elaborate
the factors in the relationship between the Comintern and the
CPGB making for unity and consensus on
the one hand and dissension and conflict on the other: disparities
between the imperatives of Soviet foreign policy and the requirements
of class struggle in Britain are obvious examples. Thorpe does
not explore this theme but he does examine a range of "control
mechanisms" intended to overcome "severe obstacles"
and "keep foreign Communists on the right lines." Obstacles
listed are the legality of the CPGB which
diminished dependence on Moscow; the British states curtailment
of the activities of Comintern agents and problems in using coercion
against CPGB members; the distance London
lay from Moscow and difficulties of travel and communication.
In the face of these obstacles, ideology and identification with
the USSR were "not deemed sufficient
to keep foreign Communists on the right lines."
59
Thorpe, therefore, starts from an unelaborated but commonsensical
nationalist model where political differentiation rather than
political identification between the Comintern leaders and the
CPGB is inherent and assumed; for the nature
and wellsprings of potential conflict are left unexplored. In
accordance with this inexplicit differentiation, he assumes a
reluctance on the part of British Communists to accept Comintern
directives and a need for the Comintern to impose policies on
the CPGB through the use of "control
mechanisms."
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The mechanisms are "surveillance
and supervision," monitoring of CPGB
documents, reports from members of other parties, surveillance
of British visitors to Moscow, maintenance of a Comintern representative
in Britain, and a CPGB representative in
Moscow. A second set of mechanisms are termed "concrete assistance,"
notably financial subsidies and deployment of foreign Communists
in Britain. A third avenue was the provision of propaganda material,
though the scale of this varied and was greatest 1924-1935. The
Comintern could also sponsor individuals and factions, manipulate
the youth movement, privilege students returning from the Cominterns
International Lenin School (ILS) in Moscow,
and, finally and rarely, fall back on "coercion and intimidation."
Thorpe concludes that external compulsion was "not sufficiently
powerful to force the CPGB, over sustained
periods, to do what it did not itself wish to do."
60
This is important because the failure of mechanisms of
control provides, in Thorpes analysis, the guarantee of
the partys autonomy from Moscow.
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44 |
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The fundamental problem with this
is that there were no "sustained periods" when the CPGB
had to be "forced" by the Comintern "to do what
it did not itself wish to do." The CPGB
typically wanted to do what the Comintern wanted it to do. There
were occasional doubts and at times grumbling and whingeing. There
were periods, such as 1928 or 1939, when there was some resistance.
These were largely, although not completely, resolved by the large
degree of consensus between London and Moscow, and the legitimacy
London accorded to the Comintern as the ultimate arbiter of Communist
truth, not by "control" or coercion. That legitimacy
was the preponderant and ultimate factor cementing the CPGB
to the Comintern. Thorpes cursory treatment of the CPGBs
identification with the USSR leads him
to underestimate the partys essential identification with
the politics of "the workers state" and the Comintern.
Contrary to Thorpe, this allegiance was primary in explaining
Comintern domination. Comintern hegemony was largely forged in
Britain not Moscow. It was largely the product of a voluntary
impulse on the part of British Communists. In the end, compliance
stemmed from the beliefs and values of party members projected
onto the Comintern and the USSR. It was
freely chosen, not coerced; control mechanisms were important
but they were secondary, reinforcing factors, more relevant to
British comprehension of Comintern policy and the supervision
of its implementation than to its acceptance or rejection.
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Thorpes scrutiny of this
fundamental, defining issue runs to a brace of quotations about
Russia from CPGB leaders prefacing peremptory
rejection of the view that identification with the USSR
adequately bonded the CPGB to the Comintern.
This is to underestimate the internationalism of British Communists
and their blending of the socialist fatherland, the Russian party,
and the Comintern to constitute the fulcrum of that internationalism.
It was not simply the belief that Russia, not Britain, was "the
workers country:" a choice most decisively affirmed
in the winter of 1939; or that to criticize the USSR
was "to sin against the Holy Ghost;" or even the CPGBs
self-declared "implicit faith in the Communist Party
of Russia and the Executive Committee of the Communist International"
(Emphasis added).
61
Faith and emotion were melded with scientific Marxism and
the pivotal belief that:
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46 |
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a sufficient degree of homogeneity pertained
in the international workers movement to admit of its central
direction. The logical corollary of this which outsiders
could never understand was the conviction that the right
tactic to adopt locally was determined by international considerations.
This was internationalism so grievously lacking in August
1914 and its organisational expression was subordination
of the national sections to the centre.
62
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This was the ABC of the CPGB.
Its first leader, Arthur MacManus, responded to accusations of
foreign domination: "The social forces are worldwide. They
know no nationality."
63
Cadres like Palme Dutt were perplexed that comrades could
consider pushing dissidence so far as to attract the wrath of
the Comintern: there was no salvation outside it. Far from conceiving
of the Comintern as some external controller, the CPGB
cadre regarded it as "our party", "our leaders."
64
This was expressed by Macfarlane long ago: "The most
important point of all to grasp is that the ordinary party member
did not see the relationship in terms of outside control
and Moscow gold. He saw himself as a member of a great
working-class international movement guided by outstanding Marxist
revolutionaries who were making Russia into a land of socialism."
65
For such party members, the Comintern and its politics
were internal and immanent.
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The documents are replete with
statements from CPGB leaders, such as:
"The Communist International must give the Party its best
political assistance and help in coping with the big tasks that
lie before the Party."
66
The CPGB attempted to instil the
spirit of Comintern membership at all levels. The syllabus of
party schools announced: "Task of the course: To understand,
absorb and correctly put into practice the general line of the
CPGB and the Comintern."
67
The leadership urged that "every Party speaker do
his utmost to carry out the instructions of the Central Executive
Committee of the Communist International.... If every one of our
speakers carries through this instruction they will be a living
part of the Communist Internationals worldwide May Day Campaign."
68
Pollitt expatiated: "The biggest lesson of the whole
of this discussion to me is the value of being a section of an
international party," and asserted against internal pressure:
"The Comintern represents the leadership of revolutionary
struggle and its criticisms were stronger than London or Tyneside."
69
J.T. Murphy recorded: "Many times I heard the remark,
We are getting living proof of the value and importance
of belonging to the CI." And
he pronounced: "We dread to think what would have happened
had we not belonged to the International and received their guidance
and authority."
70
Members felt that in a crisis: "The International
was a tower of strength and sound judgement." In all eventualities,
"the Party must have a leadership which gives the guarantee
to the membership and the CI that the line will be carried out."
71
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In terms of theory, the CPGB
had a clear conception of its dependence on the Comintern: "We
have a good practical leadership in the British Party but none
of us with the exception of Dutt can make much claim of theoretical
Marxism," Gallacher informed the Russians.
72
Reports to Moscow reminded the Comintern of "the general
theoretical backwardness of our membership" and noted that
"our Party workers have not always the time to read."
73
In comparison with the Belgians, the Canadians, the French,
the Germans, the Spanish, the CPGB stood
out in the 1920s as one of the parties most politically dependent
upon the Comintern. One historian sympathetic to the party concluded
that, by the 1950s: "Intellectually undistinguished and bereft
of even the capacity for independent Marxist thinking, the entire
British party leadership had for more than three decades demonstrated
uncritical deference to the Soviets."
74
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If all this was fundamental and
necessary to Comintern domination and CPGB
compliance, it was not sufficient. Despite the shared commonality
of politics, it is inherent in Marxism, as a method of analysis,
that analysts can reach very different conclusions as to the nature
of a conjuncture and the strategy required in it. It is natural
and inevitable that in Marxist organizations there will be differences
of opinion; despite their "implicit faith" in the Comintern,
this was true of the CPGB.
75
This is where control mechanisms did play a part, although
here again Thorpes touch is uncertain. It is typified by
his treatment of the vexed problem of financial subsidies. Kendalls
conclusions on the important role Moscow gold played in the partys
formation have stood the test of time. It is now clear that significant
subsidies continued through the 1920s and 1930s. The newly opened
archives disclose substantial allocations running from at least
£60,000 in 1921-22 to £45,000 for 1927 and £36,000 for 1928. They
paid for almost all aspects of CPGB activity:
between 1920 and 1922, membership subscriptions constituted less
than three per cent of total income. In 1924 Inkpin told the Comintern
we cannot, of course, completely discount an element of
self-interested exaggeration that the CPGBs
own income was approximately £1000 and its liabilities £400. Thorpe
himself calculates that by 1927, Comintern subsidy to the CPGB
(with a membership of less than 7,000) was equal to two-thirds
of the income of the mass-membership Labour Party. It is therefore
difficult to accept his summation: "The extent of the Russian
subsidies can also be exaggerated."
76
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Thorpe goes on to claim that it
is "plausible to argue that the money, while gratefully received,
made little real difference."
77
This is unsustainable: without the subsidy the CPGB
in all probability would have ceased to exist at some point in
the 1920s, like Sylvia Pankhursts organization, or at best
been consigned to the shadowy existence of the Socialist Labour
Party and its successors. This was the considered view of Murphy,
intimately involved with the subsidies from their inception: without
them the party would "have probably gone out of existence
within a year or two of formation."
78
Keeping the CPGB alive, subsidies
enabled it to build its organization and compete with rivals in
a fashion quite out of proportion to its membership: by 1931,
it financed 41 full-time staff, representing one full-timer for
every 165 members.
79
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As early as 1921, the CPGB
decided that Politbureau members should be paid £5 a week, other
functionaries £4 a week. This was referred to as "the trade
union rate," but was more than most trade unionists and CPGB
members earned. The general secretary, Albert Inkpin, insisted
that party staff "must be guaranteed a livelihood,"
but this was a generous livelihood when at times the majority
of party members were unemployed. These salaries could not be
paid without Comintern subsidies and, not surprisingly, the documents
suggest that a return to the factory or the dole was regarded
with something short of enthusiasm. There were further benefits
such as trips abroad and opportunities for journalism: a Comintern
representative explained to Dutt, who received a salary direct
from Moscow, that the Russian press paid 80 gold roubles for long
articles, 15-20 for short pieces, and that 4 or 5 articles could
be placed each month. Moreover, a range of employment was offered
and was sometimes seen as attracting the inefficient and politically
undesirable: "Willie McLaine, another incompetent is living
on the Famine Fund. Whitehead, with his wicked associations with
women and wine in Berlin is worse than incompetent, is also living
on the Famine Fund. When Comrade T. A. Jackson is proved incompetent
as Editor of The Communist, a position must be found for
him in the Information Bureau."
80
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Comintern subsidy permeated key
aspects of party organization in the 1920s. When the Comintern
agent Borodin, despatched to secure the reorganization of the
CPGB, was arrested in Glasgow in August
1922 and asked for his passport: "he slapped his trouser
pocket and said that this meaning money had
been his passport." Some party leaders, it seems, had
to be literally bought: after Murphys expulsion in 1932,
Gallacher recalled how Murphy had quit the CPGB
ten years earlier because his salary was stopped, returning only
after he was assured of its restoration. Quite apart from the
institutionalized annual allocations, when the CPGB
encountered difficulties, whether over wages, in by-elections,
in the Fife miners union, in the United Mineworkers of Scotland
or in the Clothing Workers Union, its reflex was to ask
Moscow for more money. Requests for special funds to bale out
the party-controlled Clothing Workers Union, led by CPGB
member Sam Elsbury, were headed in the interests of secrecy but
with some justification in view of the organizations remorseless
search for customers and hard cash: "Sams Business."
The organization of party education was inextricably bound up
with securing Russian money to resource it. Disputes over the
partys national school were resolved in the Cominterns
favour, but it had to pay a price, being landed with a bill of
£700, including £5 a week wages for the tutors. When Moscow purged
the party leadership in 1929, wages, so important at the start
of the decade, once again became a bone of contention. The response
of full-timers dismissed their employment was to appeal against
the party to the cornucopian Comintern; several solicited paid
employment for their families in Moscow.
81
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Asserting naively that: "Clearly,
such levels of financial support cannot have been without an impact.
Yet it is difficult to see precisely what the impact was,"
Thorpe fails to confront how subsidy was utilized as a "control
mechanism."
82
Between 1920 and 1923, dispensation of largesse, relatively
uncontrolled by the Russians provided a control mechanism for
the CPGB leadership. Mikhail Borodin, then
Comintern representative in Britain, paid tribute to the influence
money could exert when he informed his superiors in 1922:
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53 |
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Any authority which has heretofore been
exercised was due not to the quality of the Centre but to the
fact that the means which we allocated to the Party were all at
the disposal of one or more individuals who thus had economic
power rather than the power derived from organization and efficient
leadership. Naturally, the moment such financial means were withdrawn
or became scanty, there came an end to the economic power wielded
by the individuals and the whole business began to crumble and
disintegrate. | |