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This is a comprehensive and lucid account of the constitutional
debate surrounding the Bank of the United States during the early
years of the Republic. Though styled as an analysis of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion upholding the Bank's validity, the book focuses
much of its attention on the byplay between Congress and the Executive
Branch in the years preceding the case. That tale unfolds in three
acts: (1) the discussion over the original charter in 1791 that
divided Alexander Hamilton from James Madison and Thomas Jefferson;
(2) the resumption of that fight in 1811 when Congress refused to
renew the Bank's charter; and (3) the clamor for a reversal of this
policy following the War of 1812 that led to the creation of a new
Bank in 1816. Against this backdrop, Killenbeck then reviews all
aspects of the M'Culloch litigation challenging the Second
Bank, including the anonymous editorial battle between Marshall
and Spencer Roane that followed the decision. The book concludes
by assessing the hostile response to the opinion and reviewing Andrew
Jackson's campaign to destroy the Bank's constitutional foundation.
Most of this descriptive account
turns over familiar ground, but there are some points that cannot
be found in a standard work on M'Culloch. First, there
is a substantial discussion of the corruption and mismanagement
by the Bank's directors that was revealed shortly before the case
was heard. In contrast to the First Bank, which "had a largely
exemplary record, characterized by a generally reserved approach
to its tasks," the Second Bank "operated for the benefit of its
stockholders rather than as an instrument of national fiscal policy"
(65). Under the unfortunate leadership of William Jones, who had
recently declared personal bankruptcy, the Bank's aggressive lending
practices fueled land speculation that was a major factor in the
Panic of 1819. This economic downturn, which coincided with Marshall's
opinion, undercut the Chief Justice's paean to federal power and
gave ammunition to M'Culloch's opponents. Second, the analysis
of the congressional debates in 1811 (on the failure of the First
Bank's charter) and 1816 (on the creation of the Second Bank)
adds important context to the much better known clash between
Hamilton and Jefferson over the First Bank's charter. Third, the
book offers a much-needed review of the oral arguments in the
case, which lasted for nine days and included such luminaries
as Daniel Webster and Luther Martin. Since Marshall issued his
opinion just three days after these arguments ended, Killenbeck
probably gives them more attention than the Chief Justice did.
The book's chief weakness is that
the author does not explain why M'Culloch became a great
case. This is particularly important because, as Killenbeck acknowledges
towards the end, Jackson destroyed the Second Bank and his political
allies rejected Marshall's reasoning. In a few hurried pages,
the last chapter argues that the Legal Tender Cases, decided
after the Civil War, "made it quite clear that M'Culloch was
the guiding spirit for what followed" and that "Jackson's efforts
to repudiate or minimize M'Culloch had failed" (179, 181).
This is true to a certain extent, but that begs the question of
why M'Culloch is lionized while the Legal Tender Cases
are now neglected if they did the real work. Moreover, even after
the paper money cases were decided the Court did not adopt the
broad reading of M'Culloch that is now accepted as gospel.
The missing link is the New Deal, which needed to find precedents
for its transformation of the federal role and found one in a
selective reading of Marshall's opinion. Rather than writing a
ten-page epilogue on James M'Culloch, the named party in the case
who was a colorful character but largely irrelevant, the author
would have done better by exploring the decision's canonical status
in greater depth.
In sum, this is a fine work that
brings every thread of M'Culloch v. Maryland into a single
volume. As an example of legal argument that combines politics,
structural analysis, precedent, and pragmatic considerations,
the debate over the Bank of the United States should be part of
every constitutional law curriculum.
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