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Book Review
| William R. Casto, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution in the Age of Fighting Sails, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006. Pp. 202. $34.95 (ISBN 1-57003-629-2).
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| This book combines legal, economic, political, diplomatic, and military history with biography as William R. Casto of Texas Tech investigates the Washington administration's attempt to formulate a national foreign policy amid the turbulence of the French Revolution, the outbreak of war in Europe, and a divided administration that favored economic connections with Great Britain and a grateful country committed by treaty to France. The cabinet, made up of Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox, and Edmund Randolph, agreed that America should remain neutral and not become a belligerent in the European war. |
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Casto examines how the French and British diplomatic corps, the American cabinet, the public, the judiciary, and Congress all felt about Washington's 1793 Proclamation of Neutrality. Casto believes that the various policies advocated two hundred years ago still offer valuable lessons today. |
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French minister to the U.S. Edmond "Citizen" Genet advocated the sanctity of the Franco-American Treaty of Alliance of 1778, but did not insist that the U.S. take up arms against Britain. Genet, however, wanted the anti-British provisions of the treaty enforced, particularly the prohibitions against fitting-out British privateers and the sale of British prizes both in American ports. By implication, the treaty should allow France to fit-out corsairs (a French privateer) in American ports, enlist Americans on corsairs, allow French consuls to condemn prizes, and allow French prizes to be sold in American ports. The actions of Genet caused a diplomatic crisis. |
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Casto does an excellent job describing the naval war—particularly the role of privateers—and the subsequent handling of specific cases by Washington's cabinet and the U.S. judiciary. Casto could have spent more time on the role of the states in this diplomatic quagmire. New York's Governor George Clinton, for instance, sympathized with the French, but sustained the Proclamation of Neutrality. |
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Casto contrasts the blundering Genet with the intrepid Captain Bompard, the commander of the French frigate L'Embuscade. Casto vividly describes the engagement between the British frigate Boston and L'Embuscade in a gratuitous chapter where a page would have sufficed, but the seventeen-page chapter reads like a Horatio Hornblower novel, thus giving the reader the feeling of what it was like to be involved in these bloody naval engagements. |
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In a series of newspaper essays signed Pacificus, Hamilton put forth a broad interpretation of the executive powers of the president derived from the first sentence of Article II of the Constitution. The president was specifically limited only by Congress's power to declare war and the Senate's power to ratify treaties and confirm appointments. Many of the president's powers, however, Hamilton argued, were held concurrently by Congress. The president's ability to act quickly gave him an advantage in creating an antecedent act that Congress would usually endorse rather than overrule. |
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Casto describes Hamilton's interpretation as brilliant and supple. Casto finds those who disagreed with Hamilton wanting. James Madison in his Helvidius series either endorsed Hamilton or hopelessly meandered without offering meaningful constitutional alternatives. |
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Casto denigrates the courts because they did what courts normally do—focusing on the facts in a specific case rather than addressing broad policies. Judicial decisions usually favored the French. Hamilton preferred to avoid the courts and set not only general foreign policy but also make decisions on specific cases in the cabinet where he controlled a majority; while Jefferson preferred the courts for exactly the same reason—he knew Hamilton controlled Knox and often the chameleon Randolph. Casto also felt let down when Chief Justice John Jay refused to give an advisory opinion on the Proclamation of Neutrality, suggesting that as the court of last resort, the Supreme Court should not give a general ruling when specific cases would probably come before them. Furthermore, an opinion contrary to the administration's policy would have been a public opinion nightmare. Finally, Casto demonstrates the weakness of Congress in setting general foreign policy. The Senate backed the president's neutrality legislation, while the House opposed the bill's anti-French provisions. Thus the bicameralism of Congress worked as the check that the Founders always envisaged. |
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In looking at today's use of the two-hundred-year-old debate, Casto continues to praise Hamilton's insight. The president can be stopped only by a united Congress backed by public opinion. Presidents are loathe to violate specific acts of Congress, especially after Congress overrides a presidential veto. The courts defer to the other two branches for political matters in deciding foreign policy. Only when the president violates a specific law or the rights of individuals will the courts oppose the president's executive powers. Unfortunately Casto's manuscript must have been at press when the Supreme Court overruled President Bush's executive order on military detainees and Congress's subsequent act concerning detainees, which will now be considered in individual cases by the federal judiciary. |
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| John P. Kaminski
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| University of Wisconsin-Madison |
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