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Book Review
| Abraham Ascher, P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 468. $55 cloth (ISBN 0-8047-3977-3); $24.95 paper (ISBN 0-8047-4547-1).
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| For understandable reasons, scholars spend more time illustrating the perils of transplanting Western European constitutional models onto foreign soil than they do on extolling the possible rewards. This has certainly been the case with respect to Russia's two attempts with such models, before and after the Soviet period. Born of revolutionary turmoil in 1905–6, and terminated in the cataclysm of revolution and civil war in 1917–20, Imperial Russia's constitutional experiment from 1906–17 has not received much respect from historians. Both Soviet and Western historiography (especially since the 1960s) have characterized the late Imperial regime within a narrow range of fragile to bankrupt. To be sure, studies of discrete themes have identified promising lines of reform or evolution in the decade before 1917. But the general picture of social upheaval stalking a doomed dynasty remains regnant. It is a pleasure, therefore, to find Abraham Ascher recoloring this picture in his definitive political biography of the period's most important statesman, Peter Stolypin (prime minister from 1906 until his assassination in 1911). |
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The primary tension running through the book is the incompatibility between Stolypin's political ends and means. Ascher is especially valuable in uncovering Stolypin's goals. Employing important new sources (including a cache of 230 letters Stolypin wrote to his wife, and private reflections written to clarify his thinking on some key issues), Ascher's Stolypin emerges as more progressive and more consistent than historians have hitherto appreciated. Stolypin was a committed monarchist, who could not accept the notion of the newly founded parliament (the Duma) exercising meaningful control over cabinet appointments or foreign policy. He did, however, want to work with the Duma in shaping domestic policies. And his own policy programs were startlingly progressive, given his origins and the ideological tenor in the upper reaches of Russian society. He had far-reaching overhauls of local and central administration in his sights; he aimed to reduce religious discrimination (Ascher breaks new ground in establishing Stolypin's liberalism on the Jewish question); he wanted to build a safety net for unemployed labor; he believed in the potential of Russia's peasant farmers, once awarded the stimulus of personal ownership of land; and he had in mind to phase out the soslovie (social estate) principle in Russian society, in favor of the property principle. |
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The extreme polarization of Russia's political sphere in the aftermath of the revolution of 1905 virtually precluded government-Duma collaboration toward Stolypin's goals. First the left and then later the right imposed gridlock on reforms, in the process subjecting Stolypin to stern tests of principle: would he subvert the constitutional framework so as to effect measures he was certain the nation needed? Yes, he would. In a series of fateful moments, Stolypin invoked emergency regulations to prorogue or suspend the Duma and put through reforms. Once he even had the nation's Fundamental Laws rewritten so as to narrow the suffrage and guarantee a more conservative legislature. He also suspended due process for suspected terrorists in 1906–7, when socialists and anarchists rocked Russia's civil service with several thousand assassinations. |
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Stolypin's extralegal methods contrasted sharply with his avowed aim of nurturing a modern state based on the rule of law. This contrast compels the historian either to square the circle or to pass judgment. Ascher's judgment is unforgiving. First, he traces the legislative gridlocks in part to Stolypin's inflexibility and political simplicity. The prime minister was not a master of compromise or public relations. Second, he brands Stolypin's extralegal methods dangerously corrosive to the greater goal of forging a state order based on the rule of law. He might have commented as well on Stolypin's apparent indifference to the problem of raising a new generation of governmental leaders. In sum, while full of admiration for Stolypin's many accomplishments, Ascher finds his statesmanship flawed in a fundamental way. |
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Importantly, Ascher leaves the reader room for a more optimistic interpretation of Stolypin and the regime he served. He concedes the utility and pragmatic consistency of Stolypin's overriding of the Duma. After all, Stolypin vanquished the revolution of 1905–6; he created a viable legislature by shrinking the suffrage base; and he set the ball rolling toward a society grounded on property ownership in place of estate privilege. Historians can now combine this perspective with their growing appreciation for the evolution of moderate values among elites in the pre-WWI period. Recognition of society's obligation to protect the impoverished, and to soften religious persecution, gained much ground among Duma politicians in the years before 1914. And, Stolypin's periodic disrespect for the constitution notwithstanding, political life was maturing thanks to the restrictive electoral system he helped to create in 1907. Moreover, a recent discussion of the development of civil society in Russia speaks to maturation of the political climate far beyond the upper reaches of power. |
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Stolypin's "search for stability" was bearing fruit, therefore. Ascher is pointedly reticent to assess the regime's stability, however. In part this is because he did not undertake the herculean task of appraising the mood of Russia's countryside amid the confusion of the revolutionary land reform that bore Stolypin's name. Nevertheless, he does suggest Stolypin's potential to steer Russia to safety had he escaped assassination (and had his weakened heart held up). We see that Stolypin's career was not in jeopardy when he was killed, that Stolypin stood up to Nicholas II on important questions, and that he overrode the Empress and exiled the pernicious Rasputin from St. Petersburg. Most importantly, Stolypin was adamant about keeping Russia out of war. Ascher has demonstrated how vital the regime could be, at least in the hands of a man with Stolypin's exceptional vitality. |
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| David Kerans
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Argus Research Corporation
and Harvard University |
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