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Collisions, Prohibitions,
and the Admiralty Court in
Seventeenth-Century London
George F. Steckley
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When Anthonis Van den Wyngaerde executed
his sweeping panorama of London in 1543, he drew some two dozen
ships in the Thames, but only four of them downstream from St.
Katherine's Dock. A century later, however, Wenceslaus Hollar
carefully represented well over a hundred seagoing vessels in
a ribbon of masts winding down river as far as the eye could see.
By the 1650s a mariner noted the difficulty of navigating the
Thames at low tide, especially during "mackerel time,"
and Admiralty judges at Doctors' Commons near St. Paul's were
hearing complaints that congestion in the river was endangering
London's environment.1
Petitioners alleged in 1658 that Jenkin Ellis, a shoemaker and
wharf owner, had so exploited his foothold of just ten yards along
the north shore of the river, by selling permission to anchor
ships eight- and ten-abreast, that the entire bank from St. Katherine's
Stairs to the Dock was ruined. It had once been, said witnesses,
a "fair sandy ground" where "people might pass
on foot," where watermen could "wax and tallow their
boats." But after Ellis had arrived in 1640, the bank slowly
turned to "mud . . . ooze and dirt," and "the current
of the Thames near shore" where the ships lay was now so
"hindered . . . that if not timely prevented," the river
would be "choked up." Fires carelessly tended aboard
the ships when they were grounded at low tide threatened houses
in the entire precinct. When riding at anchor near the shoemaker's
wharf, the vessels forced lightermen to row in mid-river "against
the strength and current of the tide."2
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The rising number of ships in English
waterways had apparently reduced everyone's margin for error in
the seventeenth century. For collisions in the Thames and elsewhere
were providing the civil lawyers of London's Admiralty Court with
a stream of cases. Ironically, this litigation, it is argued here,
reveals both the resourcefulness of England's maritime judges
and the major cause of a decline in their authority during the
late Stuart decades.
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I. The Recourse
to Law
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Legal action remained throughout the
seventeenth century an important means to recover for losses suffered
from collision, for Ralph Davis has found that insuring ships
against such casualty would not become common until the 1720s.3
Shipowners filed perhaps as many as two hundred collision suits
in the sixteen years chosen for this study from across the seventeenth
century.4
Thirty of these actions were carried all the way to judgment,
and fully two-thirds of the cases decided before 1663 had arisen
from ships cracking together in the congested Thames.5
The suits themselves often had to be squeezed onto a crowded Admiralty
docket. By the late 1620s the civil law judges were contending
with an unprecedented number of maritime disputes--quarrels between
foreigner and Englishman over wartime reprisals, between master
and sailor over wages, and between merchant and owner over the
various contracts of long-distance shipping. The Warrant Books
for 1639 list 1,452 orders to arrest defendants and initiate process
in all kinds of Admiralty suits, both prize and instance. And
even though court scribes after mid-century were recording prize
warrants in a separate account, the Warrant Books from 1655 to
1662 still show a yearly average of 647 new arrests in instance
matters (see Table 1).6
This persistent traffic in everyday, non-prize litigation through
the early 1660s is also reflected in the court's busy Act Books.
A witness in a collision case of 1657 complained that he had waited
four days to testify.7
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Table 1.
Warrants and Decisions Issued by the Seventeenth-Century
Admiralty Court
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Sources: HCA, 38, Warrant Books; HCA 3, Act
Books; HCA 24, Libels and Decress. aThe sixteen years in italics are those
sampled for this study. See note 4 above for the sampling
method. bThe seventeenth-century instance jurisdiction
included such matters as bills of lading, charter
parties, collision, damage to cargo, maritime debt,
derelict, fiscal enforcement, fishing rights, flotsam,
freight, hypothecation of ship or cargo, ownership
of vessels or cargo, provisions, salvage, amd mariner's
wages.
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The press
of ordinary maritime disputes at mid-century and beyond probably
pleased the professionals at Doctors' Commons. All practitioners,
a lawyer confessed in 1651, had their eyes on the fee and wanted
their courts "packed up with suitors."8
More than 800 Admiralty warrants were purchased to initiate actions
in 1657. But within a few years after the Restoration the warrant
count had dropped sharply, by 1665 to 330. And the decline was
permanent: the average number of instance warrants issued annually
from 1666 to 1700 was 275, less than half the average for 1655-62.
This did not mean a commensurate fall in the number of decisions
issued by the court, as Table 1 reveals. But Admiralty judges
were unusually busy enforcing navigation acts in the 1670s and
mariners' pay agreements in the 1690s. When these fiscal and wage
decisions are subtracted in Table 1, it is clear that Admiralty
decrees in other types of litigation had fallen by the end of
the century nearly a third from the levels of the late fifties
and early sixties. Similar contractions were experienced by other
central courts in the late seventeenth century. But why the number
and variety of Admiralty cases should have declined in an era
marked by greater shipping traffic and customs receipts is not
easy to explain.9
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One theory
is that litigants had less reason by the 1660s to seek civil law
remedies at Admiralty. The common law courts, Daniel Coquillette
has argued, "had demonstrated their ability to meet the practical
needs of English commerce well before the Restoration, and the
civilians simply failed to offer any convincing rival advantages."10
But Coquillette rests his case heavily on improved common law
treatment of bills of exchange, instruments that had not been
a significant part of Admiralty litigation. He has perhaps underestimated
the civilians' ability to create new legal solutions for merchants
and mariners in the seventeenth century. And while he rightly
attributes greater common law recognition of mercantile practice
to the influence of Matthew Hale and decisions of Justice Holt
in the last quarter of the century, this cannot account for the
sharp drop in Admiralty warrants during the 1660s.11
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The more
familiar explanation of such decline has been given scholarly
statement by M. J. Prichard and D. E. C. Yale. In their view,
maritime business at civil law shrank under "the accumulated
weight of prohibition." The civilians' declining case load
was due not to the attractiveness of common law rules newly adapted
to commerce, but to "more insidious forces," namely
those directed by the professionals at Westminster. Common lawyers
had reasserted their claims to a variety of maritime cases as
soon as Interregnum statutes protecting the Admiral's jurisdiction
were allowed to expire, and they advised Admiralty defendants
to sue out writs of prohibition, which stopped process at civil
law.12
Prichard and Yale have used the legislative record and common
law reports to introduce two important treatises on maritime law.
But they provide no clear evidence that occasional prohibitions,
widely scattered as they were among hundreds of Admiralty suits,
fully deterred shipowners and mariners from bringing the disputed
matters to Doctors' Commons. They offer no analysis of what precisely
Admiralty judges were adjudicating in the late seventeenth century
or how well they were doing.
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An inquiry
into these matters could logically begin with the collision cases
studied here, since one response of the civilians to the rising
demand for their services in the seventeenth century was an innovative
attempt to resolve collision issues more equitably and expeditiously.
The ambiguity of circumstance surrounding the collision of two
ships in a congested river or open sea often became apparent as
the testimony of the crews was read out in court. There was seldom
a disinterested witness to validate one version or the other.
Therefore, English Admiralty judges experimented early in the
seventeenth century with a remedy long available in European maritime
codes: they occasionally abandoned efforts to identify only one
party as responsible for the collision, decided instead that the
damage was in some measure due either to accident or the carelessness
of both crews, and consequently reduced the plaintiff's award.
Thus they were finding contributory negligence long before that
notion took hold at common law.13
And the cases studied here reveal when in the seventeenth
century this approach became Admiralty routine, the simple rule
(rusticum judicium) by which liability was divided and
the defendant typically required to pay for only half the plaintiff's
losses. But the cases show more, that the civilians would go further
in their search for equity by the 1670s and develop a purely no-fault
doctrine, a rule enforced at Doctors' Commons throughout the eighteenth
century and requiring defendant and plaintiff to bear equal shares
of the total damage on both sides.
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Surely some shipowners who were aware
of these new remedies--the sharing of responsibility for collision
at sea--were willing to accept their portion of the losses and settle
without the expense of suit, which may explain part of the decline
in the number of such Admiralty cases late in the seventeenth century.
Support for this logic can be found by looking at civil law process
and noting the length and costs of collision suits that parties
insisted on pursuing to decree. Evidence of prolonged hearings and
rising fees indicates material motive for trying to resolve disputes
without hiring counsel, attending court, or even buying a warrant
of arrest. |
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On the other
hand, collision cases offer an opportunity to test the conventional
explanation for shrinking Admiralty business. Common lawyers in
the 1660s revived the use of prohibitions to claim authority over
disputes arising from crashes in navigable rivers, which, as the
present sample suggests, had been generating two-thirds of all
collision litigation at Admiralty. By noticing the location of
collisions that resulted in decrees, both before and after these
prohibitions issued, we can determine whether some ship-owners
were persuaded to avoid Doctors' Commons altogether, presumably
in order to file their suits in the Sheriff's Court or at Westminster.14
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This inquiry
into one corner of Admiralty law is, then, a modest approach to
the larger issue of declining litigation rates in the seventeenth
century. Did the business of one central court contract late in
the century in part because judges had offered a framework of
rules for ending some quarrels without legal action? Or did traffic
at Doctors' Commons decline solely because the civilians had failed
as politicians to protect their ancient jurisdiction against common
law encroachment? Argument for the first hypothesis must rest
largely on circumstantial evidence, for Admiralty records say
almost nothing about the motives or agreements of shipowners who
chose to reconcile rather than litigate. But evidence for the
second explanation is stronger, and it will be demonstrated here
that beginning in the 1660s prohibitions sharply reduced civilian
authority over collision disputes.15
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It is no
surprise that civil and common lawyers were vying for control
of maritime litigation in the seventeenth century.16
Cases from the sample illustrate how a growing commercial empire
could bring grist to the lawyer's mill. A larger navy had helped
to seize and hold markets abroad, and government agents brought
suit at Admiralty in 1657 after one of Cromwell's warships was
involved in a smash-up on the Thames.17
But most plaintiffs and defendants at Admiralty were, of course,
private shipowners. Aside from a few watermen whose lighters had
suffered damage, the litigants were invariably proprietors of
coasting vessels and larger merchantmen that had become entangled
in river or harbor or en route to and from distant markets. For
instance, alderman William Cokayne was one of several Londoners
condemned to pay £134 in 1609 after their ship, bringing
home seventy tons of Polish wheat, rammed a Scottish vessel off
Yarmouth.18
A crash in 1627 at Chester's Key in the Thames reflected the expanding
re-export trade in Asian goods, for the cargo damaged was pepper
ready for shipment to the Mediterranean.19
The Rose and Crown, a fly-boat of 320 tons, was outbound
in 1676 to load sugar at Barbados when she ran over a ship carrying
French wines to London's elite.20
Collisions also resulted from efforts to supply the city's artisans.
In 1608, the Jonas, laden with iron for the metropolis,
was holed and sunk in the middle of the night by the Chalk
Hoy of Greenwich.21
In 1678, a small vessel with timber for shipwrights had just come
to anchor near Clement's Reach when she was driven under by a
ship difficult to identify in the predawn darkness, but thought
to be the Hound, a collier arriving from Newcastle.22
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There was
good reason for such suspicion. Colliers like the Hound were
involved in more collision cases during the sample years than
ships hired for any other trade. Exports of coal from northeastern
England had increased sharply in the late Elizabethan and early
Stuart decades. By the 1640s Londoners burned more than 300,000
tons of the fuel each year, creating such a smog that John Evelyn
compared the city to the suburbs of hell or Troy after the Greeks
had left.23
Meeting such a demand for coal with a coasting fleet that averaged
under a hundred tons per ship would have required several thousand
voyages annually. Thus, a third of all decrees in the collision
cases sampled here, more than half after 1656, resulted from the
difficulty of negotiating the Thames in heavily laden but lightly
manned colliers.24
Sailors of the Hound, blamed by Captain Mustard for running
down his timber hoy, admitted that their collier lay so low in
the water she could not pass over a shelf in the Thames near Rainham
until flood tide. They insisted, however, that they then cleared
all vessels in the early morning darkness and reached London without
mishap. But Mustard's charges against the Hound were supported
by a parade of witnesses. A waterman had heard first the cracking
of vessel upon vessel, then Captain Mustard cry out, "O lord,
O lord, you have sunk my hoy." One of Mustard's sailors said
that he and the captain had leaped into the hoy's boat to save
their lives and then chased the Hound from Gallion's Reach
to Blackwall. There Mustard, vowing legal action, warned the collier's
master, Thomas Arundell, "You shall know the damage you have
done--and my name--when you come to London." Finally, a witness
alleged that the Hound's crew had tried to escape detection
by painting over the figure of a spotted dog on the ship's stern.
And though the Admiralty judge still imagined it a case of misidentification
in the pre-dawn darkness and acquitted Arundell and his crew,
Captain Mustard, as we shall see, had not exhausted all legal
options against the Hound in a seventeenth-century world
of competing jurisdictions.25
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While collier
crews were involved in numerous quarrels, they also had occasion
to support each other's claims in the city's courts. Their masters
usually came from small northeastern ports, and a certain social
distance was apparent when Robert Yaxley's collier, the Mary
of Aldborough, arriving from Newcastle in 1656, collided in
the Thames with Captain Whitty's Freeman, a great London
merchantman of four hundred tons.26
Whitty contended that his ship carried cargo worth £30,000,
drew twelve feet of water, and could not get nearer the shore
to avoid ramming the smaller Mary. But Yaxley, a veteran
Newcastle mariner, countered that Captain Whitty had run over
the Mary in broad daylight and had ordered his crew to
board her and cut her shrouds to free the ships, while he stood
on his forecastle shouting, "You collier dogs! I had not
cared if I had sunk you." To support these allegations and
win damages against the London master and owners, Yaxley found
witnesses who had arrived in the city on other colliers, mariners
who might well have rallied to him as one of their own.27
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II.Rules, Pleas,
and Ambiguity
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was responsible for enforcing rules designed to en-courage prudent
navigation and reduce the risk that cumbersome sailing ships like
the Hound and Freeman would become entangled in the
busier rivers and sea lanes of the seventeenth century. Scores of
colliers heading to London or merchantmen leaving the Downs for
various destinations might sail together with the first favorable
wind. When crews failed to keep their ships clear of one another,
the court had to decide whether it was by accident, negligence,
or--as Captain Yaxley and other plaintiffs had implied-malice.28
After determining fault, the judges had to assess the damages due,
another complex problem that could require estimates of asset depreciation,
the market value of cargoes, and the costs of lost opportunity.
Many cases were so difficult, especially those like Yaxley's, where
both ships had been under sail, that the court was prompted to apply
new substantive rules that seemed to promise fairer and quicker
solutions. |
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The older
Admiralty rules for assigning fault and damages had come from
several sources by the seventeenth century. First, there was an
occasional action to enforce patent rights of the Admiral against
those responsible for collisions. For example, Dr. Walter Walker,
the state's advocate at civil law, asserted the Admiral's droit
of deodand against a Dutch ship in 1658. The St. Jacob,
he alleged, had been found by a jury to have run over a small
boat in the Thames, drowning one of its passengers, and the ship,
said Walker, for having caused a death, was by right forfeit to
the Admiral.29
George Huntington's lawyer drew on a second source of rules in
1656 when he referred the judges to their own local "orders
and ordinances . . . touching the regulation of the river Thames"
and insisted that it was illegal for more than three ships to
lie side by side at Tower Wharf. He alleged that Nicholas Constant
had anchored his Waterhound as a fourth vessel outside
Huntington's William, and that after the collision Constant
had boasted he had come "on purpose to lust his ship inwards"
and "would not have given . . . two pennies" for the
damage done--though surely it cost him more than that to reach
the out-of-court settlement that "fully satisfied" Huntington.30
The proctor defending Robert Church in 1660 invoked a third source
of Admiralty law governing collision cases, "the use and
custom of the sea" and of "masters and mariners in the
Thames," when he claimed that unless ships were "at
the chain or hauled onshore" they should have "at least
two or three men onboard." Hence, if Church's vessel, the
Phoenix, had come afoul of the plaintiff's Consent,
it was only because the Consent was an "old rotten
ship" that had ridden at anchor for months near Redriffe
with "only a little boy on board." But Church himself,
said a witness, had violated another custom--"well known"
to "masters of ships using the port of London"--that
they should "lay their anchors athwart the river" and
had instead cast one of his northwest into the middle of the channel,
too near the Consent. Church's retort, that he knew how
to moor a ship as well as anyone, failed to convince the court,
and he was assessed £67 for causing entanglement and damage.31
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The surviving
record suggests, however, that Admiralty proctors in the seventeenth
century seldom thought it necessary to recite the rules on which
they based their clients' cases and that judges rarely identified
the sources of law that informed their decisions. Their jurisdiction
was, after all, an equitable one that permitted them to follow
the dictates of reason when enforcing right, ordinance, or custom.32
They were not required to explain their decisions for the record
and seldom did. Therefore, in order to understand what was necessary
to win a decree for full damages in a seven-teenth-century collision
case, we are forced, in the general absence of citations or explanations,
to rely on what successful plaintiffs usually set out to prove
and what their witnesses were prepared to testify.
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Such inference
is not without difficulty, but we can find the constituent parts
of most successful suits by looking at a libel from early in the
century. In 1607 shipowners Roger Ditton and company sued the
proprietors of the St. Christopher, commanded by Captain
Marsh, for damages from collision. First, Ditton's lawyer alleged
that Marsh had run his ship negligently, even willfully and maliciously,
into Ditton's vessel, the Anne, which had just left Wakering
in fair August weather bound for London. Specifically, the lawyer
said that Ditton's master, Arthur Harris, had called out a warning
as the ships came close, but that Captain Marsh, "at strife"
with his company over "how and which way they might steer,"
did nothing to avoid the collision. Second, to suggest that Marsh
had had a willful intent to damage the Anne and did nothing
to limit the harm, Ditton's lawyer added something found in many
successful collision libels, a description of how the defendant's
master and crew had behaved after impact. Marsh, he alleged, had
surely heard Captain Harris cry out "Lord, you have sunk
my hoy. I pray you, for God's cause, stay and help [save her]
and her lading." But even though Marsh knew, as he later
confessed, that the blow would have sunk the Anne, he "did
go his way and refused to help save either the goods or lives
of the company of the said Anne . . . [and] did leave her,
thinking he should never hear further of her."33
Ditton's allegations posed, then, the two general issues raised
in most collision cases for the rest of the century: first, whether
the defendant's mariners had negligently or maliciously caused
the initial damage, sometimes admitting--even boast-ing--that
they had run over the plaintiff's vessel; and second, whether
the defendants' master or crew had done anything after the collision
to prevent further harm to the plaintiffs' ship, cargo and crew,
or had stood at a distance, offering no help, perhaps even sailing
away.
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The lawyer
defending Captain Marsh and the owners of the St. Christopher
addressed only the first issue. He said nothing to justify
Marsh's behavior after the collision and insisted only that the
cause of the crash should be blamed on the negligence and stubbornness
of the plaintiff's Captain Harris, master of the Anne. Harris,
he argued, "took no care of his ship." For if he had
"kept his course as he did at his coming out of the haven,
the Christopher [would have] passed by the stern of [the
Anne] without any hurt." Captain Harris "was
willed to bear room . . . but he would not; . . . whereas if he
had . . . the said ships . . . had slid one by another . . . without
any damage." This was a defense mounted in very general terms
against only one of the charges, and it failed. The judges had
heard no testimony that compelled them to hold the plaintiff's
Captain Harris at all responsible for the collision itself. Nor
was anything offered to excuse Captain Marsh's subsequent failure
to lend a hand. Thus the judges must have found it relatively
easy to award Ditton and the other plaintiff owners £46
in full damages and court costs.34
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Neither should
the court have had much difficulty reaching judgment in a group
of cases with a different context, those raised by collisions
that had occurred in river, harbor, or roadstead, and in which
the first issue, responsibility for the crash, was simplified
because only one of the ships had been under way at the time of
impact.35
The judges, for example, assessed full damages in 1608 against
the defendant owners of the Sarah after she had rammed
the Phillip and John, which lay at anchor near Limehouse
Bridge.36
A witness testified in 1629 that the master of the Trial had
ignored his mate's advice to "heave his ship further ahead"
before he weighed anchor, so the Trial's owners were held
fully responsible for cutting both cables of the Rainbow, which
had been safely moored in the middle of the Thames.37
And the judges in 1656 surely had little trouble ruling for the
plaintiff-owners of a collier that had been quietly anchored at
Bell Wharf before the collision, for witnesses said the other
ship, the defendants' Accord, had come "floating down"
the crowded river without a single mariner--not even a boy--on
board.38
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But when
both ships had been under sail before the crash, the task for
the court was usually more complicated. Occasionally, of course,
plaintiffs-like Ditton in 1607--could provide specific evidence
to condemn the defendant in full damages. The sleeping mariners
of the Piper of Lubeck, said plaintiff's witnesses in 1655,
had "left their said vessel to sail without anybody at the
helm," and when one of the crew, at last wakened by shouts
from sailors of the fast closing James, appeared on deck
without his shoes, he tried to raise his mates. "He did call
them and swear and rail at them, but none would come." Finally
he seized the wheel himself, but by then a collision was inevitable,
and the judges, finding the sleeping crew at fault, ruled for
the London plaintiffs, owners of the James. 39
However, in most litigation that involved two moving ships, the
defendant's lawyer was better able than the proctor defending
Captain Marsh in Ditton's case to establish at least the contributory
negligence, if not the total responsibility, of the plaintiff's
crew. He might first produce evidence more specific than that
offered by Marsh's lawyer to shift blame to the plaintiff's mariners.
The plaintiff's master, said a witness, had been so drunk before
the collision that when rescued from his sinking ship he "vomited
up and down the deck" and soon fell asleep in the cook's
room.40
Almost as frequently the defendant's counsel tried to excuse his
client, or reduce his liability, by focusing on the second issue
of many cases, contending, in other words, that much of the damage
had resulted not from the collision itself, nor from the subsequent
refusal of the defendant's sailors to offer help, but from the
failure of the plaintiff's crew to help themselves. A witness
argued that after only minor damage from the collision the plaintiff's
mariners had bilged their own ship by trying to reach Whitby instead
of stopping at Scarborough.41
The defendant's crew in another case confessed that they had lacked
a rope to tow the plaintiff's ship to safety but insisted that
the plaintiff's sailors could easily have gotten help from other
ships passing by.42
A plain-tiff's master, witnesses alleged, had abandoned his ship
to further damage after the collision, then boasted that he would
profit more by filing suit than by completing the voyage.43
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This marshaling
of evidence by defense lawyers, who were responding to both issues
of most suits by describing the carelessness or willfulness of
the plaintiff's crew before and after the collision, often prompted
Admiralty judges to doubt that the defendant's sailors had been
solely at fault when two ships under sail had smacked together
in river or open sea. In other cases the judge could conclude
that the cause was accident rather than the negligence of either
party. Yes, the plaintiff's crew might have called to the mariners
of the other ship "to stand clear and avoid them, yet in
truth" it was often the case, as a witness described, that
"the wind was so high and did blow so hard that it was not
possible . . . to hear them" until it was too late.44
Thus, it is not surprising that Admiralty judges began to reveal
their uncertainties early in the century by awarding plaintiffs
only half damages and sometimes less.
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III. Division of Liability
and a No-Fault Formula
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European maritime codes had long provided
for the sharing of losses between parties to a collision. But
R. G. Marsden found that English Admiralty judges began to apply
the simple rule (rusticum judicium) of divided damages
only in the early seventeenth century, first in a decision of
1614, then in 1626.45
Judges of the High Court of Delegates, the appellate court for
the Admiralty, were also lowering damage awards at least as early
as a case of 1648 in which they admitted their uncertainty regarding
fault, and the Admiralty Court itself continued to invoke the
new rule during the Interregnum.46
For example, there is the 1657 decision of Judges Godolphin and
Cocke in Cooper v. Samuel's Delight. Witnesses said that
neither ship had "any light aboard" when they collided
on a dark night in open sea near Hull. "[T]he value of the
damage," Judge Godolphin confessed, "did not appear
unto him and neither did it appear to him that the damages were
done by the willfulness or negligence of the defendant master
or his company." So the judges, "in respect of uncertainties,"
issued a decree that charged the defendants with court costs but
only half the damage done to the other ship and her cargo of barley.
They divided liability for the plaintiff's losses despite allegations
in the usual form--as in Ditton's libel of 1607--that after the
collision the defendant master had refused to help the plaintiff's
mariners and in this case even threatened to throw them overboard.47
Two weeks later, Godolphin and Cocke confirmed their policy by
dividing liability in the river case mentioned above, Yaxley's
action against the Freeman. Captain Whitty, the defendant,
may have insulted the colliermen after the crash, but both ships
had been under way; and, after reading a draft sentence submitted
by the plaintiff's proctor that blamed the collision entirely
on the willfulness of Whitty and his crew, Judge Godolphin "directed
that another sentence be . . . drawn . . . pronouncing of the
damage to have happened by casualty." The new draft, "read
and promulgated" by the judges a few hours later, ordered
Whitty and the other defendants to pay court costs but only half
the damages suffered by the Mary. 48
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Division of liability and consequently
reduced damages were becoming a common Admiralty solution by mid-century.
This is demonstrated in Table 2, where forty-nine outcomes reported
by Marsden are combined with those from the present sample. Was
it mere coincidence that the judges were adopting this approach
in the majority of decisions from 1639 onward, that is, just as
the volume of Admiralty warrants was peaking in the late 1630s and
would remain at high levels for two more decades? (See Table 1,
above.) Or did the judges anticipate that the new rule, unavailable
at common law, might reduce pressure on the court's docket and yet
preserve an Admiralty role in this legal business? Did they reason
that because so many collisions occurred in ambiguous circumstances,
sharing the losses should seem reasonable to all involved, and if
some shipowners could not avoid suit, they could come to Doctors'
Commons to have a sensible division imposed? |
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Whatever
the initial impulse, the judges, as Table 2 indicates, had even
greater recourse to this remedy in the final decades of the century,
sometimes ignoring serious complaints about the defendant's behavior.
Captain Coleman and other owners of the Adventure of London
were assessed only half damages in 1678 even though witnesses
claimed that Coleman had ignored good advice about how to avoid
the collision off Dungeness and that his crew, fearing the plaintiff's
mariners would "tell tales" about the incident, had
been ready to let them perish with their ship.49
In the next year, the judges found no malice and assessed only
half damages despite testimony that a defendant master had boasted
on arrival at London, "God knows" we "had bulled
one poor [ship] to the bottom."50
The judge hearing Renew v. Hopewell in 1698 levied only
half damages even though the defendants admitted they had had
no light aloft at midnight in "rainy, thick weather."
But the defendants explained that in the prevailing conditions
of war they would have risked capture by privateers had they raised
their lantern from the deck, and they suggested contributory negligence
by arguing that at the time of impact most of the plaintiff's
crew were asleep in their cabins, having left an old man at the
helm who "could not get it over."51
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Table 2.
Outcomes in Seventy-Nine Collision Cases at Admiralty,
1608-1699
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Sources: Marsden Pleas in the Court of Admiralty,
2: lxxxiii-lxxxv, and Law of Collisions, 7th
ed., 158-63; HCA 3, Act Books; HCA 24, Libels and
Decrees. Marsden lists two cases in Select Pleas
that he omitted in his later Treatise on the Law
of Collisions. aThere is reason to think that many more
Admiralty cases were settled out of court than were
reported as such in the court's records.
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Admiralty
judges rarely held either party fully responsible for collisions
in the last quarter of the century, a reasonable response given
the evidence in most cases. But the judges' quest for equity in
collision matters went further, beyond contributory negligence
and to an extent that surely discouraged all but the seriously
aggrieved from filing suit. The court devised a simple no-fault
formula, first seen in a case of 1675, that could sharply reduce
the plaintiff's award or even, theoretically at least, require
the plaintiff, rather than defendant, to pay. Applying the rule
in Renew v. Hopewell (1698), the judge first subtracted
the cost of repairs to the defendant's ship (£60) from damages
suffered by the plaintiff's vessel (£250), divided the result
(£190) in half, and required defendant Robert Humble to
pay £95. This was, of course, another way of summing the
losses on both sides and holding each party liable for an equal
share of the total. The defendant in a case of shared liability
would no longer be required to bear half the plaintiff's losses
in addition to all of his own; and, if he could prove that his
own ship had suffered the greater damage, he would owe the plaintiff
nothing. No instances could be found of the plaintiff alone being
ordered to pay once the calculation was carried out. But the formula
would be described by an Admiralty lawyer in the 1750s as the
court's standard method of dividing damages in collision cases.
It might be seen as a clever device for deterring potential plaintiffs
from filing suit unless they were confident they could prove sole
fault on the part of the defendant or their own disproportionate
loss.52
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It was becoming
harder, then, for plaintiffs in the last half of the century to
win full damages by conventional argument. Nor were they successful
in persuading the court to include in awards whatever prospective
loss might be alleged to flow from the collision. In four cases
from the sample years, the court heard arguments that the plaintiffs
should recover not only for physical damages to their vessels
and cargoes but also for freight lost when collision had ended
the voyage, and even for the loss of new freightings when their
ships had been idled for repairs, called, in modern practice,
damage from detention.53
Judge Godolphin rejected such allegation from a collier master
in 1656--that five weeks of repairs had cost him a voyage to Newcastle
and back, potentially worth £100 in earnings--and he assessed
the defendant only £19 for physical damage to the ship and
the loss of coal spilled into the Thames.54
However, in Captain Yaxley's case of the following year, Judges
Godolphin and Cocke, while ultimately dividing damages between
the parties, appear also to have allowed the plain-tiff's claims
for injury from detention. Yaxley's witness testified that because
the Mary would lie at New Crane for repairs, she would
lose £50 in profit from the coal trade. By the time Yaxley's
proctor had drafted a decree to submit for the judges' signatures,
his estimate of lost earnings had grown to £100. He added
this to the physical damages of £100 done to ship and cargo,
and the court accepted his total of £200 before finding
shared liability and assessing only half that sum.55
There is no evidence in the sample at hand, however, that damages
from detention had become routine, for despite hearing plaintiffs
allege in 1679 that in three months of delay they had lost £50
in profits, surrogate judge Richard Lloyd awarded only the costs
of weighing and repairing the ship.56
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IV. Process and Delay
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Admiralty judges had adjusted substantive
law in the seventeenth century to recognize that some collisions
were accidental and others the fault of both parties. As a result,
plaintiffs faced much dimmer prospects. They had won full damages
in over 80 percent of cases at the beginning of the century but
could do so in only 12 percent at the end. (See Table 2 above.)
The judges, who divided damages in fully 70 percent of cases late
in the century, were surely by the consistency of their policy
persuading some potential litigants to share the losses among
themselves without the need for legal action. A witness testified
that Captain John Anderson, master of the Castle, admitted
his share of responsibility for a collision in 1677, thought it
"very fit his owners should pay half the damage," and
urged them to make an offer that would avoid suit.57
But the court's new doctrine may have provided additional
motive to reach out-of-court settlements, for it seems also to
have lengthened proceedings significantly when legal action could
not be avoided. Instead of simplifying matters once the pleadings
had begun, the rusticum judicium appears to have resulted
in tactics that only complicated litigation. Thus, by creating
new rules, busy judges at mid-century may have succeeded in rationalizing
their decisions and shortening their dockets. But their successors
on the bench in an era of declining Admiralty business might well
have regretted the new collision remedies, for they seem to have
had the additional and unintended effect of producing long and
expensive process, a deterrent that, like prohibitions, could
have driven some potential clients from Doctors' Commons.
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This lengthening
of litigation resulted in spite of procedural rules at Admiralty
that were well suited to collision cases. Civil law process was,
for example, especially appropriate for disputes involving high
stakes. The loss of ship and cargo from collision often amounted
to thousands of pounds, and the median claim of £400 in
the cases studied here was 60 percent higher than the median claim
in all other types of Admiralty cases reaching judgment in the
sample years.58
Seeking a relatively high award, the Admiralty plaintiff could
sue out a warrant at civil law in rem against the offending
ship itself and have this valuable asset arrested, in addition
to the master or owner, while action at common law could be taken
only against a person. Warrants of arrest in all but one of the
collision suits in the sample cited first the ship and then the
owners.59
The importance of the procedure was that it allowed the plaintiff
in a case of default, when the defendant did not answer the action,
to win possession of the offending ship, which might then be sold
to execute judgment. The plaintiff need not depend for recovery
on a defendant shipowner, or even group of shipowners, who might
have fled the jurisdiction, have debts in excess of the ship's
value, or prove utterly bankrupt.60
Moreover, the award remained as a debt against the ship should
the vessel be sold.61
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On the other
hand, a successful action in rem could guarantee no more
than the value of the defendant's ship and cargo, even when its
errant owners had been held responsible for all losses from the
collision. London owners of the James alleged damages of
£4000 from the loss of their ship and cargo by collision
in 1654, but won assets of only £2600, that is, possession
of the defendant's vessel "and all the goods in her."
With the court's permission they then employed the ship in their
trade, after selling her perishable cargo.62
Plaintiffs in 1608 who were given possession of the defendant's
small Chalk Hoy might not have recovered the full value
of £270 for the shipment of iron they had lost by collision.63
And, of course, no procedural safeguard could ensure full or speedy
execution of judgment. Plaintiffs who in 1656 had brought their
case in rem were still trying to recover from the defendant's
widow two years after an initial decree for damages, but she could
not be found, though the court had twice cited her--in the fashion
customary when parties went missing--by exhibiting the monition
at the Exchange.64
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Still, suing
the ship probably improved the plaintiff's chances of collecting
something, while other procedural options at Admiralty served
the needs of both parties and the shipping industry in general.
Shipowners could, for example, frame the case so that their captain,
usually a fellow owner, was able to testify.65
The industry employed boys, and the court's procedures allowed
minors to be sworn and deposed, even in one case after it was
alleged that a father was dictating his son's answers.66
Testimony need not be voiced before Admiralty judges in open session
but could be taken down by scribes out of court, a practice that
accommodated the working lives of merchants and mariners. A sailor
witness in one collision case was ordered to testify "before
his departure out of town," but only if the opposing proctor
had submitted his questions by noon of the next day.67
The judges were also ready to grant requests that depositions
be gathered outside London, virtually anywhere there was a relevant
source--in Edinburgh and Italy in cases of the sample, as well
as Colchester and Ipswich. Parties who failed to return the packets
of testimony by the appointed date might be fined by the court,
but such gathering of evidence at long distance inevitably lengthened
process and seems to have been in some cases a mere tactic of
delay, used more often than not by the defendant. Defendants in
one instance were granted commissions for depositions at Ramsgate
and Dartmouth and then, over protests about retarding process,
were allowed to send interrogatories to Barbados.68
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Cases that
involved testimony taken abroad lasted on average nearly eight
months longer than those that did not. But even when all witnesses
were in London, collision suits in the seventeenth century were
relatively long and costly. Those from the sample years lasted
on average two and a half times as long as cases involving other
Admiralty matters and extended roughly a year and a half from
issuance of the warrant to the last judicial pronouncement that
has been discovered.69
Quarreling shipowners may have been more likely
to compromise before filing suit once divided damages became the
predictable outcome. But there is no way to document this. Admiralty
records cannot tell us how often or why parties chose to avoid
suit and rarely even hint at the nature of agreements reached
after warrants had been served. The cases sampled here do suggest,
however, that both judges and plaintiffs were sorely disappointed
if they had expected that the new and equitable rules would abbreviate
pleadings once begun. Collision suits from 1655 onward, when the
rusticum judicium was in place, lasted more than twice
as long on average as cases before 1630 (see Table 3). By the
end of the century the median length of collision suits was nearly
ten times longer than that for all other kinds of disputes at
Admiralty. And we may suspect that the new substantive rules had
actually prolonged process. Among collision cases, those ending
in divided damages had a median length of thirty-five months,
nearly three times the median of those that had resulted in full
victory for plaintiff or defendant.
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There is
plausible explanation for this disparity. Defendant shipowners
may have been encouraged by the prospect of getting damages reduced.
But in order to ensure that result they had to do all they could
to cultivate the judge's uncertainties, using, if necessary, every
tactic at hand.70
Admiralty proctor Ralph Suckley, for example, first appeared for
defendants Captain William Lee and his wife Mary in 1656, just
as division of damages was becoming doctrine. Suckley gave himself
time to build his case by conveniently failing to file his interrogatories,
leaving testimony incomplete until the plaintiff's captain had
returned from Norway. The lawyer then produced a string of witnesses
in 1657 who declared that little of the plain-tiff's cargo of
coal had been lost, that the plaintiff's mariners could have limited
the damage by immediately seeking a haven after the collision,
that the plaintiff's ship and mariners had stood at a distance
waiting for the Lees' vessel to perish, and that the Lees themselves
had suffered considerable injury, including the projected loss
of freight from a venture already contracted. When these allegations
failed to convince the judges, lawyer Suck-ley managed to delay
a decision throughout 1658 and twice stood silently by when his
client Mary failed to appear to hear a sentence that would have
declared her husband wholly at fault. Then later that year Suckley
found a way to restate the facts, and the judges ultimately awarded
the plantiff shipowners only half damages. This circuitous passage
to divided liability had taken more than two-and-a-half years,
and Captain Lee had died en route, but artful lawyering had saved
his widow £350, a brave sum in the seventeenth century.71
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Table 3.
Median Length, Costs and Awards in Admiralty Cases,
1608-9, 1628-29, 1655-62, 1678-79, and 1698-99
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Sources: HCA 38 Warrant Books; HCA 3, Act Books;
HCA 24, Libels and Decrees, 1606-1699.
For each measurement, the number of cases with data
is given in parentheses.. aThe case is measured from the date of
warrant to the date of decree, report of agreement
or assignment to arbitration. Measurement deos not
include time taken for an appeal to the High Court
of Delegates. bFees assesed for appeal to the High Court
of Delegates are not included here.
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Litigating
strategy was not, of course, the sole factor determining the length
of collision cases at Admiralty. Prosecuting a suit even to a
default judgment, after the defendant had failed to appear, could
take months in the busy court of the 1650s, and the judges would
routinely order a monition published at the Exchange to give errant
shipowners or mariners a last chance to show cause why sentence
should not be executed.72
When suit was joined, parties occasionally prolonged matters by
appealing judgments to the High Court of Delegates. In Yaxley's
case, for example, the defendant owners were unhappy despite the
ruling against them for only half damages. Perhaps they objected
to Judge Godolphin's decision to include in the damage calculation
losses from detention of the plaintiff's ship. But their appeal
to the Delegates, whatever its basis, meant that final resolution
at civil law was not reached for over four years, and Yaxley was
still at Doctors' Commons seeking execution of judgment more than
seven years after he had filed suit.73
In another case, Robert Clarke finally prevailed on appeal in
1663, but his ship had been damaged in 1658, and the £14
he won was less than a tenth of the claim he had filed nearly
five years earlier.74
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A result
of deliberative process was that average court fees in collision
cases, even without including the costs of appeals, were high
relative to those paid in other venues or even in other types
of Admiralty actions. Costs in a large sample of common law suits
from the late seventeenth century rarely exceeded £5 and
almost never £10.75
The Admiralty Court assessed fees that averaged £7.7 in
360 cases involving matters other than collision during the years
sampled here. But they assessed £13.6 in the eight collision
cases for which there are data. London owners of the Freeman
first paid £15 to defend against Yaxley's suit in 1657,
then £8 for their unsuccessful appeal to the Delegates.76
And although the median figures given in Table 3 are based on
few data, they suggest, first, that the costs charged in collision
suits grew faster than in other Admiralty actions over the course
of the century, and, second, that this was simply because the
cases were taking much longer to litigate than those involving
other matters.
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V. Prohibitions and Decline
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There was, of course, a final strategy
available to parties who were losing at Admiralty in the seventeenth
century: challenging the court's jurisdiction by alleging that
the matter was triable only at common law, a protest that could
be raised either before or after judgment--even occasionally after
execution of judgment--at civil law.77
Thomas Newman and company faced such a challenge to their Admiralty
suit in 1678. They had produced compelling, if circumstantial,
evidence that their ship Lamb had sunk while at anchor
in the Downs after being struck by the larger Rose and Crown.
Sailors of the Rose and Crown had admitted, said witnesses,
that they had run over another ship in the Downs on a night so
dark that the men "could not discover their hands . . . if
they held them up in the air," and the Lamb was the
only vessel in the area reported to have been damaged on that
date. There was testimony that the master of the Rose and Crown,
in order to avoid detection, had sailed on without stopping
to put his Thames pilot ashore at Deal or Dover and had carried
him all the way to Falmouth, a thing "scarce ever heard of."
The defendants had conceded the facts and asked for arbitration,
but that could begin only when the Rose and Crown's master
had returned from abroad. In the meantime the case was proceeding
to judgment at Doctors' Commons, and the defendants scrambled
to avoid a decree that would almost surely run against them. They
sought a writ of prohibition from King's Bench on grounds that
the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction over collisions in the
Downs, a roadstead that, they alleged, was part of county Kent
and therefore governed by common law. And although their lawyer
failed to offer sufficient proof at Westminster, so that the judges
granted a consultation, allowing the Admiralty case to proceed
to sentence, the owners of the Rose and Crown had managed
to drag out the litigation, and avoid paying £130 in damages,
for more than two and a half years. By investing that sum in overseas
trade during the interim, they might easily have gained enough
to pay the extraordinary court costs of £25.78
Such fees, nearly four times the median levy in all Admiralty
cases from the sample years, may have been in part punitive, for
they were assessed by Sir Leoline Jenkins, a judge who had called
for legislation to prevent defendants like the owners of the Rose
and Crown from using prohibitions to escape Admiralty authority.79
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Common
lawyers had aggressively revived their claims to a variety of
maritime matters as soon as the Restoration parliament refused
to renew Interregnum ordinances that had protected Admiralty powers.80
The failure to halt process against the Rose and Crown by
prohibition in 1678 does show that Westminster judges were not
always ready, even late in the century, to take collision cases
away from the civilians without first hearing a convincing argument.
But if they doubted that the Downs was part of the county and
within their reach, they could be persuaded about rivers and harbors.
Common law judges denied Admiralty jurisdiction over cases involving
Thames collisions in 1604, 1616 and 1618.81
After the Restoration, they claimed authority over an incident
in Weymouth harbor. More important, in 1664 they reasserted their
powers over all collisions in the Thames by stopping Admiralty
process against the Barbados Merchant, a ship driven by
storm from her moorings at Wapping, Old Stairs, and carried downstream
to Bell Wharf, where she had struck and sunk the Dolphin. 82
Indeed, the single collision suit prohibited in the sixteen years
sampled here--in this case two months after sentence--also involved
a crash in the river, one we have met before. In 1679, Captain
Mustard obtained a writ setting aside Admiralty acquittal of the
Hound's crew and forcing Captain Arundell to prove once
again, this time before common law judges, that his collier had
not run over Mustard's timber hoy in the early morning darkness
at Clement's Reach. Conversely, the remaining six cases from the
seventies and nineties, those that Admiralty judges were allowed
to determine without common law interference, had all followed
from collisions in the open sea.83
The present sample suggests, then, that roughly two thirds of
collision disputes resolved at Admiralty before 1663 had originated
in London's crowded river, but that after the prohibition of the
following year in Martin v. Green, few if any did. If prohibitions
were as effective in preventing other kinds of maritime suits
from being heard at Doctors' Commons, the sharp and continued
decline in Admiralty warrants beginning in the 1660s would be
easy enough to explain.
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The outcome
of the jurisdictional quarrel over collision cases had clearly
forced civil lawyers to yield space. Admiralty advocate Edward
Simpson would concede in the 1750s that common law courts had
authority over all suits involving collision in the Thames, indeed
over all civil cases arising in any navigable river, and it seems
that shipowners after 1664 had seldom risked prohibition by taking
such business to Doctors' Commons.84
Thus, collision litigation declined in England's central maritime
court not because shipping traffic had slowed or merchants and
masters had become less combative but because legislators and
judges had changed the rules. First, it is clear that when the
Restoration parliament abandoned statutory protection of Admiralty
powers, the "weight of prohibition" prevented those
involved in river crashes from securing remedies at civil law.
Second, it appears that though Admiralty judges retained authority
over cases involving collision on the high sea, shipowners were
discouraged from filing these suits as well, perhaps because the
civilians' new substantive rules allowed for a finding of contributory
negligence. Even if we were to triple the actual number of collision
decrees from 1680 to 1699 in order to account for the prohibited
river cases, the total decisions at Doctors' Commons would have
been exactly the same in these last two decades as in the period
from 1640 to 1659, while the number of ships annually approaching
the Thames had increased since mid-century by roughly a third.85
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When Captain Anderson arrived at
London on his damaged collier in 1677, he was ready, said a witness,
to admit some fault for the collision off Tynemouth, share losses,
and forgo Admiralty suit. Surely there were other potential plaintiffs
in the second half of the century who were willing to compromise
when warned of the probable outcomes at civil law. Had they filed
a case after 1650, they likely faced prolonged litigation, could
not expect to recover for detention, or win, because of the rusticum
judicium, more than half the physical damages to their ships.
Had they filed after 1675, they might even have been forced to
bear part of the defendants' losses according to the new
no-fault formula. Thus, recently defined rules must have persuaded
some parties to avoid risking principal loss, lengthy process,
high costs--and incidentally jeopardizing the capital of other
ship-owners--over matters of accident and shared responsibility.
Such reluctance to sue would have been unhealthy for the Admiralty
lawyer living by fees but not necessarily for the law or the shipping
industry, for if the new and reasonable doctrine failed to satisfy
some owners who were angry over losses from collision, it may
have prompted them to accept the practice of insuring their ships.
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38
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George F. Steckley is a professor of history
at Knox College. Support for this study came from the Faculty
Research Fund and the Edgar S. and Ruth W. Burkhardt Fund for
History at Knox College. The author is grateful to Martin Eisenberg,
Becky Alyea, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of the argument.
Notes
1.
See, for instance, Matson v. Naylor, High Court of Admiralty,
Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter HCA) 13/71, fols. 446-47,
examination of William Cox, May 1657. Most of the cases cited
in this article are unreported and in manuscript only. Admiralty
scribes often gave case titles in more than one version, so I
have adopted a standard and usually shortened title for each of
the manuscript cases cited. In these citations only the names
of the ships are italicized.
2.
Office, promoted by Gwyn v. Ellis, 1659, HCA 3/46, fol. 2; 3/47,
fol. 387; 3/48, fols. 190, 577; 13/72, fol. 209, examinations
of John Stokes, Humphrey Hutchins, and Thomas Lovell.
3.
Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (London:
Macmillan, 1962), 87-88.
4.
The sixteen years sampled for this study are italicized in Table
1. The research design was to read all instance cases in these
years that were determined by decree, arbitration, or reported
agreement. Warrant numbers and the literature on Admiralty jurisdiction
suggest that the last relatively active period of instance litigation
was from 1655 to 1662, and therefore these eight years were studied
in an effort to discover reasons for decline. Then, for comparison,
eight pairs of years were chosen for study at suitable intervals
over the rest of the century. Warrants issued to begin Admiralty
cases of all kinds exceeded decrees, court-ordered arbitrations,
and recorded settlements in the sample years by a ratio of roughly
seven to one, so that thirty such official determinations in collision
cases suggest that perhaps as many as two hundred suits had been
filed.
5.
Admiralty decrees are found at HCA 24. Collision cases were frequently
determined by interlocutory decrees inscribed only in the court's
Act Books (HCA 3). Therefore, both the court's decrees and procedural
record have been used to discover all collision decisions resulting
during the sixteen sample years from interlocutory, first, or
second ("definitive") decrees, arbitrations assigned
by the judges, or out-of-court agreements recorded by the scribes.
In cases for which it is available, information has also been
drawn from the Warrant Books (HCA 38), libels and allegations
filed with the decrees (HCA 24), and examinations, that is, testimony
taken at London or on commission elsewhere (HCA 13).
6.
HCA 38/22-23, Warrant Books including 1639; HCA 38/31-37, Warrant
Books covering 1655-62.
7.
William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1903-1972;
reprint, London: Methuen, Sweet, and Maxwell, 1966), 1:564. I
have verified that warrants for prize cases of the late 1650s
were not being entered in the registries found at HCA 38. Matson
v. Naylor (1657), HCA 13/71, fols. 446-47, testimony of William
Cox, May 1657.
8.
Charles George Cocke, English Law (London, 1651), 185.
9.
C. W. Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since
1450 (London and Rio Grande: Hambledon Press, 1998), 29-33.
10.The Civilian Writers of Doctors' Commons,
London: Three Centuries of Juristic Innovation in Comparative
Commercial and International Law (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot,
1988), 298.
11.
Daniel R. Coquillette, "Legal Ideology and Incorporation,
IV: The Nature of Civilian Influence on Modern Anglo-American
Commercial Law," Boston University Law Review 67 (1987):
937-47.
12.
M. J. Prichard and D. E. C. Yale, eds., Hale and Fleetwood
on Admiralty Jurisdiction, (Publications of the Selden Society,
vol. 108, 1993), cxvii-cxxix. For two examples of this general
approach, see Holdsworth, English Law, 1:552-59; Henry
J. Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell: Judge of the
High Court Admiralty, 1798-1828 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), 24-30. Modern accounts taking this approach usually
rehearse the complaints about common law encroachment published
in the early 1660s by such civilian judges as John Godolphin,
Richard Zouch, and John Exton.
13.
Holdsworth, English Law, 8:459-62; James Oldham, The
Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth
Century (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina
Press, 1992), 2:1118-21.
14.
I have not followed collision cases from Admiralty into the common
law courts, although the findings here suggest the usefulness
of doing so.
15.
General conclusions about the decline in Admiralty litigation
must await further study. Warrant totals from the 1620s through
the 1640s were swollen by prize actions. Until their number can
be extracted, it will be difficult to determine how sharply instance
litigation fell away in the last half of the century or how many
actions in the early decades had resulted in out-of-court settlements.
Moreover, because the scribes did not regularly identify Admiralty
plaintiffs by origin, it will not be easy to determine whether
fewer provincial litigants were coming to Doctors' Commons late
in the century. For these issues as they relate to other courts,
see Craig Muldrew, "The Culture of Reconciliation: Community
and the Settlement of Economic Disputes in Early Modern England,"
Historical Journal 39 (1996): 915-42; J. A. Sharpe, "'Such
Disagreement Betwyx Neighbours': Litigation and Human Relations
in Early Modern England," in Disputes and Settlements:
Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 172-87; Henry Horwitz and Patrick
Polden, "Continuity or Change in the Court of Chancery in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries?" Journal of
British Studies 35 (1996): 24-57; and W. A. Champion, "Recourse
to the Law and the Meaning of the Great Litigation Decline, 1650-1750:
Some Clues from the Shrewsbury Local Courts," in Communities
and Courts, ed. Christopher Brooks and Michael Lobban (London
and Rio Grande: Hambledon Press, 1997), 179-98.
16.
For a convenient survey of the seventeenth-century politics of
jurisdiction, see Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, 15-30.
See also these earlier studies: D. E. C. Yale, "A View of
the Admiral Jurisdiction: Sir Mathew Hale and the Civilians,"
in Legal History Studies, 1972: Papers Presented to the Legal
History Conference, Aberystwyth, 18-21 July 1972, ed. D. Jenkins
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1975), 87-109; Brian P. Levack,
The Civil Lawyers in England (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1973); and G. F. Steckley, "Merchants and the Admiralty Court
during the English Revolution," American Journal of Legal
History 20 (1978): 137-75.
17.
Bernard Capp, Cromwell's Navy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 4-6, 9; Lord Protector v. Joshua (1657),
HCA 3/47, fol. 401; 3/48, fol. 40.
18.
Thomson and others v. Elizabeth (1609), HCA 3/27, fol.
170; 13/40, fols. 41-42; 24/ 73/259, 261.
19.
Fortrey and others v. Elizabeth and Robbins (1628), HCA
13/46, fols. 63-66, 452, 508.
20.
Newman and others v. Rose and Crown (1679), HCA 3/54, fols.
2, 244, 379; 13/78, examinations of Andreas Veale, Robert Biffen,
Harbert Alwyn, David Lockwood, William Lee, Samuel Stone; 13/131,
answers of Jacob Lucy and Samuel Swinock; 24/118/42, 24/ 119/11,
15, 47, 153, allegations and decree.
21.
Busbridge v. Chalk Hoy (1608), HCA 3/27, fol. 164; 24/73/43,
392.
22.
Mustard and others v. Hound (1678), HCA 3/54, fols. 55-56,
128; 13/78, 27 May 1678, and examinations of John Badland, Joris
Wind, James Mathews, Richard Wakefield, Edward Barnet, William
Hersey; 24/119/36.
23.
London's share of Newcastle's shipments, already at 69 percent
in 1615, would reach 80 percent by the end of the century. Brian
Dietz, "The North-East Coal Trade, 1550-1750: Measures, Markets
and the Metropolis," Northern History 22 (1986): 286,
288. John Evelyn, Fumifugium (1661), in The Writings
of John Evelyn, ed. Guy de la Bédoyère (Wood-bridge:
Boydell Press, 1995), 138, 147-48.
24.
Keith Wrightson estimates London's importation of coal in 1640
at 300,000 tons. See Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in
Early Modern Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000),
170. Total London imports from Newcastle and Sunderland had reached
395,125 tons by 1682/83. Dietz, "North-East Coal Trade,"
292, table 2. John Chartres estimates four to six voyages per
year for a collier in the Newcastle-London trade. See "Food
Consumption and Internal Trade," in The Making of the
Metropolis: London, 1500-1700, ed. A. L. Beier and Roger Finlay
(London: Longman, 1986), 189. Davis implies that the average collier
supplying London carried less than one hundred tons, many presumably
only thirty-five to fifty tons. Davis, Rise of English Shipping,
60, 72, 207.
25.
Mustard and others v. Hound (1678), HCA 3/54/66, fol. 128;
13/78, 27 May 1678, examinations of John Badland, Joris Wind,
James Mathews, Richard Wakefield, Susanna Potter, Edward Barnett,
William Hersey; 24/119/36, decree.
26.
Davis, Rise of English Shipping, 92-93.
27.
Yaxley and others v. Freeman (1657), HCA 3/47, fol. 517;
3/48, fols. 302, 360, 453, 542, 600; 3/49, fols. 27, 121; 13/70,
24 Nov. 1654, examinations of John Page, Richard Cockett, Samuel
Brown, George Putt; 13/71, fols. 366-68, examinations of Richard
Cawcot, Samuel Brown, William Fisic; 24/111, 322, libel; 24/112/62,
209, allegations; 24/113/ 67, 212, definitive sentence and bill
of expenses; High Court of Delegates, Public Record Office, Kew
(hereafter DEL), 5/16, decree. For Yaxley as a veteran collier
master, see Roger Howell, ed., Monopoly on the Tyne, 1650-58,
(Society of Antiquaries of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1978), 39-43.
28.
For a fleet of sixty colliers leaving Newcastle together in October
1658, see Sorrell v. Agreement (1659), examination of Edward
Keete, HCA 13/72, fol. 711. For nearly seventy merchantmen and
convoy leaving Portsmouth in 1696, see Basil Lubbock, ed., Barlow's
Journal (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1934), 2:459-60. For
fleets of merchantmen leaving or arriving together in the Downs,
see G. F. Steckley, ed., Letters of John Paige (London:
London Record Society, 1984), 116, 129.
29.
Lord Protector v. St. Jacob (1658), HCA 3/48, fol. 132;
F. R. Sanborn, Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial
Law (New York and London: Century Co., 1930), 295.
30.
Huntington and co. v. Waterhound and Constant (1656), HCA
3/46, fol. 400; 3/47, fol. 61; 24/112/65, allegation on behalf
of Huntington.
31.
Swyer and co. v. Phoenix (1660), HCA 3/49, fol. 104; 13/72,
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