Book Review

In the early 1990s the violent nature of American society became a hotly contested political issue. While the violent crime rate fell slightly from 1,932,270 in 1992 to 1,857,670 in 1994, a number of dramatic and horrific crimes captured public attention and generated state and federal legislation. The widespread desire to finally do something about the phenomenally high levels of violence in the United States culminated with the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the capstone of President Clinton's first term. In Politics, Punishment, and Populism, Lord Windlesham offers a precise and fascinating portrait of the process by which public fears became national law, while also focusing much needed attention on the unintended consequences of a democracy's efforts to control crime.	1
Windlesham is meticulous in his analysis. The political process is examined every step of the way, from the initial public outrage through the media barrage and the posturing of politicians, on to the maneuvering of Congress and the White House and negotiations among the key players, with further consideration of the impact of the ensuing legislation. It is not a pretty picture, and the democratic convictions of many readers will be shaken by this shady story of intrigue and hypocrisy. As Windlesham summarizes: "The American political system, if that is an apt description of such a shifting and unpredictable compound of laws and customs, is prone to be swayed by emotion more easily than by reason" (216).	2
Windlesham examines the political circus surrounding the expansion of the death penalty and restrictions on habeas corpus, Megan's Law and the Three Strikes crusade, mandatory sentencing and drug control, the assault weapons ban and the Brady Bill. Each of these pieces of legislation was driven not so much by thoughtful efforts to craft effective public policy as by the felt need of politicians to respond rapidly to public passions. In each instance intellectual and even ideological consistency went out the window. The reader can enjoy the spectacle of states' rights Republicans seeking to federalize criminal law while Democrats emphasize local law enforcement as both attempt to show that they are tough on crime. That perceived necessity to appear even tougher on crime than anyone else led to some amusing displays of neo-barbarism, as members of Congress sought to trump one another with ever harsher rhetoric and penalties, and President Clinton converted to the three strikes position based on information from his pollsters. No one seemed to notice that the average prison term served for acts of violence tripled in the fifteen years after 1975 while the prison population grew to more than one million, with no discernable impact on the rate of violent crimes. The result of a political desire for a quick fix was a near chaos of legislation, producing results contrary to intentions. For instance, the three strikes legislation brought a sharp decrease in plea bargaining, as every previously convicted defendant had little choice but to plead innocent and demand a jury trial. Courts and jails became swamped, leading to the premature release of many criminals in an effort by local authorities to avoid federal prosecution for overcrowding. In Los Angeles County the average length of sentence served fell from nearly two-thirds before three strikes passed to 45 percent afterward. Meanwhile an "inconvenient pattern" emerged, as "crime rates dropped more steeply in states without three strikes than in those that had adopted that policy" (72).	3
As the former chair of England's Parole Board and Home Office Minister, Windlesham brings a fresh, comparative perspective to the nature of American criminal justice. A great deal of his analysis is informed by the obvious but rarely explored point that "It is guns that are the unique phenomenon of criminal offending in America" (223). Though it is difficult to argue with that point, the gun lobby and its Congressional delegation have demonstrated an admirable ability to alter, weaken, and defeat anything approaching sensible regulatory legislation. The National Rifle Association is especially effective in "its skill at exploiting the sense of righteousness attached to gun ownership" (206). As Windlesham shows, the NRA's representatives in Congress are willing to allow the exacting regulation of anything and anyone, except guns. Using the Second Amendment "as a smokescreen to avoid taking up a position based on the facts and the consequent hassle" (209) the NRA has successfully placed guns in a special protected legal position, to the point that several states forbid law suits against gun makers. Though every opinion poll shows that the vast majority of Americans want gun regulation, the American people just do not care enough to actually demand legal change. A very telling survey by the National Opinion Research Center found that just 7.8 percent of those interviewed claimed to have ever taken any sort of political action on guns, from joining an advocacy group to simply writing their members of Congress. That means that 92.2 percent of those surveyed did not even take the time to send an e-mail, despite any personal judgments they might otherwise express. Politicians are thus in the enviable position of not having to worry very much about the broader public reaction to their legislative efforts.	4
The only flaw in this otherwise superb book is Windlesham's failure to define "populism," a phrase he relies upon to describe those democratic impulses with which he disagrees. That oversight is fairly typical and does not interfere with this fine introduction to the modern politics of criminal justice. There is nothing approaching objective law in the passage of the 1994 Crime Bill, just political positioning for public approval based upon transient emotions. Those who believe that recent events in Littleton may produce change would do well to read this book.	5
Michael A. Bellesiles Emory University

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