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Book Review
Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on Trial, Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1998. Pp. ix + 216. Price $12.95 (ISBN 0-7006-0919-9).
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Although it has long since been overturned, Lochner
v. New York (1905) remains one of the most controversial cases
in Supreme Court history. The facts of the case are well known.
In Lochner, the Court declared unconstitutional a New York
State law limiting bakery workers to no more than ten-hour days
or sixty hours per week. The Court argued that the law impaired
the workers' liberty to contract for longer hours if they so wished.
Known both for the judicial activism of the majority and the famous
dissents by Oliver Wendell Holmes and John Marshall Harlan, Lochner
remains central to the ideological battles over the Court's role
in the conflict between the free-market and the regulatory state. |
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In Lochner v. New York: Economic
Regulation on Trial, Paul Kens offers a revised edition of his
first book, Judicial Power and Reform Politics: The Anatomy of
Lochner v. New York. The thesis is the same in both books. Kens
describes the powerful influence social Darwinist and laissez-faire
ideas had on the Lochner court. This, of course, is not a
new argument. Kens is following in the footsteps of turn-of-the-century
Progressives (and historians such as Charles Beard and Robert McCloskey)
who accused the Court of grafting the ideas of Herbert Spencer and
William Graham Sumner onto the Constitution. In his dissent in Lochner,
Justice Holmes fueled these allegations when he wrote "this case
is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain." Although not new, what makes Kens's argument
important is that it challenges recent scholarship which argues
that the Lochner decision had little to do with laissez-faire
or social Darwinist ideals. Rather than linking Lochner to
the laissez-faire ideas of Herbert Spencer, many recent scholars
view the case as a natural outgrowth of the values of Jacksonian
economic individualism and the Republican Party's antebellum free-labor
ideology. In response, Kens points out that the majority in Lochner
hardly had Jacksonian goals in mind. Jacksonian individualism was
based on a deep resentment of moneyed interests and concentrations
of wealth. Jacksonians feared that the government would aid the
rich and powerful at the expense of the common person. This was
not, Kens argues, the view held by the laissez-faire jurists of
the Lochner court who were concerned with protecting economic
privilege rather than opposing it. Instead, Kens successfully links
the evolution of substantive due process and liberty of contractthe
doctrines that underpinned the Lochner decisionto the
rise of laissez-faire and social Darwinist thought in the late-nineteenth
century. If Rufus Peckham and the other members of the Lochner
majority thought they were upholding Jacksonian ideals, Kens concludes,
the history of the case shows "how laissez-faire constitutionalism
turned the Jacksonian ideals on their head" (184). While Kens does
acknowledge that the Court actually overturned very few turn-of-the-century
reform laws--Lochner was the exception, not the rulehe
also shows how substantive due process and liberty of contract forced
lawmakers to tailor reform statutes to meet the Court's constricted
definition of police powers. Kens also outlines how the judicial
activism of the Lochner court laid the groundwork for the
Supreme Court's reactionary stand against the New Deal in the 1930s.
While the Supreme Court let many Progressive-era reform laws stand,
the doctrines of substantive due process and liberty of contract
gave the Court a veto power over state legislation that it had not
had in the past and that it would use increasingly in the future.
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As a revised edition of a previous
monograph, Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on Trial,
restates Kens's thesis in a more accessible, updated, footnote-free,
and paperback format. This is a welcome contribution. The book should
now find its way onto the reading lists of courses on legal and
constitutional history, as it is well suited for a general audience.
Kens places the Lochner decision firmly within its historical
context and uses it as a window to an age. In the course of his
narrative, Kens introduces the reader to an array of subjects including
the noisome conditions in New York's tenement bakeries; Progressive
reformers and Tammany Hall politics; nineteenth-century intellectual,
economic, and labor history; and the lives and personalities of
important jurists and lawyers. He does this while presenting the
key constitutional and legal developments in a clear and compelling
manner. Thus, the book will keep the attention of undergraduates,
law students, and other general readers. For this achievement alone,
Kens should be commended. |
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Michael A. Ross
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Loyola University, New Orleans
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