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Book Review
Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv + 244. $35.00 (ISBN
0-691-02780-3).
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Taking her title from New York ward politician
George Washington Plunkitt's famous dismissal of municipal reformers
as mere "morning glories" that withered quickly (as opposed to political
machines that flourished "like fine old oaks"), Amy Bridges looks
at cities where reform was a long-term success. From the Progressive
Era through the 1960s, most of the large cities of the Southwest
were governed by reform regimes. In the 1910s and 1920s, they set
up commission systems with mixed results, but after World War II
they replaced these with city-manager systems with weak mayors and
citywide councilmensystems that lasted until the 1970s. While
standard accounts of the history of American city government associate
reform successes with small, homogenous suburbs such as Winnetka,
Illinois, and Scarsdale, New York, Bridges shows that attention
to the Southwest changes this picture considerably. There, reform
cities included Dallas, Phoenix, San Diego, and San Antonio, which
had large and diverse populations. While Albuquerque, Austin, and
San Jose were smaller, they too were ethnically diverse cities ruled
by reform systems. Houston, which did not adopt reform government,
serves as a foil to help to unravel the politics of municipal reform
in the region. Bridges calls the regimes of the southwestern reform
cities "Big City Reform," shows that this variant of municipal government
was indeed a very important part of the national picture, and devotes
most of the book to showing just how government and politics worked
under it. |
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Big City Reform was undemocratic.
It rested on a panoply of devices for disfranchising the poor and,
particularly, African-Americans and Chicanos. Some of these, like
the high Texas poll tax, were statewide laws, part of the legacy
of southern race relations. Others used familiar strategies developed
by northern urban reformers (the unsuccessful "morning glories")
to dampen voter participation: citywide elections, nonpartisanship,
elections scheduled in off-years and odd months, few and inconvenient
polling places. Reformers nominated candidates for city offices
in the closed-door meetings of nonpartisan slating groups, which
even their members had to admit were actually political parties.
Once in office, the reformers provided what their core constituents
wanted: frugal government, low taxes, good schools, and high-quality
services and amenities for Anglo middle-class neighborhoods. There
was little or no corruption and minimal provision of social services
for poorer residents. Reform governments also pursued growth agendas
including the aggressive annexation of outlying areas, whose developers
and middle-class residents enjoyed the extension of services and
amenities in a pattern that leapfrogged past poor neighborhoods
and communities of color. Bridges demonstrates this point by surveying
the locations of libraries and parks, and noting the long-term neglect
of basic services (such as drainage) in African-American and Chicano
areas of certain cities. The growth agendas finally caught up with
reform regimes in the 1970s, by which time they had accumulated
large municipal debts and begun to face a new environmentalist resistance
to growth among their core Anglo middle-class constituents.
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Middle-class discontent,
however, is not what destroyed the reform regimes. The civil rights
movement organized communities of color to oppose their exclusion
from what an anti-reform Dallas politician in 1965 called the "'father
knows best' approach" to city government (176). District elections
and the end of suffrage restrictions doomed Big City Reform. This,
Bridges concludes, has finally ended the distinctiveness of southwestern
city government. It has left a legacy, however, in the relative
political inexperience of urban communities of color in the Southwest. |
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Framed as a contribution to
a political science literature that has excluded the Southwest,
this book actually makes its most important theoretical contribution
by stressing the importance of rules and institutions in shaping
political culture. Bridges rejects cultural explanations of reform.
Reformers in the Southwest campaigned against the systems
of government that they overthrew, rather than invoking ethnocultural
language or attacking particular "bosses" or "ward-heelers." They
also benefited from the institutional weakness of political parties
in the region. The main reformist arguments were that reform charters
would enable city governments to do a better and more professionalized
job at promoting and managing growth and would be better able to
resist the temptations to corruption offered by powerful utility
companies. |
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The chief weakness
of this book is its organization. Bridges adopts a chronological
and thematic approach that discusses all of the cities simultaneously,
which makes it difficult to follow the particular histories and
remember the key players in any one of the cities. Clearly, though,
this reflects a tradeoff, since Bridges is arguing for the distinctiveness
of the Southwest, while she also is arguing for the shared history
of its cities. There are also occasional errors such as referring
to the IWW as the "International" rather than the "Industrial Workers
of the World." Nevertheless, Morning Glories tells an important
story convincingly. Old debates about city politics that were based
on the experience of the Northeast and Midwest, particularly the
one about whether it was bosses or reformers who represented democratic
aspirations, are renewed by Bridges's evidence from the Southwest.
Now that we know what reformers did when they won, the bosses look
a little better. Bridges makes this point explicit in her conclusion.
Chicago's heritage of machine politics, with voter participation
rates much higher than those of the southwestern reform cities,
allowed a victorious Carol Mosely Braun to tell her African-American
constituents in 1992, "we know how to do this" (217). One might
still question this interpretation of machine politics, but Bridges
has made it very difficult to pose "reform" as a more democratic
historical alternative. |
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Robin L. Einhorn
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University of California, Berkeley
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