Book Review

The distinctive character of American republican constitutionalism took shape during the 1760s and 1770s imperial struggle with Great Britain and was quite evident in the first independent American state constitutions of 1776, according to historian Marc W. Kruman. For at least a generation, scholars led by Gordon Wood have focused upon broadened suffrage and legislative restraint of magistrates as key factors in a post-independence development of core constitutional ideas that crystallized during and after the 1787 Philadelphia convention. But in this thoughtful book Kruman argues effectively that American constitutionalism's characteristic commitment to individual rights, broad suffrage, equal representation, separation of powers, and mixed government was clearly pronounced in the state constitutions created over a decade earlier at the time independence was first being declared. Consequently, Kruman's work deserves the serious attention of anyone examining the origins and development of the American constitutional republic.	1
Kruman points out that Americans, as they came to regard the British Parliament as exercising arbitrary and illegitimate authority (especially when it abrogated the Massachusetts Bay charter in 1774) and as they prepared to sever their ties with Great Britain, became extremely conscious of a need to redefine and legitimize their governance arrangements. They embraced the English model of formal statements regarding the nature of governmental authority and the liberties of the people but grew increasingly uncomfortable with the British constitution of several parts (hardly "unwritten" despite the common label) and, particularly, its capacity to be altered by simple parliamentary majority. The rebellious colonies moved to replace their colonial charters with unitary, written state constitutions restricting the power of both magistrates and legislatures. In fact, the May 1776 call of the Continental Congress for states to proceed with the construction of governments resting on popular authority, two months prior to the better-known July declaration, arguably represented the critical step in asserting independence.	2
A careful examination of all of the revolutionary state constitutions, and not merely the last to be completed (the much-studied Massachusetts constitution), allows Kruman to illuminate several salient points. Foremost, he puts to rest the notion that constitution making was treated as ordinary legislative action. The rhetoric surrounding the election of initial state assemblies, the concentration of those assemblies on constitution making, and their prompt adjournment so that new elections could be held to sanction their work made clear how they were regarded, and indeed regarded themselves. The fact that for the most part representatives were not nominally chosen to serve as constitutional convention delegates has, according to Kruman, obscured the reality that the bodies in which they served were treated as extraordinary temporary gatherings to write the fundamental laws. Once their work was completed, they strove in a variety of ways to obtain immediate popular sanction for their efforts.	3
Kruman stresses that the first state constitutions sought to restrict the authority of legislatures and other instruments of government, rather than merely reduce the executive power as Wood and others have contended. Americans in 1776 were quite sensitive to what they considered Parliament's improper actions and established a variety of devices—bills of rights, annual elections, term limits, required residence of representatives in their districts, equal apportionment, separation of powers, and bicameralism—to restrain their legislatures. Most significantly, in most states framers specifically asserted the ongoing power of constitutions to direct and define overall government by articulating systems for constitutional amendment through councils of censors, voter initiative, or approval by consecutive legislatures, all instruments of constitutional reform beyond the control of temporary legislative majorities. Kruman's depiction of the multiple constitutional restraints on legislatures as well as magistrates is perhaps his most notable insight.	4
Again challenging prevailing views, Kruman asserts that the first state constitutions rooted the right of suffrage in personhood, not property. In the eighteenth century the British regarded economic independence and a stake in the community as evidenced by a certain level of property holding as the necessary prerequisite for suffrage. The revolutionary American states, except for Virginia, reduced property-holding requirements and broadened the base of suffrage to reflect a concept of representation and consent from all who were taxed. The right to vote became a function of an entitlement to self-protection. Loyalty to the Revolution, through military service or tax paying, emerged as the standard of suffrage. Those who remained loyal to Britain, even if large property holders, faced disenfranchisement, while supporters of the Revolution, even if formerly barred from voting, now gained the ballot. With independence of judgment still at the core of the suffrage issue, New Jersey enfranchised unmarried women who held some property, though it joined other states in disqualifying married women, regarding them as dependent, focused on domestic life, and represented by their husbands. The few free blacks were similarly granted suffrage.	5
Kruman concludes his case for a revised understanding of the revolutionary state constitutions by calling attention to their separation of powers. Even in the most democratic structure, the 1777 Pennsylvania constitution, a variety of devices separated executive and judicial from legislative authority. Bans in Pennsylvania and elsewhere on multiple office holding as well as the establishment in most other states of upper legislative houses were designed as restraints on the effective power of legislatures. When state senates were created, the evidence suggests that the intent was not so much to represent property interests as to divide legislative power. As in his other arguments, Kruman demonstrates in these structural discussions that distinctive American constitutional principles were in place after 1776 and did not await 1787 to emerge. More descriptive detail on the construction and content of each of the revolutionary state constitutions might add further weight to his case, but Kruman's central point is well made. It must now be taken into account in any consideration of evolving American constitutionalism.	6
David E. Kyvig University of Akron

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