Book Review

In this densely argued text, David Richards develops what he terms "moral slavery" as a historical, philosophical, and legal concept. Deriving his understanding from the politics and philosophy of nineteenth-century abolition feminists, he defines moral slavery as "the unjust degradation of all classes of persons from their status as bearers of human rights into a servile status" (402). This deprivation, he argues, occurs through the denial of "the essential culture-creating moral powers of conscience, free speech, association, and work" (98). Richards uses this concept to undergird a redefinition of the meanings of constitutional guarantees of rights, particularly with respect to the rights of lesbians and gay men. Tension between Richards's elaboration of the concept of moral slavery and his dedication to an argument in support of the constitutional protections of gay and lesbian rights forms an interesting if sometimes problematic instability in the development of his argument.	1
Drawing on the historical traditions of Enlightenment notions of tolerance and nineteenth-century feminism, Richards argues that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments can best be interpreted as abolition feminists interpreted them: as injunctions against the deprivation of the right to the free development of a moral personality through the oppression of moral slavery. Moral slavery, he argues, flourishes in the context of the "paradox of intolerance," a concept defining abolition feminists' understanding of a religious intolerance that silences critical discussion precisely at the moment when it is most subject to reasonable inquiry. Richards is particularly interested in the linkages made by abolition feminists between the deprivations of rights on the basis of race and gender and the ways that those connections fueled an argument for human rights. While Richards's extensive use of political and philosophical works in developing this analysis of the "correct" reading of the Reconstruction amendments is strong, his historical contextualization is less so, relying predominantly on secondary sources. Thus his perception of a critique of moral slavery that foregrounds the right to develop identity and culture, while extremely interesting, remains presentist in its reflection of contemporary identity politics. Richards's argument would have been made stronger by an interrogation into the meanings of identity, culture, and morality in the antebellum period on which he focuses. This problem does not, however, obviate the usefulness of his legal interpretation in contemporary legal arguments, or the potential usefulness of the concept of moral slavery more generally.	2
The most interesting contribution Richards makes in his development of the concept of moral slavery is his emphasis on the right to intimacy as an essential requirement for the development of moral personality and free conscience. Richards uses close textual analyses of both nineteenth-century and early espousers of the rights of homosexuals (most notably Walt Whitman) to assert a variety of connections between seemingly disparate arguments (opposition to anti-miscegenation laws, sexual exploitation of slaves, marriage laws, woman's right not to marry, free love principles) to outline a basis for asserting a right to intimate relations. This argument is strengthened by his assertion of the importance of sexuality in the denial of rights on the basis of race and gender. The centrality of the right to intimacy as an aspect of the development of moral personality forms Richards's strongest ground for his advocacy of contemporary gay and lesbian rights and his redefinition of the meaning of "rights."	3
The second half of Richards's book has a decidedly different tone and strategy. Here he forms specifically legal arguments concerning gay and lesbian rights in legal battles over anti-gay/lesbian legislation, the illegality of gay marriage, and the exclusion of self-identified gay men and lesbians from the military. Richards asserts that lesbians and gays have been the victims of moral slavery, which "may indeed today in America cut deeper and thus more unjustly into moral personality than that of African Americans, women, and Jews" (403). In response to this injustice, as well as to homophobia and religious prejudice, Richards proposes that the suspect classification status that applies to gender and race be extended to homosexuality. Returning to the issues of freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, work, and the right to intimate life used in his definition of moral slavery, Richards shows through the historical links he has traced how arguments for suspect class status have helped feminists and proponents of civil rights to challenge discriminatory legislation. He does this most convincingly in his arguments about intimacy and his interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a guarantor of the freedom to develop moral personality.	4
In his specific legal arguments Richards focuses on religious tolerance rather than moral slavery as a basis for the rejection of legislation restricting the rights of lesbians and gay men. Richards makes a case for this interpretation by citing the ways that homophobic legislation is touted in the name of religious law and tradition and by emphasizing the historical trajectory of tolerance laws in protecting moral integrity. He asserts that arguments for religious tolerance would extend and strengthen current strategies calling for more just legal interpretations. Unfortunately, Richards does not specifically develop his argument for the applications and understandings of religious tolerance throughout his book and does not discuss the ramifications of using such an argument for contemporary progressive purposes weakening this otherwise compelling argument. Because his historical trajectory or moral slavery is not as strong for the twentieth century (notably he discusses the civil rights movement and second wave feminism only superficially), Richards's argument is less contextualized and more focused on specific legal and political issues. Thus the ramifications of the use of his reinterpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in the struggle for lesbian and gay rights remain unexamined.	5
By centering his argument on the concept of moral slavery, Richards brings attention to the possibilities for developing a concept of a moral personality, and morality more generally, in twentieth-century legal thought. While this is a provocative concept, the meanings Richards ascribes to the morality are ultimately not defined. The line between Richards's provocative argument asserting a layered redefinition of nineteenth-century constitutional rights and his more pragmatic aim of assuring the legal protection of lesbians and gay men in the late twentieth century loses clarity around the problematic meanings of morality and their complicated relationship to understandings of religion and civil rights. Despite these difficulties, Richards provides a set of compelling questions and a thoughtful meditation on the prospects for the extension of civil rights in this contemporary moment.	6
Greta Rensenbrink University of Chicago

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