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Book Review
David Cohen, Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xii + 214. Cloth $54.95 (ISBN 0-521-38167-3),
paper $18.95 (ISBN 0-521-38837-6).
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In a well-known essay, Oswyn Murray once suggested that
scholars of different nationalities tend to imagine the Greek city-state
in very different ways: "To the Germans the polis can only
be described in a handbook of constitutional law; the French polis
is a form of Holy Communion; the English polis is a historical
accident; while the American polis combines the practices
of a Mafia convention with the principles of justice and individual
freedom" ("Cities of Reason," Archives européenes de sociologie
28 [1987]: 327). David Cohen's fascinating book gives us the American
model writ large. His Athenians relentlessly pursue their own honor,
seeking to dishonor others and meeting insults with either violence
or litigation, depending on which seems most likely to produce results.
Cohen sees many similarities with modern feuding Mediterranean societies
like Andalusia (140) and the Sarakatsani (161), and even within
the notoriously violent medieval Iceland (79-82). He pursues this
argument through the evidence of fourth-century b.c. Athenian legal
speeches and philosophical tracts. |
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It is an original thesis. Most ancient
historians emphasize the lack of violence in Athenian culture and
the Athenians' willingness to submit their disputes to communal
judgment. After all, the Athenians themselves constantly said that
was what they were doing. Cohen concedes that "the homicidal blood
feud appears, for the most part, to have been displaced into other
arenas" (84), but he goes on to argue that we should believe little
or nothing that the Athenians said in legal speeches, because everyone
involved in dispute resolution expected these performances to be
manipulative and deceitful, and there was in any case no practical
way to check the facts in a speech (106-12). Methodologically, he
offers a radically constructivist argument, disconnecting the surviving
texts from any underlying, prediscursive social reality; but throughout
the book he nonetheless makes objectivist claims, drawing on comparative
cases to suggest that Athens "really" was a feuding society. |
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Cohen relentlessly pushes the evidence
for conflict, self-promotion, and struggles over honor in Athens,
but he also follows the very proper historical strategy of squarely
confronting the main sources that other historians have used to
build up a more pacific model of Athenian society. In chapters 5
and 6 he offers extended discussions of Lysias speeches 3 and 4
and Demosthenes 21 and 54. He exposes many of the unexamined assumptions
that scholars have brought to these texts and offers alternative
reconstructions of the events leading up to the lawsuits, arguing
that the self-effacing personas that the speakers created for themselves
were just one more strategy in their endless attempts to gain an
advantage over other elite Athenians. His arguments are often refreshing,
but equally often tendentious; and his treatment on pp. 25-28 of
Thucydides 3.81-83, the famous account of the civil war on Corcyra
in 427 b.c., is even more so. |
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This is an important and stimulating
book, but Cohen's arguments are one-sided. His basic methodological
premises are that if we take seriously the institutions and expectations
that shaped the production of the law court speeches, then we cannot
accept at face value the Athenians' own protestations of their wish
to avoid conflict; but we can treat comparative evidence as proxy
data, establishing a model of general expectations, which inclines
Cohen to set up a null hypothesis that unless there is overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, we should assume that Athens fits the
traditional Mediterranean anthropologists' model of an agonistic,
honor-and-shame society. But the book would have been even more
interesting if Cohen had pursued the implications of his constructivism
more consistently. Once we divorce the Athenian evidence from a
prediscursive baseline, comparative studies cannot reattach it.
We find ourselves facing a world of competing language games, writing
history without foundations, as some would put it. We can perhaps
produce a fascinating new cultural history of the rhetoric of violence
in Athens, but not a social history of law, community, and everyday
violence. |
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The exercise would have been
more revealing still if Cohen had foregrounded the Athenians' regular
renunciations of violence and self-interest instead of bracketing
them off. The Athenians claimed to be embarrassed at the excessive
pursuit of honor (philonikia) and to be committed to an ideal
of equal honor for citizens. Whatever their actual psychological
states, this unusual construction of masculinity should be at center
stage in any discussion. To make full sense of it Cohen would need
to tackle a wider range of Athenian sources, such as fifth-century
tragedy and comedy, and also to draw on more flexible anthropological
frameworks. Cohen cites Michael Herzfeld's influential book The
Poetics of Manhood (Princeton, 1985), dealing with sheep stealing
and aggressive eghoismos on modern Crete, but avoids Herzfeld's
equally well-known article "Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative
Analysis of Moral Systems" (Man 15 [1980]: 339-51), comparing
the Cretan system with the radically different sense of honor in
a village on Rhodes. For the economically more secure Rhodians,
self-promotion is less honorable; the strongest form of honor belongs
to the man who provides for his family as a cooperative member of
the community. Similarly, David Gilmore's study Aggression and
Community (New Haven, 1987), dealing with social conflict and
the pursuit of honor in agonistic Andalusia, features prominently
in Cohen's book, but Gilmore's broader Manhood in the Making
(New Haven, 1990), reviewing the variety of forms ideas of masculine
honor can take, does not. |
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Law, Violence and Community
is a thought-provoking study. It is polemical and often one-sided.
I doubt that many historians of Greek law will accept its thesis
in full, but on the other hand, nearly all will benefit from reading
it. |
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Ian Morris
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Stanford University
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