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Book Review
Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson,
1742-1798, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997. Pp. x + 228.
$37.50 (ISBN 0-8262-1103-8).
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In their repeated attempts to comes to terms with
the character of America's political and philosophic founding, scholars
inevitably encounter James Wilson's contribution and are compelled
to pause, even if briefly. For there is no denying that Wilson was
among the most influential statesmen of his time, a key figure in
the making of the United States during those critical years between
the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the 1787
Constitution. Moreover, Wilson's statesmanship is matched by sustained
reflections on the principles that inform America's independence
and the newly constituted Union. There is perhaps no more penetrating
account of the central tenets of liberal, democratic republicanism
by any American founder to rival Wilson's 1790-1791 Lectures
on Law (Robert G. McCloskey, ed., The Works of James Wilson,
2 vols., [Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1967]). In the Lectures Wilson provides a detailed
account of natural law, natural rights, the origin of government
by consent, as well as a description of the form and end of government
founded on such principles. Yet in spite of providing a comprehensive
vision of the American regime, and in spite of Wilson's contributions
as a statesman, scholars seem unable to grant him a place in the
American pantheon. It remains true that in telling the story of
the makers of the American republic, the names Jefferson, Madison,
Hamilton, Adams, Washington, and others easily come to mind, while
Wilson's remains obscure.
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Mark David Hall's The Political
and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798 attempts to
put an end to generations of ambivalence toward Wilson the thinker
and statesman. Hall does so by providing what he calls a "comprehensive
and systematic analysis of Wilson's political philosophy" (1). Two
studies in the 1930s examined Wilson's natural law teaching in detail
(William Obering, The Philosophy of James Wilson: A Study in
Comparative Jurisprudence [Washington D.C.: Catholic University
of America, 1938], and May G. O'Donnell, James Wilson and the
Natural Law Basis of Positive Law [New York: Fordham University
Press, 1937]). His statesmanship is accounted for in most studies
of the founding period and perhaps most comprehensively in Geoffrey
Seed, James Wilson (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978). But
unlike his predecessors, Hall attempts to embrace Wilson in all
of his parts: philosopher, lawyer, revolutionary pamphleteer, statesman,
professor of law, and one of the first Justices of the Supreme Court.
In so doing, Hall aims to show that there is an intimate relation
between Wilson's political thought and practice. "The central thesis
of the work," Hall argues, "is that Wilson's views of morality,
epistemology, and human nature led him to be the founding period's
more important advocate of a strong and democratic national government
that also protects individual rights" (1). For those who may wonder
if such an exercise is animated by archeological curiosity simply,
Hall reminds his readers that "America's current constitutional
system closely mirrors that envisioned by Wilson" (199, emphasis
added). The added benefit of Hall's study is that in seeing Wilson
we see ourselves. |
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After a brief description
of Wilson's "Political and Intellectual Development" (7-34), Hall
turns to the "foundation" of Wilson's philosophical and political
edifice, namely, the founder's account of natural law (35-67). According
to Hall, America's Scottish founding father "viewed natural law
as the God-created absolute standard against which individual and
community acts must be measured" (35). Supposedly, Wilson's understanding
draws from medieval scholasticism, especially the writings of Richard
Hooker, "who in turn borrowed from Thomas Aquinas" (40). It is not
clear from Hall's account just what precisely the various dicta
of natural laws are according to Wilson, except that they
seem to issue in a respect for natural rights. Hall argues
that "When Wilson applied the dictates of natural law to individuals
he often lapsed into the language of natural rights. In so doing
he did not make the distinctions between terms like 'natural law,'
'natural right,' and 'natural rights' that some modern scholars
make" (45). There are reasons for such a conflation of terms, or
so we are led to believe. Hall argues that natural rights fall under
the obligations issued by natural law, and these go beyond the requirements
enunciated by the proponents of "egoistic" theories of human nature.
"It should be evident that in taking this approach Wilson rejected
the Hobbesian attempt to ground natural rights on self-preservationa
view that some scholars argued prevailed in the American context"
(46). |
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From the discussion of natural law,
Hall moves to the question: How do human beings make intelligible
the content and meaning of such supposedly "universal" standards?
In response to this question, Hall turns to Wilson's moral sense
theory. Hall argues that Wilson "understood the moral sense to be
an epistemological device useful for knowing the absolute standards
of natural law" (76). Those "standards" of right conduct are accessible
to all, hence the democratic character of Wilson's epistemology.
By what means the moral law is to be known is, however, less than
clear. Wilson's epistemology turns out to be a conflation of a scholasticism
emphasizing the role of reason in making the natural order of the
cosmos intelligible to human beings (Thomas Aquinas) and what we
might call a more "modern" understanding that gives primacy to the
human passions as the sovereign monitors of thought and action.
At one point in the argument, Hall writes that Wilson supposedly
"joined [Thomas] Reid ... in arguing that reason plays an important
role in knowing and interpreting one's moral sense" (72), and at
another point in the argument Wilson supposedly "rejected the Scholastic
contention that reason plays a large role in the gaining of moral
knowledge" (77, 89). In case of doubt, Wilson also "considered the
Bible an important source of moral guidance" (72), but with important
qualifications (74). |
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The book's fourth chapter,
"The Most Democratic Man in America" (90-126), marks an important
transition in the argument from political theory to political practice
by examining Wilson's theory of "political obligation" (90). For
Wilson, political obligation rests on consent (93). But consent
or social contract theory, which is based on the primacy of human
equality and freedom, and, thus, is seemingly at odds with a political
theory that asserts the primacy of obligation to others, might seem
to be at odds with the account of natural law Hall provides in the
previous chapter. Hall finds a way out of the contradiction. To
begin, Hall writes, "One must keep promises, Wilson reminded his
readers, because it is God's will for us to do so" (97). More importantly,
"Wilson believed that democracy is simply a means for creating law
in agreement with a Christian conception of natural law" (104).
Throughout the Lectures, Wilson demonstrates a "steadfast
adherence to the basic tenets of orthodox Christianity" (11). In
Hall's hands, then, Wilson is an advocate of the "Lockean conception
of social contract" (97), joining "Locke in arguing that the people
always retain their sovereignty" (101), holding "individual natural
rights to be absolute" (102), and yet simultaneously requiring citizens
to be bound by the requirements of "Christian" obligation. Here
we revisit the same conflation of natural law and natural rights
that is present in Hall's analysis of natural law. |
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Leaving aside Hall's concluding chapter
("James Wilson, a Man for All Seasons," 193-201), and a discussion
of charges against Wilson's fidelity to democratic principles leveled
against him by contemporaries and a few scholars of note ("'James
the Caledonian,' an Aristocrat?" 127-47), the final substantive
engagement with Wilson occurs in chapter six ("The Scot as a Nationalist,"
148-92), where Hall takes up Wilson's (Federalist) defense of a
"strong national government" (148). This is the book's most explicitly
political chapter, examining Wilson's role as a statesman during
the 1787 Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying convention
in Pennsylvania, primarily though not exclusively. Of special concern
to Hall is the relation between the state and federal governments
and Wilson's role in setting up an always tentative divide between
local and national governments. Apart from reasserting the primacy
of government in protecting natural rights (173-74), we witness
in this chapter a partial eclipse of theoretical questions in favor
of a largely historical account of Wilson's doings and sayings at
the various conventions. The chapter ascends to the book's earlier
themes by taking up the problem of citizenship in its penultimate
section (179-86). This is familiar territory indeed. |
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This book has the merit of
taking Wilson seriously and taking seriously Wilson's claim that
the political thought and practice of the American founding are
intimately wedded (43). But the supposed admixture of classical
and modern sources, of modern and ancient theories of natural law,
of natural right (singular) and natural rights (plural), of reason
and sentiment, of theories of obligation founded on Christian duties
and those founded on the protection of individual natural rights,
is not a marriage of incompatible doctrines we can ascribe to Wilson.
Wilson was an able rhetorician who adorned his lectures with numerous
sources, both ancient and modern. In confronting the manner in which
Wilson appropriates the thought of the past, it is necessary to
remain attentive to his very careful and idiosyncratic use of authorities.
To cite but one example, in spite of Wilson's extensive references
to the Deity, and repeated reminders of our obligation to higher
powers, Wilson writes, and Hall ignores, that the "defense of one's
self" is "justly called the primary law of nature" (Wilson, Works,
609). And the law of nature is know to us by "feeling," that is,
by the passionate concern for our well being (Wilson, Works,
132-33). Hall never asks the hard questions. The hard questions
are less about whether Wilson is a "believer" and more about the
precise content of Wilson's belief. Instances abound in which it
can be clearly demonstrated that Wilson employs classical, so-called
"Christian" sources for distinctly modern purposes. If a study is
to be undertaken that succeeds in securing Wilson's place among
the most prominent American founders, such a study would have to
begin by examining Wilson's rhetoric with great delicacy. That study
remains to be written. |
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Eduardo A. Velásquez
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Washington and Lee University
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