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Book Review



Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997. Pp. x + 228. $37.50 (ISBN 0-8262-1103-8).

In their repeated attempts to comes to terms with the character of America's political and philosophic founding, scholars inevitably encounter James Wilson's contribution and are compelled to pause, even if briefly. For there is no denying that Wilson was among the most influential statesmen of his time, a key figure in the making of the United States during those critical years between the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the 1787 Constitution. Moreover, Wilson's statesmanship is matched by sustained reflections on the principles that inform America's independence and the newly constituted Union. There is perhaps no more penetrating account of the central tenets of liberal, democratic republicanism by any American founder to rival Wilson's 1790-1791 Lectures on Law (Robert G. McCloskey, ed., The Works of James Wilson, 2 vols., [Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967]). In the Lectures Wilson provides a detailed account of natural law, natural rights, the origin of government by consent, as well as a description of the form and end of government founded on such principles. Yet in spite of providing a comprehensive vision of the American regime, and in spite of Wilson's contributions as a statesman, scholars seem unable to grant him a place in the American pantheon. It remains true that in telling the story of the makers of the American republic, the names Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, Adams, Washington, and others easily come to mind, while Wilson's remains obscure.
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     Mark David Hall's The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798 attempts to put an end to generations of ambivalence toward Wilson the thinker and statesman. Hall does so by providing what he calls a "comprehensive and systematic analysis of Wilson's political philosophy" (1). Two studies in the 1930s examined Wilson's natural law teaching in detail (William Obering, The Philosophy of James Wilson: A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence [Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1938], and May G. O'Donnell, James Wilson and the Natural Law Basis of Positive Law [New York: Fordham University Press, 1937]). His statesmanship is accounted for in most studies of the founding period and perhaps most comprehensively in Geoffrey Seed, James Wilson (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978). But unlike his predecessors, Hall attempts to embrace Wilson in all of his parts: philosopher, lawyer, revolutionary pamphleteer, statesman, professor of law, and one of the first Justices of the Supreme Court. In so doing, Hall aims to show that there is an intimate relation between Wilson's political thought and practice. "The central thesis of the work," Hall argues, "is that Wilson's views of morality, epistemology, and human nature led him to be the founding period's more important advocate of a strong and democratic national government that also protects individual rights" (1). For those who may wonder if such an exercise is animated by archeological curiosity simply, Hall reminds his readers that "America's current constitutional system closely mirrors that envisioned by Wilson" (199, emphasis added). The added benefit of Hall's study is that in seeing Wilson we see ourselves. 2
     After a brief description of Wilson's "Political and Intellectual Development" (7-34), Hall turns to the "foundation" of Wilson's philosophical and political edifice, namely, the founder's account of natural law (35-67). According to Hall, America's Scottish founding father "viewed natural law as the God-created absolute standard against which individual and community acts must be measured" (35). Supposedly, Wilson's understanding draws from medieval scholasticism, especially the writings of Richard Hooker, "who in turn borrowed from Thomas Aquinas" (40). It is not clear from Hall's account just what precisely the various dicta of natural laws are according to Wilson, except that they seem to issue in a respect for natural rights. Hall argues that "When Wilson applied the dictates of natural law to individuals he often lapsed into the language of natural rights. In so doing he did not make the distinctions between terms like 'natural law,' 'natural right,' and 'natural rights' that some modern scholars make" (45). There are reasons for such a conflation of terms, or so we are led to believe. Hall argues that natural rights fall under the obligations issued by natural law, and these go beyond the requirements enunciated by the proponents of "egoistic" theories of human nature. "It should be evident that in taking this approach Wilson rejected the Hobbesian attempt to ground natural rights on self-preservation—a view that some scholars argued prevailed in the American context" (46). 3
     From the discussion of natural law, Hall moves to the question: How do human beings make intelligible the content and meaning of such supposedly "universal" standards? In response to this question, Hall turns to Wilson's moral sense theory. Hall argues that Wilson "understood the moral sense to be an epistemological device useful for knowing the absolute standards of natural law" (76). Those "standards" of right conduct are accessible to all, hence the democratic character of Wilson's epistemology. By what means the moral law is to be known is, however, less than clear. Wilson's epistemology turns out to be a conflation of a scholasticism emphasizing the role of reason in making the natural order of the cosmos intelligible to human beings (Thomas Aquinas) and what we might call a more "modern" understanding that gives primacy to the human passions as the sovereign monitors of thought and action. At one point in the argument, Hall writes that Wilson supposedly "joined [Thomas] Reid ... in arguing that reason plays an important role in knowing and interpreting one's moral sense" (72), and at another point in the argument Wilson supposedly "rejected the Scholastic contention that reason plays a large role in the gaining of moral knowledge" (77, 89). In case of doubt, Wilson also "considered the Bible an important source of moral guidance" (72), but with important qualifications (74). 4
     The book's fourth chapter, "The Most Democratic Man in America" (90-126), marks an important transition in the argument from political theory to political practice by examining Wilson's theory of "political obligation" (90). For Wilson, political obligation rests on consent (93). But consent or social contract theory, which is based on the primacy of human equality and freedom, and, thus, is seemingly at odds with a political theory that asserts the primacy of obligation to others, might seem to be at odds with the account of natural law Hall provides in the previous chapter. Hall finds a way out of the contradiction. To begin, Hall writes, "One must keep promises, Wilson reminded his readers, because it is God's will for us to do so" (97). More importantly, "Wilson believed that democracy is simply a means for creating law in agreement with a Christian conception of natural law" (104). Throughout the Lectures, Wilson demonstrates a "steadfast adherence to the basic tenets of orthodox Christianity" (11). In Hall's hands, then, Wilson is an advocate of the "Lockean conception of social contract" (97), joining "Locke in arguing that the people always retain their sovereignty" (101), holding "individual natural rights to be absolute" (102), and yet simultaneously requiring citizens to be bound by the requirements of "Christian" obligation. Here we revisit the same conflation of natural law and natural rights that is present in Hall's analysis of natural law. 5
     Leaving aside Hall's concluding chapter ("James Wilson, a Man for All Seasons," 193-201), and a discussion of charges against Wilson's fidelity to democratic principles leveled against him by contemporaries and a few scholars of note ("'James the Caledonian,' an Aristocrat?" 127-47), the final substantive engagement with Wilson occurs in chapter six ("The Scot as a Nationalist," 148-92), where Hall takes up Wilson's (Federalist) defense of a "strong national government" (148). This is the book's most explicitly political chapter, examining Wilson's role as a statesman during the 1787 Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying convention in Pennsylvania, primarily though not exclusively. Of special concern to Hall is the relation between the state and federal governments and Wilson's role in setting up an always tentative divide between local and national governments. Apart from reasserting the primacy of government in protecting natural rights (173-74), we witness in this chapter a partial eclipse of theoretical questions in favor of a largely historical account of Wilson's doings and sayings at the various conventions. The chapter ascends to the book's earlier themes by taking up the problem of citizenship in its penultimate section (179-86). This is familiar territory indeed. 6
     This book has the merit of taking Wilson seriously and taking seriously Wilson's claim that the political thought and practice of the American founding are intimately wedded (43). But the supposed admixture of classical and modern sources, of modern and ancient theories of natural law, of natural right (singular) and natural rights (plural), of reason and sentiment, of theories of obligation founded on Christian duties and those founded on the protection of individual natural rights, is not a marriage of incompatible doctrines we can ascribe to Wilson. Wilson was an able rhetorician who adorned his lectures with numerous sources, both ancient and modern. In confronting the manner in which Wilson appropriates the thought of the past, it is necessary to remain attentive to his very careful and idiosyncratic use of authorities. To cite but one example, in spite of Wilson's extensive references to the Deity, and repeated reminders of our obligation to higher powers, Wilson writes, and Hall ignores, that the "defense of one's self" is "justly called the primary law of nature" (Wilson, Works, 609). And the law of nature is know to us by "feeling," that is, by the passionate concern for our well being (Wilson, Works, 132-33). Hall never asks the hard questions. The hard questions are less about whether Wilson is a "believer" and more about the precise content of Wilson's belief. Instances abound in which it can be clearly demonstrated that Wilson employs classical, so-called "Christian" sources for distinctly modern purposes. If a study is to be undertaken that succeeds in securing Wilson's place among the most prominent American founders, such a study would have to begin by examining Wilson's rhetoric with great delicacy. That study remains to be written. 7


Eduardo A. Velásquez
Washington and Lee University



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