Kerrie Saville | Exploding the Stability Myth: Structural Change in the Australian Trade Union Movement, 1969–85 | Labour History, 96

Exploding the Stability Myth: Structural Change in the Australian Trade Union Movement, 1969–85

Kerrie Saville^*

Traditional studies of long-term change in trade union structure have predominantly relied upon the aggregate number of trade unions as the principal measure, or indicator of change over time. Using the Australian trade union movement as an example, this article argues that our understanding of the long-term change in the external structure of trade unions would be better served by using Waddington's structural events approach examining the incidence of four distinct 'structural events' – union formations, dissolutions, breakaways and mergers. In doing so, this article presents new data on structural change in the Australian trade union movement between 1969 and 1985. It casts doubt on the traditional argument, which relied on the apparent lack of change in the aggregate number of unions reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics to argue that this period was one of structural rigidity. The structural events data reveals that far from being a period of structural stability, it was in fact one of significant change, albeit in the composition of the Australian trade union movement, rather than in the aggregate number of trade unions in operation.

Existing accounts of the structural evolution of the Australian trade union movement during the twentieth century identify three distinct phases of development. Two of these are described as periods of significant change, whilst the third is given to be one of structural rigidity. The first period of change, between 1901 and 1919, was one of incomparable growth, in which the number of unions in Australia increased from 198 to 394.¹ William Howard's 'dependency theory',² whilst questioned by some,³ attributes this growth to the introduction of compulsory arbitration, and the role of the early Registrars which acted promptly to register a body of registered unions to meet the 'institutional needs' of the system. The second period of change, between 1986 and 1996, in which the number of unions in Australia more than halved, falling from 326 to 132, has also been the subject of considerable discussion. The radical restructuring of the Australian trade union movement during these years is generally attributed to a massive union merger wave.⁴ When we consider the two periods of change evident in the structural development of Australian trade unionism in the twentieth century there is widespread agreement as to their existence and their cause, but is this also true of the period of structural rigidity between 1920 and 1985? This phase of structural development is, for the most part, described in the literature as one of structural rigidity because the aggregate number of unions in Australia varied little during these years, declining only marginally from 388 in 1920 to 323 in 1985. The accuracy of this assumption, however, is brought into question by two smaller bodies of literature which emerged in the 1970s. The first reports significant growth in both the level of white-collar union membership and the number of white-collar unions in operation in Australia during the 1970s. The second suggests that a number of state union amalgamations occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s.⁵ In light of these contradictory accounts, the intention of this article is to take a fresh look at the structural development of the Australian trade union movement during these later years of supposed structural stability. In doing so, this article presents, and attempts to explain, new data on the incidence of four distinct structural events – formations, dissolutions, mergers and breakaways – in the Australian trade union movement between 1969 and 1985. The first section of this article presents an overview of the contradictory accounts of structural change that currently exist in the Australian literature pertaining to the 1970s and 1980s, some of which extend back in time to the formative years of the arbitral system. The second section outlines the 'structural events approach' and reports, and attempts to provide an explanation for, data on the incidence of union formations, dissolutions, mergers and breakaways.

Conflicting Accounts of Structural Development: 1969–85

As noted in the introduction, the period between 1969 and 1985 has generally been described as one of structural rigidity in the Australian trade union movement. This description is premised on a lack of change in the aggregate number of unions reported to be in operation in Australia. In fact the literature suggests that this pattern of structural stability can be traced all the way back to 1920, with the number of unions varying only marginally during the 65-year period between 1920 and 1985, declining from 388 to 323. Two explanations are provided for this rigidity. The first attributes it to the arbitral system. On the one hand, Howard's 'dependency theory' attributes the rigidity to the changing actions of the early Industrial Registrars. Howard asserts that the early registrars acted 'to create, quickly and without excessive legalism, a body of registered unions'⁶ because they were needed to facilitate the administration of the arbitral system. He then contrasts this with the supposed behaviour of later registrars, arguing that by 1920, once a sufficient number of unions had been registered to give the system effective coverage over the Australian workforce, the registrars then adopted a more legalistic, procedural approach which acted to obstruct and restrict the continued registration of new unions. In effect, Howard ascribes the structural rigidity following 1920 to the actions of the early Industrial Registrars, arguing that they first eschewed excessive legalism in an effort to promote the registration of new trade unions, and then increased the legal complexity of the registration process once an adequate number of unions had been registered to ensure the effective operation of the arbitral system.

On the other hand, authors such as Rimmer and Griffin and Scarcebrook attribute the structural stability following 1920, not to the Industrial Registrars as Howard does, but to the protections afforded to those registered trade unions already within the federal system by the operation of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (later known as the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972).⁷ Rimmer contends that the Act contributed to the structural stability of the trade union movement by propping up small and industrially weak unions, that may otherwise have disappeared, by forcing employers to recognise unions registered under its provisions, and by ensuring the members of such unions, with limited resources and limited bargaining power, received wage improvements via a system of award flow-ons. In addition, it is widely accepted that the operation of the Act's 'conveniently belong' provision, which prescribed that an association was to be refused registration if there was already a registered union to which its members could conveniently belong, acted as a significant stabilising force, in that it made it possible for existing registered unions to object to, and obstruct, the registration of additional unions.⁸ In fact, when testing Howard's explanation for the structural stability of the Australian trade union movement following 1920, Griffin and Scarcebrook's results lead them to argue that 'the "culprits" are not the Industrial Registrars but rather those registered organizations already within the system which have used the mechanisms of the Act to jealously guard their position'.⁹

The second explanation for the rigidity, specific to that of the 1970s and early 1980s, attributes it to a low incidence of union mergers, with only 16 federal mergers reported between 1971 and 1986.¹⁰ Isaac and Ford provide a political explanation for the lack of merger activity, arguing that Australian trade unions resisted amalgamation due to 'the desire of particular groups to maintain their independence; the fear of loss of status of officials in the smaller unions; differences in industrial and political attitudes; and differences in membership dues and benefits'.¹¹ Deery and Khoury on the other hand, provide a legal explanation for the low incidence of federal union mergers. They reason that the introduction of section 158N into the Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1972 prevented federal unions from merging by requiring a minimum of 50 per cent of the enrolled membership of each union to participate in a merger ballot, and more than 50 per cent of the voters to vote in favour of the proposed merger for it to be approved. Section 158N's demand for such a high participation rate was prohibitive, and acted to inhibit federal union mergers. Whilst a limited number of absorptions were possible as a result of unions obtaining an exemption from the provision, only two mergers were attempted under s.158N, and only one was successful. Whilst the members voted in favour of amalgamation in both cases, only the Seamens Union of Australia (72 per cent participation rate) and the Marine Cooks, Bakers and Butchers Association of Australia (82 per cent participation rate) succeeded in achieving the required ballot participation rate of 50 per cent or higher.¹²

These explanations provide significant insights into the slow pace of structural development taken to have characterised the Australian trade union movement following the initial introduction of the arbitral system. Yet questions remain. As Rimmer remarked in 1981: 'It is still open to question how much Australian union structure has remained stable since 1920'.¹³ Earlier theorists have assumed this period was one of structural rigidity due to two factors – the slow rate of change in the total number of Australian unions between 1920 and 1985, and the low level of federal merger activity following 1972. But was the period really one of structural stability? And was the period really denoted by a lack of merger activity if all jurisdictions, both federal and state, are considered? Two small bodies of literature cast doubt on these assumptions. The first casts doubt on the low incidence of merger activity. Research conducted into the merger activity of state unions suggests that these unions, uninhibited by federal legislation, were merging.¹⁴ The second casts doubt on the assumption that the operation of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and more specifically its provisions against dual unionism, resulted in the structural rigidity of the Australian trade union movement. This body of literature suggests that the 1970s saw an increase not only in the number of white collar trade unionists, but also in the number of white-collar unions.¹⁵ If this is to be believed, new unions were forming, but the number of trade unions in operation was remaining steady. This suggests that other unions, most likely blue-collar unions, were disappearing. So, was the period one of structural stability or structural change? In relying on the aggregate number of trade unions as the only indicator of long-term structural change it would seem that the existing literature on the structural development of the Australian trade union movement fails to present a complete picture of the pattern of structural activity experienced between 1920 and 1985, as the small decrease in the aggregate number of unions reported to be in operation appears to conceal substantial compositional change. It would appear that whilst existing studies of structural development may help explain the existence of structural stability in established industry sectors, such as manufacturing, they nevertheless fail to account for the structural change seemingly associated with the emergence of new industries and new occupations. It follows, then, that the causal analysis provided by these studies is also incomplete.

Structural Events: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Structural Change

Waddington offers an alternative approach to this problem.¹⁶ Waddington examines the longitudinal development of trade union structure in Britain by considering data on four trade union structural events – formations, dissolutions, mergers and breakaways. In their defence, past Australian studies have focussed on a single structural event – mergers – as opposed to adopting a 'structural events approach', due to a lack of relevant data. Whilst Waddington was able to access public data on all four structural events from a single source, namely the Employment Department, Australia's bifurcated system of government, and the restrictions placed on the Australian Bureau of Statistics by the Census and Statistics Act 1905, have meant that such data is not easily accessible. However, the construction of a longitudinal database by the author that tracks the existence and structural activity of all Australian unions, both federal and state, for the period between 1969 and 1985, makes new data on all four structural events available. Gathered principally from registration records in the arbitral jurisdictions, and trades and labor council affiliation records in the non-arbitral states of Victoria and Tasmania, this data provides us with a more complete picture of structural change between 1969 and 1985. It also allows macro-level analysis of non-merger structural changes that up until now have gone largely unexplained. Table 1 presents aggregate data on all four structural events.¹⁷

Table 1: Total Number of Structural Events, 1969–85

	1969–74		1975–80		1981–85		Total
	No.	Ave per year	No.	Ave per year	No.	Ave per year	No.	Ave per year
Formations	35	5.8	21	3.5	14	2.8	70	4.1
Dissolutions	26	4.3	18	3.0	8	1.6	52	3.1
Mergers	18	3.0	14	2.3	8	1.6	40	2.4
Breakaways	3	0.5	5	0.8	5	1.0	13	0.8
Total	82	13.7	58	9.7	35	7.0	175	10.3

Table 1 shows that a total of 175 structural events occurred in the period between 1969 and 1985. It is clear that this period was one of substantial structural change, not one of structural rigidity. So, how do we explain this new picture of structural change? To what can we attribute the pattern of activity that denoted union formations, dissolutions, mergers and breakaways between 1969 and 1985? Each of these structural events will be discussed in turn, beginning with the most dominant mechanism for change, the formation.

Formations

Waddington defines a formation as 'the establishment of an independent union where no prior organization existed'.¹⁸ In the Australian context, issues of data availability resulted in a union formation being defined as an instance in which a 'new union' was 'registered' in an arbitral jurisdiction or 'affiliated' with a trades and labor council in a non-arbitral state.¹⁹ In line with this definition, the formations data series was constructed from two distinct sources. First, for unions registered within one of Australia's arbitral systems the published and unpublished registration records of both the federal and state Industrial Registrars provided a record of the date on which each union was registered, and its title. Second, in the non-arbitral states of Victoria and Tasmania, union formations were identified in accordance with the addition of a new affiliate to the Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) and the Tasmanian Trades and Labor Council (TTLC) respectively, as provided by their annual directories and unpublished affiliation records. Whilst not as reliable as registration records, these documents were identified as the only longitudinal sources identifying each individual union in these non-arbitral jurisdictions.²⁰

Table 1 shows that 70 new unions formed in Australia between 1969 and 1985. Table 2 shows that a high proportion of these formations resulted in the 'birth' of a white-collar union, many of which represented professional and para-professional workers (38) in the tertiary education (17), education (10) and finance, property and business services (7) sectors. The majority of these new unions were single-state unions. To what can we attribute the birth of these unions?

Table 2: Union Formations by Type of Work

Type of Work	1969–85
Blue-collar	13
White-collar	57
Total	70

The majority of unions formed between 1969 and 1985, did so to represent professional white-collar workers. Why was this? A number of factors contributed to the formation of these unions. In part, this growth in the number of white-collar unions reflects an expansion in the size of the white-collar workforce (which increased from 2.1 million workers in 1969 to 3.2 million workers in 1985), and in turn, an increase in both the absolute and relative number of white collar unionists, with white-collar union density increasing from 30.2 per cent in 1969 to 39.3 per cent by 1981. In particular, the large number of unions formed to represent academics, teachers and those in the finance, property and business services sector reflects the fact that the greatest growth in white-collar employment occurred within these sectors, with the number of employees in the community services sector, of which education and higher education were a part, almost doubling from 658,300 in 1969 to 1.2 million by 1985, and the number of employees in the finance, property and business services rising from 220,400 to 1.1 million.²¹

Whilst parallels can be drawn between growth in white-collar employment and the number of white-collar trade unions, employment growth offers only a partial explanation for the formation of these unions. One need not result in the other. So why did it? On the one hand, growth in white-collar unionism during this period can in part be attributed to compulsory trade unionism and union security devices. After all, the preference decision in Federated Clerks' Union of Australia v. Altona Petrochemical co. Pty Ltd (1973)²² (the Oil Clerks' case) caused employers, particularly in the oil, banking and insurance industries, to negotiate agreements in which union membership was made compulsory for new employees, in return for which unions agreed not to seek the inclusion of a preference clause in awards. Similarly, the federal Labor government elected in 1972, encouraged public servants to become union members.²³

On the other hand, the growth in white-collar trade unionism can be attributed to the growing union consciousness of white-collar workers. Such attitudinal change has been associated with the 'proletarianisation' of the white-collar workforce as their professions and job autonomy were reined in. Two unusual examples concerned the unions formed for middle-ranking defence force officers (following a dispute over lump sum superannuation tax), and Catholic priests and nuns (when the principals of Catholic schools applied to have their association registered as a trade union in New South Wales).²⁴ Further evidence of the 'proletarianisation' of white-collar workers during this period, can not only be seen in the mergers of the white-collar union federations with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU),²⁵ but also in the increased level of strike activity of Australia's white-collar unions. For example, in 1969 the first national strike by the Australian Bank Officers Association took place, while in 1979, several Commonwealth public sector unions – the Administrative and Clerical Officers Association and the Australian Public Service Association (Fourth Division Officers) – stopped work nation-wide in opposition to threats to job security posed by the Commonwealth Employees (Redeployment and Retirement) Act 1979. This was the first such strike in 70 years.²⁶

It is clear from the above discussion that a rise in both white-collar employment and the union consciousness of white-collar workers contributed significantly to the formation of new unions in this period. However, with many of the newly formed unions concentrated in a few industries – higher education, education, and finance, property and business services – it is important that industry specific explanations are also considered.

Higher education was the industry with the largest number of formations, accounting for approximately one quarter of the 70 formations between 1969 and 1985. The majority of these involved college academics, who like the Torrens College Academic Staff Association (1974) and the Academic Staff Association of the South Australian Institute of Technology (1975), gained registration in the 1970s as single-state unions in South Australia. Historical accounts of industrial relations in the higher education sector suggest that these union 'formations' occurred because existing 'staff associations' began to see the need to behave more like 'proper' unions by securing registration and awards. Behind this lay a gradual change in the attitudes of academic staff as they abandoned 'the psychology and discourse of community and collegiality'.²⁷ Government policy had much to do with these changes. In 1964, the Commonwealth Government acted on the findings of the Report of the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia, and introduced the 'binary' system in which higher education was to occur in 'equal-but-different' organisations—universities and Colleges of Advanced Education (CAEs). This restructure influenced the development of industrial relations in the sector as college academics suffered from 'status anxiety' and a lack of occupational autonomy compared to university academics, and were subjected to closer supervision by state governments, creating divisions between university academics and those who worked in the CAEs, and introducing a formal adversarial process for the review of academic salaries. This division between academic staff took on even greater importance following the establishment of a permanent body to review academic salaries. Established by the Commonwealth Government in 1976, the Academic Salaries Tribunal accepted the work value argument presented by the universities and broke the nexus between college and university salary scales. This decision shocked the Federated Staff Associations of Australian Colleges of Advanced Education (FSAACAE) and its affiliates who were accustomed to an established relativity with the university staff. They responded by turning to the state industrial tribunals for awards – a step which, in most states, required traditional staff associations to register as trade unions.²⁸

Concern about employment conditions in the higher education sector did not dissipate with the changes outlined above, but continued throughout the remainder of the 1970s and the 1980s as the sector continued to be the subject of enquiry, reform, and cuts to government funding.²⁹ These threats led to the formation of many new unions.

Education accounted for 10 of the 70 unions formed between 1969 and 1985. A review of these organisations shows that the majority represented workers in independent and Catholic schools. Little can be ascertained from the published union histories examined in regard to the forces which led teachers in independent schools to formally register their staff associations during this period. All that we can glean from the available literature is that for teachers in independent schools, the most significant issue they confronted at the time, which may have lead them to register their associations, was that of achieving and maintaining parity in salary and conditions with state school teachers. The total package of award provisions of those in independent schools were seen to be inferior, despite salary parity being achieved in 1971. In the Catholic school sector it appears that the union formations during this period were pragmatic in nature. Teachers in Catholic schools (increasingly lay teachers by the end of the 1960s) were struggling to achieve comparable salary and conditions with those in both state and independent schools. They were also seeking the establishment of a formal regulatory framework for setting salary and conditions that would allow for teacher representation and would cater to the needs of those in the Catholic school system. During the 1970s, both the Victorian Catholic Primary Teachers Association (VCPTA) and the Association of Teachers in Victorian Catholic Secondary Schools (ATVCSS) were formed as state unions. As was the case in higher education, these 'formations' reflect the changes made when existing staff associations – the Catholic Lay Teachers Association (female primary teachers) and the Male Lay Teachers Guild (male secondary teachers) – chose to register and take on the character of a trade union. In this case, the staff associations did so to enhance their chances of being recognised in the determination of salary and conditions.³⁰

Finally, seven new unions were formed in the finance, property and business services industries between 1969 and 1985. A review of these organisations reveals a rather eclectic group of unions created to represent workers in banking, real estate and insurance. But also included were unions of workers such as court interpreters and commercial artists. The best documented cases in this sector are in banking and insurance. Workers in both professions were concerned with the erosion of their real salaries following high inflation in the early 1970s. Unable to rely on the Commission for salary increases in the collective bargaining system between the 1967 Metal Trades Case decision and the 1974 Wage Indexation decision, the workers in these sectors found themselves in direct negotiations with employers who dragged their feet in bargaining and treated employee claims 'with mild contempt'.³¹ This change, acted in combination with automation, mergers, branch rationalisation, and deregulation to raise concerns about job security, career structure and working conditions, and to increase the militancy of workers in the sector. Finally, historical accounts attribute the increased militancy of workers in banking and insurance to an increase in the proportion of younger employees who 'were not prepared to cop what the young people of the '60s were prepared to cop'.³²

These three industry based accounts provide further support for the general explanations for union formations outlined above. In each case, union formation was the result of an increase in union consciousness on the part of white-collar workers concerned with employment conditions and gaps in existing representation and regulation. Interestingly, some of these workers, such as those who formed the state-based Rural Bank of NSW Officers Association in 1970, could have chosen to join existing trade unions. Many, however, resisted representation by existing unions because they saw them as 'different'. Others, however, had neither the choice of being represented by an existing federal union, nor of forming a union that could gain federal registration. As most of the unions that formed during this period did so to represent academics, college staff and teachers – professionals which the law did not consider to be 'industrial' – they were prohibited from registering in the federal system as a result of the decision in Federated State School Teachers' Association of Australia v. Victoria (1929).³³ This restriction was not removed until the decision of the High Court in 1983 in R. v. Coldham; Ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union (1983).³⁴

Dissolutions

Waddington states that 'a dissolution occurs when a union ceases to exist as an independent entity'.³⁵ In the Australian context, however, the same issues of data availability mentioned in regard to union formations applied to union dissolutions, and resulted in a dissolution being defined as an instance in which an existing union was either deregistered in an arbitral jurisdiction, or disaffiliated from a trades and labor council in a non-arbitral state, for a reason other than amalgamation.³⁶ In line with this definition, the dissolutions data series was constructed from the same two sources as was relied upon in the collection of the formations data. The registration records of the federal and state Industrial Registrars provided a record of the date on which each union was deregistered, and its title. In instances where unions had been deregistered due to punitive action, and it was known that the same organisation was later re-registered, no record of dissolution or formation was made. In the non-arbitral states, union dissolutions were identified by the disaffiliation of a union from the VTHC and the TTLC respectively, as denoted by the continued exclusion of a union from the federation's annual union directory. These records were cross-referenced against the union reported information published in the Industrial Information Index: A Guide to Unions, Employers Groups and the Industrial Relations Industry.³⁷ A final membership figure for the dissolved union was also obtained, where possible, from the records of the Industrial Registrars or the affiliation records of the VTHC and the TTLC, or a supplementary source such as the ACTU's financial affiliation lists.

The aggregate data on union dissolutions shows that they made a significant contribution to the compositional change that denoted the period, with 52 unions dissolved between 1969 and 1985. Just over half of these were blue-collar unions, 15 of which had represented plant and machine operators whilst another 10 had represented tradesmen. The two most dissolution prone industries were also traditional blue-collar strongholds, namely transport and storage (10) – rail and air transport in particular – and manufacturing (9). Finally, Table 3 reveals that the majority of these dissolved unions were extremely small, with approximately 80 per cent of the 43 unions for which membership data was available reportedly having a membership of less than 500 members. In addition to being extremely small, 18 of the 38 dissolved unions for which membership trend data was available had also suffered from declining membership prior to their dissolution. In summary, many of the unions dissolved between 1969 and 1985 were tiny blue-collar unions representing both skilled and semi-skilled workers in the traditional industries of manufacturing, rail and aviation.

Table 3: Trade Union Membership of Dissolved Unions, 1969–85

Union Membership	1969–85
Less than 100	18
100–499	16
500–999	6
1000 or greater	3
Unknown	9
Total	52

A number of explanations can be given for the demise of these unions. The first relates to union membership. Whilst Howard, Rimmer and Rawson assert that the arbitral system afforded Australian unions sufficient legal protection to ensure their continued survival irrespective of their size, this argument is not supported by the data in Table 3.³⁸ The majority of unions that dissolved between 1969 and 1985 were extremely small, and in all likelihood lacked the resources necessary in order to function effectively and survive. Australian unions were not 'financially well off' during this period, with Wielgosz finding that 'both in aggregate terms and on a per capita basis, they lag[ged] behind their counterparts in other industrialized countries'.³⁹ But was this especially true of the unions that dissolved?

Unfortunately, data on the financial position of these unions is restricted to the 17 unions that dissolved in NSW. Nevertheless, this data reveals that a significant proportion of these unions were in financial difficulty. In 11 of the 17 cases, union expenditure equalled or exceeded income in more than 40 per cent of the financial returns lodged by the unions between 1965 and their dissolution. Fifteen of the unions also had less than $5,000 in reserve at the time of their last financial return.⁴⁰ The small size of these unions failed to provide them with the financial resources they needed to survive. This situation was exacerbated not only by membership losses in the years preceding their demise, but also by the inflationary economy of the 1970s and the costs of collective bargaining between the Metal Trades Case in 1967 and the Wage Indexation Case in 1975. Confronted with these circumstances, unions such as the state-based West Australian Gold Mining Clerks Association (1971) and the federally-registered Federated Coopers of Australia (1977), perished.

The 'smallness' of the unions that dissolved between 1969 and 1985 made their continued operation tenuous, but it was not the only factor that contributed to their demise. Other factors emerge when one examines the industries most prone to dissolutions – manufacturing, rail and aviation. What emerges is a complex picture of industry decline, technological change, and to a lesser extent union rivalry.

In the manufacturing sector, the nine dissolutions between 1969 and 1985 can best be attributed to industry decline. Recession, tariff cuts, and the loss of traditional markets all contributed to a decline in the number of manufacturing establishments in operation, and the loss of jobs, with the number of employees falling by 17.5 per cent from 1.4 million to 1.1 million.⁴¹ This decline contributed to the dissolution of unions in manufacturing and associated occupational groups such as tradesmen and plant and machine operators, and drivers. These groups accounted for 92 per cent of the blue-collar unions dissolved in this period. Technological change also caused job losses in manufacturing, especially amongst tradesmen who 'suddenly found their skills to be obsolete'.⁴² It is likely that manufacturing unions such as the state-based Broom Workers Union of New South Wales (deregistered in 1971) and the Federated Coopers of Australia (deregistered in 1977) dissolved, at least in part, due to technological redundancy. The dissolution of craft-based unions because of technological change spread into many industries at this time, resulting in the dissolution of tiny skilled unions such as the state-registered Merchant Tailors Cutters Association of New South Wales (1974) and the federally-registered Ship-Joiners Society of Australia (1975).

Other dissolutions in the manufacturing sector (and others) were likely to be the product of unofficial absorptions, that is, situations where members were transferred from one union to another with more general rules, without an official amalgamation ballot being conducted. Jadeja provides a number of possible examples in the federal system. It is thought that the members of the Sugar Works Employees Union of Australia (450 members when last reported), which officially deregistered in 1977, were absorbed by the Australian Workers Union. Similarly, Jadeja suggests that the membership of the Baking Trade Employees Federation of Australia (1460 members when last reported), which officially deregistered in 1981, was unofficially absorbed by the relatively new Bakery Employees and Salesmens Federation of Australia, which had gained registration in 1979.⁴³

In the rail industry, unions such as the state-based Queensland Railway Guards, Shunters and Conductors Association (1974) and the Queensland Railway Signalmens Union of Employees (1982) dissolved due to industry decline, and changes in manning levels and work practices caused by technological change. In Victoria, for example, post-World War II rail struggled to compete with private industry, and in the case of both commuters and the transportation of freight, alternative forms of transport—road and air—took the place of rail. This fall in demand resulted in the closure of services and the loss of jobs. These job losses were further intensified by changes in technology and work practices. The introduction of computerised traffic control systems, two-crew trains (eliminating conductors), mechanical track maintenance, and automatic ticket vending all eliminated jobs, and in turn the disappearance of the 'specialised' unions who represented the workers who performed them.⁴⁴

In contrast to rail, union dissolutions in aviation were, at least in two of the four instances, the result of union politics. These two cases concerned the dissolution of two federal unions, namely the Australian Air Pilots Association (AAPA) in 1970, and the Air Pilots Guild of Australia (APGA) in 1979.⁴⁵ In both cases, the unregistered Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP) played a central role. In the first case, the AAPA failed to recover from a mass resignation of members in 1959, who had resigned in order to form the AFAP. In the latter case, that of the APGA, a union formed by a breakaway group from the AFAP, and registered in 1970, the union was deregistered as a direct result of a series of challenges to its registration by the AFAP. From the outset, the AFAP objected to the registration of the APGA. AFAP officials also attempted to infiltrate the APGA by funding its own members to join the rival union with the aim of building their numbers within its ranks to the point at which, in accordance with the APGA's rules, they could achieve the majority needed in a membership vote to dissolve the union. Despite fending off this attack, the 1970s proved difficult for the APGA. The union failed to attract disenchanted members away from AFAP, and did not have the resources to undertake significant recruitment. Its progress was also inhibited by its inability to achieve an award in its own right, as employers refused to deal with any union other than the AFAP, which represented the majority of pilots. Because of these failures the APGA decided to merge with the Transport Workers Union of Australia (TWU). This action prompted the AFAP to challenge the registration of the Guild for a second time, as it feared having to compete with a union of the industrial strength of the TWU. The AFAP was successful in this challenge and the APGA was deregistered for failing to 'provide for the levying and collection of subscriptions, fees or penalties from members of the Guild',⁴⁶ or to keep an accurate register of members.

Mergers

According to Waddington 'a merger is the combination of two or more unions to form a single union';⁴⁷ an event that he suggests may occur either as an acquisition, in which a larger union absorbs a smaller one, or as an amalgamation, in which a new union is formed from the combination of two similarly sized pre-merger organisations. In the Australian context, a merger, whilst still considered to be an act of combination between two or more unions, was deemed to have taken place when, in accordance with the relevant statutes in the arbitral states, there was a formally recorded legal combination of unions. In the non-arbitral states, the affiliation records of the VTHC and the TTLC were relied upon in identifying mergers. As to the difference between merger types, this was determined largely by size as dictated by the literature, with an amalgamation deemed to involve participants of a similar size (the second participant having a membership of 10 per cent or greater than that of the largest merger participant), while an absorption involved a significantly larger union acquiring a smaller union (the smaller union having a membership less than 10 per cent that of the acquiring union).⁴⁸

Merger data was primarily obtained from the records of the various Industrial Registrars (and the Tasmanian Industrial Commission), which supplied both the names of the unions involved and the date on which each merger was legally consummated. These records were supplemented by the affiliation records of the VTHC and the TTLC. Membership data was also collected for each of the merger participants, where possible, to enable the mergers to be categorised as either amalgamations or absorptions. These figures were drawn from multiple sources: the figures used by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to determine balloting requirements; the records of the Industrial Registrars; and the affiliation records of the ACTU and the VTHC. Whilst exhaustive efforts were made to obtain similar data for unions operating in South Australia and Tasmania, it proved difficult to obtain.

Table 1 shows that 40 mergers took place between 1969 and 1985. With seven of these mergers involving more than two unions, in effect they reduced the number of unions in operation in Australia by 49. Table 4 reveals that these mergers were equally divided between amalgamations and absorptions, whilst Table 5 shows that most occurred at the state level. On closer examination, it was found that the majority of merger participants were blue-collar unions (30 amalgamating unions; 19 acquiring unions; 17 absorbed unions) representing workers in the manufacturing sector (10 amalgamating unions; 9 acquiring unions; 21 absorbed unions).

Table 4: Union Mergers by Type, 1969–85

	1969–85
Amalgamation	15
Absorptions	20
Mixed	3
Unknown¹	2
Total	40

1. Membership figures were unavailable for at least one merger participant.

Table 5: Mergers by the Combined Jurisdictions of Participants, 1969–85

	1969–85
Federal & Federal	8
Federal & State	1
Federal State Branch & State	11
Federal State Branch & Federal State Branch	2
State & State	18
Total	40

Of all the structural events for which data was collected, there is little doubt that the merger has attracted the most attention from trade union scholars in Australia, with it regarded as the principal mechanism for change (or the lack of it). The results presented in Table 5 show a higher incidence of mergers amongst state unions than federal unions. The low incidence of federal mergers has, as noted earlier, attracted considerable attention in the Australian literature, which attributes it to legal obstacles and the disincentives of union politics and conservatism.⁴⁹ However, to what do we attribute the mergers amongst state unions? Whilst the legal obstacles known to hinder federal union mergers did not inhibit state union mergers, what factors drove these unions, many of which represented blue-collar workers in manufacturing, to set aside issues of union politics in order to merge?

Two explanations can be offered for these mergers. First, changes to workforce composition were an underlying factor in many mergers. Just as growth in the white-collar workforce between 1969 and 1985 period prompted an increase in the number of white-collar unions, the relative contraction of the blue-collar workforce was accompanied by a decline in the number of blue-collar unions. While this decline is in part reflected in the pattern of union dissolutions, it is also reflected in mergers. Blue-collar unions, many of them organising dying crafts, accounted for 30 of the 39 amalgamating unions and 37 of the 47 unions involved in absorptions.

Several factors contributed to the relative decline in the blue-collar workforce. As was noted earlier, one of the most significant factors was the decline of the manufacturing sector, which in the 1970s and 1980s experienced a fall in both the number of establishments and the size of its workforce. This shrinking membership base put particular pressure on unions representing the occupational groups such as tradesmen, plant and machine operators, and drivers, and labourers, traditionally associated with manufacturing. These problems were further compounded by technological change. Increased computerisation and automation of manufacturing processes not only reduced the size of the workforce, but also abolished traditional craft skills. Mergers were an alternative to dissolution for unions representing workers whose skills were being made redundant by technology, or who were feeling the ill-effects of the contraction of the manufacturing sector. The mergers of the state-based Coastal bbbbrated Water and Cordial Manufacturers Employees Union, Western Australia (250 members) and the Western Australian Chemical and Allied Industrial Union of Workers (700 members) with the WA branch of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union in 1974, and combination of two federal unions in the Federated Felt Hatting and Allied Trades Employees Union of Australia (97 members) and the Australian Textile Workers Union in 1984, are both examples of small manufacturing unions which chose to merge rather than perish when confronted by these conditions.

Whilst manufacturing was the primary source of mergers amongst craft unions, other non-manufacturing craft unions exhibited the same tendency. In the building trades, for example, two small Queensland craft unions merged in 1973 to form the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Joiners and Bricklayers, Queensland. In New South Wales, the largest craft union in the industry, the New South Wales branch of the Building Workers Industrial Union of Australia (BWIU), also combined with several small state-based craft unions, such as the Operative Stonemasons Society of the State of New South Wales. In printing, new technology in the 1960s and 1970s forced traditional craft rivals, the Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia (PKIU) and the Amalgamated Printing Trades Employees Union of Australia (APTEUA) to form the Printing and Kindred Industries Union (PKIU) in 1966. And in the metals trades, the federal body of the AMWU consolidated its position by absorbing small federal unions such as the Federated Shipwrights and Ship Constructors Association of Australia in 1976, and the Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Australia in 1983, a strategy replicated amongst metal unions at the state level.

The second explanation for the mergers that took place between 1969 and 1985 is one of union size, with a number of mergers instigated by unions with a desire for growth. This was evident in the mergers of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia (FMWU) which involved itself in a series of mergers during the period with the intention of expanding its coverage by entering into new jurisdictions. This expansion often took place at the state level, and involved mergers with small state unions, which could not be replicated at the federal level. Between 1973 and 1982, both the federal body of the FMWU and its state branches pursued an intentional programme of expansion via amalgamation. This was first spelt out by Ray Gietzelt in 1956, who in his first report as General Secretary made growth the agenda, setting a two-year goal to double the union's membership. A series of mergers followed during the 1970s and early 1980s, which saw the FMWU, largely through its state branches in Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia in particular, amalgamate with or absorb a diverse mix of unions, such as the WA Chemical and Allied Industrial Union of Workers and the Leather Canvas and Allied Trades Federation, Queensland Union of Employees, which it considered 'unable to adequately protect the industrial interests of their members' or 'receptive to a proposition for amalgamation'.⁵⁰

In summary, whilst institutional factors such as the law and union politics restricted merger activity amongst federal unions between 1969 and 1985, these obstacles did not operate equally at the state level. Many state-based craft unions, especially in manufacturing, opted to merge in light of a shrinking membership base produced, at least in part, by industry decline, and technological redundancy. Other more ambitious unions chose to merge in order to grow and represent their whole industry.

Breakaways

The final structural event is the union breakaway. Waddington defines a breakaway as a 'section of a union which secedes to become an independent organisation without the sanction of the executive of the original union'.⁵¹ In the Australian context, this definition proves to be overly restrictive. For whilst it allows for instances such as Moore v. Doyle (1969),⁵² whereby a breakaway occurs when a state branch chooses to split from their federal body without its consent for the purposes of independently representing the interests of its members solely within its state jurisdiction, it fails to make provision for those breakaways that have been prevented by the application of conveniently belong provisions from gaining registration, and therefore in many cases operating, as an independent organisation. It fails to allow for those breakaways where a group of workers secede from one union and join another in order to maintain registration, and access to the award system. The unique legal nature of the federated Australian system of union registration requires, therefore, that a breakaway be deemed to have occurred when a section of a union secedes, without the sanction of the executive of the original union, to become either an independent organisation or to merge with another.⁵³

As was the case in Waddington's series of studies, the data series covering breakaways is the most open to question.⁵⁴ Whilst Waddington was able to access information pertaining to the occurrence of union breakaways from the same source from which he obtained records of registration, deregistration, and merger, namely the Employment Department, it was not possible, in the Australian context, to collect the necessary information from the registration records of the Industrial Registrars, nor the affiliation records of the VTHC or TTLC. It was found that the occurrence of a union breakaway, as opposed to that of the other structural events, was not recorded in the same manner, or by the same institutions, as it is not a structural event contemplated by legislation in Australia.

Information on the occurrence of union breakaways was collected from three principal sources. First, a review of the Australian literature was conducted in order to find existing studies on union breakaways. Second, a review of published union histories was conducted to identify incidence of union breakaways. Third, Australian case law was searched for cases in which the precedent established in Moore v. Doyle was invoked. These principal sources were supplemented by the knowledge of both those interviewed in relation to union mergers between 1986 and 1996 as part of a larger study of structural events in the Australian trade union movement, and those in the Industrial Registry Offices.⁵⁵

Only 13 union breakaways were found between 1969 and 1985, resulting in the addition of just 9 independent organisations. Occurring at an average of less than one per year, these breakaways were isolated incidents. Of the four structural events examined in this study, union breakaways had the least impact on the structure of Australian trade unions.

The small number of union breakaways prompts two questions: What factors explain the low number of union breakaways in Australia between 1969 and 1985? And given these factors, to what do we attribute the 13 breakaways that did occur? Two general explanations exist for the low number of breakaways. The first concerns the political costs of a breakaway. A union breakaway is indicative of an irreconcilable breakdown in internal union relations, and as such it is fundamentally a political event that represents the most extreme form of intra-union conflict. In most instances, unions attempt to manage factional battles either through the ballot box or by other means. In few cases do either of the factions in dispute willingly walk away from the other side, and the large, potential power base in which they are combined to operate as a smaller, potentially less powerful organisation. Concrete losses accrue to smaller organisations—including reduced voting power in ACTU and Australian Labor Party (ALP) ballots.

Second, the level of breakaway activity in Australia, at least in the arbitral jurisdictions, has been severely restricted by 'conveniently belong' provisions in the conciliation and arbitration acts. These provisions were designed to minimise duplication of union coverage and conflict over 'body snatching'. As noted above, these provisions allowed both registered unions and employers to object to an application for registration of a new union on the grounds that an organisation to which the members of the association might conveniently belong has already been registered. The prospect of not being able to gain registration (and therefore a tribunal award) due to objections by the breakaway group's parent union (which neither wishes to lose members nor face competition from a rival union) has tended to curb serious consideration of secession.

Given these general barriers, what factors explain the 13 breakaways that did occur between 1969 and 1985? The first explanatory factor is related to the fact that 54 per cent, or seven of the breakaways, took the form of a state branch seceding from a federal union. A breakdown in federal-state relations was, therefore, the major cause of union breakaways. The breakaways of the New South Wales Branch of the Transport Workers Union of Australia (TWU) in 1969, the NSW branch of the Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia in 1977, and the Queensland branch of the Royal Australian Nursing Federation in 1982, to name just a few, illustrate this. In each case, a state branch seceded from the federal union with which it was at war.

The most infamous breakaway in this period caused the Moore v. Doyle case.⁵⁶ In this case, the federal body of the TWU attempted to prevent the NSW branch of the union, which was also registered in the state jurisdiction, from changing its rules to enrol lorry owner-drivers, as this was not allowed under the rules of the federal organisation. The branch argued that as a state-registered union it had a separate legal personality and was beyond the control of the federal union. Litigation on this point was finally settled by the Industrial Court in 1969 which upheld the argument of the NSW Branch. Unions could, it seems, have a 'dual legal personality', in both federal and state jurisdictions. This 1969 decision licensed breakaways as long as they followed the principles set down in Moore v. Doyle.⁵⁷

Despite the legal complications resulting from the decision in Moore v. Doyle, the TWU could have continued to operate as a single united union if it were not for the lack of harmony between the federal and state body. Historical accounts of the TWU suggest that the breakdown in relations between the federal and NSW unions was the result of several long-standing tensions, which had seen an 'uneasy relationship' develop between the two groups. First, the NSW union felt its 'numerical representation on Federal Council did not correspond to its contribution to federal coffers'.⁵⁸ Second, the fiery and arrogant personality of Ted Harris, who became federal secretary in 1966 is said to have alienated many of the NSW officials. The third factor contributing to tension between the two groups was the divergent political positions of the two leadership groups within the labour movement, with the federal leadership considered more left-wing than its state counterpart. These long-standing factional tensions and poor personal relations had strained to breaking point by 1969.⁵⁹

Similar issues led to other 'Moore v Doyle type' breakaways, including that of the Sydney branch of the Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia (PGEUA) in 1977. In this example, the federal union had resolved to seek a federal award, breaking the historical preference for state awards. This decision caused friction between the federal union and its Sydney branch which 'had extreme right-wing officials who did not agree with the (generally) militant approach of the union and which collaborated quite extensively with N.S.W. employers'.⁶⁰

Again, this breakaway can be attributed to ideological differences between the federal leadership and their counterparts in the Sydney branch who

for many decades ... were members of the NSW right—in both the Trades and Labour Council and the Australian Labor Party ... Right-wing trade unions looked to the ALP State Government to provide improvements and protect them from employer attacks. [The] Sydney Branch also believed the NSW right [wing of the labour movement] would protect it against any action or activity of the federal union [which was more left-wing].⁶¹

The remaining six breakaways arose from secession by sectional groups, not state branches. Lacking the state registration and awards of the seceding state branches discussed above, these breakaways faced the prospect of having to work 'outside' the industrial relations system, or of having to join another registered union. However, in most cases the internal tensions were so high that members were willing to do so in order to achieve greater sectional representation. Turner suggests that these kinds of breakaways are the product 'of a minority interest group which feels unable to exercise an influence on union decision making commensurate with its perception of its sectional status and potential strength'.⁶² The breakaway of the Victorian ambulance officers from the Hospital Employees Federation (HEF) in 1978 to form the Ambulance Employees Association of Victoria (AEAV) exemplifies this type of secession:

the reasons for the breakaway at that stage, was that the HEF was a reasonably militant union and whenever they had an issue that effected members like hospital cleaners and some others, they also let the ambulance officers go out. And especially since the ambulance officers were very powerful, and they were using them and the ambulance and paramedics felt abused. They felt that they wanted their own identity so they broke away and formed their own union, the AEAV. And fortuitously, the breakaway union got national registration.⁶³

The breakaway of a group of Victorian power station operators from the Municipal Officers Association of Australia (MOA) in 1978 offers a second example. The superior wages and conditions these highly skilled workers traditionally held in relation to other State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) workers were eroded during the 1970s. The power operators blamed the MOA for this, perceiving that it had not protected or pursued their sectional interests as well as it could have, due to its protection of other interest groups within the union. Disgruntled with the MOA's 'perceived failure to adequately pursue their sectional interests',⁶⁴ the power operators negotiated to secede and transfer their membership to the inactive Latrobe Valley branch of the Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (AIMPE) in return for autonomy.⁶⁵

Conclusion

Conventional wisdom regarding the structural development of the Australian trade union movement, premised as it is on the aggregate number of trade unions reported to be in operation, and the federal union merger as the principal mechanism for structural change, or the lack of it, is a good example of the under-analysis of the structural development of the Australian trade union movement. This article has argued that if a comprehensive explanation for the structural development of the Australian trade union movement, or any other for that matter, is to be developed, then it must be informed by a more complete picture of the structural dynamics experienced. This can be achieved by adopting Waddington's structural events approach, which examines the incidence of union formations, dissolutions, and breakaways, in addition to the incidence of union mergers. Such an approach not only contributes to our knowledge and understanding of all of the dimensions of union structural development, and their interrelationships, but in making it possible to analyse structural events at both an aggregate level, and on a case by case basis at the union level, it makes it possible to consider both environmental and politico-institutional explanations.⁶⁶

An examination of the occurrence of formations, dissolutions, mergers and breakaways in the Australian trade union movement between 1969 and 1985, reveals that the period was not one of structural rigidity as previously thought. The protection afforded Australian unions by the arbitral system was not enough to ensure the continued survival of all unions, nor did it obstruct the formation and registration of new unions, at least not in new and emerging sectors of the economy. The assumption that the union merger is always the principal mechanism for change, or the lack of it, in trade union structure, was also found to be a fallacy, with union formations and union dissolutions both found to outnumber the incidence of mergers during this period. Rather than being a period of structural rigidity, the period between 1969 and 1985, was instead found to be one of significant change. Whilst the aggregate number of trade unions in operation remained steady, the composition of the Australian trade union movement changed dramatically, as a result of significant growth in the number of white-collar trade unions, and the death or amalgamation of many traditional blue-collar unions. These events caused a 'scissors effect' in which the formation of new white-collar unions acted to replace the blue-collar unions that were disappearing.

The expansion of the services sector and the increase in the number of white-collar professionals associated with it provided the basis for growth in white-collar unionism and the number of white-collar unions. Yet the expansion of the white-collar workforce would have had little effect, were it not for the growing union consciousness of these workers, with which it coincided. Confronted with industry reforms which threatened job security and career structures, and the erosion of their terms and conditions of employment, professionals in the higher education, education and banking and finance sectors no longer felt comfortable with the paternalistic, and sometimes contemptuous attitudes of their employers. As was the case with their blue-collar counterparts, the 'proletarianisation' of the white-collar workforce saw them seek recognition in the determination of salaries and conditions, and to register as trade unions. In most cases, these 'formations' denoted a shift in the 'unionateness' of existing organisations, with professional workers seeking to register their existing 'staff associations' as 'proper' trade unions.

Whilst the expansion of the white-collar workforce provided the basis for the union formations that took place between 1969 and 1985, the contraction of the blue-collar workforce also contributed to the dissolution and merger of many blue-collar unions. Industry decline and technological change in the traditional union strongholds of rail and manufacturing resulted in membership losses for many unions. With a great many of the unions organising in these sectors already small in size, and without significant financial resources, these unions found their very existence under threat; a situation further compounded by the onset of a resource-hungry collective bargaining process in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some folded, whilst others, such as the Wool and Basil Workers Federation of Australia, opted to merge rather than perish.

Kerrie Saville (née Hose) is a lecturer in Human Resource Management, School of Management and Marketing at Deakin University, Burwood in Victoria. In 2006 she was awarded a PhD for her thesis: Structural change in the Australian Trade Union Movement: 1969–1996. Her current research interests include trade union structure, the organising of professional sportspeople, and temporary skilled migration.
<kerrie.saville@deakin.edu.au>

Endnotes

^*� The author wishes to thank Professor Malcolm Rimmer for his advice on an earlier version of this work, and the two anonymous journal reviewers, whose comments aided in the improvement of this article. The author's reworking for the Australian context of Waddington's definition is described in detail in her thesis: Kerrie Hose, Structural change in the Australian Trade Union movement: 1969–1996, unpublished PhD thesis, Deakin University, 2005.

^1.� Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat no. 6323.0, Trade Union Statistics, Australia, various.

^2.� W. Howard, 'Australian trade unions in the context of union theory', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 19, no. 3, 1977, pp. 255–273.

^3.� See for example, W. Creighton, W. Ford and R. Mitchell, Labour Law: Text and Materials (2^nd edn), The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1993; P. Gahan, 'Did arbitration make for dependent unionism? Evidence from historical case studies', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, no. 2, 1996, pp. 648–698.

^4.� See for example, G. Chaison, Union Mergers in Hard Times: The View From Five Countries, ILR Press, Ithaca, 1996; G. Griffin, 'Changing trade union structure', in B. Dabscheck, G. Griffin, and J. Teicher (eds), Contemporary Industrial Relations: Readings, Longman Cheshire, Sydney, 1992, pp. 211–222.

^5.� G. Griffin, 'White-collar unionism 1969 to 1981: some determinants of growth', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 25, no. 1, 1983, pp. 26–37; R. Lansbury, 'The growth and unionization of white-collar workers in Australia: some recent trends', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 19, no. 1, 1977, pp. 34–49; D. Rawson, 'A note on manual and non-manual union membership in Australia', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 16, no. 4, 1974, pp. 394–397; H. Gill and V. Griffin, 'The fetish of order: reform in Australian union structure', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 3, 1981, pp. 362–382; J. Hocking, Union Amalgamations: A Journey from Mythology to Reality, Industrial Relations Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW, 1990; K. Spooner, The Rationale for Trade Union Amalgamations: The Case of New South Wales Trade Unions 1964–1983, MCom thesis, University of New South Wales, 1984.

^6.� Howard, 'Australian trade unions in the context of union theory', p. 264.

^7.� M. Rimmer, 'Long-term structural change in Australian trade unionism', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 3, 1981, pp. 323–344; G. Griffin and V. Scarcebrook, 'The dependency theory of trade unionism and the role of the Industrial Registrar', Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol. 16, no. 1, 1990, pp. 21–31.

^8.� Rimmer, 'Long-term structural change in Australian trade unionism'.

^9.� Griffin and Scarcebrook, 'The dependency theory of trade unionism', p. 30.

^10.� Rimmer, 'Long-term structural change in Australian trade unionism'.

^11.� J. Isaac and G. Ford, 'Part II: Introduction' in J. Isaac & G. Ford (eds), Australian Labour Relations: Readings, 2^nd edn, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1971, p. 100.

^12.� S. Deery, 'Trade union amalgamations and government policy in Australia', Australian Bulletin of Labor, vol. 9, no. 3, 1983, pp. 190–207; D. Khoury, 'The federal law relating to union amalgamation in Australia: help or hindrance?', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 20, no. 1, 1978, pp. 56–66.

^13.� Rimmer, 'Long-term structural change in Australian trade unionism', p. 337.

^14.� Gill and Griffin, 'The fetish of order: Reform in Australian union structure'; Hocking, Union Amalgamations; Spooner, The Rationale for Trade Union Amalgamations.

^15.� Griffin, 'White-collar unionism 1969 to 1981'; Lansbury, 'The growth and unionization of white-collar workers in Australia: some recent trends'; Rawson, 'A note on manual and non-manual union membership in Australia'.

^16.� J. Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining: The Merger Process and British Trade Union Structural Development 1892–1987, Mansell Publishing, London, 1995.

^17.� For an in-depth account of the construction of this longitudinal database see K. Hose, 'Structural change in Australian trade unionism, 1969–1996: a structural events approach', Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol. 29, no. 2, 2003, pp. 177–193.

^18.� Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining, p. 11.

^19.� Author's reworking for the Australian context of Waddington's definition described in detail in her thesis: Kerrie Hose, Structural change in the Australian Trade Union movement: 1969–1996, unpublished PhD thesis, Deakin University, 2005.

^20.�Victorian Trades Hall Council Official Trade Union Directory and Digest, various; Tasmanian Trades and Labor Council Directory and Digest, various.

^21.� Griffin, 'White-collar unionism 1969 to 1981'.

^22.�Federated Clerks' Union of Australia v. Altona Petrochemical co. Pty Ltd (1973) 150 Commonwealth Arbitration Reports (CAR) 387.

^23.� Griffin, 'White-collar unionism 1969 to 1981'; Lansbury, 'The growth and unionization of white-collar workers in Australia'

^24.� R. Crompton and G. Jones, White-collar Proletariat: Deskilling and Gender in Clerical Work, Macmillan, London, 1984; M. Burgmann, 'Australian trade unionism in 1983', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 26, no. 1, 1984, pp. 91–98.

^25.� The Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations and the Council of Australian Government Employee Organisations (CAGEO) merged with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) in 1979 and 1981 respectively. See G. Griffin and V. Giuca, 'One union peak council: the merger of ACSPA and CAGEO with the ACTU', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 28, no. 4, 1986, pp. 483–503.

^26.� P. Bentley, 'Australian trade unionism 1969–70', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 12, no. 3, 1970, pp. 377–386; Burgmann, 'Australian trade unionism in 1983'; Griffin, 'White-collar unionism 1969 to 1981'; Lansbury, 'The growth and unionization of white-collar workers in Australia'; J. Hill, From Subservience to Strike: Industrial Relations in the Banking Industry, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1982; G. Manning and H. Manning, Worth Fighting For: Work and Industrial Relations in the Banking Industry in South Australia, Australian Bank Employees Union, South Australia and Northern Territory Branch, Adelaide, 1989; K. White, Barney: The Story of Rees D. Williams, Architect of the White-Collar Union Movement, Hargreen Publishing Company in conjunction with the Australian Bank Employees Unions, Melbourne, 1989; K. White, An Open Account: 72 Years of Unionism in the State Bank of Victoria, Finance Sector Union, Melbourne, 1992; B. Carr, 'Australian trade unionism in 1979', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 22, no. 1, 1980, pp. 98–103.

^27.� J. O'Brien, 'The collective organisation of Australian academic staff: 1949–1983', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 35, no. 2, 1993, p. 217.

^28.� L. Martin, Report of the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1964; O'Brien, 'The collective organisation of Australian academic staff'.

^29.� Post-secondary education was the subject of review in a number of reports. See Committee to Advise on the Establishment of a Fourth University for Victoria, Report of the Victorian Fourth University Committee, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1971; Australian Universities Commission, Fifth Report of the Australian Universities Commission, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, May 1972; Western Australian Post Secondary Education Commission, Post Secondary Education in Western Australia: Report of the Committee on Post-Secondary Education, Government Printer, Perth, 1976; Committee of Enquiry into Post Secondary Education in South Australia, Post Secondary Education in South Australia: Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Post Secondary Education in South Australia, Government Printer, Adelaide, 1979; J. Hearn, 'Australian trade unionism in 1981', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 24, no. 1, 1982, pp. 99–107.

^30.� H. Spence, The Only Abiding Solution: A History of the Teachers' (Girls' Schools) Award. Victorian Independent Education Union, Melbourne, 1997.

^31.� G. Gleghorn, Life in General: A Short History of Organised Insurance Workers in Australia, Australian Insurance Employees Union, Richmond, 1991, p.55.

^32.�Ibid., p. 80.

^33.�Federated State School Teachers' Association of Australia v. Victoria (1929) 41 Commonwealth Law Reports (CLR) 569.

^34.�R. v. Coldham; Ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union (1983) 153 CLR. 297.

^35.� Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining, p. 10.

^36.� Hose, Structural change in the Australian Trade Union movement: 1969–1996.

^37.� Information Australia – Margaret Gee Media Group, Industrial Relations Index: A Guide to Unions, Employer Groups and the Industrial Relations Industry, Information Australia Group, Melbourne, various.

^38.� Howard, 'Australian trade unions in the context of union theory'; Rimmer, 'Long-term structural change in Australian trade unionism'; D. Rawson, Unions and Unionists in Australia, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1978.

^39.� J. Wielgosz, 'Financial resources of Australian trade unions', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 16, no. 4, 1974, p. 330.

^40.�Report of the Industrial Registrar under the Trade Union Act 1881 (NSW), Government Printer, Sydney, various dates.

^41.� Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1980; J. Hagan, The History of the A.C.T.U., Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1981.

^42.� Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia, Report, p. 389; Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry, Policies for Development of Manufacturing Industry: A Green Paper, vol. 1, AGPS, Canberra, 1975.

^43.� R. Jadeja, Parties to the Award: A Guide to the Pedigrees and Archival Resources of Federally Registered Trade Unions, Employer Associations & Their Peak Councils in Australia 1904–1994, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1994.

^44.� E. Butler-Bowden, In the Service? A History of Victorian Railways Workers and Their Union, Hyland House, South Yarra, 1991; N. De Pomeroy and R. Gilbert (eds), Men of the Footplate: One Hundred and Thirty Years of Railway Trade Unionism 1861–1991, AFULE (Vic. Div.), Melbourne, 1992; M. Hearn, Working Lives: A History of the Australian Railways Union (NSW Branch), Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1990.

^45.� R. Brooks, 'Rival unions and registration: the Australian Federation of Air Pilots and the Air Pilots Guild of Australia, 1969 to 1979', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 4, 1981, pp. 447–465.

^46.�Ibid., p. 462.

^47.� Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining, p. 9.

^48.� G. Michelson, 'Trade union mergers: a survey of the literature', Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol. 26, no. 1, 2000, pp. 93–113.

^49.� Isaac and Ford, 'Part II: Introduction'; Deery, 'Trade union amalgamations'; Khoury, 'The federal law relating to union amalgamation'.

^50.� M. Beasley, The Missos: A History of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1996, pp. 56–57. The appendix of this text provides a full list of the union's mergers for the period under review in this article.

^51.� Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining, p. 12.

^52.�Moore v. Doyle (1969) 15 Federal Law Reports (FLR) 59.

^53.� Hose, Structural change in the Australian Trade Union movement: 1969–1996.

^54.� Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining.

^55.� This article, which addresses structural change in the Australian trade union movement between 1969 and 1985, draws upon data collected as part of a larger study which considered structural change between 1969 and 1996. In the process of examining the high number of union mergers found to have occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s a series of 18 semi-structured interviews was conducted with trade union officials in 2000. The 18 officials came from 10 different union organisations, and were interviewed as they were considered to have expert knowledge of their union's past merger activity. In addition, they were selected from a range of union types (blue-collar and white-collar unions; public sector and private-sector unions; conglomerate and industry unions; individual unions and a union confederation) to ensure a range of experiences were represented. For more information on the larger study conducted, see Hose, 'Structural change in Australian trade unionism, 1969–1996: A structural events approach', and K. Saville, 'The structural events approach – a 'better' way to understand long-term change in trade union structure: the Australian story (1985–96)', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 49, no. 5, 2007, pp. 757–773.

^56.�Moore v. Doyle (1969) 15 FLR 59.

^57.� M. Bray and M. Rimmer, Delivering the Goods: A History of the Transport Workers' Union in New South Wales 1888–1986, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

^58.�Ibid., p. 230.

^59.� Bray and Rimmer, Delivering the Goods.

^60.� G. Crawford, Footprints: History of the Plumbers' Union, George Crawford, Beaumaris, Victoria, 1997.

^61.�Ibid., p. 85

^62.� H. Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1962, p. 265.

^63.� Interview with Rod Morriss Secretary of the Ambulance Section of the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union (Victorian Branch), 26/09/2000.

^64.� J. Teicher, 'Breakaway unions: An Australian case', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 11, 1986, p. 158.

^65.�Ibid.

^66.� Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining.

Content in the History Cooperative database is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the History Cooperative database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.