Cathy Brigden | Reassessing the Victorian Trades Hall 'Split' of 1967–73 | Labour History, 96

Reassessing the Victorian Trades Hall 'Split' of 1967–73

Cathy Brigden^*

The suspension of 27 unions from the Victorian Trades Hall Council (THC) from 1967 to 1973, colloquially referred to as the 'split', has long been regarded as a classic case of internal union conflict. Drawing on recent theoretical developments in the study of peak unions, this article seeks to provide a reassessment of this prevailing analysis by exploring dimensions of peak union power and purpose. Using the conceptual lens of collective union power and organisation power, the dispute between the unions and the THC leadership is re-examined. While these concepts enable more interrogation of the internal dynamics between the key participants, analysis of the dispute also locates it in the broader socio-political context of the period providing further insight into the nature of peak union power and purpose.

From the end of 1967 to mid-1973, 27 affiliates, mainly left-wing unions, were suspended from the Victorian Trades Hall Council (THC) in a dispute known as the 'split'. The THC 'split' is one of the most well known episodes in the THC's history, having been the subject of two articles, one of which, David Plowman's analysis published in this journal in 1979, was then reprinted in a book of readings on trade unions.¹ In returning attention to the 'split', this article offers a re-interpretation of this internal dispute with a reassessment of Plowman's prevailing analysis. Dimensions of peak union power emerge as central and contested issues, and are examined by drawing on recent theorising about peak union power and purpose.

From a position of chronic under-theorising and indeed scant attention, Australian industrial relations scholars and labour historians have recently made significant advances in the study of peak unions.² As Ellem and Shields have highlighted, two trajectories in the theoretical debates about peak unions have developed.³ One of these is the exploration of the multidimensional sources of peak union power and purpose while the second is the interrogation of internal power dynamics of peak unions through the conceptual lens of organisation power and collective movement power.⁴ This extended Hyman's analysis of how individual unions exercise 'power for' and 'power over' members to the peak union scale. The shift to the peak union scale requires recognition of the different power dynamics faced by peak unions, between the leadership and affiliates, between affiliates and factions, in the relationships with peak unions with which it is affiliated, as well as political parties. By coupling the insights of Flanders' analysis of 'movement' and 'organisation' with Hyman's examination of 'power for' and 'power over' union members to unravel both how and why peak union power is exerted, these dimensions of peak union power can be reconceptualised as organisation power and collective movement power.

Peak unions' particular role in promoting 'power for' affiliates and union members goes to the heart of their role in maintaining and sustaining the notion and structure of a union movement, so that peak union purpose involves the 'pursuit, mobilization and expression of collective movement power'.⁵ Recasting 'power over' as organisation power highlights the organisational nature of the contesting of power within peak unions. Their intersection is evident 'when a peak union exerts organisation power over affiliates to exert, in turn, organisation power over their members in the pursuit of collective movement power for those affiliates'.⁶ While organisation power should not be understood as an end in itself but the means through which collective movement power is advanced, it is also clear that there is ground for contestation over how and by whom organisation power is exerted and how collective movement power is envisaged, constructed and articulated.

These concepts provide insights into the internal dispute of the 'split'. What characterised the events of 1967–73, it will be seen, was a struggle for both organisation power and collective movement power between the THC leadership and the 27 so-called 'rebel unions'⁷, a power struggle centred on questions of strategy and purpose. This was reinforced during the years of the suspensions, as the 27 unions took action over issues on which the THC was either slow to act or uninterested, including both socio-political issues, such as the Vietnam War and environmental issues, and industrial matters such as the penal powers. The first section of the article begins by sketching the background to the dispute, highlighting the internal shifts in the power balance following a major leadership change in the THC. This is followed by discussion of the key stages in the dispute, with identification of the various pressures at play that shaped organisation power and collective movement power. The next section re-assesses the standard accounts of the split, in particular Plowman's dominant analysis, while the final section places the dispute in the broader socio-political context of the late 1960s and early 1970s to provide further insight into the nature of peak union power and purpose.

The THC 'split'

The events within the THC which culminated in the suspensions of such a large group of affiliates need to be understood against developments during the preceding three years, after a leadership change in 1964 following the death of the THC Secretary, Vic Stout. Aged 78, Stout had held office since 1938. In the wake of the 1955 Australian Labor Party (ALP) split, Stout had maintained a semblance of factional balance on the executive through adoption of a power-sharing approach.⁸ This came under increasing pressure from right-wing unions in the early 1960s. Predating, but almost anticipating, the death of Stout in March 1964, that power struggle was initially centred on the battle for succession, a battle in which the Right was overwhelmingly successful. The subsequent contest for the secretary's position saw an open factional battle. Despite being Assistant Secretary for 16 years, Mick Jordan found himself challenged by a left-wing candidate, Jack Wood (an organiser with the Plumbers Union), who had gained Stout's support as his successor. Jordan won the ballot and the right-wing unions' candidate secured the then vacant assistant secretary's position. The exclusion of the Left from the key decision-making bodies, the executive and the disputes committee, was extended by the end of 1964 as the Right then gained control of the two presidential positions, the executive and the elected membership of the disputes committee. The Left went from a position in which it was at least partly able to affect both organisation power and collective movement power to being excluded from positions of influence. Although fiercely challenged by the Left – throughout 1965 and 1966, Council meetings saw a flurry of divisions over votes, invariably lost by the Left – this enabled the Right to reconstruct collective movement power in a way compatible with their vision.⁹

Two issues in particular provoked substantial debate, highlighting the growing gap between the leadership and the Left. The first was over THC representation, while the second concerned the control over industrial disputes and, by extension, the legitimacy of industrial action. The arguments in both debates emphasised the importance of the degree of affiliate inclusion in the THC. It was not just being affiliated but being able to affect decision making, which went to the heart of the construction of organisation power. Arguments over representation and industrial disputes, ostensibly about decision making, were essentially debates about organisation power and its translation into collective movement power.

For many years, the representation formula (which determined the number of delegates for each affiliate and hence voting strength) had been a point of contention. Unchanged since 1915 and unchallenged since 1948,¹⁰ an unsuccessful proposal to amend the formula reignited debate about how to balance representation and participation in April 1966. With the existing formula over-representing small affiliates – given their proportion of the membership – the proposal sought to increase the representation of larger affiliates, but at the expense of smaller unions.¹¹

Control over industrial disputes increasingly confronted and frustrated the THC specifically over the activities of shop committees. Under the THC rules, affiliates were to refer disputes, particularly those involving other unions, to the disputes committee, which would determine the dispute strategy, including whether appropriately 'authorised' industrial action would be taken. With shop committees active in a number of left-wing unions, there was a propensity for 'unauthorised' industrial action to take place. Unable to exert control over shop committees, the THC leadership not only determined to increase the executive's capacity to intervene in and control all disputes, but also sought to absolve unions from supporting 'unauthorised' strikes: suggesting that the collective movement power pursued by these actions was narrowly conceived and not deserving of broader affiliate solidarity.¹² With the largest turnout in two years, the debate took place at the 'wildest [THC] meeting in years' where, in a tight vote, the rule changes were carried by 141 votes for, to 121 against.¹³

By the end of 1966, then, left-wing affiliates were confronting the perceived unfairness of the representation formula together with an ever-increasing gap between the competing industrial strategies of more militant affiliates and the THC.¹⁴ As the THC sought to increase control over affiliates, organisation power was maintained through skewed representation of unions while the Jordan leadership recast the interpretation of collective movement power increasingly narrowly. Unable to participate in the application of organisation power or contribute to the definition of collective movement power, left-wing affiliates were effectively disenfranchised from the construction of industrial strategy.

The Competing Matters of Principle

These debates over issues of union democracy and autonomy, the attempt to change the representation formula, and the rule changes, had immediate ramifications in early 1967. 'Unauthorised' stoppages were once more the trigger for THC action. The imposition of organisation power over the use of industrial action by the metal unions interfered with how those unions were seeking to gain collective movement power for members in relation to their frustration with the delayed progress of the Metal Trades Award Work Value Inquiry.¹⁵ At the 6 April Council meeting, in another close vote of 135 for and 110 against, four metal trades unions (the Amalgamated Engineering Union, Sheet Metal Workers Union, the Boilermakers and Blacksmiths, and the Metal (Moulders) Union) were suspended until January 1968, their return conditional on the unions giving a written undertaking to abide by THC rules. Secretary Jordan's indignation was evident:

Such action can only be regarded as wilful contempt for the constituted authority of Council and if permitted to continue must lead to industrial anarchy with the consequent disintegration of the Trade Union Movement in Victoria.¹⁶

The ramifications of the suspensions, namely the loss of 15 votes for the Left, were quickly felt. The THC leadership succeeded in increasing affiliation fees by 113 per cent by the slim margin of eight votes. Not only did the vote underscore the importance of the numbers that could be called upon by the Right and the Left, it was subsequently said to have 'provided the ignition charge' to the actions of the left unions.¹⁷

Disaffected unions began meeting, expressing concerns over how the THC leadership handled individual disputes, the propensity of the chairman to suspend delegates and unions, and the question of representation.¹⁸ Clearly, these were all issues involving the use of organisation power, underscoring its centrality to the dispute between these affiliates and the THC leadership. The unions developed a four-point plan and agreed to withhold affiliation fees until matters improved. By November, six months had elapsed with the parties no closer to agreement, and the disaffected unions now numbering twenty six. Plowman attributed the intransigence to the issues becoming 'matters of principle'.¹⁹ It could, of course, be argued that the matters had always been ones of principle for the unions, concerning as they did questions of union democracy and autonomy.

The overriding new matter of principle for the THC leadership became, however, the unions withholding fees, distracting attention from the actual issues in dispute. The executive determined that there would be no negotiations until the unions dropped the fee tactic.²⁰ Consequently, on 9 November 1967, the defaulting unions were formally notified that, due to their failure to pay, rule 12²¹ would be invoked in a week from which time they would be suspended from Council until affiliation fees were paid in full.²² Significantly, suspension was only from Council, not the disputes committee or tenancy in the Trades Hall. Consequently the THC disputes committee retained a degree of organisation power over the otherwise suspended unions, and the suspended unions remained part of the THC. The maintenance of the relationship is noteworthy, as discussed below. Nonetheless, the scale of the suspensions was unprecedented with immediate impact on Council: as clearly shown in 'Empty Seats in the THC', The Sun's picture of the Council Chamber the week after the suspensions took effect..²³

Cast as 'being anti-Union and a negation of the principles of Trade Unionism', the actions of the unions were described in terms of attempted (and clearly illegitimate) organisation power to gain a distorted collective movement power: 'a deliberate plan designed to gain domination of the [THC] by increasing representation in favour of bigger Unions, thereby eroding the rights of smaller Unions'.²⁴ The THC leadership's strategy was to depict the dispute as one concerning democracy, in which the THC's protection of smaller unions was imperative.²⁵ To support the argument that the unions were presenting a competing notion of collective movement power previously discounted as illegitimate, links were also drawn with the suspension of nine left-wing unions in 1948–51. Citing the 'ARU [Australian Railways Union], Tramways, Seamen, Ships' Painters, Builders' Labourers, [Meatworkers] backed up by: Painters, Liquor Trades, Clothing Trades, Blacksmiths, etc', in an article titled 'Flashback: They're At It Again', The Unionist claimed 'A number of the same unions and the same personalities were involved in the last major attempt to split the Trade Union Movement in Victoria'.²⁶ This argument sought to diminish the importance of the claims, to reduce the credibility of those concerned by painting them as those who had previously, and unsuccessfully, sought to redefine and, in the process, undermine collective movement power for the union movement. Secretary Jordan also blamed Communist influence, with this notion of a 'Communist plot' against the smaller unions emphasised in the pamphlet he endorsed in early 1968, 'A Call to Victorian Unionists', wherein he claimed '50% of the Unions involved ... have strong Communist influence ... there can be no doubt that the present anti-Union stand ... is being guided by these influences'. The effect on collective movement power was articulated:

the ringleaders in this plot have indicated their contempt for the industrial needs of the rank and file, as lack of finance must necessarily curtail the activities of the Council which operates on behalf of all Victorian Trade Unionists. The action is clearly sabotage from within and is being perpetuated by a fifth column who place their political aims and ambitions above the bread and butter issues of modern trade unionism.
THIS WHOLE OPERATION IS TO BE CONDEMNED AS A WILFUL ANTI-UNION ACTION.²⁷

The language used here, so reminiscent of the 1940s and 1950s, reflected both internal and external influences. Australian society was still affected by the Cold War environment, as were other western industrialised countries. The ongoing Vietnam War meant that Communism and the ramifications of Communist control were continually being discussed in the media. Moreover, events of the 1940s and 1950s, where unions were the sites of ideological battles for control over industrial strategy, were not so distant in the collective memories of trade union officials. Given the direct involvement of a number of union leaders in internal union struggles between Communists and Industrial Groups in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was only a short step to take to describe the current challenge in a similar fashion.²⁸

Following the suspensions, negotiations recommenced. They soon stalled with the adoption of a harder line ('pay up or be disaffiliated') by executive members in an attempt to enforce organisation power. In July 1968 the THC invoked a further dimension of organisation power over the recalcitrant affiliates: refusal to negotiate.²⁹ Although nearly a year then elapsed before there was another round of discussions, this should not suggest that there were no moves to heal the breach. Following this decision, the 'centre' group of unions emerged as another party seeking to influence the dispute. These were unions remaining in the THC that sought to exert power over both the leadership and the suspended unions to achieve reconciliation in 1968 and early 1969. Factionally, it was also quite a disparate group with 'a number of unions who could not be called "centre" by any stretch of the imagination' according to Food Preservers Secretary, Tom Ryan. The 'centre' unions included the Timber Workers Union, Wool and Basil Workers, Food Preservers Union (until it joined the suspended unions in 1972), Municipal Employees Union, Hospital Employees Federation No.1 Branch, Building Workers Industrial Union (BWIU), the Gas Employees, Rubber Workers and the Australian Workers Union.³⁰ As not all the centre group adopted a similar view of the actions of the suspended unions, pressure was put on both parties in the dispute.

Despite the centre unions remaining a minority voice, with other financial unions in late October 1968 endorsing the THC leadership's position, there were soon suggestions of this group's willingness to exert more decisive organisation power over the THC. The joint signing of a pamphlet, THC Dispute: There is a Solution, by Hubbard, Timber Workers' Secretary and Ken Carr, spokesperson for the suspended unions, also demonstrated a degree of consensus between the suspended unions and at least one of the centre unions.³¹ Although not sufficient for them to act in concert with the suspended unions, the centre unions could be regarded as being their advocates within the THC, signifying that the Council was not united. Statements by both groups reinforced the possibility of an alliance. Hubbard told the THC Executive in March 1970 that they only needed three more affiliates to join with them to produce a centre-left alliance with the suspended unions, reinforcing the continuing pressures for unity, from both the centre unions and the suspended unions. A similar situation of pressure from the centre unions arose in 1970, again when there was a negotiating vacuum. Isolation and a permanent split, therefore, were not the desire of the suspended unions, nor did other unions want it. This alliance highlighted the suspended unions' internal and external access to an additional potential source of organisation power over the THC.³²

The First Shift: The 1969 Rule Changes

The first concession came after resumption of discussions between the suspended unions and the THC in June 1969. Described as a way to 'test the bona fides' of the suspended unions, the Council representation rules were amended.³³ Twenty-nine delegations were increased: 15 suspended unions; four 'centre' unions and ten 'THC' unions. The significance of this rule change cannot be under estimated, despite the suspended unions' rejection of the new formula. The THC leaders' previously ironclad refusal even to contemplate amending the representation rules had been overcome, even if it was portrayed by the THC executive as a pressure tactic. Although they did not achieve all their demands, the suspended unions' use of organisation power, together with the influence of the centre unions, succeeded in causing change. While resolution of the dispute rested on more than just this issue, this represented an undeniable shift for the THC leadership.³⁴ Nonetheless, these changes to Council representation, while important in themselves, did not lead the way to either ongoing negotiations or an early settlement.

The death of Secretary Jordan on 5 June 1969 stalled any subsequent progress. While Assistant Secretary Ken Stone was easily elected Secretary, the election for Assistant Secretary was highly contested, with the outcome significantly shaping the relationship between the suspended unions and the new leadership. John Grenville, THC research officer, narrowly beat Morgan (ASE) by 87 to 84 votes after preferences.³⁵ This was not a popular victory as neither Stone nor the centre unions supported Grenville, who was allegedly linked with the National Civic Council (NCC).³⁶ Further, it was said that Grenville 'stepped into Jordan's role as champion of the anti-rebel cause – not through necessity as Jordan had, but through ideological conviction'.³⁷

Such leadership changes affected the degree to which the leadership and the executive could control the approach taken regarding the suspended unions, and thus the duration of the split. Cracks within the THC leadership group soon appeared. Grenville did not share Stone's interest in exploring avenues to resolve the dispute.³⁸ In addition, the polarisation within the Trades Hall was illustrated by the following view: 'The [THC] hard-liners would like to see the rebels thrown off the ... disputes committee, denying them the support of the entire Trades Hall in important strikes'.³⁹ The THC leadership, then, had to contend with internal pressure, in fact, to escalate matters and bring about a more extensive split between the antagonists.

The suspended unions were also experiencing internal conflict. In April 1970, there were reports of divisions amongst the suspended unions, with nine unions purportedly wanting to return.⁴⁰ Despite evident differences of view, they were not sufficient to propel any of the suspended unions to return. Political schisms in both the ALP and the Communist Party added to the internal conflict being experienced in the labour movement.⁴¹ The implications for unity amongst the suspended unions were seen in the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU):

After 1971 there was no single coherent alternative body on the Left to formulate policy alternatives to the [ACTU] Executive's recommendations. The different Communist parties fielded competing candidates for the same positions, and did deals with the Right to get their own men up.⁴²

This was clearly going to be a testing time for the suspended unions in maintaining a united front, which in turn required exercising a degree of organisation power over themselves in order to be able to exert concerted organisation power over the THC.

The Second Shift: The 1972 Concessions

Although maintenance of the THC hard-line persisted through much of 1971,⁴³ the year ended on a more positive note. Grenville's resignation in September led to the election of the THC's Industrial Officer Peter Nolan as Assistant Secretary. Following a pre-Christmas executive meeting that discussed delegation size 'in an attempt to overcome the four year old split within the Trade Union Movement', Stone and Nolan then tried to capitalise on this willingness to shift position to see if there was 'a way forward'.⁴⁴ Stresses within the THC were showing, reflecting the difficulties of resisting the attempts of certain affiliates to apply their own measure of organisation power: some financial unions were 'growing tired of the dispute' and were considering withholding affiliation fees. Strategic differences were appearing between Stone and some executive members, showing the limits to Stone's capacity to exert organisation power over the executive.⁴⁵

When negotiations recommenced in May 1972 the THC shifted ground, agreeing to amend the representation formula further. Unions with more than 10,000 members gained two more delegates (from four to six) and amalgamated unions retained prior delegate entitlements for up to 12 months. Nine delegations increased: four suspended unions; three 'centre' unions, and two 'THC' unions. All these unions had previously benefited from the 1969 rule changes. That some of the suspended unions and the centre unions were primarily the beneficiaries of the proposal indicated the willingness of the THC to address their demands, at least to some extent. Tactically, this reflected the understanding of Assistant Secretary Nolan that 'to his knowledge' there were 15 votes among the suspended unions for a conditional return.⁴⁶

It was felt the proposal 'would meet with a substantial measure of acceptance by the Council', even though Council had not been apprised of the position.⁴⁷ Despite continuing differences with the suspended unions, the executive was trying to satisfy both their demands and anticipate the reaction of Council. It also reflected the executive's faith that it could exert sufficient organisation power over Council for acceptance of the negotiated deal. Moreover, it was recognised that a deal might not be reached were Council kept more fully informed of the substance of the negotiations, given the possibility of greater adherence to a hard-line amongst Council delegates, amongst whom the influence of the NCC could not be discounted. The NCC's activities within the THC included 'an NCC initiated 'numbers' game to effect both Trades Hall Council and ACTU policies' as well as regular caucus meetings held by 'NCC agents in order to determine policy for Trades Hall meetings'.⁴⁸ Maintaining control over Council meant in effect quarantining (or excluding) Council from the ebb and flow of the negotiating process.

Although it was understood that the executive position represented 'a genuine attempt to settle the dispute', the ensuing four-month negotiations in 1972 failed to resolve matters.⁴⁹ The THC position was, in effect, non-negotiable. The executive had bypassed Council, anticipating opposition to the initial concessions offered, and it was felt any further movement would increase the level of opposition. While a number of the suspended unions were keen to return (and indeed the Australian Railways Union did in January 1973), others wanted all matters resolved before considering a return.⁵⁰ By this stage in the negotiations, then, the impact of organisation power was discernible in the struggle between the THC and the suspended unions as well as both groups' internal organisation power. The emphasis was essentially on representation, the consequences in term of decision-making then directly influencing collective movement power.

In April 1974, the suspended unions agreed by 13 to 9 to resume discussions with the THC over procedural matters: implementing the agreed terms and payment of outstanding affiliation fees. Despite the vote only being 59 per cent of those present and the return taking months rather than weeks, the delays mainly concerned the financial consequences for affiliates of nearly six years of arrears.⁵¹ The real return of the suspended unions was 2 August 1973 when Council accepted the credentials of 12 unions.⁵² President Chandler, in welcoming the returning affiliates, spoke of their effect on collective movement power:

the return of the Delegates will enliven the debates on this Council and will reflect the views of a much broader cross-section of the Trade Union movement ... I am certain that the industrial and political campaigns which are so necessary to the success of many of our claims will improve greatly as a result of the unity that has been re-established.

He then invited delegates to the Old Ballroom for 'a friendly glass'.⁵³

Just prior to the return, Ken Carr was reported as saying, 'that few concessions had been won, but most of the unions were of the view that nothing further would be gained by staying out of the Council'.⁵⁴ Certainly from the THC's increase in representation for large unions in May 1972 and the April 1973 meeting of the suspended unions, no further amendments to the proposal were made. This, however, has to be seen in the context of a second change to the representation formula, following the 1969 amendments. Plowman makes the point that, with this concession, the THC 'had come half way to meeting the rebels' maximum representation'.⁵⁵ Once the THC proposal was recognised as a final offer, then little more was to be gained and a pragmatic return was likely.

Rival Bodies: The Orthodox Explanation

The split has been examined in two published accounts. One is a contemporary account by Grattan and Barker, two print journalists, published in 1970 mid-way through the dispute, which includes what were necessarily suppositions about possible outcomes.⁵⁶ The second, an academic analysis by Plowman provides both a chronological description and an analysis. He constructs a story from a perspective of conflict grounded in ideologically based relationships (adopting the colloquial terms of 'the split' and the 'rebel' unions).⁵⁷ Dominating his analysis is the conflict and the ideological 'confrontation': the processes of division rather than the renegotiation of unity. Plowman, too, engages in conjecture about the longer-term implications of the dispute. While clearly the 'leitmotif' was conflict, an over-emphasis on this to the exclusion of other factors narrows the understanding of the impact of the suspensions on the THC. By locating these events in their broader historical context, however, this reassessment of the split points to continuity and the reconstruction of unity. The significance of the split lies in this, not so much in the conflict that was a constant feature of the THC.

The split was as much about the negotiation of a basis for unity as it was about division. Plowman, though not intending to focus on this, does indicate that:

Though, very early in the split, the rebels announced they would not form a rival ... THC organisation, their Trades Hall Administrative and Financial Review Committee in fact operated as one. The rebels authorised spokesmen to 'speak out on all matters of concern to the industrial interest of Victorian workers'. They decided to launch a full scale publicity campaign to achieve 'reform' of the ... THC.⁵⁸

So, on the one hand, it was a rival organisation but, on the other, it sought reform of that body to which it was opposed. The question then arises as to why, if a rival organisation, it was endeavouring to change the THC, rather than seeking to capitalise on its flaws and urging other unions to join it to make it the recognised representative of Victorian workers. That this was not the case casts doubts on the validity of the 'rival' or 'competing body' assertion.

In their analysis written during the split, Grattan and Barker adopt a similar view to Plowman, arguing that the 'emergence of a semi-structured rival organisation to the THC ... challenged the very notion that the existence of a central authority necessarily [emphasis added] promotes the interests or militancy of blue-collar workers'.⁵⁹ Given the continuing attempts by both parties to negotiate a basis for a return, this analysis cannot be supported. Certainly there were disagreements in strategy and ideology between the THC and the suspended unions, but it could also be argued that the suspended unions collectively supported the existence of a peak union articulating their interests and replicated this on an informal basis until a negotiated unity could be regained. What became clear was that the peak union must be and must be seen to be promoting the interests of workers.

Plowman uses the 'divorce' metaphor to characterise the relationship between the parties: 'Separation had been consummated in divorce [in 1968]'.⁶⁰ A more appropriate metaphor is that the split remained a separation, with neither the THC nor the suspended unions, by and large, actually desiring the complete fracturing of the THC/affiliate relationship. As Ken Carr indicated in 1970, 'there is a hesitancy to contemplate the total sundering of ties with the official trade union body'.⁶¹ Protracted as it was, the dispute demonstrated the overriding commitment of the Victorian union movement to unity and to a single co-ordinating body. While clearly that commitment could be tested and stretched beyond endurance, most of the unions failed to sever their relationship with the THC by disaffiliating.

Rather, their strategy was to reform the THC to bring about representative democracy in the THC decision-making bodies, unlike the gerrymander that, it was argued, had developed from the unchanged 1915 formula. Such internal reform would then affect the way organisation power was exercised and its playing out in collective movement power for the working class. Both symbolically and strategically, the consequence of disaffiliation being outside the THC would have only inhibited the achievement of that objective of reform, while also changing the nature of the negotiating relationship.

Importantly, the dispute was not just confined to the THC leadership and the suspended unions. The centre unions placed pressure on both sides, but in particular the THC leadership, to come to a resolution. Here the complexities of the exertion of organisation power and the factional power balance in the THC were highlighted. It confirmed that not all THC affiliates were united behind the THC leadership, and that their imposition of organisation power was not unconditionally accepted. The centre unions were not unwilling to suggest that they too may be forced to take action if the THC refused to enter into negotiations. Their role should not, though, be overstated. In his concluding comments, Plowman asserts that only the centre unions could 'bring together the main trends in the union movement and cement together a house so long divided'.⁶² This does seem to overlook the election results in the immediate post-return years where left candidates were elected in the half yearly elections.⁶³ It also presumes a stable alliance and unity amongst the centre unions, which is questionable.

The involvement of the centre unions also points to the significance of representation. This is consistent with the argument that the split concerned the role and purpose of the Trades Hall, including the appropriate basis of representation. A gerrymander was seen as inappropriate by the Left, and other, unions. Plowman (citing Grattan and Barker) presents this in a rather cynical fashion:

Representation loomed large in the conflict since the art of politics is, in part, the art of numbers ... Naturally the conflict was not presented in such crude self-interested terms, but rather the issues were 'fought out in terms of arguments about 'rights' and 'democracy' with each side's interpretation of these principles based on the needs of its own case`.⁶⁴

These comments ignore what 'having the numbers' meant in both practical as well as ideological terms. For unions along the ideological spectrum, 'having the numbers' enabled the pursuit of policies, strategies and tactics consonant with what they saw as their conception of union purpose, indeed their invocation and expression of collective movement power. It affected both the capacity to exert organisation power and construct a certain form of collective movement power. Having the numbers was only important if something could be done with those numbers – the capacity to mobilise those numbers should not be overlooked. Moreover, the comment that 'the issue was largely ideological' misunderstands the significance of ideology in this dispute.⁶⁵ It was a dispute predicated on ideology and ideological difference, translated into arguments over forms of organisation power and collective movement power, which in themselves were ideologically bounded.

Plowman concedes that there were pressures on both sides for unity: on a 'non-rational sentimental level' to go back to the 'good old days' as well as pragmatic reasons. He concludes by saying that

for a number of reasons (including the underestimation of the THC's ability to hold out so long) the rebels were never too far from the bargaining table and negotiations, in one form or another, became an established part of the Trades Hall background.⁶⁶

That proximity was not just their tactic was evident by the way the THC leadership also remained close by, often initiating negotiations (something more consistent with a separation rather than a divorce scenario). Even during periods when no formal negotiations with the suspended unions were underway, the executive's attention was directed to seeking resolution. Failure to recognise this means the THC leadership's role in the resolution of the dispute is under-explored, as indeed it is in Plowman's discussion where it appears as if it were only the suspended unions that faced increasing pressure. He argues an

important force steering the rebels back to the [THC] fold was that, contrary to the unified image their propaganda presented, the rebels formed a heterogeneous group which, as the split protracted, became increasingly difficult to hold together ... By 1971 the rebel ranks were weakened by the return ... of two unions (three more 'defections' took place before the split was healed) and by increasing conflict between the Communist parties.⁶⁷

Premature returns were in fact limited. Despite the reports of internal tension in 1970, only three unions returned prior to the April 1973 resolution. Given the obvious ideological differences within the Left, this could be seen as demonstrating considerable unity and commitment whatever fragmentation was occurring at the edges. However, it is the case that when the suspended unions decided to return, they all returned; the split was mended. Again, an awareness of the internal tensions experienced by the suspended unions needs to be matched with an appreciation of the tensions the leadership group was also having to manage, which included relations with both the centre unions and Council.

Finally, in depicting the return of the suspended unions as 'capitulation', Plowman questions what was achieved by the split, concluding that this was an 'equivocal truce' in which little was achieved. For Plowman, the failure to deal with outstanding issues meant '[r]eunion ... has only been maintained at the expense of Council prevarication'.⁶⁸ Clearly, one person's pragmatism can be another's capitulation; such assessments are continually made in industrial relations. Judgements frequently have to be made as to when to hold out and when to reach a settlement. As we have seen, the suspended unions achieved two changes in the representation formula, first in 1969 and again in 1972. This meant they had in fact caused the THC to shift ground, not just once but twice, on a fundamental issue over which the leadership had held firm for decades. Although falling short of the desired solution (which might appropriately be viewed as an ambit claim), the suspended unions had nevertheless exerted considerable organisation power over the THC leadership.

Contextualising the Split

When placing this dispute in its broader political context, it should not be derisively described as 'merely' an ideological struggle, as if this were inappropriate, improper or illegitimate. In keeping with the spirit of the times that saw the questioning of authority and control, there was a logic to the struggle reflecting other struggles. The suspended unions sustained their commitment to inter-union co-operation throughout the period of estrangement from the THC. Just as the suspended unions argued that the THC should pursue collective movement power for union members and the broader community, they modelled this behaviour themselves. Their actions reinforced the importance of unity to these unions in Victoria, as they worked closely together on a wide range of industrial and political issues. That this took a more formal form underpinned the commitment to inter-union co-operation, together with a commitment to organisation amongst these unions. This gave them some cohesion in action, enabling them to more effectively present a united front, something important if we see this as a competing vision of collective movement power. By acting together, it also meant that these unions were willing to accept exertion of organisation power, albeit in a smaller forum and amongst unions more factionally sympathetic to each other.

For all the disunity and conflict experienced during the split, this was a dispute that was resolved. The THC and the suspended unions did come to an agreement, those suspended did again take their seats on the Council, and change was instituted. The challenge to the leadership's imposition of organisation power was successful, even if the suspended unions did not gain all they desired. The nature of organisation power changed, not the least arising from the Left's electoral wins in the first half-yearly elections after their return. Victorian unions remained committed to a peak body. The THC leadership, despite periods of refusal, did negotiate to end the dispute; the suspended unions did agree in the end to terms that fell below their claims, and the actions of the centre unions reinforced the importance of a united house of labour. That the THC should remain as the forum for inter-union co-operation was, in fact, a view common to most.

A broader point can also be made about the relations between unions and the THC. No affiliates remained permanently estranged from the THC. The Tramways Union, which did disaffiliate, later re-affiliated. Major unions were, and desired to be, in the union fold. So how individual unions themselves envisage the THC, in terms of their own participation, was important: the question of the role played by the THC as interpreted by affiliates was not just an abstract concept, not when the THC enabled affiliates to exert organisation power collectively as well as construct collective movement power. For unions to be in the fold, however, they had to be able to affect the direction of the union movement, not merely have that imposed upon them.

The impact of the external environment needs consideration, along with debates about the purpose of the THC and at its essence, collective movement power. Was it to be a role consistent with right unions' desire for unions to eschew politics, or the left unions' view that politics was unable to be disentangled from unionism? This was seen in the penal powers dispute, as well as support for issues such as protests against the Vietnam War.

The penal powers industrial campaign revealed the differing industrial and political strategies amongst Victorian unions, emphasising the differences of collective movement power and the impact on the nature of industrial campaigns:

To many Left unions, the very presence of penal sanctions threatened the right to strike and their way of conducting their own business. To many Right unions, penal powers were a remote threat, and to the extent that they prevented strikes that might involve their own members, perhaps no bad thing.⁶⁹

Illustrating the Left's view, Tramways Union Secretary Clarrie O'Shea argued 'it is a matter of taking up the struggle [over the penal powers] on a proper class basis to win a better way of life'.⁷⁰

For the THC, however, it was again a case of being confronted by 'unauthorised' stoppages and, as it saw, challenges to its exercise of organisation power. Extensive industrial action, including a 24-hour national stoppage in the metal industry, and increasing fines led the metal unions, whose actions were then endorsed by the ACTU, to refuse to pay any fines and legal costs. Such developments were not confined to the metal industry, as shown by the history of disputation and use of penal powers in the tramways. Continued refusal to pay the fines by the Tramways Union culminated in the gaoling of O'Shea for contempt of court for his behaviour before the Industrial Court in May 1969.⁷¹

Not surprisingly, the issue of the penal powers, together with the gaoling of O'Shea, further demonstrated the distance between the suspended unions and the THC while explicitly highlighting the sharply contrasting views of collective movement power. In this case, the suspended unions, fighting for one of their own as well as the principle of taking industrial action, proved to be a better gauge of rank-and-file feeling. The rally, organised by the suspended unions for the morning of O'Shea's court appearance, saw about 5,000 people decide on a 24-hour stoppage if any 'punitive action' was taken and then march to the Industrial Court.⁷² Such resoluteness was in contrast to the THC's equivocation. Any support by the THC leadership was tempered by the spectre of 'unauthorised' action. This led to a heated Council meeting on the night of O'Shea's gaoling, which, while indicating the opposition to the penal provisions, 'deplored' unauthorised stoppages without the authority of the trade union movement. Once again, the issue of organisation power was paramount.⁷³ Not surprisingly, other sections of the Victorian union movement were not so ambivalent, with two extensive 24-hour stoppages being held. As Hutson argued, 'Those resolutions proved to be King Canute affairs because the wave of protest flooded over them'.⁷⁴

The impact on the pursuit of this kind of collective movement power was clear. The THC was overly anxious that a lack of appropriate organisation power over industrial action would undermine achievement of collective movement power. Secretary Jordan's earlier references to anarchy succinctly summed up the importance placed on control that was the consequence of 'properly' wielded organisation power. In contrast, Ken Carr, speaking on behalf of the suspended unions, claimed there were broader issues of principle associated with trade unions acting as a protector of workers 'in all aspects of their lives', exemplifying the breadth of what collective movement power could mean:

If the Trades Hall Council is working effectively and is prepared to take up the issues, then we would probably be better back in it. While they don't, the gap has got to be filled.⁷⁵

Other (often right-wing) unions saw their industrial responsibilities focussed on the workplace, rather than encompassing broader social and political issues. In its memorial tribute to Mick Jordan, The Clerk described him as

a fighter for trade union unity [who] opposed unnecessary strikes and strikes which were obviously political. Such stoppages, he maintained, hindered rather than assisted the proper aims and best welfare of the workers.⁷⁶

At the heart of these contrasting views was a significant difference about the boundaries of what constituted collective movement power for union members. Did it stop at the factory gate or office door, or did it extend to broader political and socio-economic issues affecting working class lives? Should unions exert organisation power over members to take industrial action in pursuit of socio-political collective movement power, rather than workplace-based collective movement power? In short, many of these issues turned upon what should be the role of the THC. For Carr, it involved the THC being a co-ordinated and co-ordinating body, a collective body capable of pursuing both industrial and social (or political) issues. His concept of 'trade unionism' encompassed a role for a peak union like the THC. Once more, the existence of a peak union was not the issue but, rather, the role it played within the trade union movement and the strategies it pursued.

In considering 'what was achieved' by the suspended unions' actions, concrete outcomes can be identified. Union leaders such as O'Shea achieved commitment to a counter-view of collective movement power, with the suspended unions maintaining a level of solidarity around the question of union democracy. The strategy of the THC was less successful, not least because of the position adopted by the centre unions, which also contested the hand of THC authority. This was not to say that the suspended unions were entirely successful in extending their vision of collective movement power to the centre unions, but neither was the THC able to maintain internal cohesion. Concessions were gained because this challenging vision achieved broader union commitment not only with the centre unions (as seen through their internal pressure on the THC) and the rank and file (as exhibited in the penal powers campaign), but also together with an external environment where democracy had greater symbolic appeal than did notions of authority.

Shifting focus from exploring the internal machinations to casting the struggle as indicative of broader societal trends enables greater insights into the motivations and strategies of the respective parties. The dispute occurred when conflict was almost commonplace in a variety of settings – many, but not all, workplace-related. The mid-1960s were a time when the world's attention was drawn to the streets of Paris and the factories in Italy. The French sit-down strikes of May-June 1968 concerned 'the question of worker control', including 'participation in industrial decision-making'.⁷⁷ At the core of the THC dispute were the suspended unions' demands for democratic, participative decision-making. Democratic change and greater rank and file control were common to both the THC 'split' and the industrial disputation in Europe.

The 'split' spanned 1967 to 1973, arguably years which internationally were the most politically and socially turbulent for many years. For example, in the United States,

If ghetto riots and antiwar demonstrations have long defined our image of social turmoil in the late 1960s, these were also years of industrial militancy among well-paid white workers. During every year from 1966 to 1973 work stoppages reached levels not seen since the end of World War II.⁷⁸

Understanding how this reflected a general rise of militancy suggests that the THC leadership, rather than the suspended unions, were the resistant force. Just as the 1948 suspensions could be seen in light of Cold War politics and the containment of Communist influence, so too the events within the Victorian union movement of the late 1960s need locating in their world context.

This could also be seen in the growing antagonism to the ongoing war in Vietnam. Support for the anti-war activities of the suspended unions, culminating in active support for the Moratorium marches, could be compared to the ambivalence of the THC (which 'deplored' the 'intrusion' into trade union affairs by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, in contrast to previous support for peace initiatives under Stout's leadership).⁷⁹ Other traditional patterns of authority were also being contested. Conservative, white, male authority was challenged on many fronts: the rise of the women's movement challenged patriarchal authority, while Aboriginal land rights challenged white supremacy. Issues like apartheid also confronted the union movement, as shown by opposition to the 1971 Springbok rugby tour.⁸⁰

Conclusion

This analysis has sought to provide new insights into the internal THC dispute known as the 'split', by using the concepts of organisation power and collective movement power. The split was one of the more dramatic examples of the incessant struggles over the leadership of the THC and the use of organisation power over affiliates by the leadership, and by affiliates over the leadership. It exemplified how those who possessed greater organisation power could influence collective movement power, underscoring how securing organisation power was inextricably intertwined with collective movement power. The fluidity of organisation power and the malleability of collective movement power ensured the ongoing struggle between the factions. Factional control over either organisation power or collective movement power was neither immovable nor impenetrable. Even when it appeared that the right-wing unions had an unassailable strangle-hold over organisation power, the tenacity of the Left in contesting that control led to representation changes, and then to a period of factional volatility in the latter 1970s 'after the split'.

The actions and strategies of the left unions also reinforced that there was not a simple linear relationship between organisation power and collective movement power: it was not the case that gaining organisation power led to control over collective movement power, or that dominance of organisation power ensured dominance over the nature of collective movement power. This revealed that a much more complex inter-relationship was evident in the battle over the use of organisation power and what sort of collective movement power it produced. This contributes to a more nuanced understanding of peak union power and purpose.

By locating the internal THC dispute in a broader socio-political context, the impact of broader societal issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s was explored. While a particular set of circumstances led to the specific form of the dispute, nevertheless the ideological contest at the heart of the split – over the nature and imposition of authority, the wider socio-political role of unions desired by some and resisted by others – was seen in similar struggles elsewhere. The notion of collective movement power was not an abstraction, but had demonstrable features and outcomes. By placing the dispute within this broader context and focusing on recent theoretical developments in the study of peak unions, this analysis has offered a reassessment of Plowman's prevailing analysis of the split, one in which the dimensions of peak union power are central.

Cathy Brigden is a senior lecturer in industrial relations in the School of Management at RMIT University. Her current research is focused on exploring historical patterns of women's representation and participation in peak unions, in particular the Victorian Trades Hall Council, and the role of women's unions, such as the Female Confectioners Union.
<cathy.brigden@rmit.edu.au>

Endnotes

^*� Thanks to Bradon Ellem for all his support when this article began its life as a chapter in my thesis and the two anonymous Labour History referees for their helpful suggestions.

^1.� David Plowman, 'Unions in conflict: The Victorian Trades Hall split 1967–1973', Labour History, no. 37, November 1979; David Plowman, 'The Victorian Trades Hall split', in Bill Ford and David Plowman (eds), Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations Perspective, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1983, pp. 303–324; Michelle Grattan and Geoffrey Barker, 'A house divided: a study in trade union conflicts', The Australian Quarterly, vol. 42, 1970.

^2.� See Bradon Ellem and John Shields, 'Why do unions form peak bodies? the case of the Barrier Industrial Council', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, 1996, pp. 377–411; Bradon Ellem, Raymond Markey and John Shields (eds), Peak Unions in Australia: Origins, Purpose, Power, Agency, Federation Press, Annandale, 2004; Cathy Brigden 'Analysing internal power dynamics in peak unions: a conceptual framework', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 49, no. 4, 2007, pp. 483–496.

^3.� Bradon Ellem and John Shields, 'Beyond the 'will to unity': theorising peak union organisation and agency', in Ellem, Markey and Shields, Peak Unions in Australia, p. 35.

^4.� Brigden, 'Analysing internal power dynamics in peak unions'.

^5.�Ibid., p. 488.

^6.�Ibid., p. 489.

^7.� Twenty-seven unions were initially suspended at the end of 1967, one union later joined the group in 1968, and two unions then returned to the Trades Hall Council (THC).

^8.� Cathy Brigden, 'The Melbourne Trades Hall and the ALP split', in Brian Costar, Peter Love and Paul Strangio (eds), The Great Labor Schism: A Retrospective, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2005.

^9.� See THC Council minutes, 1965–66.

^10.� THC Council minutes, 20 May 1948.

^11.� THC Council minutes, 14 April 1966. Unions of less than 1,000 members had their delegations reduced from up to three delegates to only one; unions with less than 8,500 members had their number of delegates reduced, while unions with more than 11,000 members gained more delegates.

^12.� THC Executive minutes, 19 October 1966.

^13.�The Age, 18 November 1966, p. 1.

^14.� See THC Executive minutes, 14 July 1965, 11 August 1965.

^15.� The shift in national wages policy from the Basic Wage and Margins Case to a National Wage Case in 1966 had led to the next general increase in margins being determined by a 'work value' inquiry into metal trades classifications. See Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia, 1920–72, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. 278.

^16.� THC Council minutes, 6 April 1967.

^17.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 52.

^18.�Ibid., p. 53; Grattan and Barker, 'A house divided', p. 12.

^19.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 53. The plan included Council and executive representation, recognition of individual union rights (including the lifting of the metal unions' suspensions) and finances.

^20.� Secretary's report to Council, THC Council minutes, 30 November 1967.

^21.� Grattan and Barker, 'A house divided', p. 13.

^22.� Rule 12 outlined the consequences for affiliates being in arrears: 'any union owing more than two quarters' affiliation fees automatically ceases to have the right to representation on the THC'. Secretary's report to Council, THC Council minutes, 30 November 1967. The suspended unions were: Actors Equity, Amalgamated Engineering Union (suspended 6 April 1967), Australian Railways Union, Boilermakers and Blacksmiths' Society (suspended 6 April 1967), Builders Labourers Federation, Clothing Trades, Cold Storage Union, Electrical Trades Union, Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Association, United Firemens Union, Federated Furnishing Trades Society, Hospital Employees Federation No. 2 Branch, Liquor Trades Union, Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, Meatworkers Union, Miscellaneous Workers Union, Moulders (Metal) Union (suspended 6 April 1967), Operative Painters and Decorators Union, Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union, Seamens Union, Sheet Metal and Agricultural Implement and Stovemaking Industrial Union (suspended 6 April 1967), Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union, Federated Shipwrights and Ship Constructors Association, Transport Workers Union, Tramways Union, Vehicle Builders and the Waterside Workers Federation. The 28^th union, the Postal Workers Union, was suspended on 18 July 1968. Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', Appendix 2.

^23.�The Sun, 17 November 1967.

^24.� Secretary's report to Council, THC Council minutes, 30 November 1967.

^25.� Such analysis does assume homogeneity amongst the groups of 'small' and 'large' unions, which is not consistent with the alliances found in each group. Among the 27 unions, a third of the unions had less than 2,000 members, and half of those had less than 1,000 members, while although unions remaining loyal to the THC were clustered in the group with less than 1,000 members, there were seven with more than 5,000 members: calculated from Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', Appendix 1.

^26.�The Unionist, February 1968, p. 4.

^27.� Secretary's report to Council, THC Council minutes, 30 November 1967. 'A call to Victorian unionists' was reprinted in The Clerk, February 1968, p. 7 and The Unionist, February 1968, p. 3.

^28.� For example, in the ARU's elections in 1967, the Right's ticket included J.T. Ryan, candidate for vice president ('Radical leftists, Communists and collaborators, manipulated area and shop committees are being rejected') and K. Hunt, candidate for Assistant Secretary ('Vote for the Industrial Group team that can be trusted to give responsible leadership. Get rid of the Communists and their collaborators') (Gazette, May 1967, p. 8). See also Bradon Ellem, '"Hell for Leather": industrial relations and politics in the boot trades, 1945–55', Labour & Industry, vol. 7, no. 1, 1996, pp. 125–148.

^29.� THC Executive minutes, 15 May 1968; THC Council minutes, 18 July 1968.

^30.� Food Preservers Secretary's annual report, 1972, p. 35. The Age, 20 July 1968, p. 3. THC Executive minutes, 21 August 1968, 2 October 1968.

^31.�The Age, 1 November 1968, p. 3; THC Executive minutes, 29 January 1969. THC Executive minutes, 14 May 1969.

^32.� For discussion of an alliance, see Tramway Union Executive minutes, 23 March 1970 reprinted in the Tramway Record, May 1970, p. 4. The Age, 2 April 1970, p. 6.

^33.� THC Executive minutes, 14 May, 16 June 1969; THC Council minutes, 5 June 1969, 31 July 1969; Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 62; Grattan and Barker, 'A house divided', p. 15. Council agreed to change the basis of representation as follows:

20–499 members 2 delegates

500–999 members 3 delegates

1,000–5,999 members 4 delegates

6,000 and above 5 delegates

An unsuccessfully amendment was moved by J.J. Brown (Ballarat Trades and Labour Council (TLC)) which mirrored the suspended unions' proposal. THC Council minutes, 31 July 1969.

^34.� Outstanding ongoing concerns included Executive composition, financial concerns, the powers of the Industrial Disputes Committee, as well as a new demand, the deferral of proposed changes to provincial TLCs.

^35.� Ironically, Jordan died the day after he submitted the notice of motion of the rule changes to Council. THC Council minutes, 5 June 1969. Ken Stone defeated McDonald (Building Workers Industrial Union) by 129–36 votes. The Assistant Secretary results after distribution of preferences. THC Council minutes, 24 July 1969:

1st count 2nd count 3rd count 4th count

Grenville 58 + 5 = 63 + 15 = 78 + 9 = 87

Morgan 35 + 0 = 35 + 14 = 49 + 35 = 84

McDonald 38 + 1 = 39 + 5 = 44

Taylor 25 + 9 = 34

Jordan 16

^36.� In the late 1950s, the lay National Civic Council (NCC), led by B.A. Santamaria, had replaced the Catholic Social Studies Movement (The Movement), which had been set up by priests and unionists. With its links with the Democratic Labor Party, Sheridan describes the NCC as having played a 'significant role in the trade union movement' following the 1955 ALP split. Sheridan, Mindful Militants, p. 199.

^37.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 63. In an interview in the late 1970s, Grenville claimed to have been associated with the NCC from the late 1950s and that he had been 'promoted by NCC controlled unions for the position of Assistant Secretary'. Pattern of Deceit, no date; see also Who is this Man Grenville? leaflet, Committee for the Defence of Trade Unionism, no date. Tom Ryan observed that before Jordan's death, 'it seemed that a settlement was in sight' but Grenville's election 'isolated the various groups working for a settlement'. Food Preservers Secretary's annual report, 1972, p. 35.

^38.� At an Executive meeting where there had been disagreement over an action of Secretary Stone's, Assistant Secretary Grenville 'uttered an offensive remark relating to the Secretary'. THC Executive minutes, 11 February 1970. Grenville then alleged there had been an 'improper' meeting between Stone, ACTU Secretary Hawke, Hubbard for the centre unions, and suspended unions' representative Innes. THC Special Executive minutes, 25 March 1970; THC Executive minutes, 1 April 1970. Stone told the executive that he was 'disturbed at the fact that in his opinion some Executive members were not showing sufficient loyalty both in the Council Chamber and in relation to discussing Executive business outside the Executive meeting' and asked that all matters of difference be kept within the executive. There was no dissent to this report. THC Executive minutes, 22 April 1970.

^39.�The Age, 2 April 1970, p. 6.

^40.�The Age, 30 April 1970, p. 3; The Unionist, May 1970, p. 3; Tramway Record, March 1970, p. 2. In 1969, union elections in the Transport Workers Union led to a change of leadership and the consequent return of the union to the fold of the THC. Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 62; see also The Unionist article, 'Clean Sweep in TWU election', June 1969, p. 3. The Hospital Employees Federation No. 2 branch returned in February 1971.

^41.� Federal intervention into the ALP's Victorian branch saw a new executive and structure imposed on the branch. Other state branches of the ALP were not immune from federal scrutiny at this time. As discussed by Markey, the NSW branch too was 'investigated' by the ALP federal executive. Raymond Markey, In Case of Oppression: The Life and Times of the Labor Council of New South Wales. Sydney, Pluto Press, 1994, pp. 481–2. A further organisational split within the Communist Party in 1971 had similar consequences. See Tom McDonald and Audrey McDonald, Intimate Union: Sharing a Revolutionary Life, Annandale, Pluto Press, 1998, pp. 172–74.

^42.� James Hagan, History of the ACTU, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1981, p. 377.

^43.� THC Executive minutes, 3 March 1971, 17 March 1971. Meetings with the suspended unions took place in June and July 1971. THC Special Executive minutes, 27 June 1971, 9 July 1971, 25 October 1971; THC Executive minutes, 14 July 1971.

^44.� THC Executive minutes, 15 September, 15 December 1971.

^45.� Both the Printers and the AWU put pressure on the Executive. THC Executive minutes, 26 January, 8 March 1972, 8 April 1972.

^46.� THC Executive minutes, 21 June 1972. See Negotiating meeting minutes and THC Executive minutes, 10 May 1972; THC Special Executive minutes, 11 May 1972. THC Executive minutes, 19 July 1972. Numbers estimated from Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', Appendix 1.

^47.� THC Executive minutes, 9 August 1972.

^48.�Pattern of Deceit, p. 50.

^49.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 64. The only additional matter discussed related to the payment of arrears.

^50.� THC Executive minutes, 13 December 1972. The Age, 26 January 1973, p. 3.

^51.� See THC Executive meetings, 16 May 1973, 23 May 1973, 13 June 1973, 20 June 1973; Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 65. The Age, 13 April 1973, p. 4; THC Special Executive minutes, 18 April 1973; Scope, 19 April 1973, p. 3.

^52.� The Postal Workers had returned in May and the Liquor Trades in July. A further two returned in late August, another in December and two in January 1974. Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', Appendix 2. The six remaining unions took between a further six months to two years to return. In some cases this was because of the amount of outstanding affiliation fees while, with others, reaffiliation had to be sought.

^53.� THC Council minutes, 2 September 1973.

^54.�Scope, 28 June 1973, p. 5.

^55.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 64.

^56.� Grattan and Barker, 'A house divided'.

^57.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict'. The THC referred to the suspended unions as the 'unfinancial' unions.

^58.�Ibid., p. 55.

^59.� Grattan and Barker, 'A house divided', p. 4.

^60.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 54.

^61.�The Age, 8 July 1970, p. 6.

^62.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 67. It is questionable whether the centre unions would have been so willing to make such threats and play such a role with the THC leadership had the suspended unions disaffiliated.

^63.� THC election results, December 1973, June 1974.

^64.� Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 48, quoting Grattan and Barker, 'A house divided', p. 4.

^65.�Ibid., p. 48..

^66.� The pragmatic reasons were promoting the left agenda through both the THC and ACTU; dealing with a government, which would only negotiate with the THC, and their own tendencies to fragmentation. Plowman, 'Unions in conflict', p. 61.

^67.�Ibid., p. 60.

^68.�Ibid., p. 67. The outstanding issues were the size of delegations of amalgamated unions, the provincial TLCs, and the role of the Industrial Disputes Committee. The failure to go through the formal disputes procedures should not be taken to suggest that the THC gave up its co-ordinating role in this area. The point of contention was the involvement of Council, not that there could be no role for the THC. This was illustrated by the compromise, whereby unions held joint meetings chaired by Trades Hall officials.

^69.� Hagan, History of the ACTU, p. 257.

^70.�Tramway Record, July 1970, p. 2.

^71.� See Jack Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers, Amalgamated Engineering Union, Surry Hills, 1966, pp. 264–72. The stoppages stemmed from the work value inquiry that had led to the suspension of the metal unions in early 1967. Following the Arbitration Commission's decision in December 1967 that increases in margins should be 'absorbed' into existing over-award payments and the employers' attempt to do so, there had been ongoing industrial action by the metal unions against absorption. The employers made extensive use of the industrial relations legislation, through ss109 and 111 of the federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, to have the unions fined for breach of the bans clause in the Metal Trades Award. Although the bans clause in the Tramways award was deleted in 1966, after the Arbitration Commission (unusually) found it to be 'more of a hindrance than a help in settling the dispute', the question of the fines remained outstanding. Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers, p. 265. The employers rejected staggered repayments and what ensued was six months of attempts to recover the monies, initially by the employers and then by the Registrar of the Industrial Court.

^72.� Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers, p. 269.

^73.� THC Council minutes, 15 May 1969.

^74.� Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers, p. 270.

^75.�The Age, 8 July 1970, p. 6.

^76.�The Clerk, vol. 33, no. 3, 1969, p. 6.

^77.� Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France 1830–1968, Cambridge University Press, London, 1974, p. 141.

^78.� Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, Basic Books, New York, 1995, p. 413.

^79.� See THC Council minutes, 19 March 1970 Although the ACTU Executive's view was that 'peace was trade union business', opposition to the Moratorium Committee's work was underlined by an amendment to the THC Executive's motion, carried by 43 to 37 votes, to distribute multi-lingual leaflets disassociating the THC from the campaign, indicating that any call for action such as work stoppages was contrary to trade union policy. THC Council minutes, 16 April 1970.

^80.� THC Council minutes, 3 June 1971; THC Executive minutes, 7 July 1971.

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