Nick Martin | 'Bucking the machine': Clarrie Martin and the NSW Socialisation Units 1929–35 | Labour History, 93

'Bucking the machine': Clarrie Martin and the NSW Socialisation Units 1929–35

Nick Martin^*

The Socialisation Unit's campaign of the early 1930s remains an intriguing and under-explored part of the NSW Labor Party's history. This article will provide further information on this campaign by looking at the role of one of the prominent leaders in the campaign, C.E. 'Clarrie' Martin. By examining Martin's diaries for the period, we are able to provide further explanation on the background to the campaign, its aims and its methods. From this vantage point we can make further conclusions about the nature of the campaign and the reasons for its eventual failure.

During the 1930s depression crisis in New South Wales a group of rank-and-file activists and junior union officials attempted to defeat the political machine of Labor Premier J.T. Lang through the creation of 'Socialisation Units'. These local Units were used by left-wing party members to organise among Australian Labor Party (ALP) members, trade unionists and the public and within three years had grown to equal the influence of Lang's powerful 'Inner Group' faction. In a bitter campaign for control of the NSW Branch of the ALP, the Units would be defeated by the 'Inner Group' machine, with their attempts to secure a socialist majority within the party leading to their dissolution and an end to their legitimacy.

In this study we will look at two unexplored aspects of this struggle. Firstly, we will examine the role played by one of the prominent leaders of the Socialisation Units, Clarence Edward Martin, who for much of the time was the MLA for the provincial seat of Young.¹ Martin's extensive diaries for this period are an under-utilised resource and a genuine blow-by-blow account of the socialisation campaign.² The motives behind such a campaign are usefully explored through immediate recollections, recorded in a diary. Unlike oral histories or autobiography, the political diary gives a direct, personal and evolving look at what can become important historical events. The results may be more partisan than reflective, but that is a quality worth capturing when looking at the experiences of a dedicated activist like Martin, and a time of great upheaval like the 1930s depression. Martin's account of this campaign provides us with new insights on the Socialisation Units and also shows the effect of such a campaign on the development of a political individual.

Secondly, we will look at some of the reasons for initial success and eventual failure of the Socialisation Units, focusing of the kaleidoscopic factional dynamics of the period, and their contradictory relationship with Lang and his 'Inner Group'. The rise of the Socialisation Units and their confrontation with the Langite political machine can only be understood by examining the different locations of power within the NSW ALP, in the context of the social and political dislocation caused by the depression. The influence of 'Red' trade unions and their leaders reached their peak just prior to its onset. This influence maintained some of its radical edge, but had effectively become a ruling clique within the branch, solidly behind Lang, particularly as he pursued radical policies in the depression context which defended working-class gains. It is also clear that had the depression not occurred, left-wing elements in the NSW branch would have continued to make small, and directionless, interventions in the political direction of the branch. Only with the economic dislocation of the depression did the socialisation supporters have a context relevant to the creation of a mass, socialist campaign. As will be seen, the leadership of the Socialisation Units attempted a difficult and contradictory policy of staying within the Langite mainstream as long as possible, while attempting to push it left-wards. This policy would eventually lead to internal and external conflict.

Martin's diaries reveal many of the tactical decisions taken in this high-stakes campaign, providing a unique opportunity to delve deeper into the socialisation movement story and to analyse the reasons for its defeat.

Socialisation in Context

Robert Cooksey provides us with an official history of the Socialisation Units in his 1970 work Lang and Socialism.³ Utilising extensive interviews with the participants, Cooksey brought to light a hidden story about one of the great rank and file revolts of the Labor Party. What Cooksey's work could not examine were the immediate political reactions and tactical decisions employed in the socialisation struggle. What comes to light through Martin's diary is a campaign unsure of its scope, troubled by internal and external contradictions and attempting to define itself within the mainstream of the NSW Labor Party but in opposition to its most popular leader. Martin's diary shows that many of the activists had shared backgrounds, some stretching through the One Big Union and conscription campaigns, but that many more were a new generation of socialist leaders. This group were under 40 years of age and included many from the universities and lower ranks of trade union officials. Alongside Martin in this group were Bill McNamara, J.O.A. Bourke, A.J. Taylor, Sam Lewis, Jim Maloney, Wally Evans and Jack Hughes.⁴

In opposition to the Socialisation Units stood Lang's political machine – his 'Inner Group' – a group of trade union officials, party officials, parliamentarians and publicists who were hardened by the factional battles in the branch of the 1920s and who had worked to secure Lang as parliamentary leader. The membership of Lang's 'Inner Group' changed over time but it was built around Jock Garden (Secretary of the NSW Labour Council), Jack 'Stabber' Beasley (Leader of the Lang group in Federal Parliament), Jim Graves (Secretary of the NSW ALP), J.B. 'Plugger' Martin (Organiser of the NSW ALP), J. Stewart (Electrical Trades Union), Harold McCauley (Lang's publicity officer) and a number of other trade union officials. Many of the union and party officials were former militants themselves, having participated in the anti-conscription and One Big Union campaigns and the debates on communist affiliation to the ALP. This group took a contradictory position in relation to the Socialisation Units, particularly when the NSW branch split from the federal party in 1931. By 1932 however, it was clear that the Units presented a challenge to the dominance of the 'Inner Group' and the political resources of the machine were mobilised for their defeat. This included the use of numbers at the annual Easter conference to deny the Units legitimacy and also the use of the Labor Daily, the mass circulating organ of the ALP, as a partisan tool against the Units.

In the last phase of Unit activity the campaign moved from being an ideological struggle into being a political, or factional, struggle for control of the ALP. This interplay between ideology and factionalism was initially not difficult for the Unit leadership to maintain, and a consequence of the radical environment of the NSW branch. Miriam Dixson has shown that a 'rough hewn class struggle ideology' definitely permeated both the Socialisation Units, the Langite forces, and the group of union officials who were decisive to Lang defeating socialisation – the 'Trades Hall Reds'. The broad 'left' of the movement was more extensive than the Socialisation Units themselves, with the spectrum of the accepted 'left' stretching from Lang and anyone who opposed the Federal Government's deflationary policies, through to the 'united front' element of the Socialisation Units who were sympathetic to the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). This meant that the Socialisation Units had fertile ground for their ideology within the mainstream of the NSW ALP, and that they initially had an opportunity to work with the leadership of the party machine while at the same time attempting to push it leftwards. In this context the mobilising program and belief structure of the Units should be seen as having external as well as internal audiences. Externally, the Units sought to provide an effective policy response to the depression crisis, while rallying support to the Langite ALP and avoiding divisiveness. Internally, the Units sought to articulate long held left union views, such as industrial unionism, aiming to secure the support of party stakeholders. They also sought to rally the rank and file into an effective internal political force, developing decentralised and democratic power within the ALP.⁵

The Units were not effective in securing support from the union leadership, despite some significant in-roads in Unit organisation inside the unions by 1933. Few union leaders were socialisation supporters, with the clear exception of Jack Kilburn from the Bricklayers Union and the officials of the Miners Federation and Australian Railways Union (ARU). Some former 'Inner Group' dissidents, like A.C. Willis, eventually moved to support the socialisation forces. Despite the militant 'Red' reputation of many union leaders, they tended to side with the Lang 'Inner Group', particularly once Lang had moved to dismember the socialisation forces. His powerful political machine was also able to deliver both patronage and influence to the unionists who were associated with it. In the heightened class struggle environment of the depression, Lang's commitment to repudiation of overseas loan repayments and rhetorical defence of working-class living standards made him an effective, if not radical, leader for the needs of the union leadership and indeed membership. In this context, a move to the mass socialisation movement by many of the union leadership was unlikely.

Division among socialisation supporters on tactics and the correct line on the factional confrontation with the Inner Group also debilitated the movement. Moves to secure union support came too late in the campaign and were tainted by the campaign then being waged against the Units by Lang. Attempts to rally support from the smaller sections of the movement were also unsuccessful as was potential agreement with the right-wing rump federal ALP. Deprived of official status by the 'Inner Group' controlled the annual conference, the Socialisation Units ultimately unravelled as a mass campaign.

The Beginnings of the Socialisation Campaign

The young left-wingers who would form the Socialisation Units were experienced, but junior, operatives in the ALP. On the eve of the depression crisis, they were able to promote an agenda in keeping with the militant mood of the rank and file but of little interest to the main 'players' of the state ALP. While the union officials and Lang continued their consolidation of power within the party, and conflict with the federal branch, the left-wing activists continued to build support in the branches and to have some of their own elected to positions of minor authority. They were successful in having their forums recognised as 'official' by the annual conference, but were given limited resources to carry their agendas forward by the state party executive. The long-term objectives of the group were set before the depression crisis, but it was only the financial meltdown which would give them fertile ground to construct a viable socialist alternative within the ALP.

At the 1928 conference the future socialisation activists achieved their first wins. The conference in that year was a particularly radical moment in the NSW ALP. Lang's newly constituted 'Inner Group' successfully stared down the federal conference to defend states' rights and 'rank and file' decision-making to allow Communist Party members to participate in the ALP.⁶ The young left-wingers took the opportunity to move to create a Labor Propaganda Army (LPA), supported by branch agitational units. The motion anticipated the Socialisation Units by two years, and accurately put forward the ideological and campaign objectives of the left-wing:

That for the purposes of effective Labor propaganda, conference instructs the executive (1) to immediately proceed with the establishment of a permanent propaganda organisation within the ALP whose purpose is to be the continuous all-the-year-round dissemination of Labor leaflets and other literature and the holding of public propaganda meetings wherever possible, such organisation to be based on propaganda units formed in connection with every willing league and union; (2) to assist in the formation and encouragement of Labor speaking classes in every electorate, so speaking teams may be available and sent through the country; all Labor Parliamentarians [to] assist in all these activities.⁷

One of the first leaflets issued by the LPA set out 'the real meaning of the objective of the ALP, ie "the socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange"'.⁸ The 'Inner Group' controlled executive was directed to support the efforts of the LPA, but by the 1929 conference no such support had been forthcoming.

The left wing had another win in 1928 with the formal incorporation of their 'Labor Educational League' (LEL) into the ALP structure as the 'ALP Educational Advisory Committee'. The LEL had been formed in 1927 to 'discuss and demand socialist educational reform'⁹ and represented ideas within the party which to some were 'dilettante, even clotted'.¹⁰ The LEL promoted a reform agenda which did present a coherent political explanation of the role of education in empowering ordinary people, and the lack of working-class content in the mass education of the public school system. The LEL stood against war, imperialism and for greater independent working-class learning, most notably through a Labor College.¹¹ As a schoolteacher and Workers Educational Association (WEA) lecturer, Martin was very active in the formation of the LEL.

As part of the militant mood in 1928, Martin was elected as Vice-President of the NSW Branch of the ALP, becoming the youngest member to serve in this role. Following a fiery speech denouncing 'rats' in the movement and calling for mandatory recall of disloyal members the left succeeded in having him installed against an 'Inner Group' candidate.

Martin and Socialisation

Figure 1: Clarence E. Martin, 1939

Courtesy author's private collection

Martin represented a different strand within the NSW ALP from the dominant industrial left. His beliefs were centred around a guild socialist framework with a strong emphasis on decentralised power, industrial unionism and the expansion of workers' education. Rising through the Teachers Federation, WEA and ALP, he actively participated in branch affairs wherever he lived. In Glebe, Newcastle and Young Martin actively recruited and built a party presence. A prominent supporter of branch member rights and decentralisation, his views on authoritarian leadership had already brought him into conflict with Lang's 'Inner Group' before his election to state parliament as the member for Young in the Lang landslide of 1930.¹²

Martin's connection to the young left-wing set was demonstrated in his first parliamentary forays, through attempts to promote the agenda of the LEL.¹³ In 1930 Martin used question time to query whether the Minister for Education had considered the

advisability of amending the school syllabus ... with a view to eliminating undue emphasis upon war and allied subjects, to creating a fuller appreciation of world development, to the lessening of racial antagonism, and to giving due weight to the various democratic developments of more recent time.¹⁴

These moves by Martin to implement some minor socialistic reforms were quickly displaced by larger events, when the full effect of the depression began to bite economically and politically in 1931. As circumstances changed, so too did Martin's take on his role as a socialist within parliament and within the ALP.

Conflict in Caucus 1930–31

As the depression crisis deepened in 1931, the federal ALP government pursued a deflationary policy, in accordance with the advice of the conservative economists. Lang at first signed up to the policy, but as opposition within the NSW labour movement became more apparent, tacked to the left and put forward his own 'Lang Plan'. This would lead to a formal split between the federal ALP and the NSW branch, contributing to Lang's image as a staunch defender of working-class interests. The 'Lang Plan' was an accurate reflection of the early stirrings of the labour movement against deflation. The Plan was constituted around three demands: (1) the renegotiation of interest payments or repudiation of overseas loans; (2) a maximum rate of interest on all government borrowings of three per cent; and (3) the replacement of the gold standard with a 'goods' standard.¹⁵ Repudiation had been a central demand of the NSW Labour Council and was important in securing their continued political support. Lang also sought to pacify the left-wingers with his commitment to limitation of interest repayment and a 'goods' standard. Martin was one of the most vocal advocates for a goods standard within the caucus and the parliament. As a result, he and others on the left welcomed the 'Lang Plan' with Martin even seconding its adoption in caucus.¹⁶ The difference between Lang and the left was that Lang believed the Lang Plan to be a campaigning tool for the survival of the government whereas the left viewed it as the beginning of a socialist response to the depression. As was reported the next day, Martin was 'behind the policy, and would in fact go further'.¹⁷ Over the coming months, Martin would raise issues aiming to push the government agenda further. Martin called for public works to be better planned and targeted at 'reproductive' works which would deliver further employment, rather than purely ameliorative work.¹⁸ In February, Martin advocated a soviet-style managed currency as the only means of stabilising prices, through the ability to inflate and deflate at will.¹⁹ The daily papers attacked these suggestions, depicting Martin in cartoons as a bearded Bolshevik.²⁰ Martin dismissed these attacks and continued to raise policy ideas.²¹ Citing the German Government's example, Martin raised in parliament the need for a more regulated labour market including a ban on overtime and secondary occupations to lower unemployment.²² Lang's response to this suggestion was typical of his response to many of the matters raised by Martin and the left. Claiming that 'as an Australian I do not propose to adopt the standards or methods of any other country', he rejected the proposal.²³

Despite this rejection, Martin continued to campaign within the government for a socialist response to the depression. Martin detailed his growing concerns in his diary and they reflected those held by others on the left namely that; (a) the Lang government was incapable of implementing its program, (b) the policy directives from the government failed to address the root problems of the depression which lay in the nature of the capitalist system, and (c) the Cabinet, and Lang in particular, behaved in a dictatorial and undemocratic fashion. One point of conflict involved the failure by Lang to bring the 'Lang Plan' before caucus before publicly announcing it. Martin was one of the few who voiced dissent in the party room. In a particularly bitter debate in May 1931 Lang accused critical MLAs of 'base treachery' in speaking against some elements of the 'Lang Plan'. This led Martin and a small group of fellow backbenchers to present criticism within the caucus, which attracted the ire of the 'Inner Group' muscle men.²⁴ Martin's criticisms and position reflected the desperation of the deepening depression crisis, but also the frustrations of many with the government. This disenchantment would lead to his active involvement in the Socialisation Units.

Figure 2. Adopt Soviet's Currency System

Daily Guardian, 29 January 1931Courtesy author's private collection

The Formation of the Socialisation Units 1930–31

In 1930, the left-wingers in the LPA succeeded in having a Socialisation Committee established by the annual conference, to investigate means to 'propagate the first and principal platform of the Party – the Socialisation of Industry'.²⁵ The Socialisation Committee was convened with Bill McNamara as secretary, and a membership comprised wholly of socialists.²⁶ The Socialisation Committee might have met the same fate as the LPA, had there not been the intense economic dislocation and political confusion triggered by the depression crisis. Against this backdrop, the Committee quickly took its watching brief and ran with it, establishing a program of public lectures, distributing leaflets, and organising 'Socialisation Units' around the local branches of the ALP and trade unions. By far the most successful Unit activities were their extensive public and party lectures. Many of the Unit leadership were experienced public speakers and employed these skills to build Unit membership. The Units' newspaper, Socialisation Call, published a full list of future lectures, and synopses of successful Unit events and achieved a claimed circulation of over 40,000.²⁷ The Socialisation Committee sought to establish a Labor presence where none existed: at rank and file level in the unions, in the sphere of education through a Labor College, and at the University through a 'Labor Club'.²⁸ The Socialisation Committee also pointed out to elected representatives that under the motion passed at the 1930 conference, they were required, as part of their party duties, to speak out publicly on socialisation matters.²⁹ Martin became active in the Units through these activities. Throughout 1931 and 1932 he conducted a series of lectures in Newtown, Newcastle, Concord, Bondi, Campsie, Drummoyne, Granville, Paddington, Randwick, Coogee, and other localities.³⁰ On occasions 'some hundreds' turned out to hear Martin speak, mainly in the metropolitan and inner city heartlands of the ALP, where the depression was acute. During these meetings working-class supporters were looking for answers, and were sometimes disappointed by the policies propounded by the Unit leadership. Martin's response was to point out that he was 'no Messiah' and that only consistent industrial, educational, and political agitation through a mass movement could bring about lasting social transformation.³¹ Martin was one of the few serving politicians to actively engage with the socialisation movement and was genuinely committed to steering 'an honest intellectual course' in relation to the campaign.³²

Socialism in Our Time: For One Day 1931–32

The Easter conference in 1931 marked the highpoint of Socialisation Unit activity, although the tactical decisions made were not agreed by all in the leadership of the Units. With the 'Inner Group' still warily tolerating the Units, the Unit leadership decided to make a decisive push for their agenda at the annual Easter conference. Early on in proceedings the Units secured the adoption of the socialist objective, as a part of the NSW ALP platform.³³ This victory spurred the Unit leadership to push for a conference resolution committing the ALP to the transition to 'socialism in our time'. In a wide ranging motion before the conference, Bill McNamara moved that the ALP adopt as its fighting policy for the state election a program to implement the transition to socialism within three years, through government regulation.³⁴ As Jack Kilburn stated at the conference 'something drastic must be done'.³⁵ The 'Inner Group' desperately attempted to defeat the moves, fearing electoral annihilation on a socialist platform. Despite these moves, the 'Inner Group' was defeated with Martin noting that

The fact is that the original motion (though utterly impracticable) seriously challenged the Lang-Graves–Garden group. The AWU joined in voting for it –apparently to embarrass the 'Inner Group'.³⁶

Despite being an insider on many of the tactical discussions in the weeks before the conference, Martin was unaware that the motion for the transition to socialism was being moved. His comments also demonstrate that he believed that the push was unnecessary, a poor tactical decision and that it too openly challenged the authority of the 'Inner Group'. Martin's diary also reveals that the Unit leadership were aware of the binding affect their resolution would have on the government, although they appear to have been unaware of the repercussions the move would have. From his vantage point in the parliamentary caucus, Martin could foresee the factional response these moves could trigger, and also appreciate the tenuous grip the government had on the whole political situation. The combination of these factors led the 'Inner Group' to move that the resolution be severely amended when the conference re-convened the next day, intensely lobbying delegates to ensure that by 65 votes to 35, the motion was altered to prevent any prescriptive directions for the government.³⁷ These moves by the Units resulted in a more aggressive stance against the Units from Lang's 'Inner Group', with the Units now viewed as a serious threat to their dominance of the ALP. It also demonstrated that core support for socialisation lay at around one-third of the conference, and that without the support of union bloc votes, which could be effectively turned by Jock Garden, a socialisation majority would not be forthcoming. Despite calls from the Unit leadership for greater 'unity' and the setting aside of 'personal differences', as the year progressed the machine men of the 'Inner Group' would move to isolate and then disband the Units.³⁸ These moves would draw Martin into closer activity with the Socialisation Units, as his desire for socialism merged with his opposition to what he saw as the dictatorial tendencies of the 'Inner Group'.

On the Outer and Out of Politics 1932

In managing the fallout from the Easter conference, some of Lang's pronouncements still attracted critical support from the likes of Martin. Refusal to pay interest due on overseas loans to the Australian Government, despite the protestations of the NSW State Governor, and a plan to implement high income taxes for the wealthy, were all vocally endorsed by Martin.³⁹ Despite these new initiatives, Martin's disillusionment with the trajectory of the Lang government deepened, despairing with his colleagues in parliament. As Martin would bemoan

The 'boys' here think I'm a fool to do these Socialisation addresses – it certainly does not do me any good in the electorate and I am beginning to despair of the possibility of inducing any real radical attitude in Australia. The people seem to be growing even more conservative and I am convinced that we will never have a chance of introducing any radical measures and also winning office.⁴⁰

These comments reveal the fragility of the socialisation campaign. While thousands of ALP and working-class militants had joined the Units, they were nowhere near achieving ideology or numerical dominance over the ALP, with the caucus and the union leadership remaining committed to the Langite leadership and its response to the depression.

The campaign for socialisation was soon to be displaced by bigger debates, with the State Governor suddenly dismissing the Lang government in 1932. As a result the ALP possessed neither the means nor wherewithal to implement the socialist objective, regardless of the views of the individuals involved in the Units, or party conferences. At the subsequent 1932 election the United Australia Party candidate for Young trounced Martin as the ALP slumped to one of the worst defeats in its history. For Martin the loss of his seat in parliament exposed him to personal hardship, caused reflections in bitterness, but confirmed his beliefs. As he would express to a meeting of socialisation supporters after the defeat:

My experience in Parliament has consolidated my Socialist beliefs and made me realise more fully than ever [the] need for spreading socialist thought ... In my opinion Lang, though a good fighter, knew very little about socialism. This [comment] might be deemed a little indiscrete but it is true and might just as well be frankly stated.⁴¹

Now out of parliament, Martin was free to conduct the socialisation fight, which would now intensify into an outright struggle for the control of the NSW ALP.

Building Momentum: Campaigning Speeches, Broadcasts and Interventions 1932–33

The 1932 election loss was analysed and dissected by the Unit leadership. Despite the annual conference directing Lang to fight the election purely on the policy of socialisation, he had fought his own campaign. In June and July of 1932, a meeting of the socialisation leadership determined that the implementation of the objective now could not be achieved until the Socialisation Units had captured the machinery of the ALP; meaning control of the annual Easter conference and through it the state executive of the party.⁴² This meant a distinct break on their part with Lang and the 'Inner Group', although by this stage it was clear that the 'Inner Group' was already manoeuvring to curtail the influence of the Socialisation Units. As a result the socialisation campaign had to seek-out other allies. The Unit leadership was not shy of discussing alliances with distinctly un-socialist parts of the movement. The federal ALP appears to have initially approached McNamara and Martin, to win the Units to the idea of affiliating with the federal party. The prospect of Martin becoming the secretary of the federal party was held out as a carrot during meetings with AWU power-broker Clarrie Fallon and a young Arthur Calwell. The Unit leadership rejected both offers as they believed to accept cooperation with right-wing sections of the movement, like the AWU, would lead to the 'sabotaging of the [Socialist] Objective'.⁴³ Moving to the federal party would not only have diluted the Units within the more right-wing national entity, it would have also excluded them from effective influence in their home state, New South Wales. Despite the Unit leadership rebuffing these moves, they may have contributed to Lang's decision to launch an internal offensive against the supporters of socialisation.

Now out of government, Lang began his fight for control of the NSW ALP by continuing to position himself as a left militant, at least in comparison to his federal adversaries. Most important to this strategy was Lang's call, not for the socialisation of industry, but for the vaguely defined 'socialisation of credit'.⁴⁴ It does not appear that this policy was ever fully articulated or explained, but as a political device it proved very effective in marginalising the Socialisation Units. Part of the strategy was to capture the militant language of the left, and effect a weaker policy response. Another element was to denounce the socialisation leaders, particularly McNamara, in public and through the Labor Daily. Lang used the country ALP conference, a far more timid affair than its metropolitan cousin, to establish the 'new line' in a constituent party forum. He also used the opportunity to link his campaign against Federal Government policy to an attack on the Socialisation Units. As Martin notes in his diary,

Lang talked of 'socialising credit' etc and had a go at some of us. Of course ruling gang had it all their own way, Lang raved about the Banks – which is naturally a popular cry – and hinted that all must concentrate on that. Obviously a knock at socialisation group. But he also had one or two more direct shots – one a real pearl – not to let movement 'become merely an academic background, throwing into relief preenings of a few vain and glorious pedagogues'.⁴⁵

These were personal attacks, directed primarily against McNamara and Martin, and a new feature of the 'Inner Group' campaign against the Units. These comments and the intensifying of the fight they reflected stirred Martin to work even harder. Being without full-time employment, Martin was at least free to continue to campaign and spread socialisation propaganda. Through the union-owned radio station 2KY, Martin conducted night-time broadcasts on behalf of the Socialisation Committee. He also continued working within the WEA, which provided a supplement to an irregular income.

In 1933 radio 2KY maintained a contradictory position in the emerging factional dispute between Lang and the left, with socialisation supporters like Martin being given airtime with the direct support of Jock Garden.⁴⁶ This was perhaps Garden, the consummate political chameleon, covering his bases or an indication of a fading sympathy for socialisation. Regardless, Martin used this airplay to introduce some interesting forms of political propaganda in support of the Units' campaign.⁴⁷ Socialisation Unit members were invited to send in questions on socialisation, war debts, foreign affairs, local politics, and economics.⁴⁸ The broadcasts were incorporated into the Socialisation Units' general propaganda. The Unit newspaper Socialisation Call advised members and supporters to tune into Martin's broadcast and contribute to the debate, and form study and discussion circles around the show.⁴⁹ Also, Martin used the opportunity to answer 'fake' questions which were used to delineate the distinction between the complete socialisation favoured by Unit supporters, and the socialisation of credit being propagated by Lang.⁵⁰ This was a direct appeal to the rank and file over the heads of the 'Inner Group' and a continuation of the rank and file organising which had sustained the Units to this point. The use of the medium was unique among radical groups in the depression, and the integration with other propaganda organs demonstrates the coherence of the socialisation campaign.

The campaign was also strengthened through its mobilisation of smaller elements in the labour movement, such as the WEA. In late March of 1933, the WEA organised a conference on socialisation, with papers presented by Professor Gerry Portus (influential founder of the WEA), E.R. Voigt (a prominent member of the Labour Council), Bill McNamara, Professor John Anderson, and Ted Theodore (representative of the federal ALP). Although billed as an impartial event, all the 'broad left' elements in the movement were represented along with the federal party. The 'Inner Group' responded by banning promotion of the event through party circulars and the Labor Daily and boycotted attending.⁵¹ Martin, McNamara and other Unit supporters used the forum to push strongly for support for the Units in their struggles against the party machine. Martin also took the opportunity to make one of his strongest declarations for socialism. In a wide ranging speech, Martin attacked the narrowness of Australia's economic academics, and advocated 'Industrial Unionism and a socialist political programme'. Martin concluded his speech by stating that:

If the reactionary elements succeed in liquidating the socialisation movement it will be to declare that the Labor Party is not a Socialist Party; that it is content with the policy and legislation of anaemic liberalism; that it is definitely reactionary; and [aims] to repress [the] sanest, cleanest, and best impulse that has appeared in the party in a quarter of a century.⁵²

McNamara's speech, which was reprinted in Socialisation Call, also drew a clear distinction between those who supported socialisation as a mere 'objective' and socialisation as a 'method of arriving at that objective'.⁵³ The Unit supporters clearly were using the forum to rally support in areas where 'Inner Group' control was weak in the lead-up to the now anticipated major confrontation at the 1933 conference.

The Decisive Fight for Conference 1933

In addition to his activities at 2KY and the WEA, Martin also continued his work as one of the frontline socialisation speakers. In the period leading up to the 1933 Easter conference Martin spoke at Labor League meetings in Marrickville East, Marrickville West, and at meetings of the Road Transport Union, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), and the Clerks Union.⁵⁴ He was also able to convince the University Labor Club 'caucus' to begin operating as a Socialisation Unit.⁵⁵ Coordination of the activities of Martin and other socialisation propagandists occurred at an ad-hoc socialisation head quarters, located in Jack Kilburn's office at Trades Hall. The main focus of these actions was to secure a socialisation majority at the metropolitan, and then Easter conference. A majority at the metropolitan conference appears to have been easily achieved, with Martin noting the excitement amongst delegates upon realising that the socialisation forces had a two-to-one advantage over the Langite group.⁵⁶ One of Martin's tasks at the metropolitan conference was to act as a 'socialisation floor whip' – canvassing the AWU-aligned delegates and urging them to support the socialisation forces. Martin also spent much time talking to delegates about the tactics for the day with the aim of 'putting some ginger in them'. Martin's efforts proved useful, with the socialisation forces using their majority to call Lang's posturing into question. As Martin states;

The socialisation group ... has concentrated on pressing [for the] socialisation objective. But the 'Labor Daily' has launched a shocking campaign of distortions, lying, and abuse in declaring that it's a 'clique' and that they are out to smash Lang and the 'Labor Daily'. The articles are vicious, venomous and dastardly – and are all aimed at smashing the socialisation movement and retaining control by Graves and therefore by Lang. Lang suggested in a speech that the policy for Federal elections should be socialisation of banking but Conference did not immediately pass a motion of praise, but subjected him to a fire of questions – the first anti-Lang show for some years! On a motion that the next Federal election be fought on the socialisation of banking and unification, Kilburn moved an amendment that socialisation of credit be part but that also the whole policy of socialism in effect be put forward. The amendment was carried! –Another win for Socialisation!⁵⁷

The Lang forces regarded the mobilisation of socialists at the metropolitan conference as a direct challenge. Through the pages of the Labor Daily, the outcomes of the conference were misrepresented and socialisation supporters maligned. Over following weeks Martin asserts that the Labor Daily refused to publish pro-socialisation resolutions from over 30 movement bodies, but continued to give prominence to motions past 'spontaneously' by party organs in support of Lang.⁵⁸ Martin's attempts to rally branches after the metropolitan conference suffered, he believed because of the line pursued by the Labor Daily. At a meeting of the Belmore branch, Martin asked for the privilege of speaking:

[I] was granted 20 minutes and made a strong plea for socialisation objective and against the blackening of those forwarding it. They listened and even applauded but turned down a motion of support for socialisation in favour of an amendment 'supporting Lang and the Labor Daily'. Ye gods, it's quite impossible to overcome the Labor Daily influence and Lang idolatry ... What a travesty it is that the official organ can declare a Conference majority to be traitors and get away with it.⁵⁹

Despite official protests to the editorial board of the Labor Daily, its campaign was unrelenting. Its vindictive editorials, and the public stance of Lang, severely dampened the attempts by socialisation supporters to be elected as delegates to the annual Easter conference. Even socialisation chief, Bill McNamara, was defeated for election by Langites.⁶⁰ This created doubts for Martin who would state with trepidation in his diary that he was 'beginning to wonder whether we are playing with fire. If we do not win at Easter then it looks like the chopping block for a goodly number'.⁶¹

When the delegates assembled for Easter conference at Sydney Town Hall on Friday 14 April 1933, the socialisation supporters were outnumbered by a four-to-one Langite majority. Despite strong support from the Miners Federation delegates and the Australian Railways Union, socialisation suffered an irrevocable defeat.⁶² In his official report to the conference, secretary Graves began the attack by claiming the Units were 'dominated by Communistic influence'.⁶³ The report was passed by an overwhelming majority, disbanding the Units for their 'disruptive activities'.⁶⁴ Without irony, the socialisation of credit was also confirmed as the immediate policy of the ALP.⁶⁵ These events effectively removed any claim to legitimate status which the Units could use to continue their propaganda and organising activities. The Unit leadership still viewed the mass-based ALP as the only effective vehicle for socialism, and yet their movement was now denied any legitimate status by the factional power-group around Lang. This presented the leadership with an ideological and strategic inconsistency which played itself out in the internal affairs of the Units. As Martin would say;

And now what? It is hard to see what faces us – for the outcome of this revolt has been that Lang through 'Labor Daily' has again triumphed and sits squarely in saddle and further socialist impulse has received a severe set back and maybe it has been destroyed, though I'm hopeful that such is not the case.⁶⁶

Figure 3. Bloody But Unbowed

Socialisation Call, vol. 2, no. 8, April 1933Courtesy author's private collection

The Socialisation Movement Collapses 1933–34

All through the campaign in the lead up to the 1933 Easter conference serious political differences had emerged for the group. Some have asserted that these divisions were a manifestation of a split within the Units between 'democratic socialists' and 'revolutionary socialists'.⁶⁷ Others have laid blame at the feet of sectarian CPA members and crypto-communists, active in the educational classes of the Units.⁶⁸ Whilst both of these may have been long-term factors in the internal divisions, it appears from Martin's diaries that the divisions were particularly concerned with leadership issues and internal tactical questions on the relationship of the Units to a now antagonistic ALP executive.⁶⁹ With the official ruling from the annual conference backed with the threat of expulsion, these internal differences became intense and bitter. Martin's view was clear on these matters, and was reflected in the opinion of other socialisation leaders.

In general we have arrived at [the] conclusion that we should work within [the] Party; that to form a separate party would be suicide – though we find it difficult to suggest [the appropriate] 'machinery' to maintain socialisation work. There is said to be a strong body of opinion for a break away and we will have difficulty in restraining them.⁷⁰

Immediately after the Easter conference the socialisation forces called a rank-and-file conference to determine the future of their movement. The democratic socialist leadership of the Units, including Martin, went into the weekend conference committed to keeping the Units, and the Unit activists, within the ALP. Around 200 gathered for the conference on 22 April 1933 at a Redfern hall owned by the Boot Trades Union. Martin chaired the early sessions of the conference, but was absent for the evening session which produced political fireworks. Bitter debate ensued on the question of remaining within the ALP. The 'revolutionary' group proposed maintaining the Units in full existence, affiliating with other working-class organisations, and consulting with the ARU and Miners Federation with a view to forming a new Industrial Labor Party. The latter proposal would have invited certain expulsion from the ALP by the executive. Despite the protestations of McNamara and Kilburn, the proposal was adopted. Disgusted by proceedings and offended by the tone, Jim Maloney, the Secretary of the Boot Trades Union, closed the hall and the Conference broke up in disorder. The Units had proved themselves internally exhausted. Martin believed that the Inner Group would 'be chuckling mightily for the Socialisation forces have, it seems, liquidated themselves'.⁷¹ A socialist perspective was far from dead in NSW Labor, with Martin at least being 'determined to carry on guerrilla warfare, having a "go" at the crooked mob whenever possible'.⁷² This would indeed be the case, as the factional struggles continued for the remainder of the decade.

The Retreat from Socialisation 1934

Lang proved a ruthless executioner of the Socialisation Units. Members who had participated in the Units or campaigned for dissident 'Independent Labor' candidates like A.C. Willis in the Bulli by-election were expelled from the ALP.⁷³ The Unit leadership appear to have held some hope that Willis' authority could be used to either lever Lang out of the leadership or to at least create another source of legitimate authority within the parliament. His defeat, in what was a stronghold for the Miners Federation, demonstrated the extent of Lang's mobilising ability. This was recognised by Martin who appreciated the significance of the defeat, stating in black-humour that: 'it will soon be axiomatic that you cannot buck the machine!'⁷⁴ The Inner Group also pursued those who stayed within the ALP, with Martin being beaten by Langite Joseph Lamaro for preselection for the federal seat of South Sydney in what Martin believed to be a doctored ballot.⁷⁵ Martin was bluntly told where he stood by Langite, Jack Beasley.

Met Jack Beasley MHR in Martin Place at 2:15pm today. He stopped me and asked me whatever was idea in supporting socialisation fight – he tackled me strongly. He repeatedly asked – did we want a new leader? I would not be drawn on this line, asserting that the question was not one of leader. Then he inferred that I wished to jump to a position of authority – apparently he thought, I aimed at leadership (!) and it is clear from what he said that some ... are spreading that idea. ... [H]e kept asking what do you fellows want? What is your programme? – and that something definite must be stated etc. This is always difficult to controvert but I said we stood for full socialisation. This he replied would mean defeat – and I said it would probably mean political wilderness for 15 years. ... It is clear that Inner Group are fighting nastily and they are certainly pitching for me!⁷⁶

Martin's response to the crushing of the Units and these personal defeats was to clearly separate himself from active participation in politics, and pursue work and further studies, commencing a law degree at Sydney University. The intensity of the workload of combined full-time study and full-time employment made Martin's political activity erratic and in cases non-committal. A depressive attitude also comes through his diary entries for this period. As Martin stated:

What is to be done? If we continue, then tis expulsion. And can we do anything worth while by defying them, being expelled, and thus separating ourselves from Party members. I'm inclined to think not – it might be tactical for us to disband – and to keep a kind of subterranean organisation going. I think this could be done and with a fair measure of success.⁷⁷

Secret meetings were called on 14 and 21 June 1935 'in connection with advancing socialist thought in [the] ALP and endeavouring to lead towards [the] overthrowing of the present gang in control'.⁷⁸ Around 12 of the Socialisation Unit leadership attended with Bill McNamara and Don MacSween being the 'prime movers' behind the meeting, although Martin asserts that he was consulted beforehand. Martin described the aims and proposed methods of this reformation:

[I]t is proposed only to admit those whom we can trust. In general the idea is to do socialist research – spread it by whatever means we can find – and, when desirable, to work out and initiate moves against the present control. The question of a name is difficult as it is anticipated that the Executive will ban it if and when they find out about it. Of course, it's all very nebulous, but it is an attempt to do something in this period of despond in the movement.⁷⁹

The socialisation supporters viewed change within the ALP as now possible only through clandestine, secret organisation, facilitating dissent where it occurred but not openly organising around a political program. In effect a cadre Left faction was to be formed. While Martin was correct in identifying the limitations inherent in the new grouping, the assembling of the socialisation supporters did, at the very least, ensure that the main agitators for socialist change within the ALP remained connected and prepared should the internal party situation change.

The group named itself the 'Labour Research Association', an innocuous title reminiscent of the British Fabian 'Labour Research Department', run by G.D.H. Cole and which produced practical research for trade unions and other movement bodies.⁸⁰ Like its British counterpart, the Labour Research Association formed two research committees, one of which was chaired by Martin with the aim of producing 'a few pamphlets'.⁸¹ Others who were involved wanted the organisation to make some 'immediate attacks on the Inner Group', an idea that Martin saw as 'a desirable objective' but one which would lead to a 'dissipation of our forces' due to the low level of resistance to Lang within the movement generally. The idea that the old Unit leadership could capture the executive of the party still had currency for some. Instead the Labour Research Association (LRA) appears to have confined itself to 'fanning the flames' of dissent within the party whenever they occurred.⁸² Whilst this supporting role remained important, particularly in relation to internal party disputes, it was outside of the ALP that real opposition to Lang was building. Martin recognised this fact, and quickly dropped out of active participation in the LRA.

In investigating these new forms of resistance Martin did, however, provide an essential link between the socialisation supporters and the emerging industrial opposition from communists and militants in the unions. In coming years it would be this united action of left-wing ALP members and communist trade unionists which solidified as an alternative to the 'Inner Group', politically and organisationally. Martin would go on to play a leading role in these struggles also, riding the 'popular front' wave back into parliament in 1939 as the Industrial Labor Party candidate for Waverley.

Conclusion

What is revealed by an examination of Martin's account of the socialisation struggle, is that it provides a classical example of a rank and file struggle against a party machine, with campaigning techniques, factional manoeuvres and ideological cleavages not dissimilar to many other confrontations in the ALP. Martin's account gives us a fresh insight on the campaign and also provides us with a study in the further development of a political individual. Martin would eventually find himself placed outside of the Langite Labor Party, before helping in seizing control of the NSW Labor Party in 1939 for the left and their allies. The lessons of the socialisation fight stayed with Martin, as did the political network which continued from it, even as the ALP moved into government in New South Wales in 1941.

Nick Martin is the Director of Research at the Australian Labor Party National Secretariat in Canberra. He has a BA (Hons) and LLB, both from the Australian National University.
<Nick.Martin@cbr.alp.org.au>

Endnotes

^* This article has been peer-reviewed for Labour History by two anonymous referees. The author thanks them for their comments. The author is the grandson of C.E. Martin.

¹ MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly), the lower house of the NSW Parliament.

^2. The diaries of Clarence Edward Martin (hereafter Martin Diaries) were formerly held in the Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales but they are currently held privately. Martin's papers, 1928–1953 (hereafter Martin papers), are held in the Mitchell Library (ML).

^3. R. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism: A Study in the Great Depression, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1971.

^4. Cooksey asserts that the young leadership of the Socialisation Units eventually included E.A. Barker, Q. Booth, J.O.A. Bourke, R. Downing, W. Evans, J. Hughes, J. Kidd, J. Kilburn, W. McNamara, D. MacSween, C.E. Martin, C.A. Morgan, J.J. Maloney, F. O'Neill, T. Payne, J.H. Sydney, S. Taylor, J.B. Sweeney and A.W. Thompson. See Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 19, footnote 16.

^5. M. Dixson, Greater than Lenin?: Lang and Labor 1916–32, University of Melbourne, Political Science Dept, [Parkville, Vic.], 1977.

^6.Labor Daily, 5 April 1928.

^7.Labor Daily, 10 April 1928.

^8.Labor Daily, 15 April 1927.

^9. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 7.

^10. B. Nairn, The Big Fella: Jack Lang and the Australian Labor Party 1891–49, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1986, p. 219.

^11. A motion was carried to establish a Labor College: 'That the establishment of Labor Colleges for the teaching of economics, political science and allied subjects, based upon acceptance of the class struggle, be given every support and assistance by the ALP executive and Labor governments; further that all state schools teachers, who realise their working class position, be called upon to teach wherever possible in accordance with Labor ideals and traditions and to link up with the Labor Educational League'. Labor Daily, 1 April 1929.

^12. For a detailed look at Martin's life, see Paul White, C.E. Martin: A Political Biography, thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Economics of Sydney University, 1986.

^13. Martin Diaries (1929–31), 11 December 1930, p. 274.

^14. Parliamentary Debates, Session 1930–31, 18 December 1930, p. 572, ML, MLK 04389 - MLK 04390.

^15. C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney University Press in association with Oxford University Press, Sydney, 1970, pp. 228–231.

^16. Martin Diaries (1929–31), 18 February 1931, p. 300.

^17.Sun, 1 May 1931.

^18.Bathurst Advocate, 29 January 1931.

^19.Sydney Morning Herald, 18 February 1931.

^20.Daily Guardian, 29 January 1931.

^21. Martin Diaries (1929–31), 4 February 1931, p. 292.

^22.Cowra Free Press, 26 June 1931.

^23.Ibid.

^24. The proceedings were reported in the papers the next day. Sun, 1 May 1931.

^25.Labor Daily, 10 February 1930.

^26. These included; J. Kilburn, W. McNamara, D. Grant, E.A. Barker, E.E. Cook, F. Saidy, Mrs L. Lynch. On the 1931 Committee Jock Garden and other 'Inner Group' members would be elected to monitor the activities of the Units. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 8.

^27.Socialisation Call, vol. 1, no. 3, 1931.

^28. Martin was the driving force behind the reconstitution of the Sydney University Labor Club. Despite sometimes violent opposition from right-wing and 'apolitical' elements on the campus, along with other activists and alumni, he successfully convened the first meetings of the club on 18 February 1931. Martin Diaries (1929–31), p. 300. The club formed its own Socialisation Unit on 9 May 1931. Martin Diaries (1931–32), p. 1. The Sydney University Labor Club continues to operate to this day.

^29. These moves appear to have engendered fear amongst some parliamentarians that the Units would challenge un-cooperative members for pre-selection. Very few elected representatives participated regardless of the directives of the conference. See Socialisation Call, vol. 1, no. 4, 1931.

^30. Martin Diaries (1929–31); 16 March 1931, p. 314; 24 March 1931, p. 317; 27 March 1931, p. 321. Martin Diaries (1931–32), 17 May 1931, p. 5; 5 June 1931, p. 21; 22 June 1931, p. 33; 7 July 1931, p. 39; 5 August 1931, p. 63; 1 September 1931, p. 80.

^31. Martin Diaries (1929–31), 16 March 1931, p. 314. Martin Diaries (1931–32), 10 May 1931, p. 2.

^32. Martin Diaries (1931–32), 10 May 1931, p. 2.

^33. Australian Labor Party, State of New South Wales, Platform and Rules, Trades Hall, Goulburn St, Sydney, 1931, printed by Labor Daily Ltd.

^34. The Unit leadership declared in support of the moves: 'We, as a section of the ALP, stand as far as is humanly possible for the peaceful and orderly realisation of the only solution of today's evils – Socialism, and on that basis, in conclusion, now call upon all sections and all individuals in the Labor Movement [sic] to intensify their organisation, agitation, and propaganda for Socialisation – on the job, in the Unions, the ALP branches, the Socialisation Units, the unemployed, the homes; at all places and at all times possible – fully confident that the deep morality and historical appropriateness of our message of Hope will compel the masses to follow us, through suffering and self-sacrifice, if needs be, to the next great stage of Humanity's Progress through the Age – the World-wide Fraternity of Socialist Peoples'. Undated notes from a WEA Presentation, from the Martin papers, ML MSS 4947 MLK 04387.

^35. Quoted in Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 39.

^36. The AWU were closely aligned with Scullin's Federal ALP. Martin Diaries (1929–31), April 1931, p. 329.

^37. Martin Diaries (1929–31), April 1931, p. 329.

^38.Socialisation Call, vol 1, no 10, 1931.

^39. Martin Diaries (1931–32), 5 June 1931, p. 33.

^40. Martin Diaries (1931–32), July 1931, p. 40.

^41. Martin Diaries (1931–32), 15 September 1932, p. 320.

^42. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 64.

^43. Bill McNamara and Martin met repeatedly with delegates from the Federal ALP including Clarrie Fallon (AWU), A.A. Calwell (Victoria), and Percy Coleman MHR (Federal ALP President). Martin Diaries (1932–34), July 1933, p. 170.

^44. See G. Freudenberg, Cause for Power: The Official History of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Labor Party, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1991, p. 179.

^45. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 30 January 1933, p. 40.

^46. Martin arranged a slot with the support of Garden and the advertiser, Lands. Bill McNamara was brought into negotiations on Martin's behalf to swing the director of the station, E.R. Voigt, into support. See M.H. Ellis, The Red Road: The Story of the Capture of the Lang Party by Communists, Instructed from Moscow, Sydney and Melbourne Publishing Co, Sydney, 1932, p. 238, and Martin Diaries (1932–34), 12 January 1933, p. 24.

^47. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 30 January 1933, p. 40.

^48.Socialisation Call, vol. 2, no. 8, 1932.

^49.Socialisation Call urged Unit members and the many thousand of 2KY listeners to tune into the session offering 'a fertile field for all "Call" readers to clear up the obscurities in their own minds and those of the aforesaid listeners'. Socialisation Call, vol. 2, no. 8, 1932.

^50. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 19 February 1933, p. 62.

^51. E.M. Higgins, David Stewart and the WEA, Workers Education Association of NSW, Sydney, 1953, p. 60.

^52. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 25 March 1933, p. 99.

^53.Socialisation Call, vol. 2, no. 8, 1932.

^54. Diary entries March 1933 in Martin Diaries (1932–34), pp. 80–92.

^55. Martin alleges that this was despite the actions of NSW ALP secretary J.J. Graves in denying the group official status for the purposes of conference elections; Martin Diaries (1932–34), 19 February 1933, p. 62.

^56. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 25 February 1933, p. 67.

^57. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 16 February 1933, p. 52.

^58. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 2 March 1933, p. 76.

^59. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 23 February 1933, p. 68.

^60. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 16 March 1933, p. 92.

^61. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 17 February 1933, p. 58.

^62. The ARU had been one of the few unions to move consistently for socialism. By 1931 the leadership had issued plans for 'The Organisation of Transport Workers for Socialism' which included the formation of Socialisation Units, district socialist committees. See Martin papers, ML MSS, MLK 04387 - MLK 04290.

^63. Nairn, The Big Fella, p. 268. See also Socialisation Call, vol. 2, no. 8, 1932.

^64. Quoted in Freudenberg, Cause for Power, p. 179.

^65. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 80.

^66. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 17 April 1933, p. 111.

^67. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p. 81.

^68. See for a discussion of this work the unpublished memoir of J. Normington-Rawling, a former communist leader who turned on the CPA in the 1940s. Held in the Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (NBAC), holding number N57/2, p. 512.

^69. In early February Martin convened a meeting of the main socialisation figures including Jack Sweeny, Gen Lynch, Sid Davis, Jack Pickard, Bill McNamara, Jack Hughes, Don MacSween, and the rebel group Tom Maddock, Clarrie Campbell, and Jim Quinton. Martin recalls that the rebel group 'seem determined to fight the socialisation committee and Billy McNamara in particular... [T]hey believe that it should definitely be an anti-Lang fight and that it will certainly become one'. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 17 February 1933, p. 58.

^70. Martin Diaries (1932–34), Thursday 20 April 1933, p. 114.

^71. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 24 April 1933, p. 120.

^72. Martin Diaries (1932–34), 11 March 1934, p. 322.

^73. The Units actively threw themselves into the campaign to elect former Miners Federation secretary and MLC (Member of the Legislative Council), Albert Willis, to the federal seat of Bulli in late 1934. Conducted in a South Coast electorate, where the Miners Federation was strong, many socialisation supporters believed that high profile union candidate Willis could beat the 'Inner Group' candidate, 70-year-old J.T. Sweeny. Willis failed and as a result many activists were expelled by the NSW executive. Nairn, The Big Fella, p. 269.

^74. Martin Diaries (1932–34), Monday 5 June 1933, p. 192.

^75. Martin Diaries (1932–34), Monday 1 January 1934, p. 290.

^76. Martin Diaries (1932–34), Thursday 24 August 1934, p. 209. (MHR indicates Member of the House of Representatives, the federal lower house.)

^77. Martin Diaries (1932–34), Sunday 27 August 1933, p. 212.

^78. Martin Diaries (1934–37), June 23 1935, p. 157.

^79.Ibid.

^80. M. Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, Stanford University, California, 1964, p. 186.

^81. Martin Diaries (1934–37), 4 August 1935, p. 171.

^82. This was more than rhetoric on Martin's part. In August 1935 the LRA was involved in supporting dissidents in Marrickville ALP branches (including C.C. Lazzarini MLA) who were attempting to call a 'rank-and-file conference' to discuss rules changes within the Party structures which would remove significant power from the leader Lang, and restore the role of local branches in a number of areas. See Martin Diaries (1934–37), 18 August 1935, p. 177.

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