Ann Jones | 'Sindicalistas Australianos': A Case Study of International Trade Unionism | Labour History, 93

'Sindicalistas Australianos': A Case Study of International Trade Unionism

Ann Jones^*

In March 1974 a delegation of Australian trade unionists travelled to Chile to investigate the situation under the newly installed military government. Labour historians have largely ignored this episode. This article will examine the events both leading up to and including the delegation, and restore them to their rightful place in the historical record. It will also frame the delegation as an example of internationalism in progress rather than an illustration of any one model of internationalism.

The Pinochet regime began its domination of Chile with a bloody coup d'état on 11 September 1973. In a military strike on the Presidential palace the Chilean military turned on its own government, incarcerating and later torturing and killing many of its own citizens. The shots that were fired in Santiago were heard around the world. Thousands of miles away in Sydney, a group of Australians began a protest against the overthrow of Chile's democratically elected government. They opposed the violence against civilians and the intervention of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the affairs of another country. Among those Australians stung into action in 1973 was a group of trade unionists. Their involvement, and commitment to the people of Chile, led to the formation of a delegation of Australian unionists which travelled to Chile in 1974 – one of the first groups of foreigners allowed into the country after the coup. Supported by rank-and-file unionists, the five Australian trade unionists negotiated their way into a country under a state of siege.

The article which follows has three aims. Firstly, although the actions of the Australian trade unionists captured attention and imagination around the world, they have been largely forgotten by labour historians. By exploring both the events leading up to the despatch of the delegation and those occurring during the delegation's visit to Chile, this article seeks to restore this initiative to its rightful place in the historical record. Secondly, the article offers an important case study of international trade unionism: 'Case studies of international solidarity actions are so rare', write Peter Waterman and Jane Wills in their recent book, 'that they tend to be repeatedly reproduced, as if the references or cases speak for themselves and do not require critical examination or reinterpretation'.¹ The 1974 delegation to Chile provides a fresh example of trade union internationalism and solidarity. Thirdly, the article endeavours to respond to Waterman and Wills' call for a 'critical examination' of such acts of international solidarity. By reconstructing the events surrounding the delegation's formation and visit, the article analyses whether the action is classifiable within the models of Industrial National or Social Movement Unionism.

Industrial National Unionism or Social Movement Unionism?

While there are numerous models of trade union organisation and internationalism² for our purposes the two most illuminating constructs, notwithstanding their apparent mutual exclusivity, are those of Industrial National Unionism and Social Movement Unionism. Industrial National Unionism could be classified as the interrelation of national trade union bodies on almost purely industrial topics. It is a hierarchical and structured form of unionism. Local level branches affiliate through regions to a national level, which in turn affiliates to a national representative organisation such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). These national level bodies then take part in international organisations of unions. Thus, organisations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Labour Organisation and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) provide national organisations with the chance to communicate, meet and organise through a hierarchical and bureaucratic system. In general, the self-perpetuating bureaucracy of these organisations channelled their support into their own form of internationalism above all others, including more grass roots approaches. Where Industrial National Unionism did stray outside the industrial sphere, it tended to follow a more paternalistic aid model promoting a structured hierarchy in unionism and politics.³

Commentators have debated the worth of various labels for describing union moves to include activities outside the industrial and workplace spheres. A consensus on the terminology and its exact connotations does not seem to exist. Below I attempt to synthesise the idea of a more socially orientated union under the most prominent label: Social Movement Unionism. George De Martino referred to 'Social Unionism' as that which pursues social justice in and out of the union context.⁴ Social Movement Unionism, the term originally coined by Peter Waterman and later used by Kim Moody, has had more detailed scholarly attention.⁵ This new unionism highlighted the social responsibility of labour and had strong links to the New Left movements in the 1960s. Social Movement Unionism allowed trade unions to create practical relationships with other community groups in order to achieve their extra-industrial goals. In some instances, Social Movement Unions functioned in a hierarchical or vertical manner, as was the case with Industrial National Unionism. However, such organisations could also have a horizontal orientation. Shop-floor alliances across borders or participating in direct contact with New Left or social movement groups were (and are) acceptable and encouraged in Social Movement Unionism, and networks take precedent over organisational hierarchy.⁶ Social Movement Unions undertook the lobbying of government and regulatory agencies and also the provision of practical aid, grass roots actions, delegations and campaigns to raise awareness.⁷ It follows that Social Movement Unions would use a 'networking' approach to social movements across borders. The international nature of social movements, facilitated by the ease of communication and travel, therefore pulls the actions of social movement unions into the international arena.

The 1960s and 1970s saw radical left trade unions in Australia begin to defy what Meredith and Verity Burgmann have called the 'caricatures of trade unions as bastions of homophobia, machismo, racism, ethnocentrism and ecological irresponsibility'.⁸ The Chile Solidarity Campaign was established on the back of the solid activism beyond the industrial sphere during the 1960s and early 1970s, when union activities occurred in support of peace, non-violence, anti-Vietnam war, women's liberation and the anti-Greek military junta. Labelled 'New Left', these movements focussed on 'personal liberation, participatory democracy, the struggle against racism and sexism, direct forms of political activity, community decision making and environmentalism'.⁹ Academics, students, women and previously politically inactive people were mobilised around the idea of a better society. Some radical left unions took on New Left concerns and became centres of activism for various social issues, from aboriginal rights to the environmental impact of urban development. The delegation to Chile thus arose not only out of a strong sense of international unionism, stemming in part from a strong history of Industrial National Unionism, but also from the new interest in social movements and support of the self-determinist sector of the left.

Self-determination was at the core of the euro-communist idea: that is, the freedom for each country to follow its own path to communism. The euro-communist shift in Australia also encouraged participation in and cooperation with the movements of the New Left as a way of popularising their cause. This contributed to some unions' move outside the industrial sphere, especially those whose upper hierarchy was in some way connected with the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). For the purposes of this article, the most important of these was the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union (AMWU). This ideological realignment also increased a feeling of solidarity with the Allende Government, which provided a practical example of a country beginning to follow its own path to socialism. These interlocking factors predisposed the AMWU to exhibit a form of Social Movement Unionism as it became more involved with the fledgling Chile Solidarity Campaign.

Initiative and Opposition

In 1973 the Allende government of Chile was implementing its platform of socialist reforms, which included the nationalisation of large industries, reforms to the health and education systems and a popular program of free milk for children. Allende's program of reforms was called 'La vía chilena al socialismo' (the Chilean way to socialism), a path towards socialism particular to the Chilean situation. These reforms prompted hostility towards Allende's Government from several sources: the political right wing in Chile, multinational companies with interests in Chile, landowners, and even the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church and members of the Popular Unity government. The manipulation of the Chilean political and economic situation by CIA and multinational companies such as International Telephone and Telegraph began before Allende's election and intensified during his presidency. This external intervention contributed to political instability in Chile, which ultimately led to the Allende government's downfall. The extreme left and right wings started to rebel against Allende in congress. Brian Loveman later commented that 'the most critical factor of all in the failure of the Allende administration was bad politics and unrealistic economic policies,' not to mention the USA's support and training of the Chilean military.¹⁰ Of course, there was considerable disagreement as to the reasons for the downfall of the Popular Unity Government, and this was debated in full by the various elements of the Left in Australia.

Allende died on the day of the coup. On that day alone there were 15,000 detentions,¹¹ the first victims of a long and brutal dictatorship. During the 17 years of the military regime, 100,000 people were imprisoned, and thousands more were abducted and murdered.¹² As Alan Angell, Director of the Latin American Centre at Oxford has argued, 'images from the days following the 11 of September flooded the screens and newspapers around the world', burning images of the detentions and bombings into the minds of the public.¹³ The images and news of the repression provoked an outcry from people and groups with an interest in the political left throughout the world.

Groups pledging solidarity with the Chilean people emerged rapidly all over the world. In Australia, trade unionists were essential to the Chilean solidarity movement: throughout the dictatorship one union or another provided a firm base of support for solidarity activities and were among the most committed to the Solidarity Committees. There were at least 30 solidarity groups formed over the period of the dictatorship in Australia. Actions taken by Australian unions included petitions, letter writing campaigns, aid to refugees, fundraising, hosting exiled Chilean politicians and other significant figures, and media campaigns. Major actions were taken on the waterfront, where the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) black banned all cargo to and from Chile. The export most affected was wheat. Following the coup, Chile's share of Australian wheat exports fell from seven per cent to zero.¹⁴ However, one of the most noteworthy of all the actions taken by Australians was a delegation to Chile undertaken in 1974 specifically by trade unions.

While the union most involved in organising the delegation was the AMWU, cooperation and support was also forthcoming from the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Union, the International Metalworkers Federation and the Chilean Democratic Secretariat in Rome as well as other Australian unions.¹⁵ In 1973 the AMWU was entering a period of relative prosperity, with a new building being constructed in Sydney and various new professional administrative positions being created. These additional positions provided more staff resources for the union, which, in turn, enabled both closer attention to industrial issues and greater advocacy on social-justice issues, such as the Chile Campaign.

In Australia trade unions provided the essential support and resource base for the Australian Chile Solidarity Campaign. For many of the unions, the Chile Campaign was neither their only involvement with international causes nor their first. Unions had previously been involved in the Anti-Apartheid, the anti-Greek military junta, the Spanish Civil War, the Indonesian War of Independence, and the Anti-Vietnam war movements. Chile Solidarity followed precedents set by these previous international campaigns and commitment to the campaign was boosted by the strong anti-United States of America and anti-imperialist sentiment of the time.¹⁶ The Chilean Solidarity Campaign was, however, the first large-scale Australian union involvement in a Latin American campaign and the longest solid commitment to an international solidarity movement by Australian unions.

The formation of the delegation was prompted by a throwaway remark during a visit to Australia by the president of the Chilean national airline, Lan Chile. In November 1973, General Germán Stuardos, newly appointed president of Lan Chile, became the first Chilean Government official to enter Australia after the coup. Stuardos was a 'debonair' man who 'muster[ed] all what [sic] urbanity he could to defend the regime and its odious doings, already well known'.¹⁷ According to journalist Derry Hogue writing in the Australian, Stuardos had been a General in the Chilean Air Force during Allende's government, but had resigned shortly before the coup as a protest against Allende's policies.¹⁸ Stuardos visited Australia acting in the interest of the military junta: petitioning for Lan Chile landing rights and justifying the Chilean military's actions because of the 'hatred' and 'extreme' policies that Allende's government had implemented in Chile. In 1973 Lan Chile still only flew commercially to Tahiti, forcing passengers to connect with other airlines in order to travel on to Australia, so the general was keen to make a good impression.¹⁹ A press conference held for Stuardos exposed him to questioning on what was occurring in Chile. In the days prior to the media conference, AMWU Publicity Officer Henry McCarthy and unionist Steve Cooper (who had spent time in Chile in 1973 prior to the coup) had agreed that journalists should be encouraged to question Stuardos about the abuse of trade union rights. General Stuardos' off-hand response to one such question produced an opportunity. He said 'we will be lucky if union officials from your country come to Chile and see what has happened and how much happier the people are now'.²⁰ Cooper and McCarthy had discussed the possibility of a delegation and decided it was a viable option.²¹

Seizing the opportunity, Cooper, who was representing the Miscellaneous Workers Union (MWU), McCarthy, and James Baird, National Organiser of the AMWU, banded together to become the 'Committee on the Delegation to Chile'.²² McCarthy rang the regional manager of Lan Chile in Australia and demanded that a delegation of unionists be able to see fellow unionists and jails in Chile in order to assess 'the happiness' of the Chilean people as stipulated in Stuardos' invitation. The invitation was formally extended to the AMWU and five other unions as selected by the ACTU. Lan Chile agreed to pay the costs of return flights for the unionists from Tahiti to Chile, with 17 January 1974 being set as the departure date.²³

Even before its departure, the organisation of the delegation illustrated the transformation of these trade unions' attitudes to internationalism. By taking direct non-vertical action (that is, not through the vertical structure of the international organisations) the unions began to illustrate some aspects of what Waterman would later call International Social Movement Unionism. However, the establishment of a formal committee and the involvement of the ACTU, a national body connected with the ICFTU, indicates that the Industrial National framework was still a strong influence on union actions. The difficulty in categorising the delegation according to the models highlights the problems with labelling such pliable interactions.

The WWF and the Seamen's Union of Australia (SUA) strongly opposed the delegation. The SUA sent representatives to every meeting discussing the delegation, and consistently raised their opposition to it. Some members of the AMWU National Council also opposed the delegation at first, but it was agreed that if the international organisations – the ICFTU, WFTU and the Catholic International Trade Union Organization – supported the delegation, then a consensus for support would be reached. The International organisations telexed their support within an hour of the requests.²⁴

Those who objected generally did so on the grounds that taking up the invitation of the military junta implied complicity with fascism, imperialism and capitalism. The Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE) was firmly against sending a delegation of unionists as guests of the military junta.²⁵ The Building Workers Industrial Union (BWIU) also felt that the acceptance of the invitation might lend respectability to the junta.²⁶ The maritime unions' opposition was based on their unwillingness to work with the Chilean military to express solidarity. They held the view that working within the framework set by the capitalist world would only add to its legitimacy. They also believed that the military regime would take the delegation 'around like circus ponies', showing them only the places where everything was unaffected by the coup.²⁷ Their objection was not due purely to the type of international unionism that the AMWU was starting to advocate, but to a nuanced ideological difference. Those in opposition to the delegation were generally anti-revisionist and therefore anti-CPA. The union movement and all Chile Solidarity activities were influenced by the divisions of the left, not only between the CPA and the Socialist Party of Australia (SPA) but also the Spartacist League, among others.²⁸

Despite the opposition, the Committee decided to pursue the invitation to see first hand the situation under military rule in Chile. They sought guarantees from the Chilean Government that would ensure the safety of the delegation's members and the Chileans with whom they hoped to come into contact. As detailed in an official press statement from the AMWU, the guarantees sought by the committee included access to prison areas, freedom to interview people without surveillance from authorities, no victimisation of those visited, and safe conduct for the delegation itself.²⁹

Although the Chilean Government was willing to give all manner of assurances verbally, the Australian office of Lan Chile received a cable from the Chilean Government stating that it 'did not consider it appropriate to give written confirmation of the guarantee[s]'.³⁰ With no assurances of the safety of the delegates or those with whom they may come into contact, the delegation was deferred. The Australians refused to move without written assurances, and Lan Chile and the Chilean authorities refused to accede to the demands.

The circumstances of the standoff over the delegation's demands provide important pointers as to whether the delegation is best understood as an instance of Industrial National Unionism or Social Movement Unionism. Clearly, a union acting outside the hierarchy of the Industrial National structures but not dealing with community or grass roots groups does not fit snugly in either model of unionism discussed here. The unionists did not act through their own national hierarchy (though the actors were not necessarily at shop-level), but they were unable to confer directly with grass roots unionists in Chile. They were thus forced to deal with Chilean governmental and corporate structures. Further, they were forced to confer with and gain support of international organisations before their delegation could take place.

As the month of January 1974 came and went, McCarthy, Baird and Cooper began to mobilise the support of trade unionists and the wider community. The AMWU distributed a press statement titled 'What is the Chilean Junta Up To?' which outlined the fight to get to Chile, and some of the occurrences within Chile that the delegation proposed to investigate.³¹ The statement also urged unions to take action. It reported on events developing overseas, urging unions to fully support the WFTU's International Day of Solidarity with the Chilean People that was due to take place on 12 February 1974. However, in a pre-emptive move at 6am on Saturday 9 February, 1974, a Lan Chile flight was black-banned at Kingsford Smith Airport in Sydney: 'When the plane landed in Sydney on Saturday morning' said Grimshaw, secretary of the NSW branch of the Transport Workers Union of Australia, 'we decided to take industrial action to show them we were fair dinkum'.³² The Transport Workers Union, with support from the AMWU, WWF, SUA and other unions, refused to touch the plane. The plane remained unfuelled and unloaded. Both the passengers and their families waiting in the terminal resented the union action. Commonwealth Organiser of the AMWU George Aitkins noted the irony:

The 138 passengers refused to leave the aircraft for 31/2 hours unless their baggage was unloaded. Some 300 relatives and friends demonstrated outside the Custom Hall by slow clapping and chanting 'chasalga' [sic] ('let them free') referring of course to the passengers but ironically the protest of the transport workers was to get the junta to 'let the Chilean trade union and political prisoners free'.³³

Even though the SUA, WWF and other smaller SPA-aligned unions did not want the delegation to go to Chile, they supported the black ban of the Boeing 707 as a separate action. The black ban was cited as 'possibly the first direct action taken in defence of Chileans by workers in another country'.³⁴ The Australian workers had moved rapidly and conclusively. While the plane lay idle on the tarmac, Lan Chile and AMWU representatives, Henry McCarthy and George Aitkins, met to negotiate its servicing. They used the black ban to highlight their opposition to the military government of Chile, and also as leverage to get the Chilean government to grant their demands. They succeeded, with the Chileans being forced to accede to the demands of the trade union delegation. After a delay of 22 hours, the aircraft left Sydney on 10 February 1974.³⁵

Following the boycott, 13 unions temporarily presented a united front against the Pinochet Regime. They endorsed a pamphlet that focussed on the black ban of the aircraft and the abuse of workers' rights by the military junta in Chile. The delegation was hardly mentioned. This was a concession to the SUA, WWF and AFULE, all of which supported the boycott of the plane but opposed the sending of a delegation. The alliance of the unions here demonstrates a blend of the two types of internationalism. The flyer's title is an open declaration of solidarity with 'oppressed people' but the text is focussed on trade union rights. This could demonstrate the overlap of industrial and non-industrial activities that unions and unionists at this time took as a matter of course. It could also be viewed as a manifestation of the socialist ideal of a world- wide working class.

Twelve Days in Chile

Leaving the strategic and ideological dispute between the Australian unions behind, the delegation set off for Chile via Tahiti on 23 March 1974. They would spend twelve days in Chile. The delegates were Jim Baird (AMWU), Steve Cooper (Miscellaneous Workers), Ron Masterson (Plumbers and Gasfitters Union), Brian McMahon (Transport Workers Union), Henry McCarthy (Publicity Officer AMWU) and Carmen Bull (translator and Argentinean born wife of prominent CPA member and WWF Organiser, Tas Bull).³⁶ No member of the SPA was a delegate.³⁷ Their activities in Chile included a meeting with the Minister for the Interior, General Oscar Bonilla, a visit to a detention centre and factories, and meetings with ex-Minister of Labour Luis Figueroa, and with underground and stranded trade unionists. Steve Cooper describes their arrival in Chile in his notes:

Night. Santiago patterned with lights as we land, full of forebodings. The rest of the passengers leave. The plane is well out in the airport. We descend the stairs and cluster at the bottom. It is very dark with a thin, swirling mist.

Out of the mist some soldiers emerge, walking towards us. One is dapper with a moustache. Major Figueroa. But he smiles and politely asks about our trip, and we can relax. We sense he is 'O.K.' given that the city is otherwise crawling with psychotic killers in uniform.

So far, so good.³⁸

Oscar Bonilla Bradanovic was an Army General, a co-conspirator with Pinochet who later met his death in a suspect helicopter accident in 1975.³⁹ Dressed in uniform, he greeted the Australian unionists by saying: 'You have come from a paradise, and I have just left hell'.⁴⁰ Bonilla's idea of hell was the previous three years of government under Allende, which had represented such hope for the Australian unionists. This poorly disguised, combative mockery must have heightened the tension in the room. Led by James Baird, the Australians tried their best to extract information about the 'hell' that they had come to investigate.

The General followed his confrontational opening with an unsubstantiated claim that there was 80 per cent popular support for the military government. He then made on-the-record remarks emphasising the freedom of Australians to form their own opinion on what was happening in Chile. The interview was then opened to questions, and the Australians began to probe intensely. They sought answers regarding the detention of unionists, the conditions at the Dawson Island prison camp in Tierra del Fuego, and confirmation that torture had taken place. At this time Bonilla was still supporting the general façade of the military government: that it was a benevolent dictatorship forced to act because of the serious Marxist threat to the people of Chile and the world. Bonilla insisted that 'the objectives of the government are to reinstate democracy and normalcy'.⁴¹ A victory for the delegation eventually came when the minister gave permission for two members of the delegation, plus an interpreter, to visit the Chacabuco Detention Centre in the Atacama Desert.

A photograph of some of the delegation in their interview with General Bonilla appeared on the front page of La Patria, a Chilean newspaper under the title 'Sindicalistas Australianos'. The photo was a part of the apparent strategy of the military government to appear open and transparent to foreign visitors. The caption below the photograph tells the reader that the visit of the Australian trade unionists was not of a 'political character' and that they did not want to visit Dawson Island Detention Centre. A clipping of the article, housed in an AMWU file, is circled various times in ink, with the following words scribbled by an unknown hand: 'this is a complete lie. Thats [sic] what we went for'.⁴²

Although the delegates did not visit Dawson Island, they were granted permission to enter the Chacabuco Detention Centre. The visit was perhaps the most important aspect of the delegation's visit to Chile, although it is clear that the Australian's were also confused about the spelling of the Centre's name. Writing Spanish words and names down as they sounded resulted in distinctively Australian approach to phonetic spelling, something that recurred throughout the visit. In this case, the Chacabuco Centre was 'Chakabooka' and 'Chacabouka' in a report and 'Chacavuco' in a union newspaper.⁴³

Australian unionists meet General Oscar Bonilla.
From left: Jim Baird, Steve Cooper, an un-known member of Australian diplomatic corps, and on the right, General Bonilla.

Source: La Patria, no. 166, 26 March 1974, p. 1 (see endnote 42) Photo courtesy: Noel Butlin Archives Centre

Despite some uncertainty over the most basic information, the intense feeling of solidarity and the determination of delegates Jim Baird, Carmen Bull and Ron Masterson was obvious as they travelled deep into the Atacama Desert, where the Detention Centre was situated.⁴⁴ Chacabuco was a mining ghost town, deserted in the 1930s after the nitrates ran out. In 1974 it was surrounded by layers of fencing with wooden guard towers. The buildings were very old and dusty, but rust and decay free as a result of the dry climate in which they were situated. The freshly painted signs on the outside of the area indicated Minas: Land Mines.

To travel the 260 kilometres necessary from Tocopilla, in the north of Chile, the delegation members procured a taxi. The guards at the detention centre carried machine guns and were very cautious of the vehicle that appeared out of the desert. At the entrance to the camp, the Australians were forced to hand over their passports and the letter from Minister Bonilla which 'caused a small stir'. A guard, still carrying his machine gun, got into the car with the delegates as they drove into the camp. Since their arrival in Chile, the delegates' list of men they hoped to speak to in detention had grown to include academics, metal workers, and a number of other unionists and non-unionists. However only 20 inmates were led out into a garden area, where some small plants struggled against the elements. The men sat in a rotunda.

The inmates looked worn, but clean. They stated that they had received relatively good treatment at Chacabuco, where they were allowed to receive censored letters and possibly visitors if they had the means to travel all the way into the desert. Although the men were all held without charges, they were relatively happy to be at Chacabuco. They thought it was the best camp, used by the junta purposely to mislead foreigners investigating human rights abuses:

It was a moving situation at the end, as we decided after 11/2 hours to leave. They embraced us and gave us an emotional farewell.

The Australians walked with the men towards their barracks behind the fence:

They then halted, all trying to talk to Carmen [the only delegate present with fluent Spanish]. I think to try and convey some last minute thoughts. We bid them farewell and stood and waved as they walked back towards the wire enclosure accompanied by the group of armed guards who shepherded them through a wire gate about 12 ft. wide and 8 ft. high. They stood and continued to wave until at last they were moved towards the huts which were in rows behind the wire.⁴⁵

A metal worker pressed a piece of paper into the hand of a delegation member. Later, when the Australian read it, it said 'we expect a lot of you comrade. We look to you to tell the Australian workers of what has happened'.⁴⁶ The Australians were anxious to leave the oppressive and intense environment, and refused the commanding officer's invitation to dine. It was a tumultuous and exhausting experience for the Australians, to see 'what can only be described, with all its emotive force, as a concentration camp'.⁴⁷

To make the most of their time in Chile, the Australians split up to visit a broad range of areas. Despite this, the military chaperones succeeded in wasting time by insisting on sight seeing and picnics. The Australians held their nerve, and Jim Baird succeeded in visiting Luis Figueroa who was under the protection of the Swedish Embassy. Figueroa had been Allende's Minister for Labour and the President of the Centro Unica de Trabajadores (CUT), the peak union body in Chile. He spoke at length to the Australian unionists about the crimes of the junta and present trade union conditions in Chile.

Delegate Steven Cooper, representing the MWU, had spent time in Chile early in 1973 at a trade union conference discussing the social and political effects of transnational companies. When he returned in 1974 he decided to revisit some of the factories where he had been a guest on his earlier visit. Cooper's report of his visit to the 'Madeco' metal working factory relays the tension and fear that existed in such factories at the time:

Sitting around the table I saw several newly appointed 'union representatives' and only one of the old committee. I think he was a left Christian Democrat then. But I am not sure.

After greetings I asked them one question – 'When you have an industrial disagreement with the boss and you get no satisfaction after exhausting negotiation – what practical action can you take?'

Cooper knew that he had asked a difficult question. The tense silence that followed led Cooper to believe:

(1) That the position here was the same as we had already been told elsewhere – 'A strike would be suicide'.

(2) That there was an informer present.

In order to ease the tension and reduce the danger in which the workers would find themselves after Cooper's departure, they then toured the factory:

On leaving the plant, we took some photos. I conveyed to them that we were aware of the true situation and they seemed rather pleased, but relieved, when I left.⁴⁸

Cooper also conducted a meeting with some surviving members of the Textile Workers Union of Chile. This union's membership had been predominantly socialist and communist and had suffered heavy losses in the initial repression by the dictatorship. The men sitting across from Cooper shared with him some of the shocking and painful stories of the terror of life under the dictatorship. They told of the executions of workers in their workplaces and of military personnel killing families and burning houses if their searches for arms were resisted. The men indicated that 'there was a lot of torture. At the national stadium some ... were shot. They pulled out fingernails. They castrated men. They violated and raped women and pushed pisco bottles into their vaginas'.⁴⁹

The confronting stories, together with the constant tension of being under armed guard, must have placed immense strain on the delegates.⁵⁰ Yet it also drew them together. 'Saturday night. Shared a room with Ron Masterson' Cooper remarked in his notes: '[We] chatted away until shut up by rifle fire nearby. (Silly Ron tries to stick his head out to see what's going on.) If the place was bugged, they got our life stories'.⁵¹

In their report in the CPA organ, Tribune, Baird, McCarthy and Bull said that 'the delegation worked tirelessly and with an average of four hours sleep a night to see as much as possible of life in Chile'.⁵² They visited a shanty town called El Carmen. Cooper again expressed the experience of returning to the shantytown where he had been welcomed a year earlier: 'I walked on into the settlement and asked a worker about Sergio, Vincente and the twelve others I knew, and he told me they had all been shot. It just felt like the end of everything'.⁵³

Almost ten days in Chile had passed before the delegation was contacted by any of the banned, underground unions. On the 2 April 1974, a secret meeting was set up with representatives of the Chilean underground resistance. A trusted interpreter accompanied Ron Masterson, Steve Cooper and Jim Baird. One of these men wrote:

After passing through a number of back streets in Santiago, we came to an old two-storey building, part of a row of buildings, we were ushered into the front room through a hallway to meet two Chileans in their 30's or 40's. A careful exchange of information followed as to our connections and they volunteered that they were among the remaining free leaders who had been the national leadership of the metal workers.⁵⁴

The Australians learned that many unionists had been detained and murdered. The unionists could still use the building, because the Metal Workers Union had given it to the Archbishop of Santiago, thus preventing the military from confiscating it as they had done with much of the other unions' property. The men had not been home since the coup of 11 September 1973 and were in danger of being detained. They believed that if they returned home, they would not only be captured, their families would also be persecuted. The un-named, nervous men proceeded to outline the limited nature of organised opposition to the junta. 'About halfway through the discussion' continues the report:

we were joined by a very impressive man in his 40's who was introduced to us as a leader of the Building Trades Workers. From the onset, he commanded the discussion with the delegation.⁵⁵

The building worker was heavily involved in the active resistance to the military government. He accused the Chileans who had already left the country of 'running away' and was strongly focused on unifying the forces of the political left and the general populace to fight the military government. The Australian unionists expressed their desire to help the resistance in Chile, but the charismatic man replied that he was looking to political parties for support, not trade unionists. The Australians replied: organised resistance could come 'from the militant trade unionists in Australia, who would be able to look for political support from the working class parties'.⁵⁶ The nuances of such statements underscore the difficulty of classifying the unions' actions. The fight against fascism and for peace clearly fits Social Movement Unionism goals, but the language here indicates a strong connotation of the Socialist International and therefore Industrial National Unionism.

Regardless of this, the statement seemed to win the trust of the Chilean men. The interpreter present said that the conversation he heard was 'the most open and frank' discussion since the unions had been forced underground months earlier. The Australians wanted to offer the men some form of immediate assistance, so rifled in their pockets to produce all the cash they had to give to the underground unionists. It totalled US$100. The Chileans reciprocated by presenting the Australians with three albums of Victor Jara's recordings, with the meeting coming to an emotional close.

The final paragraph of the report places the meeting in an international context and underlines the connection and responsibility that the Australians felt for the Chilean workers and their situation. 'This meeting, taking place as it did in the back streets of Santiago in the bare surroundings of an empty house, for me, was a most moving experience', recalled one delegation member:

It leaves one with a deep appreciation of the dedication and sacrifices made by these workers in the struggle against the Chilean fascists and the need of those who are free to help them in their life and dealth [sic] struggle, cannot be over emphasised as a part of the world movement for Freedom and Democracy.⁵⁷

The Australians felt their efforts had not been wasted, as the underground unionists:

expressed their very deep appreciation of the delegation's visit. They felt that as a result, many trade unionists were alive or free because of the fear by the junta of adverse international publicity about their anti union actions. They said that in the few weeks prior to us arriving, there had been considerable publicity in the press and progressives everywhere were hoping that we would go back and tell the story of what was happening in Chile.⁵⁸

They did. The delegation returned home from Chile on 4 April 1974 and shortly afterwards produced a four-page broad sheet newspaper entitled 12 Days in Chile, which was published in seven languages around the world. The paper outlined the activities, findings and successes of the Australian trade union representatives, as well as relaying the message from Chilean trade unionists to take action against the military junta.⁵⁹ The paper shows some photos of the delegation in Chile, Chilean children, book burning and other acts of repression. The articles describe the tyranny of the military government, giving accounts of talks with Luis Figueroa and the underground, and visits to shanty towns and factories. They reproduced a letter from Figueroa to ACTU president Bob Hawke. They called for further protests by Australian unions. In a brief description of the delegation's achievements, they include the petitioning for the release of political prisoners Olivares and Enriquez (which occurred in the weeks after the return of the delegations). They also list the retrieval of information and discussions with everyday Chileans as 'solid achievements, going beyond what was possible for representatives of previous delegations'.⁶⁰

Luis Figueroa, ex-minister in Allende's Government, said of the delegation:

The visit of the Australian trade union delegation, and because it reached the Chilean people, is of great international importance and gives great support to the Chileans fighting against oppression, we recognise that their concern is an expression of international solidarity.⁶¹

Moreover, Jim Baird was asked to appear before the International Labour Office's Inquiry on Chile trade unions in Geneva in 1974. He was one of 19 witnesses called to present information on the violation of trade union rights in Chile. Baird was specifically invited to appear by ex-minister Figueroa and the trip was endorsed by the AMWU Commonwealth Committee. Baird spent one week waiting to be called in Geneva and all documents he supplied were cross examined by the ICFTU, WFTU and CUT as well as by junta representatives.⁶²

Conclusion

The Australian Trade Union delegation to Chile of 1974 is a significant incident in the history of trade union internationalism. It deserves a place in the historical record; a place that it has been denied until now. The trip was a result of a core group of activists, mainly associated with the AMWU. Before the Chilean coup they had already started an improvised education program using the resources of the union to reach outside the industrial sphere and even that of the international labour movement (the Industrial National framework). They acted on the ideal of an international working class which was drawn from their own political ideals. The efforts of these men 'resulted in a world-wide exposure of the suppression and victimisation of the labour movement'.⁶³ Locally, they were able to use their experiences in Chile to raise awareness and accumulate support for the initial wave of the Chilean Solidarity Campaign.⁶⁴ It is hard to determine the exact depth of reaction or effect of the delegation. It formed a part of a broad and deep web of solidarity actions that took place across the world. It is difficult to separate the effects of only one action from that web.

In trying to better understand the union actions, I have attempted to critically apply the framework of Social Movement Unionism to this event. In isolation, these events cannot be considered as an example of Social Movement Unionism, but they do point to a new, more social movement oriented, form of unionism. Moreover, the delegation of Australian unionists to Chile is an example of the suppleness of trade union internationalism. Remnants of Industrial National Unionism were exhibited in the focus on trade union and labour rights, the very formation of an official delegation and a committee to organise it, the industrial nature of the boycott at the airport, and the use of the Industrial National framework (the ACTU) in the selection of the unions to attend the delegation and the support of the ICFTU and WFTU. At the same time, the delegation anticipated aspects of what is known as Social Movement Unionism by operating horizontally and acting outside the industrial sphere. The synthesis of Industrial National and Social Movement Unionism was not a conscious decision by the organisers of the delegation, but it points to a metamorphosis of trade union internationalism. A conclusion as to the form of trade union involvement in international solidarity should not be based on isolated examples such as the 1974 delegation to Chile, but, rather, on a more comprehensive understanding of activities over time. Nevertheless, this event is a significant marker in a process of change in Australian trade union internationalism. It flags the beginning of a long relationship between Australian trade unions and the Chile Solidarity Campaign which stretches the existing frameworks of interaction out of shape. The fluid nature of the historical action described here is a reminder that models of social movements and union activities are more useful in facilitating a more nuanced understanding of labour movement history than in arriving at neat categorisations of particular organisational forms and initiatives.

Ann Jones has been researching the Chilean Solidarity Campaign for four years. She is currently edging towards completion of her PhD thesis focusing on British and Australian trade union involvement in the Chile Solidarity Campaign.
<ann.jones@anu.edu.au>

Endnotes

^* I wish to thank those who commented on early drafts of this paper: Barry Carr, Diane Kirkby, Paul Pickering. Thanks to Anna Garretson her assistance in polishing the text. I am also grateful for the comments of the journal's anonymous referees. This paper forms a part of the ongoing research for my PhD project which deals with the British and Australian Trade Union reactions to the Pinochet Regime in Chile 1973–1989.

^1. Peter Waterman and Jane Wills, 'Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalisms: Beyond the Fragments', in Peter Waterman and Jane Wills (eds), Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalisms, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2001, p. 2

^2. See for example John Logue, Toward a Theory of Trade Union Internationalism, Kent Popular Press, Kent, 1980; Marcel Van der Linden, 'Proletarian Internationalism: A Long View and Some Speculations', in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.), The Modern World-System in the Longue Duree, Paradigm, Boulder, 2004, pp. 107–31.

^3. Waterman and Wills, 'Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalisms'; Mike Press, 'The People's Movement', in Mike Press and Don Thompson (eds), Solidarity for Survival: The Don Thompson Reader on Trade Union Internationalism, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1989, pp. 28, 39; Peter Waterman, 'Trade Union Internationalism in the Age of Seattle', in Waterman and Wills (eds), Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalisms, pp. 11, 14; Logue, Toward a Theory of Trade Union Internationalism; Van Der Linden, 'Proletarian Internationalism'.

^4. George DeMartino, 'The Future of the US Labour Movement in an Era of Global Economic Integration,' in Ronaldo Munck and Peter Waterman (eds), Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalization: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, pp. 83–96.

^5. Peter Waterman, 'The New Social Unionism: A New Union Model for a New World Order', in Ronaldo Munck and Peter Waterman (eds), Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalization, pp. 247–64; Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy, Verso Press, London, 1997; Verity Burgmann, Power and Protest: Movement for Change in Australian Society, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1993.

^6. Waterman, 'The New Social Unionism'.

^7. Barry Carr, Labor Internationalism in the Era of NAFTA: Past and Present, Latin American Labor Studies Publications, Miami, 1995, p. 6.

^8. Meredith Burgmann and Verity Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union: Environmental Activism and the New South Wales Builders Labourers Federation, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1994, pp. 121–2.

^9.Ibid., p. 25.

^10. Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 259; Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993, p. 66; Samuel Chavkin, Storm Over Chile: The Junta Under Siege, Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, 1985, p. 70–1; Mark Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2000, p. 27.

^11. Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet, p. 105.

^12. Chavkin, Storm Over Chile, pp. 42, 10.

^13. Alan Angell, 'The Chilean Coup of 1973: a perspective thirty years later', El Mercurio, Santiago, 24 August 2003.

^14. 'Chile Buys Again', Wheat Australia, vol. 5, no. 4, 1972, p. 1.

^15. Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean People, Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union (AMWSU): National Office, Z26, box 5. Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (hereafter NBAC).

^16. Margo Beasley, Wharfies: A History of the Waterside Workers Federation of Australia, Hallstead Press, Sydney, 1996; Brian Fitzpatrick and Rowan Cahill, The Seamen's Union of Australia, 1872–1972: A History, Seamen's Union of Australia, Sydney, 1981; Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada, Australasian Book Society, Sydney, 1975. For example, the maritime boycott of goods to and from Chile was preceded by a boycott of the export of iron to Japan.

^17. Derry Hogue, 'Lan Chile Query', email to author, 7 March 2005. Copy in possession of author.

^18. Derry Hogue, 'Chile air line wants to land here', Australian, 22 November 1973, p. 11B.

^19. 'Report re Chile "Fact-Finding Mission"', 1974, p. 3, The Waterside Workers Federation of Australia (WWF): Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC.

^20. Hogue, 'Chile air line wants to land here', p. 11b.

^21. Steve Cooper, interview with author, 21 May 2007. Notes in possession of author.

^22. Gustavo Martin Montenegro, La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990: Un estudio histórico sobre el movimiento de solidaridad australiano durante la dictadura militar en Chile, MA thesis, Department of Spanish and Latin American Studies, University of New South Wales, 1994.

^23. 'The Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union Commonwealth Council, Re: Lan Chile Airlines', 1973, p. 2, The Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia (PGEUA): Federal Office, N113/203, NBAC.

^24. 'Fitzgibbon (WWF) to Garland (AMWU) re: For Attention Cwlth. Organiser G. Atkins', WWF: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC; Jim Baird, After the Coup: The Trade Union Delegation to Chile, 2004, Typescript in possession of author. This copy was given to author by Steve Cooper, who believes it was written as a part of Baird's memoirs before his death.

^25. 'Seamen Reject invitation for Fascist Chile General', The Seamen's Journal, vol. 29, 1974, pp. 64–5; 'Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen letter to J. Baird', 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC.

^26. 'Report re Chile "Fact-Finding Mission"', 1974, WWF: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC.

^27. Steve Cooper, Interview with author, 12 October 2005. Copy in possession of author.

^28. 'Against Political Exclusionism: For a United Front against the Repression in Chile – Spartacist League', PGEUA: Federal Office, N133/158, NBAC.

^29. 'Press Statement of the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union – 7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?', 1974, p. 5, WWF: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC.

^30. 'Press Statement by Federal Council Waterside Workers' Fed. of Aust. Re: Chile', 1973, p. 1, WWF: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC; 'The Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, Commonwealth Council, Re: Chile Investigation Team', 1974, p. 1, PGEUA: Federal Office, N133/203, NBAC.

^31. 'Press Statement of the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union – 7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?' WWF: Federal Office, N133/203, NBAC.

^32. 'Unions free plane after Chilean note', Australian, 11 February 1974, p. 3.

^33. 'Report re Chile "Fact-Finding Mission"', p. 2.

^34. 'Chilean Junta Airliner Grounded', 1974, p. 2, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC.

^35.Ibid. Baird claims that the plane was boycotted for a month. Baird, After the Coup, p. 7. Steve Cooper remembers the boycott as lasting 'about a week'. Steve Cooper, interview with author, October 2005.

^36. 'AMWU Commonwealth Council re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission', 1974, N114/932, WWF: Federal Office, NBAC.

^37. 'Against Political Exclusionism: For a United Front against the Repression in Chile', Spartacist League, PGEUA: Federal Office, N133/158, NBAC.

^38. Steve Cooper, 'Journey to Chile: 1974'. Notes transcribed to one copy on return to Australia. Copy in possession of author.

^39. 'Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile, Comite Exterior Paris: Un Fraude Escandoloso', 1980, The Australian Teachers Federation, Z219, Box 83, NBAC.

^40. 'Conversation with General Oscar Bonilla, (Minister of the Interior) and Trade Union Delegation', 1974, p. 4, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC.

^41.Ibid., p. 3.

^42. 'Sindicalistas Australianos', AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC. The original caption to this photograph reads: Con el objeto de conversar sobre materias relacionadas con la actividad sindical de nuestro país se entrevistaron en la mañana de ayer con el ministro del interior, General Oscar Bonilla, una delegación de sindicalistas australianos. Los visitantes, J. Baird, H. McCarthy, P. Maltherson, P. Mac Mahon y S. Cooper manifestaron que no viajarían a la isla Dawson por considerar que su presencia en Chile no es de carácter politico. La fotografía muestra un aspecto de la reunión.

^43. 'Chacabooka', 1974, p. 7, AMWU: National Office, Z112 Box 7, NBAC; 12 Days in Chile, 'Chile 1974–1977', AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC.

^44. 'Chacabooka', AMWU: National Office; 'The Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission', 1974, p. 21, PGEUA: Federal Office, Z112 Box 7, NBAC.

^45.12 Days in Chile.

^46. 'Discussion with Metal Workers and Building Industry Leaders. Tuesday, 2nd April, 1974', 1974, p. 7, PGEUA: Federal Office, N133/203, NBAC.

^47.12 Days in Chile.

^48. 'The Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission', p. 21, PGEUA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC.

^49. '2.4.74 – Textile workers Union of Chile interview', 1974, p. 3, AMWU: National Office, Z122 Box 7, NBAC.

^50. Baird, After the Coup, p. 3.

^51. Cooper, 'Journey to Chile: 1974'.

^52. C. Bull, J. Baird and H. McCarthy, 'Chilean Resistance', Tribune, 16–22 April 1974, p. 3.

^53. Cooper, Journey to Chile: 1974.

^54. 'Discussion with Metal Workers and Building Industry Leaders. Tuesday, 2^nd April, 1974'.

^55.Ibid.

^56.Ibid.

^57.Ibid.

^58.Ibid.

^59. Baird, After the Coup; 12 Days in Chile.

^60.Ibid.

^61.Ibid.

^62. 'Baird to Cameron M.P. Re: I.L.O Inquiry on Chile Trade Unions, 4th Oct 1974', AMWSU E262/137, NBAC.

^63. 'Statement by L. Figeuroa and L. Meneses to the Delegates of the ACTU Congress', 1975, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC.

^64. Baird, After the Coup, p. 7; 12 Days in Chile.

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