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November, 2007
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Mobilising at the Workplace: State Regulation and Collective Action in Three Workplaces, 1900 to the 1920s

Sandra Cockfield*

The belief that arbitration and similar forms of state labour market regulation in Australia have limited the collective mobilisation of workers at the workplace is examined in this article. Using John Kelly's mobilisation framework, the article explores the impact of state regulation on workplace regulation and the implications for the capacity of workers to mobilise for collective action. While state regulation spread throughout the Australian states in the early years of federation, the systems varied. The Victorian wages board system was much more restricted in scope than the arbitral system established in New South Wales. The article examines the implications of this for worker mobilisation through three workplace case studies in the early decades of the twentieth century; one in Victoria and two in New South Wales. While wage boards in Victoria neither constrained nor supported collective mobilisation, in New South Wales the picture is more complicated. The article demonstrates that the impact of arbitration was uneven and contradictory, both assisting and constraining collective mobilisation and action.

 1
In Australia, it is often suggested that the long tradition of state regulation of employment and the labour market curtailed the collective mobilisation of workers at the workplace and encouraged moderate rather than militant behaviour. In the contemporary context of unions shifting to an organising approach there is a general belief that arbitration encouraged a servicing approach, that is, members remained largely inactive while union officials negotiated for improved employment conditions before an industrial tribunal. Debates on the pros and cons of arbitration occurred throughout the twentieth century, with both Marxist and non-Marxist critiques bemoaning the centralising tendencies though for different reasons. For example, Campbell, in his History of the Australian Labour Movement: A Marxist Interpretation, highlighted the preoccupation of union officials with legal issues and argued arbitration had become a substitute for workplace organising and strike action. Non-Marxist, such as Isaacs, Laffer and Niland also referred to the excessive legalism of the system. For these authors, arbitration centralised procedures and drew issues away from the workplace while also creating a 'chilling effect' on direct negotiations and conciliation procedures. This led Lansbury and Macdonald to conclude 'the arbitration system has long been seen as resulting in relatively underdeveloped mechanisms for the conduct of workplace industrial relations'.1 2
      There are problems with this popular view which must be addressed. Firstly, union identity and strategy varied and not all unions followed this approach. In a number of industries strong shopfloor union organisation and militant behaviour coexisted with arbitral regulation. Gahan has demonstrated how union strategy was influenced by a range of factors aside from arbitration. Clearly the relationship between arbitration and union strategy is more complex than the simplistic argument above suggests. Secondly, within this debate the focus has tended to fall on arbitration with only limited acknowledgment of the existence of other forms of third party state intervention. The increasing preoccupation with the federal jurisdiction exacerbated the tendency to treat arbitration as a universal concept and ignore the distinctions between different arbitral systems. This is particularly problematic when considering the early decades of the twentieth century when the various State jurisdictions were more influential then the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. These issues suggest there is a need for a more sophisticated analysis which addresses these limitations and complexities.2 3
      In this article, mobilisation theory is employed to examine the impact of different state regulatory systems on the mobilisation of collective action. Kelly's mobilisation framework identifies the key components of worker mobilisation: the formation of collective interests, the extent and nature of collective organisation, the opportunities for mobilisation around different forms of collective action and the effect of counter-mobilisations by employers and the state. Industrial tribunals impact on each of these components, shaping and constraining collective interests, union behaviour and opportunities for mobilisation. The strength of the framework is the attention given to social and political processes. Bargaining structures and institutions remain important but they do not dominate the analysis. To this extent, the mobilisation framework bridges the criticisms found in the debate between institutionalists, who focus on organisations, bargaining structures and legal processes, and those advocating a 'history from below' approach which eschew institutions and explore the social and political aspects of work.3 4
      Specifically the present article explores the differences between the fairly limited and conservative Victorian wages boards and the more interventionist New South Wales arbitral system in terms of their impact on worker mobilisation and collective action in three workplaces in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The three case studies reflect the diversity of the metals sector, with each representing a different industry. However, similarities across these industries and between firms allow comparisons to be made. Both Metters and the H.V. McKay Harvester Company were large manufacturing establishments that dominated their respective local industries of stove and oven making and agricultural implement and machinery manufacture. Both faced stringent competition from large foreign manufacturers and employed similar work processes and practices based on job fragmentation, mechanisation and incentive payment systems. While they drew the majority of their workforce from semi-skilled sections of the labour market, Mort's Dock and Engineering Company, which was engaged in high-class engineering, shipbuilding and ship repair work, sought highly skilled tradesmen employed at traditional craft work. In each case a different pattern of collective action emerged reflecting both differences at the workplace as well as differences in the state regulation. The purpose of this article is to explain the processes that gave rise to these differences and assess the influence of industrial tribunals. It begins by outlining the components of Kelly's mobilisation framework and discussing the place of industrial tribunals within this framework. Each case is then analysed separately to assess the mobilisation of workers collectively, followed by a discussion and concluding comments. 5
   

Mobilisation and State Regulation

 
In Rethinking Industrial Relations, John Kelly argued social movement literature allowed industrial relations to move beyond analyses based on bargaining structures and institutions and examine the social processes at play in the employment relationship. Drawing on the works of Tilly, McAdam and Gamson, Kelly presented mobilisation theory as a framework for understanding how individuals transform into collective actors and conversely why this transformation may fail to occur. Following Tilly, Kelly's framework is based on five components beginning with the identification of worker interests and the extent to which these are in opposition to management and defined collectively. Additionally, the framework explores how workers are organised (such as union density, structure, and the like) and mobilised, that is, those processes that turn individual workers with collective orientations into collective actors. The last two components are the opportunities available to groups to pursue their claims collectively, as shaped by the policies and actions of the state and the employer and the prevailing balance of power, as well as the recognition that collective action can take many different forms. The concept of counter-mobilisation directs attention to how employers and management affect opportunities through influencing interests, organisation, mobilisation and the form of collection action pursued. The state also facilitates and constrains opportunities in a similar vein. In Australia, where industrial tribunals have been prominent, mobilisation theory offers an explicit theoretical framework to analyse the impact of these tribunals on workplace relations.4 6
      In the early years of the twentieth century, various states and the Commonwealth experimented with industrial tribunals and these systems took different forms. The autonomous wages boards established in Victoria were quite distinctive from the unified, and interventionist, arbitral framework established in New South Wales. Victorian wages boards comprised an equal number of employer and employee representatives and a neutral chairman, who was elected by the board representatives and could exercise a deciding vote. In contrast, New South Wales established the single Court of Arbitration, presided over by a Supreme Court judge. Though replaced in 1908 by a system of trade and industry boards, constituted much as the Victorian wages boards, the arbitral nature of the system continued and the boards operated like 'petty courts' with the power to hear and call evidence and in certain cases examine employer records. These structural differences reflected differences in purpose and shaped the scope of issues covered, the place of collective labour organisation and the nature of enforcement provisions within each system. In turn, these differences shaped the capacity of workers to mobilise.5 7
      The origins of both arbitration and wages boards systems are related to the core component of mobilisation theory: injustice in the workplace which can give rise to collective interests. The starting point of mobilisation theory is the identification of interests which begin with individual workers' perceptions of injustice in the workplace. In this case injustice is more than dissatisfaction; it is a sense of being wronged. A key purpose of the tribunals was to prevent or rectify injustice through providing both distributive and procedural justice. The tribunals could moderate workers' perceptions of injustice through decisions which improved wages and working conditions though differences between the Victorian and NSW systems in structure and scope moderated the extent and type of justice provided. In the period under review the jurisdiction of the Victorian wages boards was limited to wages, hours of work and the limitation of junior labour, though not between 1904 and 1910 with respect to latter. Moreover, between 1903 and 1907 boards could not set minimum wage rates above the rates paid by 'reputable employers' in the industry. In contrast, the NSW Court of Arbitration enjoyed broad powers to settle disputes over 'industrial matters'. Moreover, the Court, and its successor bodies, developed principles and standards which it sought to apply uniformly.6 8
      Aside from substantive conditions tribunals could also influence the organisation of work and the struggle for control and, despite differences in scope, both the Victorian and NSW tribunals did this in a variety of ways. Tribunal decisions could alter wage relativities between classifications, introduce new classifications, fragment existing classifications, and set lower rates for women, improvers or juveniles. Any of these changes could influence how employers utilised labour, and the process of skill formation or degradation within trades or industries.7 For example, Justice Higgins argued in his famous Harvester Decision:
if the Court prescribes lower wages for the mere machinist it is practically putting pressure on the employer to choose the man who gets the lower wages, the man who is not a serviceable all-round craftsman.8
 		9
      While tribunals could promote grievances and a sense of injustice, for this to give rise to collective interests the individual workers must attribute the injustice to an agency (in the workplace this is management) which can become a target for collective action through developing social identities (for example, around a work group, occupation, union or social class). Both attribution and social identity are socially constructed. Social movement theorists refer to this as issue framing and have identified leadership as important in constructing collective identity frames. Similarly, the tribunals could also frame decisions in ways that legitimised and defused discontent and prevented dissatisfaction from developing into injustice. While Higgins, as in the quote above, openly acknowledged the choices open to him, later judges would often couch their decisions as the inevitable consequences of progress.9 10
      Collective interests also require workers to believe in the efficacy of collective action. The tribunals themselves offered an alternative mode of collective action but their appeal varied over time. There were notable periods where a sizeable section of the labour movement pursued direct action, for example, during and immediately after World War I. Here the enforcement provisions of tribunal systems came into play as penalties, both monetary and non-monetary, and were used to repress various forms of industrial action. This was more an issue in New South Wales where penalties operated to support the central concern of dispute prevention and settlement. In Victoria, the Factories and Shops Act did not seek to outlaw strikes and lock-outs, although an amendment to the act in 1907 provided for the suspension of a determination in the event of a strike.10 11
      Organisation and mobilisation are also preconditions for collection action and key factors in shaping the type and extent of collective action. The tribunals facilitated collective organisation and mobilisation, though there were significant differences between the Victoria and NSW systems. Unions were essential to the effective functioning of the NSW Court of Arbitration, providing both representation for workers before the Court and a means of enforcing Court awards on both employers and employees. Registration under the Act provided unions with legal protection and status as corporate bodies. It also gave them exclusive representation before the Arbitration Court, and provided for the granting of preference to unionists. In return, the internal affairs of unions came under greater scrutiny and unions became subject to penalties for illegal strikes. In contrast, unions did not have an official role in the Victorian system and non-union employees could, and occasionally did, gain appointment as wages board representatives. Moreover, full-time union officials and company managers were forbidden from being representatives until 1934. Nevertheless, unions did play an active role in wages board matters through lobbying for the establishment of boards and nominating employee representatives.11 12
      How tribunal systems have influenced unions and worker militancy has been debated broadly. Studies by Macarthy, Sheldon and Markey have contested the belief that arbitration was largely responsible for union growth after the decimation of the union movement in the depression and strikes of the early 1890s. Both Macarthy and Sheldon demonstrate that unions began to revive prior to the spread of arbitration. Another common argument asserts arbitration led to the creation of dependent unions and encouraged moderate forms of collective action. According to Howard, the absence of a tradition of strong shopfloor union organisation was one reflection of this. Campbell noted the preoccupation of unions with legal matters and argued arbitration had led union officials to become 'bush lawyers'. Gahan disputes these strong versions of the dependency thesis and argues the relationship between arbitration and union strategy was far more complex, with arbitration just one of a range of factors influencing a union's choice of goals and methods.12 13
      In addressing these issues, the transcripts of NSW court hearings and board deliberations have been essential. While a wide variety of sources have been consulted, it is, ironically, the very institution accused of marginalising workplace industrial relations which provides the most insights. Transcripts from arbitral hearings of both New South Wales and the Commonwealth industrial tribunals have proved invaluable in constructing a picture of the workplace. Transcripts are often long and detailed documents presenting the evidence of a large number of expert witnesses from all sides of industrial relations. They provided an avenue for rank and file employees and low level supervisors to explain the organisation, experience and logic of work at a particular workplace. Moreover, their testimony was open to rigorous and, at times, vigorous cross examination, increasing the reliability of their evidence. Hearings operated like inquiries as judges grappled with the nature of the industry or occupation they were charged with overseeing. During hearings judges could, and did, request that certain evidence be provided. A legacy of this is rich body of material covering a whole range of workplace issues including workplace grievances, changes in work organisation and work practices, the role of unions and industrial action. Regrettably the Victoria wages boards system did not produce a similar wealth of archival material. Fortunately, ad hoc cases of the Commonwealth Court and records of the Chief Inspector of Factories have proved adequate substitutes. 14
   

H.V. McKay Harvester Company

 
The H.V. McKay Harvester Company occupies a central position in Australian labour history because of its prominent role in the Harvester Decision. Harvester represented a watershed in Australian wage regulation. Social justice was at the forefront of a decision which clearly intended to improve the plight of lowly paid workers. However, a constitutional challenge sidelined the direct application of the Harvester Decision to its intended recipient, McKays. It was neither the first, nor the last, tribunal decision evaded by the firm, founded by Hugh Victor McKay, and reflected his staunch opposition to wage regulation, or indeed any external interference in the running of his enterprise.13 15
      McKay first began an agricultural manufacturing business in Ballarat in 1894. The expansion of the business led McKay to relocate near to Melbourne at Braybrook Junction, later renamed Sunshine after the company's main product, the 'Sunshine Harvester'. After the move to Braybrook began in 1904 the firm expanded quickly, employing 1000 workers at the peak of the season in 1907. By the 1920s this had doubled, while product diversification reduced seasonal employment fluctuations. McKay's success involved keeping output high and labour costs low. This was achieved through a Taylorist work organisation, harsh factory discipline and low wages. This environment gave rise to significant worker discontent.14 16
      Repetitive work processes, a minute division of labour and the continuing mechanisation of work processes combined to dilute requirements for skilled workers. Although some workers completed apprenticeships, the vast majority entered the industry through the improver system. In the absence of formal regulation, employers, including McKays, abused the improver system. During the Harvester Case it was revealed the firm classed 36 adult ironworkers as improvers even though many had more than five years experience in the trade. Under this system few workers became competent implement tradesmen. Over time repetition floor moulding (agricultural moulding) gave way to plate and machine moulding. In the blacksmiths' shop, pneumatic and steam driven machines replaced forging on the anvil. Tools, templates and jigs, as well as automatic machinery, characterised machine processes. Improvements in casting, forging and machinery lessened the amount of fitting required, giving rise to the employment of assemblers. Low wages went with job fragmentation and the use of improvers. At the time of the Harvester Case, the McKay company paid among the lowest wages in the industry, paying the standard implement tradesman's rate of 8 shillings to only 84 of the 407 ironworkers.15 17
      The growth of the firm also led to formalised management structures and disciplinary procedures. The appointment of a factory superintendent and department managers, who became responsible for many functions previously performed by foremen, reduced the foreman's role to training and supervision. In 1906, management formalised factory discipline by introducing a written set of factory rules with penalties for non-compliance. Additionally, workers were required to complete time cards, detailing the jobs they did during the day and the time taken, and they were harshly disciplined for time wasting. McKay's tactics to prevent time wasting extended to the introduction of the sanitary ticket system which limited the time an employee was allowed to spend in the toilet to five minutes per day or one hour per fortnight, with any time over deducted from the employee's wages. Practices such as these caused great dissatisfaction and provided grievances around which unions could organise and mobilise.16 18
      McKay's management strategy had both an internal and external dimension. While harsh conditions characterised the work, outside the workplace McKay set about creating a Sunshine community. Extra land was purchased around the works and sold to employees with the intention of creating a self-supporting township tied to the firm. The creation of a township indicated the desire of the firm to create a loyal core workforce tied to Sunshine and McKays. In some cases this financial constraint did hinder workers during disputes with the firm. However, it was predominantly foreman and leading hands that benefited, with the majority of workers commuting from inner-city Footscray and beyond. McKay also built mutual interests around the issue of tariff protection. He took a primary role in establishing the Australian Implement Employees Defence Association in 1905 to lobby for greater protection for the implement industry. The Association operated for a short time only, but significantly, before its demise it extended its interests to the Implement Makers Wages Board at the behest of McKay.17 19
      The wages board system had a limited impact on McKay's management strategy. Various wages boards' determinations did improve wages but in general they facilitated McKay's fragmentation and mechanisation of the work process. While the 1904 Iron Moulders Wages Board Determination limited the proportion of improvers employed, McKay was able to evade the determination when he moved the foundry from Ballarat to Braybrook, which was outside the Board's jurisdiction. When the determination was finally extended to Braybrook in 1906, at the behest of both unions and McKay's competitors, the limitation on improvers did reduce the number of juniors and improvers employed in the foundry. Despite this, the firm persisted with the moulding machines, though it appeared to delay their expansion. McKay also managed to delay the first determination of the Agricultural Implement Makers Board until 1909. When it finally arrived it introduced a new 'assembler' classification which supported the firm's Taylorist work organisation. Further, the determination limited the number of improvers employed but linked the proportion to the skilled labourer's rate which allowed the company to continue employing improvers in large numbers. Subsequent determinations of the Board continued in this vein, creating new classifications and lowering margins between labourers and some semi-skilled classifications.18 20
      Union organisation at the works grew under difficult circumstances. A number of unions organised at the works. The dominant union was the Federated Agricultural Implement Makers and Ironworkers Association which covered all agricultural implement workers except skilled tradesmen and workers in the foundry. Efforts to organise McKay's works in Ballarat met with failure, despite initial interest from McKay's workers. With the move to Sunshine, and the expansion of the works, the Implement Makers Union made more progress, albeit slowly. The wages boards provided a focal point for union organisation in terms of establishing boards, extending the jurisdiction of existing boards to McKays and nominating employee representatives. A separate union covering foundry labourers and assistants experienced similar problems organising McKay's workers while the low wages paid in the moulding shop excluded the majority of moulders from membership of the Federated Moulders (Metals) Union. The lack of organisation amongst McKay's employees was in distinct contrast to the situation in other prominent implement manufacturers in Melbourne, with the Implement Makers Union dominant at both Mitchell's and Robinson's works, as well as some of the smaller establishments. Various factors accounted for this; the high turnover of labour due to seasonal employment, refusal of management to allow union officials to attend the works, victimisation of workers who joined a union and the establishment of employer sponsored, rival company-based associations to represent workers. Despite this, union membership grew at McKays between 1906 and 1911, leaving only a small number of workers outside the union.19 21
      The inability of the wages boards to rectify workers' grievances, coupled with the slowness of the boards in handing down determinations, led to a more aggressive and militant approach by the Implement Makers Union. In preparation for a struggle to improve wages, the union embarked on an organising campaign to eliminate non-unionists in the industry. At McKays only 12 employees remained outside the union. The success of the organising campaign prompted the union to take on employers and strike for a closed shop. McKay coordinated and led the employer response, retaliating with a lock-out of workers. The strike highlighted the frustration and anger of McKay's workers. Members of other unions joined with the Implement Makers and refused to work. Workers stayed out for four months before the Implement Makers Union was forced to admit defeat and recommend a return to work. Despite the solidarity displayed during the strike, it ended in a massive defeat which eroded the union's position at McKay. While the Implement Makers Union retained a presence in the works, along with other unions, the number of non-unionists increased and officials were denied access to the works which limited their influence. Shop stewards for various unions operated throughout the works but they were not recognised by the firm and did not negotiate working conditions or handle workplace grievances. However, with union officials denied entry into the works, they performed an important role, soliciting union members and providing information to union officials.20 22
      After crushing the dominant union at the works during the 1911 strike, McKay introduced piecework to increase output per worker. Despite dissatisfaction with the piecework system, workers earned above wages board rates. However, the evidence also suggests some variability in earning among workers, reflecting their lack of control over the operation of the piecework system. For example, the earnings of machine moulders over a four week period show a spread of earnings from 11 to 75 per cent above wages board rates. Fear of victimisation also prompted workers to accede to piecework but jealousy and competition among workers resulted in an individual rather than a collective ethos. By the 1920s the firm was using time and motion study to set piecework rates in a further effort to maximise output. The Implement Makers and Moulders wages boards provided limited regulation with respect to piecework. The Factories and Shops Act provided the only limitation, ensuring piecework rates allowed the average worker to earn the minimum rate for the work concerned. Essentially the wages boards' determinations allowed employers to set piecework rates and establish rules and procedures governing piecework, with no requirement to consult with unions or employees.21 23
      An improved economic climate in the post-war period strengthened the position of unions and created opportunities for the unions to redress workers' grievances. The unions bypassed the wages boards and bargained directly with the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers. Through this process the union was able to improve wages and in some cases restore former wage relativities, as well as secure eight paid holidays per year. Negotiations between the Implement Makers Union and the Implement section of the Chamber also improved piecework earnings, ensuring rates allowed workers to earn ten per cent on top of the minimum time rate.22 24
      During the 1920s McKay's management did become more receptive to the Implement Makers Union and recognised the union's right to represent members in the workplace. The defeat in the 1911 strike and subsequent marginalisation of the union had led officials to take a more moderate and cooperative approach. Unlike the craft societies, the Implement Makers Union adopted a more liberal approach to piecework. Management issued a standing invitation to the Implement Makers Secretary to call at any time to discuss matters relating to the works, an offer not extended to officials of the Federated Moulders Union or the Iron Foundry Employees Union who were denied entry to the works. Additionally, at the request of the Implement Makers Union, the firm established shop committees in most departments consisting of three management and three worker representatives, with the Implement Makers President, an employee of the firm, an ex officio member of all committees. Little information exists about the early operation of these committees. They appear to have been primarily concerned with disputes over piecework, although their activities were confined to investigating grievances and they took no part in the rate fixing process. While some disputes were settled to the workers' satisfaction, in several cases men complained of being overawed by the committee process and if the committee could not reach a settlement the matter was referred to the Factory Superintendent. Overall, the shop committees do not seem to have provided an avenue for worker control of piecework. It was not until they were revived in the 1930s that they took on this role.23 25
      Overall, efforts to mobilise workers collectively at McKays stalled. In the period up until the early 1920s large sections of the workforce were clearly dissatisfied and unions were able to organise, though this did not translate into successful collective action. Management's ability to ride out the 1911 strike proved a decisive challenge to collectivism at McKays. The tensions and barriers to collective action are most aptly demonstrated by the issue of piecework. Piecework represented a concerted effort by management to individual workplace relations. While there was dissatisfaction, and this did lead to attempts to restrict output, workers were unable to sustain collective action. Victimisation by management and the needs of individual workers to increase earnings to compensate for low base rates and seasonal unemployment prevented grievances from being transformed into collective action.24 26
   

Metters Limited

 
Metters Limited offers an interesting contrast to McKays. While there are clear similarities in the labour process, at Metters a strong collective ethos arose. Metters' Sydney works were established in 1902 with the intention of producing household stoves in high volume at low cost to take advantage of the growing fashion for stoves to replace open fireplaces. The works expanded quickly and product lines diversified with success based on the adoption of production methods and management practices similar to those employed by large foreign stove manufacturers. In this environment, Metters' workers experienced similar problems of job degradation and work intensity as the implement makers at McKays. However, unlike at McKays, grievances over the piecework system manifested as collective interests and Metters' workers were able to organise and mobilise around these interests.25 27
      Workers' grievances arose out of the organisation of work which, from the outset, was characterised by job fragmentation and task specialisation. This gave rise to a predominantly semi-skilled workforce and the employment of junior labour in large numbers. Plate moulding dominated stove moulding and, from World War I onwards, machine moulding became common. Mechanical aids also simplified other foundry work such as dressing and grinding. Similarly, the stove fitter worked with standardised and interchangeable parts, with very little actual 'fitting' required. These workers could not claim to be tradesmen, as indicated by their ineligibility to join the various craft societies in the metal trades. Training methods in the industry reflected this, with the improver system of unindentured training replacing the apprenticeship system. By 1907 youths accounted for over half the metal workers in the factory. Continued mechanisation and work fragmentation threatened the position of semi-skilled tradesmen who had to contend with the promotion of boys and labourers to work they traditionally performed.26 28
      The introduction of payment by results systems in 1906, especially piecework, also generated workers' grievances. Initially Metters' workers opposed the introduction of piecework. Several of Metters' workers were recruited from the large stove works in Scotland where they had direct experience of piecework and its potential impact. Aside from rate cutting and speed up, opposition also derived from organisational features of the workplace such as inadequate facilities and materials. The exact nature of the organisational problems varied with the trade. The moulders faced an extensive array of problems. The speed of work could be affected by shortages of iron, poor quality moulding plates and an insufficient supply of moulding tools, while poor quality iron and tackle increased the likelihood of defective castings, known as 'wasters'. The pairing of moulders to lift finished boxes out of the way also caused problems if they were not paired evenly, with the slower worker slowed further by having to take time out to lift more boxes. If the pieceworker moulders rushed their work and produced inferior articles, they could cause problems further down the production chain. Poor castings required more dressing, grinding and fitting. For the fitters, time lost waiting for parts and materials and gaining access to adequate tools were among the main concerns.27 29
      Opposition to piecework provided the impetus for workers to organise collectively. A strike by workers led to the matter of piecework being referred to the NSW Court of Arbitration. As part of this process, Metters' workers formed the Stovemakers and Light Iron Moulders Union (later the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union) and sought registration under the Industrial Arbitration Act. Though membership expanded beyond Metters' workforce, the majority of members worked at Metters, including the union leadership. As a consequence, affairs at Metters dominated the union's agenda and priorities. During World War I, the union also developed a close connection with the militant wing of the NSW Labor Council, known as the Trades Hall Reds, through the Union Secretary, James Graves. Several others unions also established a strong presence in the works. Most notable was the Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Australasia, which covered moulders employed in the hollowware section where baths were made using the traditional floor moulding method.28 30
      Decisions of the NSW Arbitration Court also influenced the development of grievances. The Court directly intervened in the organisation of work and institutionalised job fragmentation. For instance, Judge Edmunds held that the Board could not prohibit a practice if it was an essential feature of the industry and that sub-division and specialisation were incidental to every manufacturing process. He argued that industries must be allowed to develop. This decision resulted in the introduction of various grades of stove fitters and stove moulders. The court presented Taylorist work practices as inevitable rather than a matter of choice and strategy. In this way the court justified workplace change and challenged the legitimacy of union and worker resistance to management strategy.29 31
      The court's support for piecework was more qualified. The first Stovemakers Award in 1907 guaranteed pieceworkers would earn, as a minimum, twenty per cent more than the day rate. However, the award also allowed individual workers to refuse piecework. This veto power over piecework disappeared in the 1911 Stovemakers' Award but regulation of piecework increased. The award required piecework rates in each branch of the trade to be set by piecework committees consisting of both employer and employee representatives. Through this provision, the court supported joint regulation and legitimated the collective interests of workers on the issue of piecework. In this sense, the court sought to facilitate workplace organisation and channel collective action into negotiation.30 32
      The initial veto power of workers over piecework inhibited but did not prevent the spread of piecework. Despite union opposition, Metters pushed ahead with the introduction of piecework using various tactics to induce workers to accept it. While a discussion of piecework at a general union meeting still revealed the majority were opposed, some members spoke in favour. By 1910 union officials acknowledged that piecework was gradually seeping into the trade. The union continued to oppose piecework after the lifting of the veto, organising an unsuccessful strike in 1912. Despite this, piecework spread throughout the works. In part this reflected the possibilities piecework offered for increased earnings and several work groups approached management and asked for piecework.31 33
      Collective action to prevent piecework was quickly transformed into action to regulate the operation of piecework. In this respect, the piecework committees mandated in the award assisted the union. However, the evidence suggests that after a short period of cooperation, Metters ignored or flouted the piecework committees. Metters' management demonstrated a willingness to buy increased output and sought to counter union organisation by negotiating directly with workers. Despite this, workers were able to exert collective control over piecework. Economic conditions and an increasing shortage of tradesmen, particularly stove moulders, increased the bargaining position of workers. Workers settled many disputes without the aid of the union and both formal and informal agreements were negotiated with management with respect to piecework prices, the distribution of work, payment for 'wasters', and the use of junior labour. Leadership also played an important role, particularly in the moulding department, where a number of men eagerly led delegations to management. The success of these delegations encouraged further collective action. The piecework committees mandated by the award may have established piecework as a collective issue, other factors were essential to ensure workers mobilised collectively and successfully.32 34
      The limited influence of arbitration is reflected in developments in the hollowware section of Metters where members of the Federated Moulders Union performed repetitive floor moulding on a task work basis. These workers were covered by the Moulders Award, which unlike the Stovemakers Award, did not require piecework committees or the like to be established. Despite this, similar workplace regulation occurred as in the stove section, with a shop committee established to negotiate the setting of tasks. The moulders used their strong labour market position to increase wages, and the weekly earnings of the Moulders were significantly higher than the award rate. As happened in the stovemaking section, management was willing to pay for increased output. Nevertheless, workers maintained collective control over the task and the union fined members who exceeded the task.33 35
      While the Arbitration Court supported joint regulation of piecework, this did not extend to support for informal worker control. The court used its disciplinary powers, including penalties and the threat of deregistration, to curb worker militancy. In turn, this placed pressure on unions to control members and restrict industrial action. The Stovemakers Union, in particularly, felt these pressures. Not being a wealthy union, it could neither afford the fines nor to have large numbers of members thrown idle by the sectional disputes of a group of members in the moulding department. A dispute over the promotion of labourers to stove moulding illustrates these concerns. When labour shortages hit during the war, management sought to promote labourers to stove moulding, a move which could potentially undermine the strong labour market position of the moulders. The union negotiated an agreement specifying the conditions labourers could be promoted to moulding but the moulders refused to accept it and continued to strike. Initially the union fined them. Due to their continued defiance, however, it subsequently expelled the moulders and sought and gained an order from the Arbitration Court preventing their re-employment at stove moulding until they had returned to work at Metters.34 36
      Overall, Metters' workforce was able to engage in collective action to protect their interests and overcome grievances with the piecework system. By the 1920s payment by results had become an entrenched feature of work at Metters, though it did not individualise the workforce as it did at McKays. In contrast, it encouraged collective behaviour. Workers not only accepted piecework, but also demanded it. When called upon by other unions to oppose piecework, the Stovemakers Union argued piecework was a viable method of payment if unions controlled output and prices, as the stovemakers did. They were less successful in influencing the organisation of work, though high piecework earnings compensated for this. Arbitration played a contradictory role in this mobilisation of collective action. Though the Court sought to constrain union and worker militancy, it did provide legitimacy for union organisation and support for mobilisation of workers around joint regulation. However, it could not control the form in which collective action manifested and disenchantment with arbitration during World War I saw its authority compromised.35 37
   

Mort's Dock and Engineering Company

 
Working conditions at Mort's Dock and Engineering Company differed significantly from McKays and Metters. Unlike the foregoing cases, Mort's Dock engaged in high-class engineering work and employed the most highly skilled metal workers with a long history of organisation and mobilisation. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Mort's Dock was the largest private ship repair facility in Australia, though the firm also had extensive facilities for shipbuilding and general engineering. The reliance on ship repair placed the firm in an unstable business environment. The docks could be empty for several months of the year but when a ship came in the works became a hive of activity, operating around the clock to complete essential repair work and allow ships to sail to their timetable. This irregularity and instability in the market engendered a set of grievances quite different to those experienced at McKays and Metters.36 38
      The majority of the workforce experienced irregular and unstable patterns of employment. The short nature of most ship repair jobs, some lasting a few weeks but many only a day or two, meant Mort's Dock hired and dismissed labour on a daily basis. The practice there was to hire men for a particular job and terminate their employment at the end of the job. The men would then have to reapply for work again. As such, even a regular supply of work at the Dock did not guarantee workers constant employment. It was the method of engagement which most distinguished the Balmain facility and other repair shops from inland metal trades employees. The selection of men followed the traditional maritime practice of a line up. Workers lined up in a row in the morning and the assistant superintendent, or a foreman, selected the men needed for the new jobs that had come in, a practice the boilermakers termed 'toeing the line'. A separate line existed for each trade, including a separate line for tradesmen's assistants. First preference was given to those men who followed Mort's Dock regularly, and made themselves available throughout the day. In this way the firm encouraged loyalty to the business and ensured a regular supply of labour.37 39
      For workers who followed Mort's Dock regularly, their interests revolved around securing enough work to earn a living. While the wages paid to Mort's Dock workers were equal to or above other engineering employers, the irregular and inconsistent employment could limit potential earnings. Overtime was one means of augmenting earnings and compensating workers for the irregular nature of work. With ships sailing to timetables, and limits to the number of vessels that could be docked at one time, marine repairs relied heavily on overtime work, especially by fitters and boilermakers. Mort's Dock adopted a practice of allocating the majority of overtime to a small number of 'preferred' workers. While some men worked up to 60 or 70 hours per week, others were turned away in the morning line-up. In this way, Mort's Dock developed a core workforce, known as 'royals' by the other workers, who acted as leading hands and remained at work even during slow periods.38 40
      Mort's Dock workers were active union members, with a long history of spearheading industrial campaigns. Both the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders had strong membership there, including union officials of the Boilermakers Society. The assistants also had a long history of militant organisation beginning with the Balmain Labourer's Union before it split into the separate Ship Painters and Dockers and the Amalgamated Ironworkers Assistants Union at the instigation of Mort's Dock workers.39 41
      Arbitral regulation offered the unions an avenue to redress workers' grievances over the distribution of overtime and work. The NSW Court of Arbitration assisted the Engineers Society and its members to restrict overtime and force Mort's Dock to distribute work more evenly by placing limits on the amount of overtime an individual could work. The 1908 Engineers Award limited engineers to 24 hours overtime per week, with the 1911 Engineers Award reducing this to 20 hours per week. When the Engineers Board further tightened overtime restrictions in 1915, reducing the limitation from 20 hours per week to 24 hours per fortnight, this exacerbated the labour problem at Mort's Dock. Led by Mort's Dock, the Iron Trades Employers Association successfully appealed this decision in respect to marine engineering. Judge Edmunds concluded that the evidence on the unfair distribution of overtime was inconclusive and the limitation was causing serious delays to ships which increased costs and made Sydney less attractive as a site for marine repairs. The result was the reversion to a limit of 20 hours overtime per week for maritime shops, as opposed to 24 hours per fortnight in general engineering.40 42
      These award provisions did not lessen the need for collective action. Union officials had to police overtime and ensure both management and employees adhered to the law. In 1914 a large number of members of the Engineers Society at Mort's Dock flouted the 20 hour overtime limit, claiming they thought the award exempted transport work. Close attention by the Society's organiser put a stop to the excessive overtime. This enforcement role gave unions added strength to control their membership and prevent disunity.41 43
      As was the case at Metters, the role of arbitration in limiting the need for worker mobilisation and action should not be overstated. Boilermakers did not gain similar award restrictions on overtime until 1915 and instead relied on direct action. Improved economic conditions during and after the war created a shortage of skilled tradesmen. This increased the availability of work and overtime and provided workers with the opportunity to mobilise against Mort's Dock labour management strategy. The firm's boilermakers sought to emulate a successful overtime ban by the Ship Painters and Dockers Union which had forced Mort's Dock to employ more workers rather than resort to overtime. On several occasions, the boilermakers sought to collectively impose a ban on overtime on Friday night. Initially, management responded by dismissing the men concerned, though this failed to curb worker action. While the Boilermakers Society, under the constraints of the NSW arbitration system, refused to endorse a collective ban on Friday night overtime, it became standard practice at Mort's Dock for overtime to be worked Monday to Thursday. Leadership was also important in mobilising Mort's Dock workers. Falkingham, the Vice President of the Boilermakers Society and a casual at the ship repair facility, organised for the men to 'toe the line' three times a day. Through this method the Boilermakers Society sought to ensure a regular supply of labour was always available, eliminating the need to work overtime.42 44
      Increased economic activity and restrictions on working overtime did force Mort's Dock to employ a wider range of workers. By 1916, over half the fitters employed by Mort's Dock were constant hands. While not permanent, these men assumed the status of 'first preference' men, that is, they formed a separate line from which management made the first selections. These constant workers averaged ten months employment a year, while the casual workers averaged between six to ten days a fortnight. While the Engineers and Boilermakers societies continued to complain about the unequal distribution of overtime and the victimisation of members who refused to work overtime, the curtailing of systematic overtime undermined management's main labour control strategy, at least with regard to tradesmen.43 45
      Mort's Dock workers also used their labour market advantage to mobilise against the wage restraint imposed by the Arbitration Court during the war. By the end of the war, union opposition to the NSW Arbitration Court was running high. The erosion of real wages and the actions of the court in the aftermath of the 1917 General Strike, when it deregistered numerous unions, had alienated the union movement, prompted several unions to question past tactics that had relied heavily on arbitration. The Engineers Society, deregistered at the time, sought to negotiate directly with the Iron Trades Employers Association. The Boilermakers Society followed suit. When the Employers Association refused to negotiate the efforts to obtain a general wage increase moved to the workplace and the unions resorted to an embargo on overtime and night shift. Despite misgivings, Mort's Dock management held the Employers Association line and refused to negotiate with the unions, insisting the matter be dealt with by the Employers Association and the NSW Arbitration Court.44 46
      The Arbitration Court sought, unsuccessfully, to limit the mobilisation of collective action. The court fined both the Engineers and Boilermakers Societies for participating in an illegal strike. Despite protestations from both unions that the action at Mort's Dock was locally based and initiated, the court, in both disputes, found the action was part of a general wage campaign that had the full support of officials of both unions. The intervention of the court served only to provoke further action by the unions and the overtime embargo continued into 1919. While the Sydney District Committee of the Engineers Society organised the embargo, as time passed the men at Mort's Dock became more persistent. Although they agreed to leave the matter in the hands of the District Committee, they insisted that the Committee approach the company's management again. Eventually, the action of the workers forced employers to concede a wage increase. With inflation continuing to erode wage gains, and the success of the unions' tactics in 1919, the unions imposed further overtime bans in early 1920. The Engineers Society led the way, with an overtime ban operating in all engineering shops in the Sydney district. Other metal trades unions soon followed suit. This time Mort's Dock management entered into negotiations and signed agreements with all the metal trades unions. The over award payments spread to metal workers in other waterfront shops, and became known as the 'waterfront loading'.45 47
      Overall, the second decade of the twentieth century had represented a period of change in labour management at Mort's Dock. The decade opened with the company's control over hiring and the allocation of overtime providing management with powerful weapons to control and discipline the workforce. By 1920, economic conditions had eroded management's position of authority, a situation taken full advantage of by skilled workers at Mort's Dock. Awards had a limited impact on these developments. Even where provisions were favourable, such as the restriction on overtime, strong workplace action by workers was required to uphold the award. Moreover, though the NSW Arbitration Court punished unions for industrial action, this failed to curb independent action by workers. 48
   

Collective Action and Industrial Tribunals

 
Workers engaged in collective action in all three workplaces, but only at Metters and Mort's Dock, regulated by the NSW arbitral system, was this collective action sustained for any length of time. According to mobilisation theory, individuals are transformed into collective actors through the framing of grievances and discontent as collective interests and organising and mobilising around these interests. The state may play a central role by creating or constraining opportunities for collective action. As discussed earlier, there were important differences between the Victorian wages boards and the NSW arbitral-style system which affected the opportunities available for collective action. On surface, the greater capacity of Metters' and Mort's Dock workers for collective action would seem attributable to the more interventionist NSW system. However, there are other factors, most notably management strategy, that also influence and shape opportunities. 49
      At McKays and Metters the production process degraded work, while piecework increased work intensity. Similar grievance confronted both workforces. Neither the Victorian nor NSW tribunals hindered the adoption of Taylorist methods. In both cases, the work process was in place before the appearance of the tribunals. However, the tribunals facilitated the extension and the adoption of Taylorist work practices through the provision of favourable job classifications and support for the introduction of incentive payment systems. 50
      In New South Wales, however, award provisions supported joint regulation and legitimised the collective interests of workers on the issue of piecework. This was important in organising and mobilising collective action to enforce joint regulation and prevent management unilaterally setting piece rates. The presence and operation of the NSW arbitration system provided some support for the formation of the union. The award also provided rights and entitlements which union and workplace leaders could draw on to frame a collective response to counter-mobilisations by management. This position should not be overstated. In the hollowware section the moulders managed similar controls without the legitimating presence of award provisions. Clearly other factors were important, such as the economic context, in particular the shortage of qualified moulders, and the militancy of workplace leadership. 51
      A similar situation existed at Mort's Dock. Grievances over irregular work and systematic overtime did manifest as collective interests and transform into collective action. Both the boilermakers and the engineers took advantage of economic conditions to control the working of overtime and force Mort's Dock management to allocate work more broadly. The boilermakers achieved this without the aid of the Court, unlike the engineers who drew support from the Engineers Award. Yet even for the engineers, collective action was required at the workplace to enforce the overtime limits. Again other factors were equally, if not more important, than arbitration. The economic context provided opportunities while the leadership of union officials created the resources required to mobilise workers. 52
      According to mobilisation theory, a key factor is workers' perceptions of the efficacy of collective action. At Mort's Dock the skilled metal workers had a long tradition of union organisation of successful industrial action which predated arbitration. They also copied the successful overtime bans applied by the painters and dockers at their work site. Similarly, at Metters, successful strikes, or threats by workers to take action, reinforced militant behaviour and encouraged further collective action. In contrast, the conservatism of the court during the war reduced the efficacy of tribunals as an alternative to direct action. 53
      Workplace relations at McKays differed significantly. Decisions of the boards did little to stem workers' grievances over wages and working conditions. Nonetheless, these grievances did not translate into sustained collective action. Counter-mobilisation by management, through a mixture of paternalist policies and harsh discipline, appears the most decisive factor. Management at McKays sought to frame worker interests in line with management interests. They actively promoted a rival association of employees to thwart the wages board system. The union fought off this challenge but remained weak and poorly organised after the devastating defeat of the 1911 strike. The failure of industrial action at McKays and management's willingness to crush dissenters discouraged future collective action. Efforts to regulate piecework collectively were hindered by workers own individual interests as well as management behaviour. Further, the wages board system did little to assist unions overcome this individualism and create a unified collective identity and response that could challenge management. 54
   

Conclusion

 
Industrial tribunals assumed a dominant position in Australia during the twentieth century. While much has been written about arbitration, there is limited research exploring the impact of these tribunals on workplace relations and the capacity of workers to mobilise for collective action. In this article, Kelly's mobilisation framework was applied to three workplaces in the metals sector in the early decades of the twentieth century in order to assess the influence of state industrial tribunals on workplace relations. In all three cases the workforce had clear grievances. There is evidence workers understood the collective basis of these grievances as well as the need for collective action. Nevertheless, there were clear tensions between individual and collective responses. In the two cases in New South Wales, discontent was more likely to result in collective action. 55
      The role industrial tribunals played in the transformation of grievances into collective action is complex and contradictory. Tribunals could and did influence the formation of collective interests. Both the Victorian wages boards and the NSW arbitral system largely supported managerial prerogative with respect to work organisation. However, the broader scope of the NSW arbitral framework acknowledged the collective basis of discontent and facilitated grievances being shaped as collective interests. In the cases reviewed, the perception of arbitration as a moderating force on union militancy and workplace mobilisation is questionable. The Victorian wages boards offered little support to union organisation but nor did they appear to hinder direct action. Union weakness at McKays reflected the concerted anti-unionism of the firm's founder, H.V. McKay. In contrast, the NSW arbitral system promoted collective action that conformed to formal procedures. However, it was unsuccessful in preventing this escalating into more militant forms of collective action. Nevertheless, the sanctions imposed by the Arbitration Court did shape intra-union relations. As the case of stove moulders at Metters showed, arbitration could be a useful ally for officials seeking to pull members into line. 56
      Industrial tribunals did influence and shape the mobilisation of collective action at the workplace. Clearly the NSW arbitral system played a more dynamic role at Metters and Mort's Dock than the more limited Victorian wages board system did at McKays. However, the role of tribunals was complex and contradictory and their influence depended on the political and social processes in the workplace. Tribunals could exacerbate or lessen grievances, but it was workplace politics which shaped how these grievances were defined and whether they led to an organised and collective response. 57


Sandra Cockfield teaches in industrial relations and is a member of the Union Strategy Research Group at Monash University. Her research interests include workplace industrial relations and union renewal strategies.
<sandra.cockfield@buseco.monash.edu.au>


Endnotes

* I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

1. E.W. Campbell, History of the Australian Labour Movement: A Marxist Interpretation, Current Book Distributors, Sydney, 1945, pp. 46–55; J. Isaacs, 'The Prospects for Collective Bargaining in Australia', Economic Record, vol. 34, 1958, pp. 347–61; K. Laffer, 'Problems of Compulsory Arbitration in Australia', International Labour Review, vol. 77, 1958, pp. 417–33; J. Niland, Collective Bargaining and Compulsory Arbitration, New South Wales University Press, Sydney, 1978; R. Lansbury & D. Macdonald (eds), Workplace Industrial Relations: Australian Case Studies, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992, 1992, pp. 9–10.

2. M. Rimmer, Union Shopfloor Organisation, in G.W. Ford & D. Plowman, (eds) Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations Perspective, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1983, pp.123–4; M. Rimmer & P. Sutcliffe, The Origin of Australian Workshop Organisation, 1918–1950, Journal of Industrial Relations, v.23(2), June, 1981, pp.216–39; P. Gahan, 'Did Arbitration Make for Dependent Unionism? Evidence from Historical Case Studies', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, no. 4, December 1996, pp. 648–98. G. Patmore, Australian Labour History, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991, pp. 101–30.

3. J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves, Routledge, London, 1998; J. Zeitlin, 'From Labour History to the History of Industrial Relations', Economic History Review, 2nd Series, vol. XL, no. 2, 1987, pp. 159–84. For a response to Zeitlin see J.E. Cronin, 'The "Rank and File" and the Social History of the Working Class', International Review of Social History, vol. 34, 1989, pp. 78–88; R. Hyman, 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping: A Comment on the "Rank and Filism" Debate', International Review of Social History, vol. 34, 1989, pp. 309–26.

4. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations, pp. 24–38.

5. Initially Victorian wages board representatives were elected by their respective constituents, but a 1903 amendment saw representatives appointed by the Minister of Labour. However, if one fifth of those affected objected to an appointee, an election was held to select new representatives. In contrast, in New South Wales the employee and employer representatives were elected but the chairman was appointed. T. Rankin, Arbitration and Conciliation in Australia: The Legal Wage in Victoria and New Zealand, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1916, p. 16; R. Frances, The Politics of Work: Gender and Labour in Victoria, 1880–1939, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993, p. 76; R. Mitchell and E. Stern, 'The compulsory model of industrial dispute settlement: an outline of legal developments', in S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds), Foundations of Arbitration, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989, pp. 114–5; M.B. Hammond, 'Wages Boards in Australia: II Boards Outside Victoria. III Organisation and Procedure', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 29, February 1915, p. 335; G. Patmore, 'Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in New South Wales Before 1998', in G. Patmore (ed.), Laying the Foundations of Industrial Justice: The Presidents of the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW 1902–1998, Federation Press, Sydney, 2003, pp. 9–14.

6. P.R. Davey, Wages Boards in Victoria 1896–1920, PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 1975, pp. 111–4, 147–8 & 183–202; K. Hince, The Victorian Wages Board System: Structure and Performance, in G.W. Ford, J.M. Hearn & R.D. Lansbury (eds), Australian Labour Relations: Readings, 3rd edn, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1980, p. 345; W. Pember Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, Vol. II, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1969 [1902], pp. 153–62.

7. L. Bennett, 'Job Classification and Women Workers: Institutional Practices, Technological Change and the Conciliation and Arbitration System 1907–72', Labour History, no. 51, 1986, pp.11–23; J. Lee, 'A Redivision of Labour: Victoria's Wages Boards in Action', Historical Studies, no. 22, 1987, pp.352–72; Frances, The Politics of Work; S. Cockfield, 'Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace Relations: "Metal Industry" Developments in the 1920s', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 35, no. 1, March, 1993, pp. 19–38.

8.Amalgamated Engineering Union v. Adelaide Steamship Company and Ors (1921) 15 Commonwealth Arbitration Reports (hereafter CAR) 314.

9. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations, pp. 29–31; E. Goffman, 'Frame Analysis' in C. Lemert & A. Branaman (eds), The Goffman Reader, Blackwell, Oxford, 1997; D.A. Snow & D. McAdam, 'Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus' in S. Stryker, T. Owens & R.W. White (eds), Self-identity and Social Movements, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000.

10. M. Waters, Strikes in Australia: A Sociological Analysis of Industrial Conflict, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982, pp. 123–4; I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia 1900–1921, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1979 [1965], pp. 83–91; Patmore, Australian Labour History, p. 11.

11. Mitchell & Stern, 'The compulsory model of industrial dispute settlement', pp. 114–5; Davey, Wages Boards in Victoria 1896–1920, pp. 89–90 & 213.

12. P. Macarthy, The Harvester Judgement: An Historical Assessment, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1967, pp. 204–5; P.G. Macarthy, 'Labour and the Living Wage 1890–1910', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 13, no. 1, 1967, p. 69; P. Sheldon, 'The Missing Nexus? Union Recovery, Growth and Behaviour During the First Decades of Arbitration: Towards a Re-evaluation', Australian Historical Studies, vol. 26, no. 104, April 1995, pp. 415–37; R. Markey, 'Explaining Union Mobilisation in the 1880s and the Early 1900s', Labour History, no. 83, November 2002, pp. 19–42; W.A. Howard, 'Trade Unions in the Context of Union Theory', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 19, no. 3, September 1977, pp. 255–73; Campbell, History of the Australian Labour Movement, pp. 46–55; Gahan, 'Did Arbitration Make for Dependent Unionism?'.

13.Ex parte H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1.

14. McKay's business began as a joint venture but he soon bought his partners out. J. Lack, 'The Legend of H.V. McKay', Victorian Historical Journal, vol. 61, no. 2 & 3, August, 1991, p. 138; Melbourne's Living Museum of the West (hereafter MLMW), Massey-Ferguson Site Study Stage 1 Draft Report - Cultural Significance, MLMW, 1985, pp. 19–20; National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA): C2274, Ex parte H.V. McKay, Transcript of proceedings before the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (hereafter CCCA), 1907, pp. 318 & 628 (hereafter referred to as the Harvester Case); Federated Agricultural Implement Makers & Ironworkers Association v. H.V. McKay Pty Ltd & Ors (1925) CAR 480.

15. NAA: C2274, Harvester Case, pp. 183, 318 & 540; University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter UMA): Sheet Metal Workers and Agricultural Implement Union – Victorian Branch (hereafter SMWAIU), Box 128, Federated Agricultural Implement Makers and Ironworkers Association v. H.V. McKay Pty Ltd & Ors, Transcript of proceedings before the CCCA, 1925, pp. 344, 361–3, 489–91, 498–500 & 785 (hereafter referred to as the Agricultural Implement Makers Case); UMA: SMWAIU, Box 128 file 2/7/1/3, Submission by H.V. McKay Pty Ltd in the Agricultural Implement Makers Case, 1925; Federated Moulders (Metals) Union v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd & Ors, Affidavit of Ralph McKay, folio 22, 29 October, 1924.

16. NAA: C2274, Harvester Case, pp. 66–7, 122, 239, 245 & 578; Factory Rules, reprinted in MLMW, Massey - Ferguson Site Study Stage 2 Report, January, 1987, pp. 165–6; UMA: SMWAIU, Box 125 file 2/1/1/3, Minutes of Agricultural Implement Makers Union (hereafter AIMU) Mass Meeting, 24 June, 1910 & Minutes of AIMU General Meetings, 18 May & 15 June, 1910; Box 128 file 2/6/2, Letter from AIMU to Chief Inspector of Factories, 19 May, 1910 & Letter from AIMU to Chairman, Public Board of Health, 19 May, 1910.

17. Lack, 'The Legend', p. 145; MLMW, Stage 1 Report, pp. 20–22; J. Lack, A History of Footscray, Hargreen Publishing Company in conjunction with the City of Footscray, Melbourne, 1991, p. 167; UMA: SMWAIU, Box 128 file 2/7/1/1, Harvester Brief – Minutes of Agricultural Implement Makers Board, 4 March, 1907; UMA: SMWAIU, Box 125 file 2/1/1/3, Minutes of AIMU General Meetings, 11 November and 20 December 1906 and 21 February and 4 March 1907.

18. Public Records Office of Victoria (hereafter PROV): Iron Moulders Wages Board, Series 5466 Box 110, Determination of the Iron Moulders Wages Board, VGG, 15 September, 1904; PROV: Iron Moulders Wages Board, Series 5466 Box 109, Memos from Ballarat Inspector of Factories to Harrison Ord, Chief Inspector of Factories, 7 & 11 October, 1904, & Report - re McKay's Braybrook, Inspector Hall to Harrison Ord, Chief Inspector of Factories, 20 October, 1904; The Age, 15 March, 1911; PROV: Agricultural Implement Makers Wages Board, Series 5466 Box 3, Determination of the Agricultural Implement Makers Board, 18 March, 1909.

19. UMA: SMWAIU, Box 124 file 2/1/1/2–3, Minutes of AIMU General Meetings, 13 October, 1904 and 5 October, 1910; NAA: C2274, Harvester Case, pp. 417, 436 & 511–3; UMA. SMWAIU, Box 128 file 2/7/1/1, Agricultural Implement Makers Wages Board Minutes, Harvester Brief, 1907; PROV: Iron Moulders Wages Board, Series 5466 Box 109, Deputation to the Minister of Labour re extending the Iron Moulders Wages Board to the Shire of Braybrook, 8 August, 1906;

20. UMA: SMWAIU, Box 125 file 2/1/1/3, Minutes of AIMU Executive Meeting, 8 February, 1911; The Age, January – March 1911; UMA: Federated Moulders (Metals) Union – Federal Council (hereafter FMMU), Box 49, J. Alston & Sons Pty Ltd & Ors v. Amalgamated Engineering Union & Ors. A compulsory conference summoned thereunder before Mr A.M. Stewart, Commonwealth Conciliation Commissioner, Transcript of proceedings at conference, 1928, p.18; PROV: Agricultural Implement Makers Board, Series 5466 Box 2, Nominations for Wages Board, May 1914; C. Fahey & J. Lack, ' "A Kind of Elysium Where Nobody has Anything Difficult to Do": H.B. Higgins, H.V. McKay and the Agricultural Implement Makers, 1901–26', Labour History, no. 80, May, 2001, pp. 108–113; UMA: SMWAIU, Box 123 file 2/7/2/1, Letter 11 October, 1926; SMWAIU, Items Box 128, Agricultural Implement Makers Case, p. 837.

21. UMA: SMWAIU, Items Box 128, Agricultural Implement Makers Case, p. 806, Box 123 file 2/7/2/1, Letter from Russell, Secretary Federated Agricultural Implement Makers and Ironworkers Association (hereafter FAIM&IA) to E.H. Barker, General Secretary, Australian Labor Party, Western Australian Branch, 11 October, 1926; Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University (hereafter NBAC): Amalgamated Engineering Union (hereafter AEU), Z102/282–285, Amalgamated Engineering Union and Others v. Metal Trades Employers Association and Ors, Transcript of proceedings before the CCCA, 1928–30 (hereafter Metal Trades Case), p. 574.

22. UMA: Victorian Trades Hall Council, Box 22 file 1/4/1/1, Minutes of Dispute Committee Meeting, 17 April, 1917; SMWAIU-Victorian Branch, Box 128 file 2/7/1/3, Submission by H.V. McKay Pty Ltd to CCCA re Agricultural Implement Makers Case; Items Box 128, Agricultural Implement Makers Case, pp. 688, 831 & 948.

23. NBAC: AEU, Z102/278–280, Amalgamated Engineering Union v. J. Alderdice and Co. Pty Ltd & Ors, Transcript of proceedings before the CCCA, 1926, pp. 865, 886 & 2409 (hereafter referred to as the 1926 Standard Hours Case); Federated Moulders (Metals) Union v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd & Ors, Transcript of proceedings before the CCCA, 1924, (hereafter referred to as the 1924 Moulders Case) p. 267; NBAC: AEU, Z102/282–285, Metal Trades Case, pp.565 & 2409; UMA: SMWAIU, Items Box 128, Agricultural Implement Makers Case, p. 837; C. Fahey & J. Lack, '"We Have to Train Men from Labourers": The Agricultural Implement Trade 1918–1945', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 42, no. 4, December, 2000, pp. 568–9.

24. UMA: SMWAIU, Items Box 128, Agricultural Implement Makers Case, p. 806, NBAC: AEU, Z102/278–280, 1926 Standard Hours Case, pp. 2422–4 & 2427–8.

25.The 'Wild Cat' Monthly, April 5 1930, p. 179 and May 7 1938, p. 212; K. Webber, 'Embracing the New: A Tale of Two Rooms', in P. Troy (ed.), A History of European Housing in Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2000, pp. 88–9; New South Wales Statistical Register, 1905–1918/19, William Applegate Gullick, Government Printer, Sydney.

26. Descriptions of the organisation of work within Metters and various other Stovemaking establishments abound in the transcripts of arbitration proceedings concerning the industry. See in particular: State Records NSW (hereafter SRNSW): Court of Arbitration, CGS 5340, Transcripts of Proceedings 1902–08 [2/99] Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union v. Fred Metters and Co., pp. 159, 196 & 242 (hereafter 1907 Stovemakers Case); NBAC: Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union (hereafter SPFM&SEU), E245/136, Transcript of proceedings of Iron Trades (Stove and Piano-Frame Makers) Board, 1910/11, pp. 800, 805, 842 & 867 (hereafter 1911 Stovemakers Case); SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings 1912–26, Item [2/340], Re Metters Ltd v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union - Application by the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union for variation of award, vol. 91, 1920, pp. 536–9.

27. SRNSW: CGS 5340, [2/99] 1907 Stovemakers Case, pp. 31, 35, 41, 45, 57, 97, 100, 118, 131–2, 135, 249 & 263.

28. NBAC: SPFM&SEU, T23/2/11, Minutes of General Meeting, 9 May 1906; SRNSW: CGS 5340, [2/99] 1907 Stovemakers Case, pp. 2–3, 7–8, 11–12,122–6, 130 & 144–5; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings 1912–26, [2/361], Re Moulders (State) Board – Application by the Federated Moulders (Metals) Union for an Award, v. 133, 1922, p. 202; S. Cockfield 'Arbitration and the Workplace: A Case Study of Metters Stovemakers, 1902 to 1922', Labour History, no. 90, May, no. 89, November, 2006, pp. 52–6; F. Farrell, 'Graves, James Joseph' (1882–1964), Australian Dictionary of Biography, 1891–1939, Vol. 9, 1986, p. 83.

29. SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings 1912–26, [2/279], Re Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group Nos. 3 and 21 Boards - Submission by Chairman of same on question of jurisdiction, 1914, pp. 19390 & 19397.

30.Stove and Piano-Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union v. Fred Metters and Co. (1907) 6 Arbitration Reports (NSW) (herafter AR) 191; Iron Trades (Stove and Piano-Frame Makers) Board (1911) 10 AR 355.

31. NBAC: SPFM&SEU, E245/110, Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No. 21 Board, Transcript of proceedings, 1913, pp. 11–12 (hereafter 1913 Stovemakers Case); NBAC: SPFM&SEU, T23/2/3–4, Minutes of General Meetings, 1908–12.

32. NBAC: SPFM&SEU, T23/2/5, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 15 September 1913; NBAC: SPFM&SEU, E245/110, 1913 Stovemakers Case, p. 12; NBAC: SPFM&SEU, E245/129, Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.16 Board, Transcript of proceedings, 1914, p. 37; NBAC: SPFM&SEU, E245/139, Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.16 Board, Transcript of proceedings, 1916, p. 43; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcript of proceedings 1912–26, [2/383] Re W.C. Myhill v. Federated Moulders (Metals) Union, NSW District - Summons to show cause - penalty for an illegal strike, before the NSW Industrial Arbitration Court, 1925, v. 135, pp. 78–9; NBAC: AEU, Z102/278–280, 1926 Standard Hours Case, pp. 812–812A.

33. W.J. Hargreaves, History of the Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Australia 1858–1958, The Worker Print, nd, c1958, p. 66; 1924 Moulders Case, pp.145–6; NBAC: AEU, Z102/278–280, 1926 Standard Hours Case, pp.812–812A; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings 1912–26, [2/383], Re W.C. Myhill v. Federated Moulders (Metals) Union, NSW District - Summons to show cause - penalty for an illegal strike, vol. 135, 1925, p. 91. See also pp. 68, 86 & 72.

34. SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings 1912–26, [2/338], Metters Limited v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union - Summons to show cause, vol. 89, 1920, p. 895; [2/339], Re Metters Ltd v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union - Summons to show cause, vol. 90, 1920, pp. 468–92; [2/340], Re Metters Ltd v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union - Application by the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union for variation of award, vol. 91, 1920, pp. 521–309; NBAC: SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meetings, 28 and 31 May, 20 June, 12 July and 2 August 1920; Metters Ltd with the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union (1920) 18 NSW Industrial Gazette 715.

35. NBAC: SPFM&SEU, T23/2/8, Minutes of Executive Meetings, 1926–1928; Patmore, 'Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration', pp. 14 & 16–7; A. Frazer, 'Charles Gilbert Heydon 1905–1918', in Patmore, Laying the Foundations, pp. 95–6.

36. A. Barnard, Visions and Profits: Studies in the Business Career of T.S. Mort, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1961, pp. 120–4; Mort's Dock - Fifty Years Ago, and Today, NSW Country Press Cooperative Co. Ltd, 1908; NBAC: Mort's Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd (hereafter MD), 37/8/5, Letter to Minister for Customs, 4 March 1927; Sydney Morning Herald, 7 October, 1908; SRNSW: Court of Arbitration, CGS 5340, Transcript of proceedings 1902–08, [2/110], Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Iron Trades Employers Association, pp. 221–2 (hereafter 1908 Engineers Case).

37. SRNSW: CGS 5340, [2/110], 1908 Engineers Case, p. 209; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcript of proceedings 1912–26, [2/291 & 2/292] Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No. 1 Board – Appeal by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Australasian Society of Engineers, Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd, Blacksmiths Society of Australasia, and the Iron Trades Employers Association, vol. 45, 1915/16, pp. 133–4, 145–6, 159–60, 193 & 200 (hereafter 1915/16 Engineers Appeal Case); Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders v. The Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd & Ors, Transcript of proceedings before the CCCA, 1924, p. 226;

38. SRNSW: CGS 5340, [2/110], 1908 Engineers Case, p. 759; SRNSW: Industrial Court, CGS 5341, Transcript of proceedings 1909–1912, [2/135], Re Engineers Award - Application for Variation by Iron Trades Employers Association, before the of NSW, 1909, v.82, pp.248–329. NBAC: MD, 37/2/24.

39. K.D. Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, 1852–1920, Department of Economic History, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, ch. 4; UMA: FMMU, Box 130, Report of the conference between representatives of the Iron Trades Employers Association and the Iron Trades Employees Unions, 2 November, 1903; Mitchell Library (hereafter ML): Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders – Sydney Branch (hereafter FSB&IS), MSS 2422 - K52392, Minutes of General and Shop Delegates meetings, 17 January, 1 February, & 4 April, 1911.

40.Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Iron Trades Employers Association (1908), 7 AR 256; Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.1 (Engineers, etc.) Award (1915), 8 NSWIG 1132; Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.1 Board - Appeal by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Australasian Society of Engineers, Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd, Blacksmiths Society of Australasia, and the Iron Trades Employers Association (1916) 15 AR 118.

41.ASE (Amalgamated Society of Engineers) Monthly Report, October, 1914, p. 20.

42.Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February, 1913; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcript of proceedings 1912–26, [2/333], Re Boilermakers, &c (State) Board - Application by Federated Society of Boilermakers, &c. for Award, v.84, 1919, p. 805 (hereafter 1919 Boilermakers Case); ML: FSB&IS, MSS 2422 – K52392, Minutes of General Meeting, 9 July, 1912, ML: FSB&IS, MSS 2422 – K52393, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 8 October, 1912, 4 May & 31 July, 1914 & 9 August, 1915.

43. Minutes of Board of Directors meetings, & 27 July 1917; SRNSW: CGS 5342, [2/333], 1919 Boilermakers Case, pp. 798–805; SRNSW: CGS 5342, [2/291–2], 1915/16 Engineers Appeal Case, pp. 43, 57, 111, 115, 130–1, 144–5 & 155–6; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcript of proceedings 1912–26, [2/322] Minister for Labour and Industry v. Amalgamated Society of Engineers - Summons to show cause, before the NSW, 1918, vol. 73, pp. 11–19 (hereafter 1918 Engineers Dispute).

44. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, pp. 83–91; Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, pp. 287–8 & 292; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcript of proceedings 1912–26, [2/322], Re Minister v. Federated Society of Makers and Repairers of Iron and Steel Boilers, &c. – Summons to Show Cause, 1918, vol. 73, pp. 302–29 (hereafter 1918 Boilermakers Dispute); NBAC: MD, 37/52, Notes of interview between Franki and King for the Company and Sinclair and Muir for the Boilermakers Society, 27 September 1918.

45. SRNSW: CGS 5342, [2/322], 1918 Boilermakers Dispute, pp.1–69 & 862; SRNSW: CGS 5342, [2/322], 1918 Engineers Dispute, pp. 1–69 & 862; ASE Monthly Reports, 1919: March, pp. 16–7, 1920: March p. 18, June, pp. 15 &18, July, p. 16 & August, p. 21; Boilermakers Quarterly Report, 1919: no. 16, January, p. 13, no. 17, April, p. 82, & no. 18, July, p. 142, 1922: no. 31, October, p. 301; NBAC: AEU, Z102/272–274, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd, Transcript of proceedings before the CCCA, 1921, pp. 1260–1; SRNSW: Court of Industrial Arbitration, CGS 5342, Transcript of proceedings 1912–26, Items [2/360], Re Ironworkers Assistants (State) Board - Application by Federated Ironworkers Association for Award, vol. 112, 1922, pp. 6–7; [2/361] Moulders (State) Board: Application by Federated Moulders (Metals) Union for Award, vol. 113, 1922, p. 401; NBAC: MD, 37/8/3, Letter to J.F. Kirby, 24 March 1922.

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