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One of the Boys or the Common Good?: Workplace Activism in the NSW Branch of the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Associations
Mark Westcott*
This article explores the interactions between union officials and delegates of the New South Wales (NSW) branch of the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Associations (FEDFA) at the Shell Clyde refinery and the Tooths Sydney breweries. It contributes to the debates concerning the tension between bureaucracy and democracy within trade unions by illustrating that these elements are not mutually exclusive. The NSW FEDFA has encouraged a strong delegate organisation, and the objectives of delegates and officials are both conflicting and accommodating with evidence of both participation and bureaucracy.
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| 'The issue of "spontaneity versus organisation" has provoked constant controversy within the labour movement'.1 This article makes a contribution to the debate that has developed around this issue by examining the dynamic relationship between workplace union representatives and full-time union officials. It examines this relationship in one particular union, the Coastal Districts Branch (NSW) branch of the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Associations (FEDFA), within the Shell Clyde refinery and the Tooths Breweries during the decade of the 1970s. |
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The article is divided into five sections. The first provides a brief overview of the debates about the relationship between union officials and rank and file membership, including a discussion of the Australian literature that focuses on union shop floor organisation and activity. The second section traces the development of delegate structures among the FEDFA membership at the Clyde refinery and the Tooths breweries. At both sites there was an attempt to encourage and mould this delegate organisation during the 1970s. Rank and file organisation and activism was an important element in the effectiveness of the FEDFA as a union in the 1970s, but there was tension and conflict as well as accommodation and cooperation between workplace union delegates and union officials. The manifestations of tension and cooperation are illustrated in the third and fourth sections of the article which focus on activities at Clyde refinery and the Tooths breweries. The third section presents evidence of delegate autonomy and its impact on the union organisation and officials. It shows that there is not a stark dichotomy between official and delegate authority but, rather, a symbiotic relationship between the two. The fourth section shows how union officials directed delegate structures to reflect their particular philosophy of union activity. In this case it was the restriction of delegate autonomy at Clyde refinery as a consequence of the development of a common industry negotiating forum which was endorsed by the union executive. However, this is not a clear case of officials reducing the authority of shop floor delegates as their activities were not subsumed by officials. The final section offers some concluding comments reinforcing the complexity of the relationship between members, delegates and paid officials. |
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Union Officials, Delegates and the Rank and File | |
| There is a widespread recognition among trade union scholars that the objectives of trade union officials sometimes differ from that of rank and file members and unpaid union representatives. Some commentators have gone further to suggest that the objectives of officials are often contrary to the interests of their members. Empirically, the identification of union officials has not always been straightforward, with the notion of trade union bureaucracy remaining very loosely defined in many of these arguments. This is particularly problematic for a consideration of unpaid union delegates (also referred to as job delegates or shop stewards). Some writers include these delegates as part of the union bureaucracy while others align them with the broader union membership. Generally, the paid officials of the trade union are most closely associated with organisational objectives and consequently union bureaucracy, while the interests of the rank and file are seen to align more closely with unpaid representatives they directly elect.2 |
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The alignment of interests between paid union officials, unpaid union representatives and the broader union membership is one strand of the larger debate over participation, democracy and bureaucracy within trade unions. Participation in union governance is often equated with the mechanisms of decision making including meetings and elections. As Sheridan points out, a dichotomy exists between participation in these official union structures and the willingness and capacity of members to act unofficially and independently at the workplace.3 This participation at the workplace represents an important element of union activity. There are broadly two approaches adopted to explain the extent to which workplace rank and file participation is encouraged or alternatively controlled. There are those explanations that argue that the degree of participation as opposed to bureaucracy within union is largely contingent on internal factors such as membership and leadership characteristics, as well as contextual factors such as market conditions and legal structures. Alternatively there are those explanations, influenced by the writings of Michels,4 Marx, Engels and Trotsky,5 which emphasise a structural predisposition toward bureaucracy at the expense of rank and file participation. While this literature has been covered extensively elsewhere6 this section provides a brief overview of the bureaucratisation debates and examines the evidence for workplace union organisation and activism in Australia. |
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The Webbs' analysis of British trade unions was instrumental in recognising the tension between rank and file members, delegates and specialist union officials. While the Webbs saw the specialisation of trade union officials and their separation from the ordinary member as a consequence of the increasing complexity of trade union operation, they did not see this necessarily creating an oligarchy.7 G.D.H. Cole, commenting on British trade unionism, noted that the precise nature of union control: 'will vary from Union to Union according to the particular conditions of different industries'.8 One important condition was the degree of organisation of employers which can in some cases bring the need for centralised authority in trade unions. Cole argued that those who were critics of this more contingent account of union governance 'have generally made a mistake of attempting to counter it with indiscriminate denunciations of officialdom and the assertion of the abstract rightness of local autonomy in the barest form'.9 |
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The conditions that gave rise to shop steward autonomy or more centralised authority has continued to be an empirical issue for a number of scholars. Alan Flanders articulated the dynamic between participation and bureaucracy as a tension between the forces for movement (member participation and activism) against those for permanent organisation (stability and continuity). In developing a non-Marxist rationale for the role of trade unions he argues that their continued existence is largely ensured by developing some kind of ongoing (bargaining) relationship with employers. Flanders sees unions as dynamic organisations that 'constantly renew their vigour by keeping the spirit of movement alive in their ranks'.10 Flanders recognises that the forces of movement and organisation may manifest as conflicting objectives between officials and delegates. The rise of workplace bargaining by shop stewards in the UK, under particular circumstances, represents such a case which is both a threat (to organisation) and an opportunity (for movement) faced by trade unions.11 |
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Other institutionally focused studies of trade unions have emphasised the contingent nature of participation, linking this to union structure and membership. Union governance becomes an outcome of certain structural characteristics rather than politics. Perhaps the most widely recognised of these was H.A. Turner's comparative study of the cotton union in Britain. Turner is clear that the differing internal qualities of unions arise as a direct consequence of the characteristics of their members. He argued that participation in unions reflected the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of union membership. Those unions that are open — in terms of jobs performed by members and lack of a dominant occupational grouping within the union — are more likely to have lower levels of member participation, and a greater distinction between ordinary members and professional officials. Turner labels these unions 'popular bossdoms'. At the other extreme relatively closed unions (restricted by occupation) which have not had membership diluted by a broadening of occupational boundaries he categorises as 'exclusive democracy'.12 In Australia, Gardiner has argued that the manner in which trade unions implement policy and attempt to achieve their goals is influenced by eight key discrete choices, all of which having a range of options.13 One of these key choices is the degree of membership involvement in a range of union activities. In developing this model of union strategy Gardner makes the case that whether unions are highly centralised in operation or allow for a high degree of membership involvement is one of a number of issues that are decided and produced in particular contexts. In this respect union policies and politics are much more contingent than determined. |
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Marxist writers have been more forthright in arguing the limits of rank and file participation in trade unions. However, among writers working within this radical paradigm there are major differences about the degree to which union officials subvert the interests and activities of the rank and file. For instance, Hyman recognises the importance of material context, arguing that in order to understand union development a theoretical link must be made between the 'active initiative of union members and their representatives, the purposes and ideologies which inform their actions and the external material forces which influence and constrain them'.14 Consequently, the policy formulation and internal political processes of unions are a mediation of the external pressures on unions which are a consequence of contemporary capitalism, as well as the pressures from current and potential union members. Unions play an oppositional role in industry but are also dependent on the success of industry for the material interests of members to be served. Union members are differentiated in the labour market and in the labour process, which affects views on appropriate aspirations and means to achieve them.15 In a later paper Hyman articulated these ideas slightly differently using sets of antitheses (bureaucracy and democracy, compromise and struggle, class action and sectionalism, and socialist politics and economism) as a means of addressing some of the 'socialist' criticisms of the trade union. The overarching theme of Hyman's narrative is that these conflicting pressures play out in different ways in different contexts, but they are never reconciled. In discussing the first of these tensions he sets out that:
Of course, there are occasions when militant union members are sold out by their leaders. But to make such instances the basis for a general theory of trade unionism is to treat officialdom as scapegoats for contradictions which are inherent in union practice as such. There is indeed a problem of bureaucracy within unions, but the problem is not primarily one of the machinations of a distinctive stratum of personnel; rather, it is a question of a corrosive pattern of internal social relations.16 [Emphasis in original]
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Given Hyman's sentiments it is curious that he was involved in the 'rank and filist' debate. Zeitlin sees the work of Hyman and a number of other writers with an interest in the governance structures of unions as representing a 'rank and filist' paradigm. Zeitlin argues that this 'rank and filist' interpretation is an:
insistence on the fundamental division within trade unions between the interests and activities of the 'bureaucracy', 'leadership' or 'officialdom' on the one hand and the 'rank and file', 'membership' or 'opposition' on the other.17
He argues that common to the various strands of this 'rank and filist' approach are two assumptions. First, as organisations trade unions have an interest in an accommodation with capitalism while their members do not. Second, the rank and file are endowed with a vast reservoir of latent power which is constrained by union officialdom.18 In rejecting Zeitlin's analysis Hyman restates his earlier observations and argues for a more-nuanced interpretation of intra-union conflict. Rather than dismissing vertical hierarchical conflict within unions, as Zeitlin tends to suggest, he argues that both Zeitlin's tensions can (and do) have hierarchical dimensions.19 This is in keeping with Hyman's general proposition that trade unions are subject to dialectical forces. Primarily:
[t]he central contradiction of trade unionism is that, at the same time as it makes possible the consolidation and increased effectiveness of workers' resistance to capitalism, it also makes this resistance more manageable and predictable and can even serve to suppress struggle.20
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Hyman's broad thesis, echoing Gramsci, is that trade unions play a peculiar role in capitalist society. They are both a product of capitalism as well as providing a means of resisting it. Within these broad parameters the activities of officials, unpaid representatives and members are structured and created. Consequently there is a dynamic and often dialectic relationship between union officials, their membership and unpaid representatives. Rather than there being a stark trade-off between bureaucracy and democracy both coexist and are necessary for union operation. However this coexistence is at times uncomfortable. |
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While the 'rank and filist' debates that emerged in the United Kingdom are germane to the study of Australian unions, there are important differences in the extent of workplace activity in British and Australian unions. For some commentators, an effect of compulsory arbitration in Australia was to inhibit the growth of workplace union activity. It has been argued that the capacity to gain legal recognition and de facto bargaining rights through registration under industrial laws provided little scope and imperative for unions to develop organisational structures at the workplace and, moreover, for workplace union representatives to have any role in bargaining. For example, Hince has argued:
In Australia the accepted procedure is that union activity is carried to the shop floor by the officers of the union branch. These officers are, in general, the only union representation in negotiations and consultations at the shopfloor level.21
He goes on to add that where shop stewards exist they are rarely part of the official union structure and are usually delegated only a very limited role in union activities. Indeed, the 'neutralisation' of the workplace from union activity was seen to be encouraged by trade unions and their officials. The perception that union and worker industrial activities were absent at the workplace has been overturned by the extensive Australian literature which details the workplace activities of trade unions and their representatives. These studies highlight the diversity of workplace activity, showing considerable variation in presence and role between unions, between industries and over time. This literature has provided some insights into the activities of rank and file representatives within the workplace and has identified a number of factors that have contributed to the growth and decline of workplace activity. It also illuminates to some extent the relationships between union officials and workplace activists, both those with and without official sanction. |
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While union organisation at the workplace in Australia has never been as extensive as that in the United Kingdom there are numerous examples of well-developed rank and file organisation. Within the Australian literature, several forms of rank and file workplace organisation have been identified, which include: shop committees (both those sanctioned by unions and those formed independently of trade unions) which were sometimes coordinated though area committees; unions sanctioned joint shop committees; single shop committees; individual union delegates or shop stewards operating in workplaces; and workplaces characterised by both rank and file and union shop committees.22 Rank and file shop committees were formed in a small number of industries, most notably railways and power generation, by employees independent of and sometimes in competition with trade unions. These shop committees, the rank and file committees, were sometimes organised due to rank and file discontent with the union officials or frustration with union ineffectiveness. As a consequence:
links with trade unions [were] not always close and trade union officials sometimes regard[ed] this type of shop committee as an illegitimate offspring of radical agitators who [were] trespassing upon proper function of trade unions.23
The role played by these committees at the workplace varied between industry and state. Rank and file committees were on the whole unlikely to encroach into areas such as negotiation of wages and award conditions, particularly in New South Wales, and generally focused on improving immediate working conditions.24 Following World War II, these 'independent committees' declined relative to union shop committees, in part due to their association with the Communist party, strong employment growth and a decline in employment in the industries in which they operated. As Rimmer and Sutcliffe observe:
[a]s a rank and file movement they were becoming defunct, and with a few exceptions their continued survival rested upon their function as a minor administrative agency in those unions that tolerated them.25
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In contrast, the union committees that developed in industries such as vehicle building, oil refining, chemicals and general engineering were in many cases actively involved in bargaining over wages and conditions in the post World War II period, particularly in those industries faced with tight labour markets and a capacity to pay over award wages. The bargaining activities of shop committees in some instances created tensions between stewards on committees and full-time union officials. Rimmer highlights the attempts by the national peak union body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), to bring under control the activities of union-sponsored shop committees.26 He shows the potential problems that strong and independent shop committees could pose for full-time union officials. In doing so he cites the obligations imposed by registration under industrial law as a factor in motivating the ACTU to extend control over shop committee activities.27 A further motivating factor was the increasing involvement of the ACTU in award bargaining in a number of industries. As Rimmer notes:
Shop committees existed in a number of these industries and government departments [in which ACTU conducted or coordinated negotiation] and they could no longer be dismissed as a remote problem to be handled by individual unions. They directly complicated ACTU negotiations.28
Consequently, a charter for shop committees was developed and approved by the ACTU in 1961, which formally excluded committees from negotiating over employment conditions covered by awards and agreements. |
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A number of writers have explicitly or implicitly studied the activities of shop stewards or union delegates in selected Australian industries. Cockfield argues that contrary to the arguments that arbitration inhibited shop steward activity, by the late 1920s the federal Conciliation and Arbitration Court was encouraging the formation of shop committees in the metal trades to regulate the negotiation of piece rates and other payment by result schemes. The push by some members of the court for formal encouragement of shop committees was ultimately unsuccessful 'as neither management nor unions were supportive of the move'.29 Derber's forays into the Australian metals industry led him to observe that, while all the workplaces he visited contained shop stewards, in a small number of plants the stewards attempted to marginalise the role of the full-time union officials due to ideological or political differences. Interestingly this position was often reinforced by plant management who preferred dealing with their workforce directly.30 Another foreign scholar, R. Lumley, found that in a number of the workplaces he studied the relations between unions and management where of a similar type to those which could be found in corresponding British workplaces. He found, contrary to the cases observed by Derber, that management attempts to strengthen their control by involving unions in aspects of work conduct were often a response to shop steward activity.31 Seemingly, rather than deal with active stewards management chose to deal directly with full-time officials. |
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In addition to those studies that have identified activities of shop stewards as a consequence of their focus on workplace industrial relations, there are studies that focus explicitly on union governance. These studies show that categorising unions as democratic or autocratic can be difficult. Undy and Martin have noted democracy has been associated with a range of internal union practices including the timing and participation in ballots, turnover in union leadership, and recognition of shop stewards and workplace representatives.32 As Frenkel and Coolican show, merely identifying these elements in a union does not reveal the complexity of internal governance. Their detailed study of the activities and governance of the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union (AMFSU) and the Building Workers Industrial Union (BWIU) noted the strong emphasis laid on shop floor representation in both these unions, particularly the metal workers union, and in both unions the commitment to the development of shop committees. Notwithstanding this stance, the activities of the shop stewards from the metal workers were constrained by national policies. In assessing whether this commitment to shop floor organisation has led to a network of shop stewards and committees, Frenkel and Coolican note that:
compared to the BWIU, workplace organisation is generally more developed among AMFSU members but it is probably only in a small minority of workplaces that it has any significant impact upon worker resilience.33
These authors also provide some insight into the relationship between full-time union officials and shop stewards, from the perspective of the full-time official. In response to questions about their working relationship with stewards, the consensus among organisers in both unions was that stewards were highly dependent on the full-time officials to manage workplace issues.34 Davis has also examined issues of democracy and governance in a selection of Australian union. In his study of six Australian unions Davis focuses mainly on participation in formal mechanisms of governance. A small part of his study was devoted to turbulence and participation associated with the interactions between delegates and full-time union officials at union meetings. While all unions allowed membership and delegate participation, the amount of discussion and dissent was not related to organisational size. Interestingly, Davis notes that '[t]here are suggestions, however, of a correlation with regard to democratic performance and members' occupation'.35 He found that among the white-collar unions he studied there was generally greater participation of member-delegates, perhaps reflecting a greater symmetry of experience between delegates and full-time officials in white collar unions.36 |
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Finally, there are studies that have focused on shop stewards or union delegates. Benson undertook a major study of shop stewards working in power stations located in the Latrobe valley in Victoria. He argues that there are five broad factors that have been used to account for variations in union activity across industries. These are: union rules and union attitudes toward stewards; attitudes of employers and management toward stewards; the degree of union commitment to or dependency on industrial tribunals; the characteristics of the workplace; and the background of the steward.37 Benson chooses to focus on the characteristics of the stewards themselves in his study, identifying four different steward types, based on union orientation and leadership style, and to draw out to what extent steward 'type' influenced behaviour. He looks at the relationship between stewards and full-time officials in passing, noting that while the unions under study had encouraged steward autonomy in dealing with workplace issues, amongst those stewards being studied almost two-thirds had involved the full-time official in the handling of an issue in the 12 months preceding the study. Benson's data suggested that there were no real conflicts between full-time officials and stewards on how to deal with workplace issues, and in the overwhelming majority of cases stewards chose to involve the official.38 However, Benson does note that the stewards from unions that had officials located locally as well as in the Victorian capital made a distinction between the full-time officials who were located in the Latrobe valley, all of whom had at some time been stewards themselves, and those that were located in Melbourne. Indeed, stewards from these unions seemed more comfortable involving full-time officials than those stewards whose union only had officials based in Melbourne.39 |
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Bramble has explicitly addressed the application of the 'rank and filist' debate in Australia. He examined the increase in workplace activism in the vehicle-building industry, particularly at Ford, during the 1970s. As shown in the studies by Lever-Tracy, there were several instances of steward-initiated strike action taken during the 1970s and early 1980s at Ford which followed the development of a new, autonomous and militant shop steward movement within the Ford plants.40 Bramble discusses the case of the VBEU during the period 1963 through to 1991 and argues that there is an apparent divergence in interests between rank and file members, their representatives elected on the shop floor and the union's full-time officials. The lack of attention to shop floor issues by full-time officials combined with authoritarian management, especially amongst foremen, saw the union experience a challenge from below during the later half of the 1960s and early 1970s whereby new union activists came to the fore. Both companies and the union responded to this challenge and, with increasingly deteriorating economic conditions in the industry, developed new modes of accommodation that appeased members but marginalised workplace activists. While arguing the case that the workplace activism in this union showed how a collective identity can be created amongst a diverse group of members, a conclusion also drawn by Lever-Tracy, Bramble remarks that the work experience of full-time officials:
tended to reinforce their attachment to the industrial order and to unite them in opposition to what was occurring inside the factories. Their status was threatened rather than advanced by shopfloor action which was taking place outside their control, and this fact helps explain their fearful reaction.41
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These studies of workplace union activity illustrate that forms of workplace union activity have been contingent on a range of internal and external factors. Within unions important contingent variables would include: the philosophy and approach of the official leadership and their support for workplace organisation; the cohesion of union members; the characteristics of the stewards; and the stewards' capacity to remain independent of full-time officials. Outside the trade union important factors would include the philosophy and policies of employers toward unions and their employees more generally, the nature of the jobs performed by union members and their capacity to mobilise independently of the wider union membership, as well as the conditions prevailing in local labour markets and the conditions prevailing in the market for goods. Important among external factors has been the legal institutional regulation of industrial relations. In Australia, the boundaries for official union activity has been influenced by the presence and activities of industrial tribunals. Registration under industrial legislation in Australia granted a union recognition but also imposed obligations not least of which was to abide by industrial tribunal rulings. The legitimacy of tribunal decisions depended heavily on the compliance of trade unions and employers. A variety of sanctions were provided to tribunals to force compliance where registered organisations were recalcitrant. Union officials were often the intermediaries between industrial tribunals and the rank and file, which perhaps heightened differences between officials and members. In cases where trade union activity was deemed by an industrial tribunal to be illegitimate, sanctions were imposed on the union branch rather than the members directly. This meant that officials from unions where workplace structures were encouraged were sometimes faced with a penalty for action they had not sanctioned. This situation, as shown in the literature, often saw union executives discourage or attempt to develop tight control over rank and file participation. |
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While the Australian literature has drawn out a range of factors that contribute to the development of workplace unionism, this article will focus on the conditions that might see union officials seek to control workplace unionism, particularly in a union that encourages workplace activity. Rather than creating a dichotomy between spontaneity and organisation, this article considers how spontaneity or movement is shaped by organisation. Within a union that encourages workplace organisation, spontaneity may be difficult to control if the rank and file are well organised, have the capacity to cause disruption — particularly where there are tight product and labour market conditions — and are faced with acquiescent employers. Under these conditions there may be no compelling reason, except perhaps legal sanction, for union officials to control this spontaneity. Conversely, if workplace activism threatens to undermine the operation of the union as a broad entity there would be some incentive for officials to control this activity. The existence of the union may be threatened by legal manoeuvres to remove rights or assets, or by employer moves to marginalise dealings with unions. If, as Hyman points out, unions depend both on the support of their members as well as support of employers (through bargaining relationships) the perceived removal of this support may act as a strong incentive to control workplace activism. These issues will be examined in the context of two particular occupational groups in a single union. The following sections investigate the relationship between delegates from the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Association (FEDFA) at three manufacturing work sites — the Shell Clyde refinery, and the Tooths Kent and Waverley breweries — and officials of the Coastal Branch of that union. |
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Delegate Structures at Shell Clyde and Tooths | |
| A particular set of conditions that prevailed both within the Coastal branch of the FEDFA and the oil and brewing industries in New South Wales created an environment conducive to well-organised autonomous workplace activity at Shell Clyde and Tooths Sydney breweries. While the Coastal branch of the union encouraged workplace activism it is argued that the FEDFA membership at the Clyde and Tooths sites was exceptional and that the economic and political conditions of the 1970s were important for understanding delegate activities at these sites. |
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The FEDFA represented a diverse group of workers working in a variety of different industries. Beginning in mining, membership spread to include occupations such as boiler operators and firemen, stationary engine drivers, crane drivers, plant operators in building and constructions, locomotive engine drivers in private industry, drivers of heavy equipment in open cut coal mines, metalliferous mining and oil refinery operatives.42 While the FEDFA was registered federally, it consisted of a number of active and autonomous branches, many of which had state registration, including the Coastal Districts Branch located in New South Wales.43 The politics, beliefs and values of the branch leadership was important for facilitating workplace organisation and activism. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Coastal branch of the FEDFA was led by left-wing officials, with some being affiliated with the Communist Party of Australia. These officials placed a heavy emphasis on participatory democracy and aggressive industrial tactics. The union leadership cultivated workplace delegates and encouraged these delegates to participate in combined shop steward committees.44 These rank and file representatives were granted a degree of autonomy from the paid union officials, not in the development of policy but in the formulation and execution of industrial activities. The FEDFA, while happy to use the industrial tribunal system in New South Wales, attempted to regulate work using a variety of mechanisms including bargaining and industrial action. Indeed, during the early part of the 1970s the FEDFA leadership in the state actively supported 'green bans' on the development of certain Sydney building sites.45 Such action saw the union defy tribunal orders and incur the sanction of the Commission on occasion. Deregistration proceedings were brought against the union on several occasions over many years.46 |
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While the FEDFA in New South Wales encouraged a delegate or steward movement, the officials of the union charted the policy direction and boundaries of delegate activity. The possible incongruence of local activity with union policy was accepted in some measure by the union leadership. For instance, in discussing the relationship between union officials and the rank and file in the FEDFA Jack Cambourn — who was State Secretary between 1969 and 1980 before moving on to become Secretary of the federal branch until 1992 — has commented that:
We've always adopted a policy of giving maximum encouragement to the delegates and active rank and filers in the union. We have a system of selection. We have a broad rank and file organisation in the union which meets regularly and it elects its own officers; it raises its own finance and conducts its own business. If I go to a rank and file meeting I'm just one of the boys. I've got to sit up the back and pay attention and I'm not allowed any more privileges than anybody else.47
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However, Cambourn has also remarked on his attempt as an official to guide the policy of the union. In particular he sought to foster a more inclusive and class-based view among the rank and file while discouraging exclusive and sectional claims. He stated:
but in the time that I've had in the [sic] influence in this union I've tried to argue that we should go for the common good, you know, of all the workers, whether they be members of our union or members of other unions. I try to follow that theme and I think it's a much more principled position, as far as I'm concerned; I mean, others mightn't agree with that.48
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The balance between 'being one of the boys' and encouraging members to 'go for the common good' proved difficult for FEDFA officials, including Cambourn, at both Clyde and Tooths sites. Particularly, this meant allowing members at these sites to chart an autonomous course (spontaneity) while attempting to guide their activities toward official union and joint union objectives (organisation). This was exacerbated by the particular circumstances of union organisation at both sites. |
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Both the Clyde oil refinery and the Tooths breweries were old manufacturing sites. Clyde refinery was established in 1925 by John Fell and Company Pty Ltd and bought by Shell Australia in 1928. Between 1959 and 1968 several new plants were constructed at the refinery which saw the workforce grow substantially. It has been estimated that the total workforce exceeded 1,000 workers by the end of 1968.49 The numbers of staff at the refinery have been reduced since the 1970s, with some occupations disappearing altogether. The Tooths Kent Brewery was established in 1835 close to what is now the Sydney central business district. The brewery was privately owned by the Tooth family until 1888 when the company was publicly listed and the owner became Tooth and Co. The brewery site expanded considerably over the course of the twentieth century as new plant was constructed on adjoining sites. In addition, Tooth and Co acquired the Reschs Waverley brewery (also situated in Sydney) in 1929 which it operated until its closure in 1984. Tooth and Company's brewing operations were acquired by Carlton and United Breweries in 1983. Over the course of its long operating history, employee numbers at the brewery expanded. In the early 1980s over 700 employees worked at the Kent Brewery.50 |
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The occupational roles and delegate structures of the FEDFA members differed substantially between the two sites. At the Clyde refinery the FEDFA represented the refinery operators. This group of workers was historically the largest occupational group amongst the waged workforce at the refinery. Other occupational groups at the refinery include maintenance staff (both electrical and mechanical), clerical staff, and at various times also laboratory staff, store workers, ironworkers and various ancillary workers. In the early 1970s, the FEDFA delegate structure at the refinery was reorganised under the guidance of Cambourn. In the mid 1970s, the operators formed their own sub branch of the union called the Refinery Operators Group (ROG), which was run by a committee comprised of the refinery delegates meeting on a monthly basis.51 While Cambourn as State Secretary had responsibility for the operators at Clyde, from the beginning of the 1970s the delegates (through the ROG) retained substantial autonomy in dealing with the day-to-day industrial relations issues at the refinery. |
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Unlike the situation at the Clyde refinery, the FEDFA represented a small section of the workforce at the Kent and Waverley breweries. The proportionally largest occupational group was the production workers in the brewery, and these workers were covered by the Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees Union of Australia (FLAIEU). The FEDFA represented boiler operators and firemen in plant and engine rooms as well as the forklift operators. The proportion of FEDFA members to total production staff was relatively low at these breweries. There were 45 members of the FEDFA employed at the Kent brewery and 36 employed at the Tooths Waverley brewery in 1963. By comparison the company estimated that there were 764 production staff at the Kent brewery alone in 1965.52 However, the FEDFA delegates at the Tooths Kent and Waverley breweries enjoyed a similar degree of autonomy to their Clyde counterparts within the union structure, perhaps more so given the long history of the industrial operation and the development of a more organic delegate structure than was the case at Clyde. In March 1975 there were 39 delegates at the Kent brewery representing 13 different unions. The FEFDA had six delegates at this site.53 While the proportion of the work force covered by the FEDFA remained relatively small their industrial impact on the site was comparatively large. The FEDFA delegates at Kent brewery, like those at Clyde, were responsible for dealing with issues on site as they arose and they retained the capacity to call industrial action as endorsed by the members. |
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Despite relatively different size and occupational roles of the FEDFA members at Clyde and Kent, there were similarities in terms of the industrial instruments which regulated their employment. Prior to 1965 employment conditions for refinery operators at Clyde were governed by a combination of state-registered industrial agreements and the Engine Drivers & c General (State) Award. After 1965 the refinery operators at Clyde had their employment conditions formalised by an enterprise occupational award negotiated with the Shell Refining Company.54 While this remained an autonomous award though the 1970s and 1980s it was increasingly affected by the development in other industry awards.55 The FEDFA members at the Kent Brewery were covered by a state-registered industrial agreement negotiated with the Brewers Association of NSW (essentially Tooth and Co. and Tooheys) from the 1930s until 1971. In 1971, the NSW Labor Council coordinated the negotiation of an industrial agreement that covered all maintenance workers employed at the Tooths and Tooheys breweries and depots. This agreement became the basis for the Breweries, Maintenance Employees (State) Award in 1974.56 Consequently, at both sites the FEDFA moved from having independent awards or agreements for their members toward greater coordination with other industry unions in bargaining. At Tooths this took the form of a state industry award, at Clyde the involvement in an industry forum. These changes in bargaining structure had a substantial limiting impact on the activities of workplace delegates at both sites. |
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It is important to note that the FEDFA members at these sites were exceptional in comparison to the broader FEDFA Coastal branch membership. They were exceptional in terms of their place in the union, the nature of their work and their workplaces. The formation of the ROG meant that the refinery operators at Shell Clyde refinery were effectively an autonomous grouping in the union and they were the only refinery operators in the Coastal branch of the FEDFA. Similarly idiosyncratic were the members at Tooths. Tooths and Tooheys were the only brewers in New South Wales for most of the twentieth century. The forklift drivers were relatively small in number and worked closely together. As there were only two brewers in the state strong links existed between forklift drivers at both companies. By the 1960s both Clyde refinery operators and Tooths FEDFA members were party to single employer awards or agreements rather than multi-employer awards, although this situation changed for the brewery workers in 1971. This was important as both sites had a history of workplace level bargaining over award conditions. Finally, both these sets of workers worked for companies that recognised workplace delegates. The Shell company refused to deal with a steward committee consisting of delegates from different unions which arguably reinforced the division between production and maintenance groups. At Tooths occupational divisions were maintained to some extent by the unions themselves. These particular circumstances in all likelihood heightened the independence of these groups from the larger union membership. |
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While FEDFA members at the two sites in question were exceptional the prevailing economic and political conditions of the 1970s increased their capacity to undertake independent action. The period of the late 1960s and early 1970s saw an increase in workplace bargaining and activity generally. As Bramble has observed the period of the early 1970s 'was one in which local unionists, sometimes with the support of branch officials, often in spite of their opposition, used strikes to drive up wages in an inflationary period'.57 Over-award bargaining increased across the manufacturing industry and the combination of high inflation and industry profitability in oil and brewing provided an impetus for local bargaining. After the late 1960s the use of penal powers by industrial tribunals had also been curbed. Together these factors created the conditions for workplace activism at these sites. |
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'Spontaneity' Threatening Organisation | |
| The organisation of FEDFA members at Clyde and Tooths created the capacity for spontaneous activity. The prevailing labour and product market context in these industries at the beginning of the 1970s provided the conditions for activism, an activism that was difficult to control. However, this activism threatened the standing of the union organisation. Terry has argued that shop stewards or delegates occupy an ambiguous position in the bureaucracy/democracy dichotomy as they can be cast as supporting either. However, the prevailing industrial law in New South Wales during the 1970s, the Industrial Arbitration Act (1940), imposed a clear obligation on union officials to control their members and delegates in the event of illegal strike action. Failure to do so could result in imposition of fines or, in extreme cases, de-registration of the union. This obligation on the legal entity of the trade union, translated to the officers of the union, makes a clear distinction between the behaviour of officials and rank and file members. This legal distinction between official and unofficial action created an uneasy situation in the FEDFA. For officials to support elected delegates undertaking 'illegal' activities exposed the union to liability; conversely, to oppose the activities of the members would risk being cast as autocratic. The potential for 'unofficial' or illegal industrial activity was heightened in the FEDFA where sections of the membership enjoyed substantial industrial leverage, as was particularly the case for forklift drivers at breweries. |
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The FEDFA had appeared several times before the NSW Industrial Commission in the 1950s and 1960s in cases arising from illegal industrial action.58 In these cases officials were often at pains to argue their inability, rather than their unwillingness, to control this action. Several of these instances involved FEDFA members at the Tooths breweries.59 For instance, in 1963 the Association was fined £150 by the Commission as a result of an illegal strike by FEDFA members at both the Tooths and Tooheys breweries.60 In arguing that the union executive had not endorsed the dispute, Jack Cambourn, then an organiser for the FEDFA, claimed that:
I want to be able to show that the decisions to hold these stoppages were decisions taken at meetings of the union delegates who in turn implemented the decisions on the job. In other words, there is no indication here that the union at any time gave directions or called workers out.61
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In 1968 the FEDFA, along with five other unions, was ordered to pay a fine of $300 by the NSW Industrial Commission, for once again undertaking strike action at the Tooths and Tooheys breweries.62 In its judgement the Commission recognised that union officials, particularly Jack Cambourn, had urged the strikers to return to work during a stop work meeting. However, the Commission argued that none of the officials from the unions involved endeavoured to prevent the strike continuing. |
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During the 1970s there was a steady stream of disputes involving FEDFA delegates in the NSW brewing industry, particularly at Tooths brewery. In a number of these disputes the FEDFA officials were caught between supporting or restraining their delegates. In 1971, for instance, the FEDFA members at Kent brewery stopped work after one of their members was allegedly underpaid. The striking workers declined the Commission's suggestion that they cease the action. In granting the company a return to work order the Commissioner recognised that the union representative, 'had done his best to cooperate with the Commission in this matter but, unfortunately, he has not succeeded in procuring a resumption of work'.63 In March 1972, the forklift drivers at the Kent brewery stopped work for ten days following the dismissal of two drivers for improper use of the Bundy clock.64 This strike action was again initiated by the rank and file. In December of the same year the FEDFA members at the Waverley brewery stopped work over a claim for a re-classification of work. This claim, and strike action, was again deemed illegal. In finding that there was no basis for the union claim the Commission made some observations about the relative roles of the officials and members in the dispute. It stated:
In the first place the FEDFA men struck without cause. Notwithstanding the efforts of Mr Cambourn and Mr Noonan who, I am quite satisfied, have personally tried to obtain a resumption of work, I believe that the Management Committee of the FEDFA have been most tardy in taking action in the matter ... the committee has not shown any real determination to discharge its responsibilities and to see that its members comport themselves within the law.65
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It is evident that union officials would want to present to the Commission an appearance of fulfilling their legal requirements and complying with tribunal rulings. However, the selected examples highlight that in the political and legal context of the early 1970s officials of the Coastal branch of the FEDFA were unwilling and unable to control the workplace activisms of their members at Tooths. This spontaneity was a potential threat to union organisation, not just as a consequence of fines but also deregistration. The Coastal branch of the FEDFA had been deregistered in the 1950s as a consequence of an illegal strike by members working in the steel industry. When the branch was granted registration again in 1958 it was excluded from organising in the steel industry. As Teagle remarks: '[the FEDFA] effectively lost 1,600 members from the steel industry. With membership totalling 10,000 this meant that this "punishment" robbed them of almost 20% of their membership'.66 This experience highlights why officials from some Australian unions did not support workplace organisation. In those Australian unions which pragmatically used both direct industrial pressure as well as industrial tribunals to achieve objectives, union officials were forced to balance their obligations to their members and to the union as an organisation. For officials in the Coastal branch of the FEDFA this meant at the very least appearing to exert some control over members and delegates, even if this actual control was elusive. |
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Moulding Activisms: Control or Common Good | |
| While the FEDFA delegates at the Tooths breweries and the Shell Clyde refinery were in a powerful industrial position due to their capacity to disrupt production, during the 1970s both sets of delegates agreed to cooperate with other unions to negotiate industry awards or agreements. In doing so they recognised that their position in both industries, in terms of wages particularly, could be undermined by subordinating their sectional interests to those of the industry workforce as a whole. This was in keeping with Cambourn's philosophy of coaxing members of the union to focus on the 'common good' rather than exploit their 'key position(s), [and their] proximity to the point of production'.67 However, for both sets of delegates these industry bargaining arrangements reduced the scope of their workplace activity and constrained their spontaneity, an outcome that peak union bodies and their employers found beneficial. |
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In 1971 the Tooths FEDFA members agreed to become party to a state-wide industry maintenance workers agreement. This agreement superseded the single agreement for FEDFA workers in the industry. Delegates consequently lost some of their influence with the development of this agreement. It was perhaps a consequence of their constrained autonomy that the members at Tooths attempted to take a leadership role in award campaigns in the mid 1970s.68 The development of the industry award, while sponsored by the Labour Council of New South Wales rather than the FEDFA, is consistent with the views of the State Secretary that the 'common good' should prevail over exclusive and sectional interests of different parts of the union membership. |
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The refinery operators at the Shell Clyde refinery experienced the combined pressure of their employer, the ACTU and their own union executive to become part of an industry bargaining framework. This in part was a consequence of the operators' unique position in the industry. The Shell Clyde refinery was the only refinery in Australia where the FEDFA had exclusive coverage of refinery operators. These workers were autonomous from the rest of the industry as they were covered by a NSW enterprise occupational award. This set them apart from the rest of the oil industry where operators, with the exception of the Caltex Kurnell refinery, were covered by two federal industry awards.69 These workers had acted and bargaining independently of the rest of the industry and in doing so led the industry in terms of wages. As noted, the philosophy of some of the executive of the state branch of the FEDFA was for a more solidaristic approach. Jack Cambourn favoured a more-inclusive rather than an exclusive approach to improving the material conditions of the workforce. His view was:
that the only consistent way is, or the only way to get consistent results is to do it on a class basis. That's my view. There's nothing to be gained by advancing the interests of only some. You've got to advance the interests of the whole class. And that's part of the communist training that I've had over the years.70
Consequently there was some dissonance between the activities of the rank and file operator group at Clyde and the union executive. |
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The industrial environment and economic conditions of the late 1970s provided an opportunity for the branch executive to alter the operators' autonomy. During the early part of the 1970s the oil companies undertook several initiatives to establish a common forum for industry negotiations. The companies had the support of the Australian Council of Trade Unions for this initiative.71 The notion of a common forum was to create some uniformity amongst industry awards; all awards would be negotiated simultaneously and one agreement would be made on all major claims, such as wages, to avoid 'leapfrogging'. The ROG at Clyde consequently came under pressure from both within the union as well as from the Shell Company to participate in the emerging industry forum. |
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The political processes within the union meant that the participation of the Clyde refinery operators in any industry bargaining forum had to gain the acceptance of the ROG. However, many operators were concerned about how this forum would affect both their participation in wage negotiations and their position within the industry. Moving into the common oil industry forum involved aligning the Clyde operators award with other, primarily federal awards for refinery operators. It also meant reduced autonomy for the delegates as industry union and ACTU officials coordinated the bargaining. The support for industry level collective bargaining reflected the tension between the common good as seen by the union executive and the particular interests of the operators at Clyde. |
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Between 1974 and 1978 pressure from several quarters, not least the Shell Refining Company, was exerted on the ROG to join the forum. This was initially met with resistance by both the ROG and officials of the NSW FEDFA. In a case before the NSW Industrial Commission in 1977, Jack Cambourn is quoted as saying:
In our view and in the view of the members, because of the unsatisfactory nature of the common negotiations, our union has looked, along with a number of other unions, with disfavour upon them, and to take no further part in common negotiations.72
This view prevailed in July 1979 with the Secretary of the ROG recording that: 'Jack (Cambourn) on two occasions pointed out the principle of the union that we would not join in C.N. (common negotiations) because all refineries/operators were/are not common'.73 However, these statements contrast Cambourn's view that the union should seek to target their industrial power for the 'common good' rather than the sectional interests of rank and file groups. The view that the ROG were being coaxed in the direction of the common forum was expressed by one operator, a delegate in the early 1970s, who commented, 'We had a union I suppose who knew where they wanted us to go and couldn't get us to go there'.74 |
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The issue of entry into common industry negotiations divided the operator group. In February 1980 a ballot was held to gauge support for entry into the common forum. The operators voted in favour of joining the forum by the slim margin of 62–61.75 The participation of the ROG in the common forum was contingent on delegates, rather than union officials, representing the Clyde operators at these negotiations. According to some of the delegates at that time union officials from other oil industry unions were reluctant to allow this. One delegate recounted that the ROG instructed the FEDFA officials not to take part in the negotiation unless the delegates were allowed to join. As a consequence, unlike the other industry unions in the common negotiations, the FEDFA representative on the union negotiating team was a delegate rather than an official. |
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The longer term effect of the common forum was to even wage relativities amongst operators in the industry with the Clyde operators losing their pre-eminent position as highest paid in the industry. Indeed, as the Clyde operators decided not to participate in the common forum, operators at the Caltex Kurnell passed those at Clyde in terms of relative wages. As the ROG secretary recorded in the minutes of a committee meeting in September 1982:
It is quite evident that our position at the top of the wage scale was about to be taken. We had been used by the AWU/Kurnell operators to pass us [sic] ... Our position since entering the (common negotiations) forum for the 78–80 award was that there was to be one offer only, made to all. Obviously this situation had changed and abuses of the system made.76
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Resentment among Clyde operators was not merely due to changing wage relativities. At another committee meeting in September 1982, an ex-delegate was reported as complaining that: '[t]he whole exercise was a big con game, all the ACTU wanted to do was play politics. The industry was using the ACTU to weaken unions'.77 |
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Conclusions | |
| This article has taken the view that unions require both participation and bureaucracy and, echoing Hyman, rather than being antithetical unions mediate both. How these forces are mediated is dependent on contingent environmental factors as well as rank and file and official agency. The activities of union officials then reflect the inherently contradictory forces of representation of member interests and accommodation of capital and state interests. The experience of the FEDFA members at Shell Clyde and Tooths presents an illustration of factors that can tip the balance toward workplace autonomy or official coordination and control. |
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The leadership of the Coastal branch of the FEDFA, while committed to encouraging workplace union structures, also held a philosophical preference for coordination of activity for the common good of the workforce. Consequently members in key positions in industry were encouraged to act inclusively rather than exclusively. The capacity of the leadership to control exclusive 'spontaneous' activity amongst members at Tooths was limited during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The capacity to take this spontaneous action was not only due to the organisation of strong workers but due to the inaction of company management — perhaps due largely to their strong market position — and the lack of deterrence from the tribunal. The NSW Industrial Commission could sanction the union entity, potentially threatening its capacity to operate but not the Tooths workers directly. This left the Coastal Branch officials in the position of having to attempt to control this action (for the appearance of the Commission) but without actively opposing their members. In comparison, the members at Clyde, while less spontaneous in terms of industrial action, were certainly very autonomous in their handling of industrial issues. |
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As the 1970s progressed the capacity for delegates at both sites to act spontaneously and autonomously decreased with their involvement in industry bargaining forums. These multi-union forums enabled unions to collectively set about changing employment conditions for a broader group of workers, but this came at the expense of individual action. This tempering of activism was to some extent the result of changed market and political conditions, as well as pressure from union peak union bodies. The context for greater workplace spontaneity and autonomy in the early part of the 1970s changed, as did the strategies of the ACTU and Labour Council as they affected FEDFA members at Shell Clyde and Tooths. The consequence was a convergence of internal and external conditions that allowed the philosophy of the branch leadership — the dilution of sectional action for the 'common good' — to influence the workplace activities of FEDFA members at these sites. The reduced capacity for workplace autonomy consequently decreased the possibility that spontaneous activity would threaten union organisation. |
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Mark Westcott is a lecturer in Work and Organisational Studies at the University of Sydney. His research interests include governance of trade unions as well as corporate governance and labour management strategies.
<m.westcott@econ.usyd.edu.au>
Endnotes
* I am grateful to the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
1. R. Hyman, 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping: A Comment on the "Rank and Filism" Debate', International Review of Social History, vol. xxxiv, 1989, p. 309.
2. J. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, Verso, London, 1988. Michael Terry has noted that the alignment of ordinary union members with unpaid union delegates is not as straightforward as some commentators would suggest. See M. Terry, 'Shop Steward Development and Managerial Strategies', in G. Bain (ed.), Industrial Relations in Britain, Blackwells, Oxford, 1983, pp. 67–91.
3. T. Sheridan, 'Democracy Among the Aristocrats: The Participation of Members in the Affairs of the AEU (Australian Section)', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 21, no. 2, 1979, p. 161.
4. Michels argues: 'By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the needs for the division of labour, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself. The existence of these special interests involves a necessary conflict with the interests of the collectivity.' R. Michels, Political Parties, Jarrold and Sons, London, 1915, p. 406.
5. For instance, Trotsky argued that 'the trade union bureaucracy persecutes the revolutionary workers ever more boldly, ever more impudently replacing internal democracy by the arbitrary action of a clique, in essence transforming the trade unions into some sort of concentration camp for the workers during the decline of capitalism'. L. Trotsky, On Trade Unions, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1969, p. 55.
6. See, for instance, J. Kelly and E. Heery, Working for the Union: British Trade Union Officers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, ch. 2.
7. S. and B. Webb, Industrial Democracy, Kelley, New York, 1965, p. 59.
8. G.D.H. Cole, The World of Labour, Bell and Sons, London, 1917, p. 260–61.
9. Ibid. In G.D.H. Cole, An Introduction to Trade Unionism, Labour Research Dept and Allen and Unwin, 1918, pp. 53–8, Cole also notes the growth of the shop steward movement during World War I, calling this 'the most significant single development in the Trade Union world during the war period'. He remains unconvinced that this movement represents a new enduring form of unionism.
10. A. Flanders, 'What are Unions For?', in W.E.J. McCarthy (ed.), Trade Unions: Selected Readings, 2nd edn, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 31.
11. Flanders, 'What are Unions For?', p. 32.
12. H.A. Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy: A Comparative Study of the Cotton Unions in England, Allen and Unwin, London, 1962, pp. 289–95.
13. M. Gardner, 'Union Strategy: A Gap in the Literature', in B. Ford and D. Plowman (eds), Australian Unions. An Industrial Relations Perspective, 2nd edn, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1989, p. 55.
14. R. Hyman, 'Trade Union: Structure, Policies and Politics', in G. Bain (ed.), Industrial Relations in Britain, Blackwells, Oxford, 1983, p. 61.
15. Ibid., pp. 63–4.
16. R. Hyman, 'Class Struggle and the Trade Union Movement', in R. Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 246.
17. J. Zeitlin, '"Rank and filism" in British Labour History: A Critique', International Review of Social History, vol. xxxiv, 1989, p. 45.
18. Ibid., p. 49.
19. Hyman, 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping', pp. 323–26.
20. Hyman, 'Class Struggle and the Trade Union Movement', p. 230.
21. K. Hince, 'Unions on the Shop Floor', in J.E. Isaac and G.W. Ford (eds), Australian Labour Relations: Readings, 2nd edn, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1971, p. 193.
22. M. Rimmer and P. Sutcliffe, 'The Origins of Australian Workshop Organisation, 1918 to 1950', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 2, 1981, p. 222.
23. Ibid., p. 220.
24. Ibid., p. 232.
25. Ibid., p. 239.
26. M. Rimmer, 'Work Place Unionism', in B. Ford and D. Plowman (eds), Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations Perspective, 2nd edn, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1989, pp. 136–37.
27. Ibid., p. 136.
28. Ibid., p. 137.
29. S. Cockfield, 'Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace Relations: "Metal Industry" Developments in the 1920s', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 35, no. 1, March 1993, p. 35.
30. M. Derber, 'Changing Union-Management Relations at the Plant Level in Australian Metalworking', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 19, no. 1, March 1977, p. 12.
31. R. Lumley, 'Control Over the Organisation and Conduct of Work: Some Evidence from Australian Workplaces', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 25, no. 3, September 1983, p. 314.
32. R. Undy and R. Martin, Ballots and Trade Union Democracy, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, pp. 189–210.
33. S. Frenkel and A. Coolican, Unions Against Capitalism, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984, pp. 105–6.
34. Ibid., p. 213–14.
35. E. Davis, Democracy in Australian Unions, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p. 160.
36. Ibid., pp. 160–61.
37. J. Benson, 'Workplace Union Organizations in Australia', Labour and Industry, vol. 1, no. 3, October 1988, p. 412.
38. J. Benson, Unions at the Workplace, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1991, pp.130–35.
39. Ibid., 133.
40. C. Lever Tracy, 'A New Australian Working Class: The Case of Ford Broadmeadows', Arena, vol. 62, 1983, pp. 55–77, and C. Lever Tracy, 'The Supervisor and the Militant Shop Steward: Evidence from the Australian Motor Industry', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 29, no. 3, September 1987, pp. 335–49.
41. T. Bramble, 'Trade Union Organization and Workplace Industrial Relations in the Vehicle Industry, 1963–1991', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 35, no. 1, March 1993, p. 56.
42. P. Huntley, Inside Australia's Top 100 Trade Unions, Ian Huntley Publishing, [Sydney], 1985, p. 107.
43. In 1992, the FEDFA merged with the Building Workers Industrial Union to form the core of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU).
44. Huntley, Inside Australia's Top 100 Trade Unions, p. 110; and S. Frenkel (ed.), A Union Point of View, TransNational Coop Ltd, Sydney, 1982, pp. 11–12.
45. There was a growing association between the FEDFA and the Builders Labourers Federation in NSW during the early 1970s, not least due to the common interest in and membership of the Communist Party of Australia shared by Jack Mundey, then Secretary of the NSW BLF and Jack Cambourn. See M. Burgmann and V. Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1998, p. 24.
46. The Coastal Branch was asked to show cause as to why it should not be de-registered in 1950 and 1951. The Coastal Branch was deregistered in 1952 (see 1952 NSW Arbitration Reports 410) and re-registered in December 1958.
47. Recorded interview with Jack Cambourn, April 1988. National Library of Australia, Oral History Project, Transcript, pp. 114–15.
48. Ibid., pp. 111–12.
49. Interview, ex-Clyde Payroll Officer, 31 July 1995.
50. This excludes employees at the Waverley brewery. The Company estimated that in April 1980 there were 1,682 award staff employed at Kent Brewery, Waverly Brewery, and depots.
51. Interview, Jack Cambourn, 3 July 1995.
52. 1963 NSW Arbitration Reports 830 and Employees at 31 July 1965 (Estimates), Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University (hereafter NBAC), Tooths Holding N20/1568.
53. List of Unions/Delegates at Kent, Irving St and Carlton St Breweries, 14 March 1975, NBAC, Tooths Holding N20/2335.
54. Refinery Operatives &c (Shell Refining (Aust) Pty Ltd Clyde) Award.
55. M. Westcott, 'Employers and Bargaining Structure: The Case of the Australian Oil Industry', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 41, no. 4, 1999, pp. 575–93.
56. 195 NSW Industrial Gazette 501.
57. T. Bramble, 'Deterring Democracy? Australia's New Generation of Union Officials', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 37, no. 3, September 1995, p. 403.
58. The Coastal Branch was de-registered in 1952 as a consequence of illegal strike activity by FEDFA members in the steel industry. The branch was re-registered under the NSW legislation in 1958. 1952 NSW Arbitration Reports 410.
59. Justices McKeon and Beattie stated in a full-bench decision in 1963 that: 'The respondent has a bad record of offences against s. 100, so bad that in 1952 its registration as an industrial union was cancelled because its members were taking part in an illegal strike: ... It was only on 19th December, 1958, that it was registered again as an industrial union: ... and since then, on 23rd March 1960, it was convicted of an offence against s. 100 and ordered to pay a penalty of £200.' 1963 NSW Arbitration Reports 830.
60. 1963 NSW Arbitration Reports 831.
61. Ibid..
62. Industrial Commission of New South Wales in Court Session. No 67/328 to 67/338, Tooth & Co. Ltd. v. The Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia (NSW) & ors. Tooheys Limited v. The Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia (NSW) & ors. Judgment of the Commission, NBAC, FEDFA Holding, N81/146.
63. 1971 NSW Arbitration Reports 41.
64. 1972 NSW Arbitration Reports 130.
65. 1972 NSW Arbitration Reports 617.
66. Greg Teagle, The Consequence of Deregistration on the Organizational Survival of a Trade Union: Three Case Studies. Honours thesis, Department of Industrial Relations, Faculty of Economics, University of Sydney, 1979, p. 93.
67. Recorded interview with Jack Cambourn, April 1988. National Library of Australia, Oral History Project, Transcript, p. 107.
68. Decision in compulsory conference 577 of 1975, Monday 22 September 1975, Commissioner Johnson.
69. Westcott, 'Employers and Bargaining Structure', p. 583–87.
70. Recorded interview with Jack Cambourn, April 1988. National Library of Australia, Oral History Project, Transcript, p. 103.
71. There is some discrepancy in accounts as to who initiated the push for industry coordination. The ACTU were instrumental in developing the standard hours award for the industry in 1972, but it seems the companies sponsored the movement towards a single bargaining forum for all industry awards.
72. Transcript, NSW Industrial Commission, 28 July 1977, Macken J., p. 7.
73. Refinery Operators Group (ROG) Committee Minutes, Book 1 (22 April 1979 to 27 February 1980), p. 6.
74. Interview, Stan Elling, 12 January 1995.
75. ROG Committee Minutes, Book 1 (22 April 1979 to 27 February 1980), p. 75. Interestingly, several delegates and the then State Secretary recall that the ROG participated in this forum from 1978.
76. ROG Committee Minutes, Book 9, p. 1,662.
77. Ibid., p. 1,677.
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