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Corio 1940: Triumph for John Curtin but Stillbirth for an Australian Motor Car

Mal Harrop*

While the 1940 by-election in Corio, Victoria was a triumph for John Curtin, it came at a cost, the still birth of a locally owned Australian motor car industry. Although national histories suggest that the major impact of Corio was a shift by Curtin in the attitude of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to sending troops overseas, this article uses local Geelong media to highlight other issues of significance both to the Corio voters and the nation. It concludes that a horse racing scandal, the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act 1940, and the presence of a large overseas-owned car assembly company in the electorate, all played a significant part in Curtin's victory. However, by opposing the monopoly provision of the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act Curtin lost the only possibility of Australia having its own car manufacturer to compete with the global giants.

 1
The Corio by-election of 1940 is best known in national history for a shift in Labor policy to support the involvement of the Australian Infantry Forces (AIF) in World War II. While Opposition leader, John Curtin, and his party opposed the initial dispatch of Australian troops to serve under the Imperial umbrella, the Corio campaign saw the Australian Labor Party (ALP) accept that the deed had been done and confirm its support for the contingent sent overseas. The policy further stressed that command decisions for Australian forces, regardless of the theatre of activities, should be made either by the Australian Government or at least with its approval. Despite this generally accepted national view of the Corio campaign, war policy had much less significance in swaying voters 'decisions'. In fact, while the Menzies government saw Labor's attitude to the war as the plank on which they would win the by-election, it was other factors which delivered the federal seat of Corio to Labor. The most significant of these was a perceived threat to employment at the Ford motor vehicle assembly plant, the largest employer in the electorate. The way in which this was handled and the subsequent Labor-inspired amendment of the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act 1940 had significant influence on the way in which Australian manufacturing industry would develop. 2
      David Day, in his biography of Curtin, simply records that the 'Corio by-election sparked new interest in Curtin as a Prime Minister'.1 There is no doubt that the profile which he gained during the campaign did much to establish the Member for Fremantle as a leader of substance not only within his party but also in the eyes of eastern states electors. Perhaps surprisingly, this biography contains no further analysis of this watershed event nor does it mention Curtin's role in amending the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act. Lloyd Ross in an earlier biography of Curtin, while suggesting that the ALP leader concentrated in the campaign on the issue of sending troops overseas, succinctly summarises that 'an election issue was the government's granting of a virtual monopoly to a private company to manufacture the first Australian produced motor cars'.2 3
      Meanwhile, Paul Hasluck, as the official war historian, suggests that the Menzies United Australia Party (UAP) government conducted 'a campaign full of blunders' and mentions the affair of 'Billie' the racehorse and the handling of the Motor Vehicle Agreement amongst these.3 With the wisdom of hindsight the successful candidate, the ALP's John Dedman writing over 25 years after the event, had few illusions. 'I now think that the election, which resulted in my obtaining a majority of 3,000 votes, was won largely on an issue unconnected with the conduct of the war'.4 This issue he believed was the 1940 Motor Vehicle Agreement between the Menzies government and Australian Consolidated Industries (ACI), which was 'inimical to the interests of the Ford Motor company, the largest industrial firm in Corio and the pride of Geelong city'.5 4
      This by-election, like any other, had to be won but it can be argued that the way in which the major parties conducted their Corio campaigns had significant influence on future Australian political and industrial development. John Curtin and his shadow ministers campaigned hard in the electorate and made local capital out of several government errors. One of these according to John Dedman's later evaluation was to create a by-election in the first place. R.G. Casey had a good grasp on the seat and Dedman believed that Menzies made a serious blunder in appointing him to Washington.6 There were even suggestions that in 'kicking Casey upstairs', Menzies was removing a serious contender to his leadership.7 Preselection of candidates, if not a blunder, did not help the UAP.8 John Dedman, the ALP candidate had contested the seat at the previous election and was also the only local resident to be nominated.9 Many of the government's campaign blunders came down to a single issue, their desire to facilitate a local car manufacturing industry. Curtin and his team found a significant ally to exploit these blunders in Ford Australia, the largest employer in the electorate. How great an influence the spectre of job losses had on the by-election result can only be conjectured. 5
      In hindsight, the Ford alliance and the by-election win came at a cost, the end of any government attempt to establish a locally owned car manufacturing industry. While both the Scullin administration and Curtin in opposition clearly confirmed the principle that Labor supported the development of local manufacturing industry through judicious use of tariff protection, the party also faced real difficulties in delivering monopoly control to 'big business'.10 This was the issue addressed during and after the Corio by-election. Indeed, it can be argued that the current trend for more and more parts for vehicles assembled in Australia to be made off shore, is related to issues of local ownership canvassed before, during and after this poll. 6
      Motor car making was a skill to which Australia came early. The National Archives provide a useful précis of the development of local car making. The road trial of the Australian designed and manufactured 'Pioneer' drew world attention when it was test driven by the Governor of Victoria, Lord Brassey in 1897. It was the first of several Australian prototype vehicles including the 'Sutton', which featured front-wheel drive and four-wheel steering in 1899.11 Early in the twentieth century, a number of vehicles were built in Australia from a combination of local and imported parts, and by 1913 the motor vehicle industry in Australia employed some 13,000 people largely in assembling vehicles from imported parts.12 Holden began motor body manufacture in 1917 and built a chassis manufacturing plant in 1926 after gaining exclusive rights to build cars for General Motors in Australia.13 The Ford Motor Company began assembling cars in Australia in 1921 and also established a chassis and body plant in 1925. By 1928, the industry employed some 27,000 workers predominantly at five major body building works; Holden and Richards in Adelaide, Smith & Waddington in Sydney, Ford at Geelong and the Melbourne Motor Body Works in Melbourne.14 The Great Depression impacted on the industry with Holden only saved by being sold to General Motors.15 The industry remained totally reliant on imported engines. 7
      The Bruce government was the first to consider establishing a complete local car making industry in 1927.16 In 1930, the Scullin administration, as part of its overall tariff reform, introduced duties on imported motor vehicle parts such as gears, axles, bearings and motor parts.17 By 1937, nearly half the factory cost of motor vehicles in Australia was attributable to local content, and at the outbreak of World War II, 40 per cent of parts was manufactured locally. The Lyons government attempted to encourage local engine production by bounty.18 Conlon and Perkins suggest that the Motor Vehicle Engine Bounty Bill of 1936 was a realisation by government that the manufacture of engines and chassis could not be accomplished by the traditional method of tariff protection but this ignores the unwillingness of overseas car makers to commit to complete local vehicle manufacture. The frustration which this caused became more pressing with the advent of war and it was this pressure which led the Menzies government to reach agreement in 1939 with Australian Consolidated Industries enabling the payment of an engine bounty to that company.19 The agreement pushed through under the wartime National Security Act virtually provided exclusive rights to make motor vehicles in Australia for a five-year set-up period. Conlon & Perkins conclude that:
the measures of the mutual agreement conferring a monopoly of car production on Australian Consolidated Industries (ACI) were extraordinary, negotiated in secrecy and introduced with haste.20
 There is no doubt that the Menzies government's solution to establish local car manufacture was lateral, that the negotiations were poorly recorded and that, once decisions were taken, there was an attempt to progress these quickly. However, this must surely be set in the context of a nation which wanted local manufacturing industry to provide employment and limit trade deficits, was frustrated by the continuing failure of any car maker prepared to go to full local manufacture and was becoming increasingly alarmed at the prospect of wartime isolation.		 8
      The Menzies government turned to a company and an individual with a track record of developing manufacturing industries in Australia. ACI, under the energetic and uncompromising leadership of W.J. Smith, otherwise known as 'Knock Out' or 'Gunboat' Smith,21 had recently changed its name from Australian Glass Manufacturers. Smith was an energetic individual whose rise to leadership was unusual even by glass industry standards. His role in the events surrounding the Corio by-election is better understood by appreciating his background. Born on Merseyside, his parents brought him to Australia as an infant and he commenced work at the Melbourne Glass Bottle Works in 1894 as a 12-year-old boy labourer. His relationship with the company which he came to lead was fraught by dispute. During his apprenticeship he became secretary of the first Victorian Glass Blowers Union. It is uncertain whether he was victimised because of this but he broke his indentures and went to Sydney to find work. Some two years later he returned to Melbourne, joined a rival glass works and resumed his union activities. His former employers took action against him for breaking his indentures and he was directed to return to complete them. Smith used his savings to buy himself out of his apprenticeship and went to work for the Caledonian Glass Works in Port Melbourne. However, this company was acquired by the dominant Melbourne Glass Bottle Works in 1904 and Smith may well have been surprised when his former boss and adversary in industrial disputes, William McNeilage, asked him to manage the Port Melbourne plant until its operations could be transferred to Spotswood.22 McNeilage later used Smith to consolidate a number of small and inefficient glass works, firstly in Adelaide and later in Sydney. However, the ambitious Smith, in part concerned by McNeilage's promotion of his sons, parted company and set up his own glass works in Sydney to compete with what had now become Australian Glass Manufacturers. Smith's threat to extend his operations to Melbourne led to discussions with the AGM board who decided to acquire his business and appoint him as Managing Director to replace McNeilage. 'Gunboat' took charge in 1921 and retained his position until 1957. Both Smith and McNeilage proved capable of identifying and securing the best available technology and of persuading workers from the USA and Europe to come to Australia to teach Australians how to use it. McNeilage explained the reasons for importing overseas specialists to train Australian glass workers to the 1906 Royal Commission on Tariffs.23 The significant difference between the two former glass blowers was that, while McNeilage's emphasis was to build a national glass container business, Smith applied the principles of adopting and adapting overseas practices to a far more diverse range of industries. Dr Helen Fountain's thesis covers this development of ACI and the company's ability to adopt overseas technology and apply this to Australian conditions in a range of glass and non-glass industries.24 The change of name to ACI reflected diversification from the core business of making glass bottles and jars not only to other forms of glass making such as window glass, glass ware, safety glass, and ovenware but also to structural engineering, plastics, metal forging, carton and box manufacture, mining and hand tool and axe making. Smith's achievements are summarised by Rimmer with the valedictory comment, 'with his passing Australia lost one of her few industrial giants'.25 9
      Given this record it is perhaps less surprising that an Australian Government offered a glass company, admittedly one rapidly diversifying into other fields, a monopoly to make cars. What happened to the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act and why did ACI never make motor cars? Part of the answer lies in the strategies used by both major political parties in the Corio campaign. This is an intriguing area of Australian industrial history in which on one occasion the great diversifier 'Gunboat' Smith and the Prime Minister Robert Menzies stood shoulder to shoulder determined to deliver their solution to give Australia a locally owned car industry. It is a story of personalities, policies, political and business opportunism and even the odd peccadillo. One certain fact is that successive Australian governments of differing political persuasions tried unsuccessfully for some 20 years to get the American and British companies who were assembling motor vehicles to turn to full manufacture. Prime Minister Menzies exaggerated when he told the House of Representatives in 1940 that federal governments had been trying to get cars made locally for 40 years but it was exaggeration born of long frustration.26 In general it seems that the Australian market was too small and too remote for the overseas car makers to consider full local manufacture. The assembly businesses were going well and one manufacturer at least, the Ford Motor Company, was enjoying imperial tariff preference on the parts it imported for Australian assembly because its operations in this country were owned by Ford Canada.27 Another potential contender was quite forthright about the situation as Laurence Hartnett recalled:
the General Motors Corporation did not want to manufacture in Australia. They were so used to big volume production in America, with millions of cars rolling off the assembly lines, that they really thought it was silly for anyone to suggest that they should make cars in such a small market as this. They not only thought so, they said so too.28
 The previous Lyons administration started positive action to improve local content with the Motor Industry Bounty Act, 1938, which taxed imported parts to provide bounties for locally made components such as radiators.29 However, it was the next United Australia Party government under Menzies which put local car manufacture firmly on the agenda. Given the circumstances and what was to happen later, it is ironic to find the Deputy Leader of the ALP Opposition, Frank Forde, tabling a 'definite matter of public importance' on 8 June 1938, in which he castigated the Menzies government for delaying local car manufacturing. He gave five reasons for his concern. These were strategic defence considerations, the need to expand secondary industries, bipartisan support for the issue, the need to improve the balance of trade and the tax already levied to encourage local car parts manufacture.30		 10
      In fact, the Department of Trade and Customs and Minister John Lawson were working on a solution. It was only after overtures to overseas car makers to establish a majority Australian-owned subsidiary appeared exhausted that broader possibilities were considered. When W.J. Smith was on one of his regular visits to Canberra in June 1939 to discuss another possible venture, he was asked by a Customs official whether ACI would consider undertaking the manufacture of motor vehicle engines and bodies. When Smith showed surprise at this suggestion, he was introduced to the Minister who confirmed it. Still unconvinced, Smith asked why General Motors or Ford had not been approached and Lawson replied that they had been but seemed reluctant to undertake full local vehicle production. This initial discussion concluded with Smith agreeing to raise the matter with his Board.31 It is uncertain whether Lawson and Smith found another area of common interest at this initial meeting. The Minister was a veterinarian by profession and would doubtless have been interested to meet one of the country's leading thoroughbred horse breeders.32 It was a matter which certainly cropped up at some stage in their relationship, with more than a passing impact on the motor vehicle agreement. 11
      Smith appears to have done his homework before embarking on his proposal because Laurence Hartnett recalls a meeting in August 1939 at which Smith asked what General Motors' attitude would be to a car-making partnership with ACI. Hartnett referred the matter to his superior, Graeme Howard, at General Motors in the USA. Following the outbreak of war Hartnett was told to advise Smith that, due to the difficulty of obtaining proper plant and equipment, the time was not opportune.33 With Board approval on 22 November 1939, Smith submitted a lengthy written proposal to Lawson. ACI agreed to establish a company with a nominal capital of £1,000,000 and an initial subscribed capital of £250,000 totally funded by ACI to make motor vehicle engines and chassis in Australia. The proposal comprehensively dealt with both the company's commitment and its expectations of the government in terms of bounty, protection and purchasing policies. One of the many provisos was a request that:
the Commonwealth Government will use its best endeavours to limit production of motor cars and trucks of the type proposed to be manufactured to the one company for a period of 5 years.34
 The government at last had a proposal on the table but it was one which involved giving ACI a five-year monopoly This monopoly clause would jeopardise any chance of bipartisan support. Smith's proposal also contained an attachment, which among other things predicted a savage attack on any Australian-generated motor industry by overseas competitors who had a 'world market stranglehold'.35 Smith's letter drew the quick response from Cabinet of a meeting with Lawson on 2 December at which the Minister asked for a modified proposal. It is unclear what this may have involved36 but it brought a prompt reply from the 'Gunboat'. Smith noted the alternative Cabinet suggestions, but confirmed the conclusions he had made during the meeting.
At that interview, I had no hesitation in saying that the proposal of cabinet as submitted by you was, in my opinion, so totally inadequate as to ensure nothing but certain failure for any organisation that attempted the task under the conditions laid down.
 Smith stressed that he had not started the negotiations, adding that it was the government's desire to get the job done which filled him with enthusiasm.
I have had no thought of personal gain, but simply set out the terms which I considered necessary for the establishment of this industry, which is so important to Australian welfare. However, in view of the wide difference between the ideas of Cabinet and myself as to just what is needed for the purpose, I feel my motives may be misconstrued by getting down to the process of bargaining and, consequently, I desire to refrain from so doing.37
 The potential saviour of the local motor industry quit the negotiations.		 12
      Within four days of Smith's refusal to weaken his proposals, Lawson introduced into the House of Representatives a Bill to appropriate revenue to pay a bounty for locally produced motor vehicle engines. He told the House that the government would impose a tax of seven pence per pound on imported motor vehicle chassis to fund the bounty for local engine manufacture. He added that companies which might have started a local industry apparently preferred to make high profits by importing chassis and engines.38 While the Deputy Opposition Leader, Frank Forde, later claimed that his question to the Minister, whether 'reputable companies' were interested in making engines, received no reply; the Labor Party supported the passage of the Bill.39 However, in fairness to their later reactions, ACI was not associated with the Bill and there was no hint that the government considered appointing a monopoly supplier. The federal government did not have the power to provide a monopoly under normal circumstances. To achieve this all state governments needed to cede their industry powers to the Commonwealth and Menzies explored this to no avail.40 13
      After the passage of the Bounty Bill press reports associated ACI with it. Concerted opposition to the agreement started much as Smith had predicted. The South Australian Government, anxious to protect its share of the car assembly industry, led the vocal protests fuelled by information from the overseas car makers. The Country Party was also unhappy about its former Coalition partner's solution fearing that there might be retaliatory trade measures against primary industries.41 The Labor Opposition viewed the secrecy of the negotiations with concern. However, there was support for the proposal, particularly in New South Wales and Victoria where state administrations hoped to increase their share of employment from the motor industry.42 Smith pressed the government for a clear agreement. On 19 December 1939, he met Lawson and Menzies in Melbourne and the Prime Minister, now vested with wartime powers under the National Security Act, handed Smith a long letter over his signature and said: 'Here is your agreement'.43 While Menzies would claim later that this was by no means a simple endorsement of ACI's proposed terms and conditions, it confirmed the vital components of bounty payments and a five-year monopoly. There would be considerable subsequent debate as to whether the Menzies letter constituted a contract but it was sufficient to send 'Gunboat' Smith on a ship to America very early in the New Year to investigate the best way to set up local car manufacture. While he regarded the Prime Minister's letter as a contract, all was not plain sailing. Following the principles which he used to establish other industries in Australia such as window glass manufacture,44 Smith sought to get the technology he needed to start car manufacturing by looking to either buy it or establish a partnership. By now, however, the 'Brigand' of the car assembly industry in Australia, Laurence Hartnett, regarded the 'Gunboat' as 'not trustworthy'. Accordingly, when Smith visited General Motor's New York executives he found them 'extremely cold to any plan involving collaboration'.45 Conlon & Perkins suggest one reason for Hartnett's distrust was that he believed that Smith was developing an alliance with Chrysler.46 At home, press and opposition criticism to the agreement was mounting. ACI was advised by the Customs Department about a month after the Menzies letter that the Tariff Board was to investigate the company's profits.47 Three weeks later came advice from Lawson that the Motor Vehicle Agreement would need to be ratified by Parliament. There were signs of a government which had jumped to a decision but which now felt it necessary to go back and build bridges. 14
      A number of factors prevented speedy implementation. The war need to make munitions superseded the demand for motor cars. The ALP and the Country Party had reservations about granting ACI a monopoly. The car assembly plants in Adelaide, and later in Geelong, lobbied strongly to protect their investment and by association employment. The press, seemingly free of wartime censorship, played out the story. Into this scenario came a political issue created by Smith and Lawson's common interest in racehorses. At some stage during their negotiations about motor car manufacture, the industrialist found time to lease one of his horses, a mare called 'Billie' to the Minister. It was an arrangement both naïve and ill timed, which was
'The Ballad of Billie'

I'm a racehorse and a winner
Of the local handicaps.
But my record's a lot thinner
Than a lot of other chaps.
I have done a bit of racing,
I've been known to lag and lose
But I spend more time in gracing
What the headlines pick as news.
They have called me Battling Billie
And although I'm really slow,
I can beat elections silly
Down at dear old Cor-i-o

Once I thought a horse's duty
Was to lead the field around
But I've found a future fruity
Where the politics resound.
And the gossips ask their neighbour
As I pass my own corral,
If I'll stick to being Labor,
Or become a National.
While I let the vets and breeders
Make my hide with grooming glow,
Every scribe is writing leaders
On the Champ from Cor-i-o.

Just forget the war orations
That the Hit and Miss will make,
I'm the cynosure of nation
And I keep M.P.s awake.
I'm the public idol proudly
Paling Phar Lap and Ajax.
And the mugs would cheer me loudly
If I favored income tax.
Let the Trump and Nuffield worry,
What's the time the watches show?
I'm the bloke who makes them flurry
When he neighs at Cor-i-o.

While I munch within my stable
The reporters come to me
And they wonder if I'm able
To express my policy'.
I'm the focus of attention,
I can show the party how.
(Even Hitler stops to mention —
'What's the odds on Billie now?')
'Resignation almost certain',
Of my boss the headlines go,
While I'm flogged by Mr. Curtin
In the Cup at Cor-i-o.

RAYBEE

compounded by Billie outperforming herself to win the Encourage Handicap at Randwick on 23 December 1939. Critics expressed surprise that the two gentlemen involved did not know that 'at such times such things were not done'.48 It was a mistake which opened the door for attacks by politicians and business competitors on both the government and the ACI Motor Car Agreement.		 15
      Matters became fraught when the Menzies government created a by-election at Corio, an electorate which contained the Ford Motor Company's Geelong plant. The popular local member, R.G. Casey, gave up the seat to become Australia's first Minister to the USA.49 The Geelong Advertiser saw Curtin's war policy as a critical issue and accordingly endorsed the United Australia Party and was critical of the views expressed by the ALP. Curtin's original view was to oppose the sending of an Australian expeditionary force to serve under allied command and editorials were critical of this. The paper asked voters to compare the Labor war policy of 'shooing the Germans away' with the Menzies 'win the war' line.50 16
      One factor important to election campaigns in regional centres was the selection of candidates. John Dedman, nominated by the ALP, was the only local resident to stand and he had also contested Corio previously.51 J.T. Vinton Smith, the UAP candidate, although highly regarded by his party, had the disadvantage of being a Melbourne-based businessman.52 The time that Curtin and his team spent in the electorate enabled them to identify and exploit local issues. The Opposition Leader committed himself to spending three days a week in the Geelong region during the lead up to the election and was strongly supported by his Ministerial colleagues. Despite the Geelong Advertiser's editorial columns, the presence of the Labor leader and his team and their willingness to address meetings throughout the Corio electorate caused the paper to report the very issues which it regarded as irrelevant and misleading.53 The election was influenced by the Ford Motor Company as the largest employer in the electorate and the perception that the future of its motor vehicle assembly operations in Australia was thrown into question by the new Motor Car Agreement. While apparently taking no direct role in any electioneering activities, it did not deny any claims about its significance to Geelong made by the Labor team.54 It ran a series of advertisements in the Geelong Advertiser inviting local residents to an open day at the Corio plant on the Saturday prior to the by-election.55 The only reported statement attributed to a Ford Australia employee throughout the campaign appears to have been a letter from one Howard Burrowes,56 which created an opportunity for the UAP. Burrowes began a letter to the Advertiser by suggesting that any implication that the Ford Motor Company of Australia was controlled by foreign interests was untrue. He went on to claim that the Ford Company of Canada was the parent of Ford Australia and continued: 'The Canadian company is as British as any company in any industry in Australia'.57 17
      The significance of Ford Australia's ownership was twofold. Canada was an ally in the war while the USA remained neutral and from a purely business point of view Ford Canada benefited from Imperial tariff preference while the American company did not. It can be argued that one aim of Australia's Trade Diversion policy in 1936 was to shift motor imports from US to Canadian plants. However, this was now less a priority than to develop complete local car production and the UAP might have made capital from this. 18
      While the Motor Vehicle Agreement was only one of the issues to face the Corio electors, scarcely a day of the campaign went by without some reference to it in the media. From the moment Dedman raised the 'monopoly' issue in his first campaign speech, Menzies and the government were on the back foot. It is possible that had W.J. Smith stayed in Australia to work through the details of his proposal to make cars locally things might have been different. However, with his 'contract' in hand, he sailed to the USA intent on striking a deal which would provide the necessary plant and equipment.58 Both the New South Wales and Victorian governments saw possible gains from the new proposal and discussions with them and with at least some of the existing car assemblers might have helped to create a coalition to support local manufacture. As it was, Menzies was increasingly isolated. The Country Party opposed the industry protection inherent in the Car Agreement and the Opposition opposed anything that smacked of monopoly. Labor was also concerned that it had not been made privy to the negotiations between ACI and the government. The Prime Minister announced his intention to take the Motor Vehicle Agreement to Parliament because of the 'Billie' affair. Curtin responded sharply:
Mr. Menzies's statement will, I think, surprise the whole community, for he says in effect that, but for Mr. Lawson's blunder and indiscretion, the motor vehicle agreement made between the Government and ACI would not have been referred to Parliament for consideration.59
 Curtin demanded that all files related to the motor car agreement be made available to him and to the Country Party Leader, Archie Cameron.		 19
      Menzies supported Lawson, declaring: 'I am not prepared to terminate the career of a Ministerial colleague simply because he made an error of judgement not involving dishonesty'.60 By 21 February, it was being reported that Curtin was to be allowed to inspect the detail of the car contract.61 Three days later the Geelong Advertiser carried a front page report containing John Lawson's letter of resignation and the Prime Minister's regretful acceptance of this.62 The Lawson resignation and the racehorse lease found expression in the 'Ballad of Billie', which captured the interest of Geelong voters and the nation.63 20
      Bill Smith's comment on the Lawson affair to Associated Press in the USA was 'This is just too silly'.64 After Lawson's resignation, John Curtin pressed his attack on the motor car agreement. He stressed that the Labor party supported motor vehicles being made in Australia but not by a monopoly. The agreement again made front page news in Geelong, after Curtin read the motor vehicle files.65 He accused the government of favouring ACI and confirmed Labor's opposition to the ratification of the contract. He noted that the details of Smith and Lawson's discussions on the morning of Saturday 2 December were unrecorded.66 Menzies' response to these accusations was reported on the front page of the following day's paper but with less prominence. The Opposition Leader delivered his attack at a speech in Geelong but the Prime Minister responded in Melbourne, arguably another tactical error. Menzies accused Curtin of making motor vehicle policy an electoral issue in Corio. The location of the Ford works in the electorate and 'an atmosphere of injustice' felt by Ford fuelled the ALP campaign.67 Menzies stated that Labor had unanimously accepted the Motor Bounty Bill when this had been presented to the federal parliament.68 The Bill provided that no bounty would be paid to any company which did not have 64 per cent Australian capital, effectively precluding the Ford Company and General Motors-Holden from receiving bounty. If Mr Curtin regarded this as discrimination, why did he approve of it in December and then oppose it two months later?69 21
      Menzies argued that the Bounty Bill represented an attempt to set up a new Australian industry to provide employment in the post-war period. It would encourage the formation of an Australian car maker by moving from the 'realm of prophecy to the realm of fact'. After the by-election, the ALP would have to decide whether they wanted an Australian car industry. The Prime Minister agreed that when the Bounty Bill was introduced, negotiations with ACI had broken down. Once the Bill was passed, these had been resumed and concluded. While the notice to other companies appeared short, they had three-and-a-half years since the government announced the bounty. There had been no positive response to the bounty. Only one company had come forward and the government was keen to see the industry established.70 Much was made by opponents of the Motor Vehicle Agreement about the shortage of notice given to the overseas car makers. Conlon and Perkins suggest that 'other interested companies like Ford had been given only forty-eight hours to prepare a submission'.71 However, Menzies' view, that there was a long history of failed negotiations with the overseas car makers and that they had been given ample opportunity to make proposals for full local manufacture, belies this. He had lost patience and believed that Ford and others had had ample opportunity to submit proposals which met Australia's national interests. 22
      Unmoved by such argument, Curtin continued his attacks in Geelong. The Advertiser reported his claim that the government had misled Parliament. In pursuit of this he raised three specific questions.
  1. Why did Menzies declare himself against a car-making monopoly and then grant one to ACI?
  2. Why was Parliament kept in ignorance of ongoing negotiations with ACI while the Bounty Bill was before Parliament?
  3. Why after Lawson had told W.J. Smith that his proposals were unacceptable did the Prime Minister accept them?72
 23
      Curtin's comments and questions dominated the Geelong paper's front page on election eve. He confirmed that Lawson had entered the lease arrangement for Billie, and failed to keep detailed notes of his meetings with Smith.73 24
      Concurrently, Menzies addressed a Geelong business gathering, stating that he would not go into detail about government attempts to establish a local car maker. This was despite allegations that the government threatened to destroy existing car assembly at Geelong. He emphasised that any agreement must go before Parliament before formal approval.74 25
      The Prime Minister lectured his business audience on 'Hypocrisy and Electioneering'. Labor had recognised that Ford was a major employer in Geelong and had swarmed into the electorate, claiming to be the people to look after Ford and its employees: 'If you open us up you will find "Fords" written on our hearts'. Menzies emphasised the Labor Party's unanimous support for the Motor Vehicle Bounty Bill. He quoted comments from Frank Forde, the Deputy Opposition Leader, in Hansard:
We are in the grip of huge vested interests. Mr. Hartnett, and Mr. French, General Manager of the Ford Motor Company, are drawing huge emoluments for the work they do in Australia. I understand they get £20,000 apiece. Under these circumstances their evidence before the Tariff Board would tend to throw cold water on the scheme because it does not suit their employers to engage in motor car production.
 Menzies went on to say that Forde suggested that the UAP government was introducing the Labor car plan. and concluded that three months later the ALP had totally changed its tune for electoral advantage.75 Following Menzies, the UAP candidate Vinton Smith suggested that Labor's somersault on the motor vehicle issue was 'one of the most agile exhibitions of political acrobatics in the history of Federal politics'.76		 26
      Nevertheless, Labor took a full-page advertisement in the final pre-election issue of the local paper.77 This left little doubt about their view of the issues. It emphasised that the issue facing voters was the viability of the local motor and textile industries. It claimed 30,000 voters were involved directly or indirectly in these industries. It quoted the UAR Attorney-General, Billy Hughes, on the motor vehicle issue:
Why is all the indignation inspired about a motor industry monopoly? They could hardly call Henry Ford a struggling entrepreneur. Were they going to say the Government had no right to establish a motor car industry in Australia to make motor cars in competition to Ford? As for the monopoly, it was evident that nothing would serve Mr. Ford and others better than the creating of conditions which would defeat Australian industry: and the idea at the back of the monopoly, was that Australian industry should be able to hold its own against great American industries established in their midst.78
 Hughes' comments were contained in the advertisement with an additional 'editorial' comment stating that 'The Ford Motor Company is NOT American : it is Canadian'. Repeating Curtin's opposition to the Motor Vehicle Agreement the advertisement claimed that 'the agreement ... would mean the transfer of the bulk of the output of the industry from Geelong and Adelaide to be centralised in Sydney'. It added that about one-third of the Geelong population gained their living either directly or indirectly from the motor vehicle industry. It emphasised that a major Geelong industry was under threat and the only solution to protect it was to: VOTE 1 DEDMAN.79 This advertisement gave a strong hip-pocket message and its timing meant that it was too late to refute.		 27
      On 4 March 1940, with about 1,000 postal votes to be counted, it became clear that the UAP had suffered a crushing defeat. Defending a majority of 5,000 votes, Vinton Smith trailed Dedman by nearly 3,500 votes. The UAP candidate claimed that the major issue was the conduct of the war. The Geelong Advertiser suggested that the ALP campaigned on peripheral issues.80 Menzies' appointment of Casey as Australia's Minister to the USA, which created the by-election, might have had a different result if Billie had failed to win at Randwick or if Ford Australia had not been in Geelong. Casey's departure, failure to field a local UAP candidate, Lawson's resignation, the motor vehicle agreement and the Ford factor; all influenced the Corio result. It was an outcome which effectively ended any prospect of a locally owned car industry, by proving what determined opposition could achieve. 28
      News of the Corio by-election and the Motor Car Agreement was widely reported. The Sydney press favoured Smith's preparedness to get the job done by going to the USA to look for suitable plant and by appointing R.J.D. McCallum, a former General Motors employee, to assist in the car making set up. Given the importance of the car assembly industry to South Australia, the Adelaide Advertiser noted that the attitudes of both Curtin and Cameron, the Country Party leader, seemed strong enough to provoke a crisis. While critical of the motor vehicle agreement, the Advertiser published Smith's views on the issue. He is reported as saying:
I have taken on this job as an ordinary working man and I am not worrying whether I personally get a sou out of it. If the industry is killed before it begins, it will be the fault of certain industries who have criticised Consolidated Industries [sic]. It seems to me that the writers who have criticised have shown an appalling lack of knowledge. We are trying to do a job. It is not my policy to talk much. I believe that what is needed in this country is deeds not words. There is too much 'knocking' going on. Knocking is all very well when you have something to knock with.81
 		29
      The Corio by-election and Lawson's resignation caused doubts to grow even within ACI. Prior to Lawson's resignation ACI Company Secretary, Stan Garnsworthy, advised the Acting Chairman, Major-General Harold Grimwade, late in February of a telephone call from another Director, F.J. Smith. F.J. reported a long conversation with W.J. Smith, the Managing Director, to whom he was unrelated. Speaking from America, 'Gunboat' told him that he was totally opposed to withdrawing from or cancelling the car making contract. He preferred to fight it out. He believed that politicians were assailing the company unfairly and that it was time to make a stand. They could have a Royal Commission or Parliament could end the agreement. He was unconcerned about the Corio by-election's impact on the car agreement. He told F.J. Smith of a telephone call from John Lawson on 21 February which was again not noted by the Minister. Lawson said he admired Smith's attitude not to withdraw from the agreement even though this might not suit him personally. W.J. Smith asked F.J. to urge the Board to do nothing and to await the government's decision on the contract. 'Gunboat' urged that no action be taken until he returned from America.82 Garnsworthy informed Lawson at 10.40am the following day that ACI would not withdraw from the car making agreement as it awaited W.J. Smith's return.83 30
      'Gunboat' Smith believed that the federal government had requested his help and that he had received a 'contract' from the Prime Minister to proceed. This contradicts Spaull's assertion that 'the company [ACI] wanted to enter motor car manufacturing'.84 Smith seemed untroubled that the government would formally investigate ACI before parliament ratified the motor car agreement. Despite the wavering of his fellow Board members, Smith believed he had a deal which he intended to honour. While the 'Billie' affair cost Menzies a Minister, it became apparent that the Prime Minister was as determined as Smith to push the car agreement through. 31
      When the Motor Vehicle Agreement Bill came before Parliament on 22 May 1940, Menzies was its advocate.85 As Hansard records show, Menzies revealed that he met with W.J. Smith in Melbourne over the monopoly issue.86 He found him 'thoroughly fair'. Smith said that if any other Australian company matched ACI's offer, he would tear up the agreement. Menzies noted that no other firm had come forward to take up Smith's challenge. The Prime Minister continued:
Mr. Smith was the only person in the course of 4 years, or of 40 years as far as I know, who presented a practical scheme under which he was prepared to invest his capital in the manufacture of motor cars in Australia.87
 Unfortunately for the Agreement and the Prime Minister, his coalition partner the Country Party opposed the Bill, believing that local car manufacture was a matter better left until after the war. The ALP foreshadowed an amendment to remove the monopoly provision from the Bill.		 32
      Menzies accused Labor of using the issue to win the Corio by-election. He claimed, 'gentlemen engaged at the Ford Motor Company plant in Geelong were told that if the Government's candidate at Corio were elected, the Ford works would be closed on Monday'.88 33
      He said the Smith proposal was the only one which would convert government policy into actual performance. He questioned how members could favour bounties but oppose special protection to a local manufacturer against the competitive powers of 'the great importing corporations'.89 Menzies became even more specific in response to an interjection:
Certainly there were others interested but no other Australian manufacturer was interested. General Motors-Holden was interested and so was the Ford Motor Company. But in what were they interested? Did they want to encourage the production of motor cars here, or to prevent it?90
 He concluded that parliamentary members faced a plain choice: 'They can either have a monopoly by an Australian manufacturer for 5 years, or a monopoly by American manufacturers for 50 years'.91 Menzies summarised the dilemma created by Corio. At least one of the overseas car makers believed that a monopoly represented the only solution to making cars in Australia.92 If this was a prerequisite for them, it was an imperative for any local manufacturer seeking to enter the industry.		 34
      Curtin moved an amendment which removed the Bill's five-year monopoly. He preceded his motion with an acknowledgment:
I believe that Australian Consolidated Industries Limited has been sincerely desirous of helping the establishment of this industry — it has been most energetic in this matter, but I see no reason why it should be assured of a monopoly in this industry as against fellow Australians.93
 With the Country Party opposed to the Bill, Labor had the numbers to push through their amendment. The Curtin amendment effectively removed the protection which the ACI Board felt to be necessary to their investment in the car industry. Although there was a Bill in place providing an agreement between ACI and the Commonwealth, the company's Chairman, Norton Grimwade, announced within a matter of weeks that it would not be investing in car making until at least the end of the war.		 35
      As Menzies had forecast, the amendment left the Australian car industry in foreign hands. Labor's Corio strategy made it virtually impossible for them to reopen negotiations to establish a locally owned motor vehicle industry. Smith does not appear to have discussed his plans with Curtin or Forde despite being on reasonable terms with the latter.94 The question of monopoly might have been resolved by a level of public equity, and ACI's monopoly in other industries such as window glass manufacture was never challenged. For ACI this attempted diversification would end with the repeal of the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act by the post-war Secondary Industries Commission. The repeal was led by John Dedman, Minister for Post War Reconstruction and member for Corio. Ultimately, gratitude and some compensation were offered to ACI.95 It was now accepted that Australia could only develop to full car manufacture by association with the powerful overseas automotive makers.96 The Department of Post-War Reconstruction wrote to every known manufacturer and assembler of motor vehicles inviting submissions for local manufacture. Five proposals from UK and American car makers were received of which two, from GMH and Ford, received serious consideration. In a proposal with some marked similarities to the earlier ACI offer, Ford sought special tariff protection, protection against domestic competition and government financial assistance, and withdrew from negotiations when asked for a more modest proposal. GMH asked for less and would make the first 'Australian' car in 1948.97 36
      Bill Smith's thoughts on this attempt at diversification are not known. If ACI had built cars, his stature as one of Australia's greatest industrial leaders would have been assured. There is no reason to doubt the former spare boy's belief that Australian secondary industry had the will and skill to be world competitive in most forms of manufacturing. One proof was his contribution as the first wartime Director of Gun Ammunition.98 Smith's feelings are perhaps best summarised by what he told ACI shareholders at the Annual General Meeting of 26 June 1940.
Mr. Menzies, then Prime Minister, and his Ministers approached me and pressed upon me a patriotic duty. I told them frankly that I could not entertain their project. But they were insistent and after frequent interviews, they finally broke down my resistance. At this stage, the so-called monopoly was offered for five years, the maximum manufacture to be 25,000 cars a year in a field of 80,000 cars. When at last I agreed to meet the situation, I told Menzies that I would tear up the contract if any USA or British manufacturer would see Australia through.99
 Menzies for his part remarked 'Hitler made cars before he made tanks'.100 He saw the Smith initiative as the only way for Australia to develop its own motor industry. The issues of principle at stake for the ALP in the Corio by-election were almost certainly not seen by any of the participants as playing a part in determining the importance of developing locally owned strategic industries. This is what it proved to be for no other industry would ever be offered the same level of protection. While Parliament ultimately rejected the possibility it is interesting to speculate what might have happened without the Billie affair and the Corio by-election. A slower racehorse, a more politically astute government and Labor looking beyond a by-election might have changed the future face of secondary industry in Australia.		 37


Mal Harrop is currently completing a doctoral thesis on the history of glass making in Australia at La Trobe University. He was both an employee in and consultant to companies and associations involved in this industry for some 30 years, including the Australian Glass Workers Union of which he was an out of industry member.
<malh@bigpond.net.au>


Endnotes

* My thanks to Dr John Hirst of La Trobe University and to the two anonymous referees whose comments and guidance were most helpful.

1. David Day, John Curtin: A Life, Harper Collins, Pymble, 1999, pp. 377–78.

2. Lloyd Ross, John Curtin: A Biography, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1977, p. 186.

3. Paul Hasluck, The Government and The People, Volume 1, 1939–1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, reprinted 1965, p. 205.

4. J.J. Dedman, 'Defence Policy Decisions before Pearl Harbour', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. XIII, no. 3, December 1967, p. 337.

5. Ibid., p. 337.

6. Norman E. Lee, John Curtin: Saviour of Australia, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1983, pp. 148–49.

7. Ibid.

8. Geelong Advertiser, 5 February 1940, p. 1.

9. Andrew D. Spaull, John Dedman: A Most Unexpected Labor Man, Hyland House, South Melbourne, 1998. Dedman's biography reveals that his local advantages could have been downplayed by his opponents since he was a British migrant and former Indian Army officer.

10. Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 17 April–31 May 1940, 4 Geo. VI, vol. 163, pp. 1,468 et seq. Curtin's speech on his amendment to the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act 1940 is an excellent summary of this ALP position.

11. <http://naa.gov.au/the_collection/transport/road.html> accessed September 2006. The emerging automobile industry section of this website provides a summarised history of early attempts to make motor vehicles in Australia including reference to the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act of 1940 and ACI's involvement in this.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. R.M. Conlon and J. Perkins, Wheels and Deals: The Automotive Industry in Twentieth Century Australia, Ashgate,, Aldershot, Hants; Burlimgton VT, 1998, p. 5.

19. <http://naa.gov.au/the_collection/transport/road.html> accessed September 2006.

20. Conlon and Perkins, Wheels and Deals, p. 5.

21. Parade, Southdown Press, Melbourne, December 1973, p. 40. The story of how Smith got his nicknames is recorded here and in several other popular publications. Smith was the manager of Australian Glass Manufacturers's Adelaide plant when, on a summer evening in 1914, he took exception to some German youths goose-stepping outside an Adelaide pub. The Germans threatened him and Bill Smith moved in with his fists knocking two unconscious, putting another in hospital and scattering a further six. He was charged but released by a magistrate who complimented him on his patriotism. He became familiarly known as 'Knockout' or 'Gunboat' because of this exploit. The US 'Ring' magazine confirms that Ed 'Gunboat' Smith was a famous boxer of the period named for his ability to attack from long range.

22. McNeilage, like Smith, was a glass blower promoted through the ranks to become Managing Director. Such promotions were not unusual in the era of hand-crafted glass making which lasted until after World War I in Australia. The industry relied on teams of workers led by journeymen glass blowers to produce bottles and jars for which they received piece work payment. Under these circumstances it was important to have management which the workers could trust to supply good glass for forming, allocate jobs fairly and strike reasonable rates for new work. In this context, both McNeilage and Smith were inspired appointments. The best information about William McNeilage is in S.G. Garnsworthy, History of ACI 1872–1964, unpublished, author's personal archives now donated to the University of Melbourne Cultural Archives as part of a collection of glass industry material, or ACI Archives, State Library of New South Wales, series 13, access number 84/1, location 1A3.

23. Royal Commission (Tariffs) Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Papers, 1906, vol. 5, McNeilage evidence, p. 1,485.

24. Dr Helen Fountain, Australian Consolidated Industries: A Case Study of Transactions in Knowhow – 1872–1967, PhD thesis, University of Sydney, March 1996.

25. G. Rimmer, in Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 2, 1892–1939, Melbourne University Press, 1988, pp. 672–74.

26. Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 22 May 1940, pp. 1,127–136.

27. Geelong Advertiser, 1 March 1940, p. 7. Howard Burrowes' letter to the Editor contains the strongest public claim that Ford Australia qualified as a British company through Canadian ownership.

28. Sir Laurence Hartnett, Kt, CBE, Big Wheels Little Wheels, Wildgrass Books, Melbourne, 1981, p. 200.

29. Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Sessions 1937–1938–1939–1940, vol. 1, pp. 251–52, 290–92, 307–08 and 332, Act 54 of 1938.

30. Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 31 May–1 July 1938, vol. 156, pp. 1,915–932.

31. Garnsworthy, History of ACI 1872–1964, pp. 118–122.

32. In addition to his achievements as Managing Director of ACI, Smith found time to establish the St Aubin's stud near Scone in New South Wales and to become a highly successful breeder. Amongst the horses to pass through his hands were Shannon and Ajax, and he opened up sales of Australian thoroughbreds to the USA with film celebrities Louis B Mayer and Bing Crosby among his clients. (Source: author's interview with Mrs Kate Fraser, grand-daughter of W.J. Smith and current owner of the St Aubin's property, 23 May 2005.)

33. Joe Rich, Hartnett: Portrait of a Technocratic Brigand, Turton and Armstrong, Sydney, 1996, p. 105.

34. Letter from W.J. Smith, Managing Director of Australian Consolidated Industries to the Honourable J.N. Lawson. MP, Minister for Trade and Customs, 22 November 1939, ACI Archives, State Library of New South Wales.

35. Ibid., Attachment.

36. When the Opposition Leader, John Curtin, was given the opportunity to view background papers related to the Motor Vehicle Agreement during the 1940 Corio by-election he expressed concern about the lack of recorded detail, particularly in relation to this meeting between Lawson and Smith on the morning of Saturday 2 December 1939. There appears to be no written record of what transpired. Geelong Advertiser, 1 March 1940, p. 1.

37. Letter from W.J. Smith to The Honourable J.N. Lawson, 4 December 1939, ACI Archives, State Library of New South Wales.

38. Votes and Proceedings of the House Of Representatives, Sessions 1937–1938–1939–1940, vol.1, pp. 565, 587–88, 594, 597, Motor Vehicle Engine Bounty Act, Act 69 of 1938.

39. Geelong Advertiser, 1 March 1940, p. 1.

40. Geelong Advertiser, 28 February 1940, p. 1. Subheading 'Cooperation of States Sought'. The paper is reporting Curtin's response to seeing files related to the motor car agreement. It quotes him as saying that Menzies met the State Premiers in June 1939 and suggested that they transfer their powers over production to the Commonwealth 'in order to enable it to confine manufacture to a single unit in the early years'. The discussion did not achieve a result.

41. Page had led the Country Party out of the Coalition and, despite attempts by Menzies to persuade the new Country party leader, Cameron, to return to coalition with the offer of ministerial portfolios, differences including the protection of manufacturing industry remained irreconcilable.

42. Geelong Advertiser, 2 February 1940, p. 5, column 5. The ALP Opposition leader in Victoria, John Cain, is reported to have led a deputation from the Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce supported by the Australian Automobile Manufacturers Association to meet the State Premier, Albert Dunstan. The deputation stressed the importance of obtaining ACI's new motor vehicle plant for Victoria, suggesting that the New South Wales government was already prepared to offer 'very definite facilities of a far reaching nature' to the company.

43. Conlon and Perkins, Wheels and Deals, p. 65 quotes Hartnett as saying 'Anyhow Smith has an agreement with them and I have no doubt he will handle it with the shrewdness for which he is famous'.

44. In most of the glass-making world, window or flat glass manufacture and bottle or container glass manufacture are separate industries run by different specialist enterprises. Smith's decision to make flat glass in Australia for the first time in 1923 was bold and required considerable capital investment, both to obtain plant and technology and to recruit overseas specialists to train an Australian work force. (See Garnsworthy, History of ACI 1872–1964, and Fountain, Australian Consolidated Industries.) He persevered in the face of fierce competition from international window glass makers.

45. Rich, Hartnett, p. 106.

46. Conlon and Perkins, Wheels and Deals, p. 65.

47. Garnsworthy, History of ACI 1872–1964, p. 120. Stan Garnsworthy was the Company Secretary of Australian Glass Manufacturers and later Australian Consolidated Industries for some 40 years. His unpublished history is a particularly useful source for information related to labour conditions and award agreements in the glass industry and for tariff decisions and negotiations.

48. Ibid.

49. Geelong Advertiser, 26 January 1940. Casey held Corio from 1931–40 and had defeated Dedman by some 5,000 votes at the previous election.

50. Geelong Advertiser, editorial comments: 10 February 1940, p. 1; 28 February 1940, p. 4; and the election eve campaign summary, 1 March 1940, p. 6.

51. Geelong Advertiser, 31 January 1940, pp. 1 and 5; 19 February 1940, p. 1.

52. Ibid.

53. From 15 February 1940 to 1 March 1940, the Geelong Advertiser published 12 major stories about the Motor Vehicle agreement, Lawson's resignation and the 'Billie' affair. Over the same period the war strategies of government and opposition were the subject of three editorials.

54. J.J. Dedman, 'Defence Policy Decisions before Pearl Harbour', p. 337. Dedman recalls a more proactive electioneering role for Ford Australia based on information supplied some years after the election. 'Years after I had retired from politics a former executive officer of the Ford company informed me that during the last week of the campaign, the managing director of the Ford company instructed his subordinates to muster every vote they could for the Labor candidate.' See also Lee, John Curtin, pp. 148–49. 'The Ford Motor Company campaigned vigorously for Labor in the by-election.'

55. Geelong Advertiser Full-page and half-page advertisements from the Ford Motor Company began on 17 February 1940 inviting Geelong residents to an Open Day at the Corio plant.

56. Burrowes says that he is a Ford employee in his letter. Inquiries have so far failed to confirm what he did at Ford but he does not appear to have been an official company spokesperson.

57. Geelong Advertiser, 1 March 1940, p. 7.

58. Garnsworthy provides an account of ACI's involvement in the Motor Vehicle Agreement from pp. 118–21 of his unpublished history. There are few details of Smith's US trip but anecdotally ACI insiders believe that Smith was close to arranging to buy the plant of the Willy's Motor Company, makers of the Jeep.

59. Geelong Advertiser, 15 February 1940, p. 1.

60. Ibid.

61. Geelong Advertiser, 21 February 1940, p. 1.

62. Geelong Advertiser, 24 February 1940, p. 1.

63. The 'Ballad of Billie' was first published in the Perth Sunday Times and republished in the Geelong Advertiser on 24 February 1940, p. 11.

64. Geelong Advertiser, 26 February 1940, p. 5.

65. Geelong Advertiser, 28 February 1940, p. 1.

66. Ibid.

67. Geelong Advertiser, 29 February 1940, p. 1.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Conlon and Perkins, Wheels and Deals, p. 27.

72. Geelong Advertiser, 1 March 1940, p. 1.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 4.

77. Ibid., p. 9.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Geelong Advertiser, 4 March 1940.

81. Adelaide Advertiser, 10 January 1940, Leader.

82. S.G. Garnsworthy, Private and Confidential Letter to Major- General Harold Grimwade 22 February 1940, ACI Archives, State Library of New South Wales.

83. Ibid., dated 23 February 1940.

84. Spaull, John Dedman, p. 27.

85. A Bill intituled— A Bill for an Act to approve the execution of an Agreement between the Commonwealth and Australian Consolidated Industries Limited with respect to the manufacture of motor vehicles and for other purposes, Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Sessions 1939 – 1940, 22 May 1940, p. 57.

86. Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 17 April–31 May 1940, 4 Geo. VI, vol. 163, pp. 1,127–136 and 1,468–512.

87. Ibid., p. 1,128.

88. Ibid., p. 1,134.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid..

91. Ibid..

92. Ford Australia sought this in their proposal to the Department of Postwar Reconstruction.

93. Ibid., p. 1,468.

94. Frank Forde was one of a number of politicians who attended the opening of ACI's Sydney Head Office. He is quoted as complimenting Smith and noting that 'Australia's bold protectionist policy had meant the building up of great secondary industries, and that their value to the war effort could not be over-estimated'. Garnsworthy, History of ACI 1872–1964, pp. 126–27.

95. Conlon and Perkins, Wheels and Deals, p. 72. Two years after the repeal of the Motor Vehicle Agreement Bill, Mr Justice Roper of the New South Wales Supreme Court, who had been appointed to arbitrate between the Commonwealth and ACI, found that 'the Commonwealth was under a moral obligation to pay compensation and [he] decided that a sum of £55,000 should reasonably be paid'.

96. Rich, Hartnett, p. 121 quotes H.C. Coombs, Director-General of Postwar Reconstruction, as saying: 'the motor industry is such that it can only be successfully established by companies with close links with powerful overseas groups for purposes of benefiting from research and "know-how"'.

97. <http://naa.gov.au/the_collection/transport/road.html> accessed September 2006. The National Archives includes a summary of those invited to make proposals to make cars in Australia with a brief evaluation of their responses.

98. 'The Directorate of Gun Ammunition, under the leadership of Mr W.J. Smith, one of Australia's leading production engineers, organised the manufacture of shell bodies with great efficiency'. D.P. Mellor, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 4, Volume V, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1958, p. 38. ACI's total contribution to the war effort is recorded in the company publication 'ACI at Battle Stations', author's archives. It involved setting up four industry 'annexes' to exclusively make war materials, including making optical glass, for the first time in Australia. See Endnote 38.

99. Conlon and Perkins, Wheels and Deals, p. 60 quoting Smith's speech to shareholders as reported in the Sydney Morning Herald of 27 June 1940.

100. Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 17 April–31 May 1940, 4 Geo. VI, vol. 163, p. 1134.

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