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Book Review
| Gideon Haigh, Asbestos House: The Secret History of James Hardie Industries, Scribe, Melbourne, 2005. pp. 496. $39.95 paper.
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| The important contribution that this book makes in the James Hardie saga, which is still being played out as I write, is that it analyses it in historical context. In laying out the company's past before us, Haigh allows us to focus more clearly on the question of whether Hardie knew that it was manufacturing a product which was causing death or merely whether it should have known. |
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Although perhaps we can't say beyond doubt that Hardie didn't know, the evidence certainly suggests that they should have known. The epidemiological evidence was 'out there' — indeed there was sufficient evidence of this nature available in the 1920s which should have raised alarm bells then about the serious dangers to health caused by the manufacturing and use of asbestos. But the factories continued to turn it out for at least another five decades. Haigh retells the story of the response of Jeffrey Skilling of Enron fame when asked what he would do if he learned the product he was making had harmful side effects. Skilling was adamant that he would keep making it because his 'job' as a businessman was to be a profit centre and maximise return to shareholders. As Haigh observes, 'Hardie seems to be the ultimate profit-before-people story' (p. 10). |
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Haigh's book is much more than just an analysis of the current events involving Hardie and its responsibility to right past wrongs. It is, as it claims, an industrial history which traces the development of the asbestos industry in Australia in a broader global context with particular reference to parallel developments in the United States. As the author concedes, fibro occupied an honoured position in Australian life. With its renown fire-retardant properties, it became the building material of choice during the 1950s and 1960s for many Australians. However, Australia's enthusiasm for the product seems to have given Hardie the opportunity to acclaim the technical prowess of the product whilst underplaying its acknowledged harmful affects which can be readily seen in this 1974 contribution to the Australian Medical Journal by Hardie's Chief Medical Officer, Dr Terry McCullagh:
The industry is well aware of the hazards of asbestos, and having briefly reviewed these I think we should also remember that, if we considered no more than its fire-retardant properties and its use in brake linings, asbestos has saved more lives than it has claimed (p. 402).
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A substantial share of the latter part of the book is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of Hardie's attempt to manage an increasing public and political perception of corporate irresponsibility and at the same time to divest itself of its liabilities to those who were suffering asbestos-related disease as a result of its business activities. This will be of particular value to scholars with an interest in social responsibility and business ethics issues as Haigh provides critical insight into the various business and legal strategies employed by the leadership of Hardie and its representatives in an attempt to dilute the growing public and political opprobrium. |
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Hardie stands condemned by its actions. On the face of it, this was a company that manufactured legal products in line with government regulations, products which were eagerly sought by enthusiastic consumers. However as Haigh shows, Hardie either knew or should have known it was putting lives at risk. Indeed several of its management team eventually succumbed to asbestos-related disease. Some within the firm took the health problems associated with asbestos extremely seriously, but they were isolated by an indifferent and untroubled Board and senior management. There was little effort directed towards worker education and even simple measures such as providing health warnings for users were resisted. |
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Even though Hardie, like others in the industry, enthusiastically supported asbestos industry research bodies, it was never really committed to exposing the dangers of the product. Its agenda was more directed toward achieving a consensus on safety minimums which allowed the industry to function with the minimum of disruption. |
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But there were others besides Hardie who knew or should have known of the dangers of asbestos. The evidence was in the public domain yet the attitude of government health authorities was, with a few honourable exceptions, 'at best apathetic, at worst culpable'. Trade unions too cannot absolve themselves from blame. Again there were honourable exceptions. Both Ray Hogan and John Neil of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union worked tirelessly to convince both an apathetic and uncooperative workforce and the FMEU itself of the seriousness of the health risks and the potential fatal consequences for members employed in the industry. Trade unions owe their membership a duty of care and it would seem that, until recently, the actions by the movement in relation to the Hardie case had been far from exemplary. |
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Overall, Haigh has written an important book and it will fill many significant knowledge gaps for those who have followed, and continue to follow, the Hardie saga. There are many lessons to be learnt here, not only by the corporate world but by its accomplices who, either by action or inaction, allow shameful episodes like this occur. However the sad fact remains that, whilst there are leadership groups in corporations who see their organisations purely as profit centres, tragedies such as this are likely to be repeated. |
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| University of Sydney |
HARRY KNOWLES | |
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