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Arbitration and the Workplace: A Case Study of Metters' Stovemakers, 1902–22
Sandra Cockfield*
An analysis of regulatory structures and work practices at Metters' Sydney stove works in the early decades of the twentieth century suggests the relationship between arbitration and workplace industrial relations was complex and contradictory. Awards of the New South Wales arbitral system simultaneously supported management prerogative and collective workplace organisation and bargaining at Metters. The actual impact of arbitration was shaped by the interaction of management, unions and rank and file workers. The article explores the influence of the NSW arbitration system on work organisation and management strategy, workplace union organisation and rank and file militancy. It is argued that arbitration did not determine or dominant workplace industrial relations at Metters but neither was it irrelevant. While on the surface it appears that various arbitral awards assisted worker control, a closer examination reveals the importance of workplace militancy, often independent of the union, in achieving this control.
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| The Sydney stove works of Metters Limited offers a revealing case study of worker and union responses to a new management paradigm and the influence of the arbitration system on these responses. At the inception of the works in 1902 the semi-skilled workforce was unorganised. By 1920 sections of the workforce had metamorphosed into a militant and active body of workers who regularly resorted to industrial action, in some cases against the wishes of union officials. This transformation occurred in a work environment where management was constantly rationalising and fragmenting the work process. Any increased managerial control that could be expected from these changes in work organisation was frustrated by the increasingly organised and militant sections of the workforce who were able to exercise considerable shopfloor control over elements of their work. |
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The culture of workplace bargaining and collective action developed within the regulatory framework set by the New South Wales arbitration system. A common perception is that arbitral regulation has prevented or hindered the development of workplace bargaining. Where workplace bargaining and militancy has occurred it has been in competition with arbitral regulation. At Metters the relationship between arbitration and the workplace was not this straight forward. While arbitral awards supported Metters' management in their efforts to rationalise work processes, this was offset by award provisions which created mechanisms for workplace bargaining. However, award provisions must be implemented and enforced, and when this aspect of regulation is examined the situation at Metters becomes more complicated. Though on the surface it appears that the various arbitral awards assisted worker control, a closer examination reveals the importance of rank and file activity, often independent of the union, in achieving this control. |
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The article examines workplace industrial relations for a group of related occupations in a single workplace in the early decades of the twentieth century. Both social and political processes at the workplace as well institutional developments are examined. Particular attention is paid to the operation and influence of arbitral awards on the development of a collective workplace identity and activism. It is argued that arbitration did not dominate workplace industrial relations at Metters, though it certainly influenced the behaviour of both unions and management. Rather, relationships at the workplace between the union, the rank and file and management moderated and shaped the impact of arbitral decisions on workplace industrial relations. The article begins by briefly reviewing various studies on the relationship between arbitration and workplace. |
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Arbitration and the Workplace | |
| A central debate in labour history is the degree of importance that should be attached to institutions such as the state and unions. The 'history from below' approach rejects the conventional institutional perspective and focuses instead on the political and social processes that shape work relations. Zeitlin has led the counter-challenge to this approach, arguing it undervalues the role of institutions in providing the labour movement with direction and influence and assumes, incorrectly, a militant rank and file overpowered by an incorporated union bureaucracy. According to Zeitlin, institutional forces were important in shaping workplace relations. In support of this he points to evidence that suggests rank and file dissent was the result of a minority of activists and not the mass of ordinary workers, labour institutions were important in coordinating and controlling job control strategies and state policies influenced regulatory structures and processes. Zeitlin's critique has yielded strong responses from those he criticised and generated a broad debate about the importance that should be attached to institutions in explaining work relations. The question of just how much importance and attention should be given to the arbitration system in explaining and understanding the history of labour in Australia is central to this debate.1 |
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There has been a widely held belief in Australia that the presence and dominance of the various arbitral systems at State and Commonwealth level had a centralising effect on unions and employer groups which drew bargaining processes away from the workplace. As Lansbury and Macdonald note:
the arbitration system has long been seen as resulting in relatively underdeveloped mechanisms for the conduct of workplace industrial relations because it has encouraged both management and unions to depend on the external system of arbitration to resolve disputes and set wages and conditions.2
This reflects an institutional approach which equates workplace industrial relations with workplace union organisation and workplace bargaining. |
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In general, industrial relations and labour history scholars have characterised workplace union organisation as atypical in Australia and confined to a few militant unions that rejected arbitration in favour of direct action. This view is best encapsulated by Howard's characterisation of Australian unions as dependent on arbitration. According to Howard, because arbitration guaranteed to unions recognition and bargaining rights they did not have to concern themselves with organising and recruiting at the workplace. By extension, the conventional perception is that arbitration has prevented the development of worker militancy through its incorporation of unions into the system. According to this view arbitration displaced workplace industrial relations in most industries. This sets up a dichotomy between arbitration and workplace. However, there is mounting evidence that challenges this dichotomy.3 |
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Arbitral tribunals did influence the behaviour of unions and the relationship between officials and the rank and file, though this was as not clear cut as Howard would suggest. Macarthy, Sheldon and Markey have all produced evidence suggesting arbitration was not responsible for the revival of unions in the early 1900s. In a detailed study of the relationship between arbitration and union behaviour and strategy, Gahan concluded unions were not dependent on arbitration to supply critical resources, nor did other strategies, including membership involvement and action at the workplace, necessarily atrophy under the influence of arbitration. Rather, arbitration was only one of a range of factors that influenced the choice of goals and methods used by unions. These studies suggest the relationship between arbitration, unions and the workplace is far more complex than is conventionally assumed.4 |
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Various studies also highlight the influence of arbitration on management strategy and the struggle for control of the labour process. Quinlan argues arbitration enhanced managerial prerogative at BHP by excluding issues from the scope of bargaining. However, arbitration could also exert direct influence on the labour process through the classification structure, apprenticeship regulations, age-based pay rates and rules regarding incentive pay schemes. Through these measures the arbitration system could influence and constrain particular management strategies around the organisation of work, with both positive and negative consequences for workers. Studies of the Commonwealth and NSW Arbitration Courts reveal a number of judges appointed to the courts were supportive of Taylor's principles of scientific management, and this informed their decisions. However, the impact of arbitral decisions was rarely straightforward. Patmore's study of the NSW Railways demonstrates the complex and contradictory impact of arbitration. While the NSW Court preserved managerial prerogative it also curtailed management's flexibility and discretion with regard to several employment matters. Further, arbitration added a new dimension to discipline through the threat of deregulation and monetary penalties for industrial action. Wright's study of the early years of BHP's Newcastle steelworks similarly highlights the complex influence of arbitration. While the NSW Arbitration Court was supportive of moves by BHP management to develop a more efficient production process, it was ultimately an independent body that could also provide material improvements to wages and conditions for workers. Positive improvements for workers could also generate changes to management strategy. For example, Bray and Rimmer's study of the labour process in transport shows how the introduction of arbitral regulation impeded the prevailing structure of managerial control and necessitated new control measures by management.5 |
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Drawing on these studies the article addresses three questions with respect to the influence of arbitration on workplace industrial relations at Metters. First, how did arbitration influence the organisation of work and management strategy? Second, what impact did arbitration have on union development and, in particular, workplace organisation? Third, to what extent did arbitration constrain collective action and worker militancy? |
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The Development of Management Strategy at Metters' Sydney Works | |
| Metters Limited manufactured stoves and other household items in several establishments across Australia. The Sydney works was established in 1902 and quickly became the largest stove works in Australia. The stove industry was in its infancy at the turn of the century but enjoyed great prosperity as households opted for the more economical stove over an open fire place. Metters was the main beneficiary of this growth, with its workforce growing steadily from around 100 employees in 1902 to over 200 in the years preceding World War I. The expansion of the works in 1916 into hollowware saw the workforce more than double over the next six years.6 |
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The expansion of the stove industry was made possible by the manufacture of affordable stoves which were smaller and more roughly made than the more highly priced ranges that could be found in wealthier homes. The establishment of a work process dependent on semi-skilled labour was essential to this development. The Sydney works were established with the intention of competing with imports from the large stove works in Scotland. These stove works had the benefit of a large domestic market which could generate economies of scale through the adoption of new production methods. While the tariff came to provide some protection to Metters, at the inception of the works in 1902 excise duties were limited. Even after tariff levels were lifted, stoves fitted up in Australia attracted only a ten per cent duty. If Metters was to be successful in this environment it had to adopt the production methods and management practices employed by its foreign competitors.7 |
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Management strategy at Metters centred on three aspects: the fragmentation and specialisation of the work process, youth employment and the introduction of piecework. Metters' management copied their overseas rivals and from the outset of the Sydney operations established a production process that fragmented work and led to task specialisation. This gave rise to a predominantly semi-skilled workforce and the employment of junior labour in large numbers. Plate moulding, a far more simplified process than floor moulding, dominated stove moulding, and from World War I onwards machine moulding became common. Improvements in the moulding process produced improvements in later stages of the work process. Better quality castings reduced the amount of grinding and dressing required. Similarly, the stove fitter worked with standardised and interchangeable parts, with very little actual 'fitting' required. These workers could not claim to be tradesmen, as indicated by their ineligibility to join the various craft societies in the metal trades. Training methods in the industry reflected this, with the improver system of unindentured training replacing the apprenticeship system.8 |
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Metters employed boys in preference to men where possible. By 1907 youths accounted for over half the metal workers in the factory. The expansion of production to include a range of small household items stimulated the further expansion of junior labour.9 Henry Spring, a managing partner, clearly stated the firm's intention to employ junior labour in preference to men:
in our business we do not want journeymen, we do not want a highly skilled moulder — we want a few to make the plates — but all the rest is off the plate, work which can be done by a boy within a few months, and same with the fitting.... We want to make all sorts of things... that can be made out of cast iron, boys can make them, and make them comfortably, but to put men on them would be simply cruel, — in fact it would simply ruin us.10
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The focus on mass-produced items and the concomitant adoption of repetitive work processes allowed Metters to adopt payment by results schemes. Though not in widespread use in Australia at this time, incentive payments were common in manufacturing industries in the United States and the United Kingdom. Through such schemes, employers hoped to gain greater control over effort levels and increase output while reducing labour costs. In addition, by relating earnings to individual output, employers hoped to break down collective output norms and induce competition and divisions within the workforce. The actual operation of piecework varied greatly between industries, affecting the success of such schemes for employers. While some workers experienced 'speed up' tactics and rate cutting, others, including those at Metters as discussed below, were able to gain collective control over piecework and turn piecework to their advantage.11 |
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In other areas of workplace regulation Metters adopted complimentary approaches. In particular, when it came to unions and the regulation of wages and working conditions, Metters took a hardline approach. In general Metters shunned industry bargaining in preference to plant level bargaining and dealing with employees directly where possible. Metters' greater size and advantage over other firms negated the need for it to cooperate with competitors. The competitive nature of the industry also inhibited cooperation and industry bargaining. The early years of the Sydney works were characterised by unilateral regulation by Metters. The firm consistently paid lower wages than other stove manufacturers. Moreover, while the formal introduction of piecework into the works did not come until 1906, wage rates varied between workers according to their output and productivity. Institutional developments forced Metters to recognise and bargain with unions, but as the discussion below will show, this occurred under duress.12 |
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Institutionalising Industrial Relations at the Workplace | |
| Initially the majority of Metters' workers were unorganised and their working conditions set by management unilaterally. While union organisation was well developed among the traditional metal trades in Australia, these societies operated as exclusive bodies, restricting membership to tradesmen who had served an apprenticeship. This left the growing number of semi-skilled workers employed in the new manufacturing industries, such as stove making, unorganised. By the end of 1907 the industrial relations landscape at Metters had changed significantly with over half of Metters' workforce unionised and the wages and working conditions of Metters' stovemakers governed by an Award. |
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Unionism arrived with a dispute over the introduction of piecework at the works. Management initially targeted junior labour who accepted piecework without a fight. However, when management refused to increase the piecework rate for a particular item and subsequently drew up a list of piecework prices that were to apply throughout the works, both adult and junior labour struck work, marking the first organised collective action at the firm. The workers agreed to return to work on the conditions existing prior to the strike leaving the issue of piecework to be settled by the NSW Arbitration Court. Before the Court could hear the case the workers had to formally organise into a trade union and register under the Industrial Arbitration Act 1901. The newly formed Stovemakers and Light Iron Moulders Union (later the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union) was slow to register under the Act and with the backlog of cases before the Court it was some time before the Court handed down an award. In the intervening period, Metters' newly organised workforce took strike action to support a wage increase claim. However, a lack of solidarity led to a quick return to work with the matter also referred to the Arbitration Court.13 |
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Though the Stovemakers Union expanded beyond Metters, strategically it relied heavily on controlling Metters' workforce. Since Metters employed more than half of the workers in the NSW stove industry, organising Metters was synonymous with organising the industry. The Union had 95 members a year after its formation, only a dozen of whom were employed outside of Metters. As a consequence, matters at Metters dominated Union proceedings. While the Union represented all grades of workers in the industry, it, like others of its ilk, was not a true industry union as most skilled auxiliary workers within these industries remained tied to occupational unions. Though it was the dominant union in the core area of stove making, the Federated Ironworkers Association, Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Sheet Metal Working Union and Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Australasia also covered workers, this last Union becoming more prominent in the works after the establishment of a hollowware section in 1916. In contrast to the Stovemakers Union, the membership of these occupational unions was spread more widely, and Metters did not play such an important part in these unions' overall strategy.14 |
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The Stovemakers Union gained several benefits from participation in the arbitration system, but there were also costs. Aside from creating the Court of Arbitration and giving it broad powers to intervene in industrial disputes, arbitration also provided unions with a legal right to organise and forced employers to recognise these unions. These benefits came at the cost of penalties on militant unions and workers who stepped outside of arbitration. These core features of the arbitration system were retained in the successor system of trade and industry boards introduced in 1908. The boards were comprised of an equal number of elected employer and employee representatives and an independent chairman with a deciding vote. They operated, as one contemporary writer put it, like 'petty courts', with the power to hear and call evidence and in certain cases examine employer records. Appeals from decisions of the boards to the renamed Industrial Court (later the Industrial Arbitration Court) led to the Court often rehearing cases and handing down its own award. Under the presidency of Judge Heydon from 1905 to 1918, the Court was very interventionist, creating precedents for boards to adopt and setting uniform standards.15 |
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The first Stovemakers' Award displayed many features that were to become common characteristics of the various NSW metal trades awards. The Award had three main features. First, it raised wage rates at Metters to the level paid in other stove works, but lower than those prevailing in engineering works. Second, it permitted the employment of junior labour, rejecting the Union's arguments for a system of apprenticeship. Third, the award permitted piecework though it granted an important concession to the Union by allowing workers to choose whether to accept piecework or continue on day work. Metters' ability to overcome the veto power of workers reveals the limitations of the award system.16 |
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The Organisation of Work, Piecework and Workplace Bargaining | |
| Management strategy at Metters centred on the development of routine repetitive work processes with workers paid by the piece. How workers responded to piecework, and whether they did so in a collective fashion, varied across workplaces and industries. Piecework, by its very nature, was designed to individualise the workplace and increase competition among workers. Linking wages to output created incentives to work harder. However, piecework also created conditions conducive to collective action. Numerous studies have revealed worker controls over output and other elements of piecework to overcome employer attempts at speed-up and rate-cutting and limit adverse competition among workers. This was the case at Metters where the initial opposition culminated in the collective rejection of piecework. When opposition failed, workers turned successfully to collective action to regulate the piecework system and over time they came to support and advocate piecework.17 |
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Worker opposition to piecework centred on a range of factors. Metters had recruited several workers from the large stove works in Scotland. These workers had direct experience of piecework and the impact it could have. Rate cutting and speed up concerned workers the most. Opposition also derived from organisational features of the workplace. In particular, workers feared that under piecework they would bear the financial brunt of inadequate facilities and materials. The exact nature of the organisational problems varied with the trade. The moulders faced an extensive array of problems. The speed of work could be affected by shortages of iron, poor quality moulding plates and an insufficient supply of moulding tools, while poor quality iron and tackle increased the likelihood of defective castings, known as 'wasters'. The pairing of moulders to lift finished boxes out of the way also caused problems if they were not paired evenly, with the slower worker slowed further by having to take time out to lift more boxes. If the pieceworker moulders rushed their work they might produce inferior articles which could cause problems further down the production chain, with poor castings requiring more dressing, grinding and fitting. For the fitters, time lost waiting for parts and material and gaining access to adequate tools were among the main concerns.18 |
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In response to worker opposition during hearings for the first Award, Judge Heydon claimed the Court could regulate a piecework system to prevent abuse. The Award prescribed that piecework rates should be fixed to enable an average competent worker to earn 20 per cent more than the day rate. This was also to constitute a minimum rate for pieceworkers, regardless of the quantity of work completed. While this provided some protection against rate-cutting, the Award did little to overcome workers' other concerns. A provision requiring "the employer shall see that the men have proper facilities for earning their minimum rates, and they are not hampered by unnecessary and preventible delays" was too vague and difficult to enforce. The most important concession granted by the Court related to the right of workers to refuse piecework, a right which challenged management strategy at Metters.19 |
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The veto power of workers inhibited but did not prevent the spread of piecework. Despite Union opposition, Metters pushed ahead with the introduction of piecework using various tactics to induce workers to accept it. As the firm employed new men, management induced them to accept piecework by telling them it was standard practice in the industry. Metters applied further pressure by indicating preference in employment would be given to those who accepted piecework, and even dismissed a man who refused piecework. While the Union convinced some new men to stop, others were attracted by the money and remained on piecework. At a general Union meeting in 1909 some members spoke in favour of piecework, though the majority remained opposed. A year later Union officials were forced to acknowledge that piecework was gradually seeping into the trade.20 |
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The 1911 Stovemakers' Award aided management's push to spread the piecework system throughout the works. The award lifted the limitation on piecework, allowing only those employed in the industry prior to the 13 May 1908 to refuse piecework. In a bid to protect workers and soften their opposition, section 3(b) of the award provided:
Such rates shall be fixed in each shop by mutual arrangement between the employer or his representative and a committee of two employees to be chosen by their fellow employees in each branch of the trade, in which such piecework or bonus system is sought to be worked.21
If the committee failed to agree, or one was not appointed, the employer had the right to fix rates unilaterally, although there was a right of appeal to the Stovemakers' Board. Furthermore, section 3 provided 'The rates fixed may be altered by mutual arrangement as above, but failing such no alteration shall be made without the permission of this Board'.22 Again, the Award did little to protect workers against organisational impediments adding only a requirement that moulders be 'paired off in respect of lifting as far as possible in accordance with their capacity of output'.23 With a more favourable award behind them, Metters' management succeeded in introducing piecework on a wide scale, but only after overcoming a plant-wide strike in 1912. James Graves, the Secretary of the Union, later said of the acceptance of piecework: 'we practically got tired of striking and had to accept it — or else keep on striking'.24 In some cases workers were happy to take on piecework as it increased earnings. For example, the dressers approached management and asked for piecework. Within 12 months of the operation of the Award piecework was widespread across the works.25 |
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It appears that after a short period of cooperation Metters ignored, or flouted, the piecework committees established to determine piecework rates. During 1912 Metters' management worked within the piecework committee system to set piece rates but by 1913 the Union was reporting cases of management unilaterally setting piece rates and refusing to meet the committee. Furthermore, when two committeemen interviewed the Works Manager in respect of prices on certain jobs, Metters docked one member's pay for the time spent away from his work, breaching an earlier agreement between the Union and Metters that committeemen would not be docked for time spent on committee work. Management refused repeated requests from the Union to meet with the piecework committee. The 1914 Stovemakers' Award amended the relevant clause to include a Stovemakers Union representative on the committee. While this gave the Union an official role on the committee, it did not compel Metters to set rates through the committee and the firm continued to ignore the Union's request for the piecework committee to be called together.26 |
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Despite Metters' obstructive tactics, direct action enabled workers to make several gains by supplementing arbitral regulation with both formal and informal agreements. The agreements regulated both piecework prices and the conditions governing the operation of piecework. The Union negotiated several formal agreements with Metters' management. Under one such agreement Metters agreed that moulders would not be docked for 'wasters'. Another agreement prevented the firm from employing juniors on the piecework system until they had been in the shop three years. This provided a de facto limitation on youth labour, something the Stovemakers' Board had explicitly rejected. Workers also settled many disputes without the aid of the Union. Although Metters would not officially meet the piecework committee, management received informal deputations from workers. This was particularly common in the foundry where piecework moulders operated somewhat independently of the Union. In contrast, the fitting and sheet iron sections were more inclined to deal with management through the Union secretary, most likely because the Union secretary at the time, James Graves, worked in the sheet iron section at Metters. Custom and practice became important in regulating the conditions of pieceworkers. Most notable was the control over output. The pieceworkers did not work a full 48-hour week. They regularly left work early and did not attend on Saturday morning at all, a practice tolerated by management in the prevailing labour market conditions. This suggests collective norms operated to restrict the output of pieceworkers. The efforts of Metters' workers to regulate the piecework system are similar to those described by Hagan and Fisher in the printing and coal industries. In these industries, as with Metters, regulation centred on preventing disputes between individual workers and avoiding overproduction and likely unemployment.27 |
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Though real gains came from outside the award system the Union continued to seek improvements through the arbitral process. At one point they attached a full schedule of piecework prices to the Award in order to stop Metters setting rates without Union involvement. However, the Court's refusal to adjust rates for cost of living changes undermined this strategy. Over time the piecework committee clause was strengthened to require the employer to notify and meet with the committee before fixing piecework rates. Similar improvements were made to the regulations regarding the organisational impediments affecting pieceworkers.28 |
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The development of piecework proceeded hand-in-hand with the further fragmentation of the work process. In this development the Stovemakers' Board and Court were far from neutral. For instance, Judge Edmunds held that the Board could not prohibit a practice if it was an essential feature of the industry and that sub-division and specialisation were incidental to every manufacturing process. He argued that industries must be allowed to develop. This decision resulted in the introduction of various grades of stove fitters and stove moulders. In this respect, the Court directly intervened in the organisation of work, institutionalising workplace change and attacking the legitimacy of Union resistance to change at the workplace.29 |
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Despite the refusal of Metters' management to set piecework prices through the piecework committee, the working conditions of many at Metters do not appear to have suffered. The pieceworkers made good money and were able to average as much per week as the more highly skilled artisans in the craft societies. This led to strong worker support for piecework payments. By the mid-1920s payment by results had become an entrenched feature of work at Metters. Workers not only accepted piecework, but also demanded it. This was in stark contrast to the attitude of the craft societies in the metal trades and put the Stovemakers Union at odds with other member unions of the Iron Trades Group. When called upon by other unions to oppose piecework, the Stovemakers Union argued piecework was a viable method of payment if unions controlled output and prices, as the stovemakers did.30 |
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Workplace Militancy | |
| The failure of arbitration to deliver the gains or protect workers was demonstrated most clearly during the World War I. A slump in the stove industry in the early years of World War I led to setbacks for workers as management used the situation to wind-back many conditions. However, as the economy improved towards the end of the war, sectional disputes on the shopfloor, particularly among the piecework moulders, became common again as the workers reasserted their control over the work process. Workplace militancy allowed sections of Metters' workforce to control the piecework system and turn it their advantage. This was very much a sectional strategy that led to benefits for particular groups rather than the entire workforce. Moreover, it threw up divisions between various work groups which management happily sought to exploit. It also created problems for the Union and challenged the authority of the arbitral system.31 |
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Worker militancy was a characteristic common to many workplaces in the latter years of World War I as workers showed their discontent with industrial tribunals through direct action. Conditions in the early years of Federation established a fertile environment for worker revolt. An expanding economy, fuelled by manufacturing growth, coincided with recovery and expansion of union membership. The onset of war highlighted the failure of the industrial tribunals to deliver real and lasting gains to workers as the NSW Government and Industrial Court encouraged wage restraint and the Industrial Boards became virtually defunct. Industrial action increased significantly after 1915, and often occurred without the approval of union officials. Wharf labourers, shearers, coalminers and Broken Hill miners all struck work in support of claims for increased wages in opposition to the advice of union officials. In addition, management attempts to rationalise work processes provoked hostile responses from unions and workers and prompted several disputes. The most notable was the 1917 general strike which began in the NSW Railway Workshops but precipitated wider social and industrial protest in communities and workplaces across NSW and beyond. Across the metal trades, where demand for semi-skilled and skilled labour was high, workplace bargaining rose to the fore. Echoing these developments, sectional disputes, independent of the Stovemakers Union, became more common at Metters towards the end of the war.32 |
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The piecework moulders were the most militant section of Metters' workforce. Management complained that the moulders participated in an excessive number of stop work meetings and deputations to management. One senior manager claimed that in January 1917 the moulders sent no less than 20 deputations to management. The moulders took full advantage of the shortage of qualified moulders and their strategic position in the production process to negotiate several new agreements with management. They were also willing, at times, to use their power to support other foundry workers.33 |
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The militancy of the moulders raised problems for the Union as well as Metters. While in the pre-war period the Union not only tolerated but supported independent action, in latter years it was less supportive. This reflected the membership base of the Union. More than half of the Union's membership was employed at Metters. A stove moulders strike could result in the closure of all stove working sections. When this occurred, the majority of the Union's members were thrown out of work, placing an enormous financial strain on a less than wealthy Union. Metters' management fuelled the tension between the moulders and the Union. Management's penchant for dealing directly with its workforce encouraged the independent behaviour of the moulders. However, when the moulders did take industrial action management was quick to initiate a prosecution against the Union for participating in an illegal strike. In both 1918 and 1919 the Union escaped with minor fines by successfully arguing before the Arbitration Court it had not authorised strikes by piecework moulders and had actively sought a return to work. On a previous occasion in 1916 it narrowly averted prosecution by convincing the men to return to work. On all three occasions the Union, backed by the general membership, refused to support the moulders and instructed them to return to work. However, it stopped short of expelling moulders, fearing what little control it had would be completely lost if the moulders were outside the Union.34 |
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Worker militancy, such as that by Metters' moulders, not only challenged Union officials, it also questioned the authority and relevance of the Industrial Court and the arbitration system. The arbitration system was premised on incorporating unions into the industrial relations landscape. While arbitration guaranteed unions representational rights, in return it demanded they control and discipline their members. The war called into the question the fairness of this trade. Legislative changes in 1916 centralised power in the Arbitration Court and effectively suspended the Industrial Boards, reinforcing the restrictive wages policy adopted by the NSW Government and the Court during the war and intensifying direct action by workers. The Court took a harsh line with unions that engaged in direct action. Over 20 unions were deregistered for their involvement in the 1917 general strike and the Court, led by Judge Heydon, resisted pressure from the NSW Government to reregister these unions, forcing the Government to legislate for this to occur.35 Deregistration served only to further remove those unions and their members from the control of the Court. Neither the Amalgamated Society of Engineers nor the Moulders' Union gained re-registration until 1920 and instead sought gains through direct action and collective bargaining with the Iron Trades Employers Federation.36 |
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In the stove industry the failure of arbitration to protect workers from the extremes of the market was apparent. The Court had assisted the further fragmentation of the work process through creating new grades of labour and refusing to regulate youth labour in any meaningful way. As the previous section has shown, the gains to workers in the industry were the result of direct action and not the awards of the Board or Court. However, a direct action strategy carried risks for the Stovemakers' Union. While severe labour shortages allowed Metters' moulders to operate outside of the system, the broader membership of the Stovemakers' Union did not have a similarly strong labour market advantage nor did the Union have the financial resources to flout the system consistently. Consequently, both the Union and the arbitration system had an interest in bringing workers into line and creating more formal processes for dealing with grievances at the workplace. |
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Institutional and Management Responses to Militancy | |
| For some, like George Beeby, the NSW Minister for Labour and Industry, the increased level of disputation in workplaces across NSW was a threat to social and economic progress. Beeby believed such progress would come through the reorganisation of work according to scientific management principles but this was being impeded by worker militancy and resistance. In keeping with his beliefs, amendments to the NSW Industrial Arbitration Act in 1918 changed the focus and direction of arbitral regulation in an effort to prevent spontaneous and unauthorised stoppages and encourage cooperation between workers and management.37 |
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The legislative amendments sought to localise and isolate disputes and formalise workplace bargaining through the development of joint management and worker shop committees, conciliation committees or industrial councils. These various types of committees were to deal with all matters except wages and working hours which were to be dealt with by the newly created Board of Trade. This reversed the centralisation of award making and encouraged workplace negotiation and regulation along similar lines to the Whitley Scheme proposed in Britain. George Beeby, the architect of this legislation, and a subsequent judge of the NSW Industrial Court, urged the formation of permanent shop committees to deal with small disputes and grievances. Importantly, Beeby saw shop committees as joint management and worker ventures and a "body acting quite independently of the union".38 In general the amendments failed to have the desired effect, and the Court continued to arbitrate on a wide range of matters. Developments at Metters demonstrate it was not that easy to subvert direct action by workers.39 |
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The Stovemakers' Union took advantage of the legislative development and, acting on the suggestion of J.B. Holme, Deputy President of the Board of Trade, the Union Secretary initiated an inter-union shop committee. This move was designed to provide greater control over the rank and file and reduce the incidence of unofficial strikes. Other unions operating in the works participated, though they adopted a more cautious approach. Management agreed to give the committee a three month trial, but insisted all matter be subservient to the respective unions. The inter-union committee quickly became active and over-reached the designs of the legislative amendments by pushing for and achieving a general wage increase. Despite the initial success, the committee ceased to operate due to a lack of support from other unions and the refusal of management to continue to deal with it.40 |
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The demise of the inter-union committee was followed by the establishment of a permanent Stovemakers' Union shop committee. Initially, the three shop stewards began to act as a shop committee in order to push for further wage increases. However, with Metters expanding rapidly, the limitation of three shop stewards per factory dictated by the Union's rules inhibited effective shop control. Shortly after, the shop committee and Union executive held a joint meeting for the purpose of "inaugurating a more efficient system of shop control".41 The joint meeting established a permanent shop committee comprised of an elected representative from each department. Two of these elected delegates were to act as the deputation to management. Importantly, with conflict between piecework moulders and the Union occupying much attention at the time, the committee was to be subservient to the Union executive. Like its predecessor, it did not conform to the mutual benefit model envisaged by Beeby. Although disputes over piecework dominated the shop committee's time, it appears to have dealt with any issue that arose, ranging from wage issues to organising Union membership. In 1919 the shop committee became the avenue for organising and coordinating negotiations over a general wage increase. This met with success and also resulted in the firm recognising the committee formally. This entrenched the position of the committee and it continued to be the focus of workplace negotiations until 1922.42 |
41
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The shop committee failed to resolve tension within the Union between officials and sections of the rank and file. Shop committees developed in several industries during the war and the inter-war period. Rimmer and Sutcliffe attribute the formation of these committees to rank and file discontent with Union officials. However, at Metters the shop committee occupied a strange position, neither subservient to Union officials nor the vanguard for the rank and file. There is some evidence the shop committee was controlled by a small group of activists who used it to manoeuvre politically within the Union. Ordinary workers were reluctant to participate in the committee, prompting the Union to introduce payment for committee work. This reluctance also reflected the self-interest, rather than union ideals, that drove shopfloor militancy after the war. The creation of the shop committee did not prevent sections of Metters' workers taking independent action. Management's preference for dealing directly with workers exacerbated the problem for the Union. For example, gas stove fitters took matters into their own hands and accepted a management offer of higher wages for increased output after unsuccessfully pushing for a wage increase through the shop committee. However, it was the piecework moulders who caused the most problems, and again the actions of management fuelled the intra-union conflict.43 |
42
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When Metters challenged the position of the piecework moulders, and sought to promote labourers to moulding to overcome a shortage of labour, a sharp division arose between the moulders and the Union. The admission of labourers to moulding threatened to mitigate the moulders' strong labour market position. While this had obvious benefits for Metters, it was also advantageous for the Union who were eager to control the behaviour of the moulders. As the Union covered workers from across the various departments in the works, it was not as concerned with losing members through changes in the work process. Deskilling and dilution, although adversely affecting sections of the membership, did not challenge its membership base. As long as the firm drew labourers from among its membership, the Union retained its standing in the foundry. In keeping with this, when the dispute broke in 1920 the Union negotiated an agreement with Metters guaranteeing continuity of work and permitting labourers to be trained as moulders if there was an insufficient supply of qualified moulders. Not surprisingly, given the recent history of the moulders, they refused to accept the agreement. Management fuelled the conflict between the moulders and the Union. The pairing of newly promoted labourers with piecework moulders provoked further disputes. In addition, Metters locked out all members of the Stovemakers' Union after a piecework moulders' lunchtime meeting went over time. The dispute was settled with the intervention of the Labor Council, the Iron Trades Employers Association and the Minister for Labour and Industry but soured relations between the Metters' management, the Stovemakers Union and the piecework moulders.44 |
43
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The action of the piecework moulders, and the retaliation by management, forced the Union to renegotiate the conditions under which the labourers could work at moulding. After drawn out negotiations, the final agreement between Metters and the Stovemakers' Union, registered under the NSW Industrial Arbitration Act, provided for the comprehensive regulation of trainee moulders. Despite the terms of the agreement, the moulders continued to defy the Union, refusing to return to work as per the registered agreement. This most likely reflected their concern that the use of trainees would dilute their industrial strength, as well as taking the 'good' piecework jobs. The Union took a hard line with the moulders. Initially the Union fined them, but due to their continued defiance it subsequently expelled the moulders and sought and gained an order from the Arbitration Court preventing their re-employment at stove moulding until they had returned to work at Metters. The Union's minutes of general and executive meetings do not record the re-admission of the moulders to the Union, and the fate of these workers is unclear. However, the level of disputation in the foundry dropped considerably during the 1920s, suggesting a victory for Metters and the Union.45 |
44
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Throughout the dispute the presence of the NSW Arbitration Court could be felt. While militant workers challenged management and the arbitration system, this action also created problems for the Union. The Court's tendency to penalise the Union for the indiscretions of the moulders influenced the Union's position and encouraged it to restrain the militancy of the rank and file. When this failed the Arbitration Court proved a strong ally. During the dispute over training labourers as moulders the Stovemakers Union used the Court to its advantage, ensuring legal support for the exclusion of the striking moulders from the stove industry. |
45
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Conclusion | |
| Workplace relations at Metters highlight the need to examine closely the interaction between institutions and social and political processes. At Metters the workplace was central to understanding the development of collective interests. However, arbitration was also important in shaping the behaviour of management and unions. Decisions of the Stovemakers' Board and Arbitration Court simultaneously weakened and strengthened the position of workers at Metters. Moreover, arbitral decisions were not automatically implemented and enforced in the workplace. The form which arbitral decisions took at the workplace depended on the actions of unions, management and workers whose behaviour shaped the implementation of the Stovemakers' Award and created divisions between the union, the rank and file and the arbitral tribunals. |
46
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The decisions of the Stovemakers' Board and Court placed few restrictions on the management strategy of Metters and the organisation of work. The Court supported and encouraged the fragmentation and specialisation of the work process. It was only the area of piecework where the Court created an initial impediment, and this was short-lived. These developments in the organisation of work led to worker grievances. Piecework created disputes over piece rates as well as the manner in which work was allocated and laid out while job fragmentation and task specialisation exposed the semi-skilled stovemakers to substitution by unskilled labourers and threatened to erode any labour market power they wielded. This created conditions conducive for collective action. |
47
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The Stovemakers' Board and Court were far more intrusive in matters affecting the economic exchange between employer and employee and keen to ensure these remained jointly regulated. Hence, the Board sanctioned the introduction of piecework but sought to ensure it was regulated properly. To the extent that this could not be provided at the industry level, the Stovemakers' Award created formal workplace bargaining structures. Thus, far from obstructing the development of regulatory structures at the workplace, the NSW arbitral system encouraged them. But to end the analysis here would create a misleading picture of the influence of arbitration. Developments at Metters show the importance of looking beyond arbitral decisions and awards, and the rules they embody, and considering the implementation and enforcement of those rules. |
48
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Direct action and militant behaviour characterised Metters' workplace, creating problems for management, the Union and the arbitral bodies. Despite management consistently flouting the Award and ignoring the piecework committee, sections of Metters' workforce were able to gain considerable control over the operation of piecework, particularly the piecework moulders. The preference of management for dealing with the workforce directly, if not individually, encouraged sectional rather than coordinated responses to grievances generated by the piecework system and the fragmentation of work. Though direct action and militancy improved the position of Metters' piecework moulders it created problems for the Union and others sections of Metters' workforce. Both the Union and the arbitral authorities were united in wanting to bring these workers under control and prevent management defiance of Award provisions. The efforts of the arbitral bodies to create a more workable piecework clause can be seen as attempts to strengthen the control of the Union and reduce the level of direct action. When this failed, the Union attempted to coordinate and control rank and file action through the shop committee, though this also failed to prevent independent rank and file action. When Metters' management sought to regain control through the introduction of labourers to moulding they capitalised on these growing tensions between the moulders and the rest of the Union. |
49
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The study of Metters suggests it is not a case of arbitration or the workplace. Both were important in shaping the collective response of workers to management. The state gave legitimacy to the Union and to collective action. However, decisions of the Stovemakers' Board and Arbitration Court had a muted impact. What was important was the organisation of workers at the workplace. The Stovemakers Union played an important role in shaping the response of workers to management strategy but it could not control these responses. It was through the collective organisation of the Union that workers made their first significant challenge to management. Nevertheless, rank and file action independent of the Union was most decisive in challenging management and creating favourable workplace conditions. |
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Sandra Cockfield lectures in workplace and industrial relations and is a member of the Union Strategy Research Group at Monash University. Her research interests include workplace industrial relations and union renewal strategies. <sandra.cockfield@buseco.monash.edu.au>
Endnotes
* This article is based on a chapter from my PhD and I would like to acknowledge the help and advice provided by my two supervisors, Peter Sheldon and Bradley Bowden. I am also grateful to the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
1. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin, England, 1968 [1963]; E.J. Hobsbawn, 'From Social History to the History of Society', Daedulus, no. 100, 1971, pp. 20–45; J. Zeitlin, 'From Labour History to the History of Industrial Relations, Economic History Review, 2nd Series, vol. XL, no. 2, 1987, pp. 159–84. For a response to Zeitlin see J.E. Cronin, 'The "Rank and File" and the Social History of the Working Class', International Review of Social History, vol. 34, 1989, pp. 78–88; R. Hyman, 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping: A Comment on the "Rank and Filism" Debate', International Review of Social History, vol. 34, 1989, pp. 309–26. For an overview of trends in labour history, and in particular the Old Left versus the New Left argument, see S. Garton, 'From Labour History to Social History', in G. Patmore (ed.), History and Industrial Relations, ACIRRT Monograph No. 1, University of Sydney, New South Wales, 1990, pp. 16–29.
2. R. Lansbury, and D. Macdonald (eds), Workplace Industrial Relations: Australian Case Studies, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992, pp. 9–10.
3. W.A. Howard, 'Trade Unions in the Context of Union Theory', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 19, no. 3, September 1977, pp. 255–73.
4. P. Macarthy, The Harvester Judgement: An Historical Assessment, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1967, p. 69; P. Sheldon, 'The Missing Nexus? Union Recovery, Growth and Behaviour During the First Decades of Arbitration: Towards a Re-evaluation, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 26, no. 104, April 1995, pp. 415–37; R. Markey, 'Explaining Union Mobilisation in the 1880s and the Early 1900s', Labour History, no. 83, November 2002, pp. 19–42; P. Gahan, 'Did Arbitration Make for Dependent Unionism? Evidence from Historical Case Studies', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, no. 4, December 1996, pp. 648–98.
5. M. Quinlan, 'Managerial Strategy and Industrial Relations in the Australian Steel Industry 1945–1975: A Case Study', in M. Bray and V. Taylor (eds), Managing Labour? Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Industrial Relations, McGraw-Hill, Sydney, 1986, pp. 20–47; G. Patmore, 'Arbitration and Bureaucracy: The NSW Railway Commissioners, 1892–1914', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 30, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 579–80; C. Wright, 'The Formative Years of Management Control at the Newcastle Steelworks, 1913–1924', Labour History, no. 55, November 1988, pp. 55–70; M. Bray and M. Rimmer, 'Compulsory Arbitration Versus Managerial Control: Industrial Relations in Sydney Road Transport, 1888–1908', in S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds), Foundations of Arbitration: The Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration 1890–1914, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989, pp. 50–73; For a discussion of the literature on arbitration and the labour process see J. Kitay, 'The State, the Labour Process and the Foundations of Arbitration', in Macintyre and Mitchell (eds), Foundations of Arbitration, pp. 352–64. For discussion of judges of the NSW Arbitration Court see chapters by A. Frazer, J. Shields, and L. Taksa in G. Patmore (ed.), Laying the Foundations of Industrial Justice: The Presidents of the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW 1902–1998, Federation Press, Sydney, 2003.
6.The 'Wild Cat' Monthly, 5 April 1930, p. 179 and 7 May 1938, p. 212; K. Webber, 'Embracing the New: A Tale of Two Rooms', in P. Troy (ed.), A History of European Housing in Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2000, pp. 88–9; New South Wales Statistical Register, 1905–1918/19, William Applegate Gullick, Government Printer, Sydney.
7. N. Windett Australia as Producer and Trader, 1920–1932, Oxford University Press, London, 1933, pp. 202–3 & 217; Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University (NBAC), Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers' Employees' Union (SPFM&SEU), E245/136, Transcript of proceedings of Iron Trades (Stove and Piano-Frame Makers) Board, 1910/11, pp. 779, 862 & 873–4 (hereafter 1911 Stovemakers' Case).
8. Descriptions of the organisation of work within Metters and various other Stovemaking establishments abound in the transcripts of arbitration proceedings concerning the industry. See in particular: State Records NSW (SRNSW): CGS5340, Transcripts of Proceedings of the Court of Arbitration, 1902–08; [2/99], Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees Union v. Fred Metters and Co., pp. 159, 196 & 242 (hereafter 1907 Stovemakers' Case); 1911 Stovemakers' Case, pp. 800, 805, 842 & 867.
9. 1911 Stovemakers' Case, pp. 800, 805 & 867.
10. 1907 Stovemakers' Case, p. 166.
11. C. Wright Payment Systems and Workplace Industrial Relations in Australian Manufacturing Industry: An Historical Overview, ACIRRT Working Paper No. 5, ACIRRT, University of Sydney, 1990, pp. 1–5.
12. 1907 Stovemakers' Case, pp. 184 & 235; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/1–2, Minutes of General Meetings, 15 April and 18 September 1907.
13. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/11, Minutes of General Meeting, 9 May 1906; 1907 Stovemakers' Case, pp. 2–3, 7–8, 11–12, 122–6, 130 &144–5.
14. 1907 Stovemakers' Case, p. 130; SRNSW: CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings of the Court of Industrial Arbitration, 1912–26; [2/361], Re Moulders' (State) Board — Application by the Federated Moulders' (Metals) Union for an Award, v. 133, 1922, p. 202.
15. R. Mitchell and E. Stern, 'The compulsory model of industrial dispute settlement: an outline of legal developments', in S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds) Foundations of Arbitration, pp. 114–5; M.B. Hammond, 'Wages Boards in Australia: II Boards Outside Victoria. III Organisation and Procedure', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 29, February 1915, p. 335; G. Patmore, 'Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in New South Wales Before 1998', in Patmore, Laying the Foundations, pp. 9–14.
16.Stove and Piano-Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union v. Fred Metters and Co. (1907) 6 Arbitration Reports (NSW) 191 (hereafter 1907 Stovemakers' Award).
17. J. Hagan and C. Fisher, 'Piece Work and Some of its Consequences in the Printing and Coal Mining Industries in Australia, 1850–1930', Labour History, no. 25, November 1973, pp. 19–39; Wright, Payment Systems. For classic studies of worker controls over piecework see: T. Lupton, On the Shop Floor: Two Studies of Workshop Organisation and Output, Pergamon, Oxford, 1963; D. Roy, 'Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 57, March 1952, pp. 427–42.
18. 1907 Stovemakers' Case, pp. 31, 35, 41, 45, 57, 97, 100, 118, 131–2, 135, 249 & 263.
19. 1907 Stovemakers' Award.
20. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/3, Minutes of General Meetings, 1908–10.
21.Iron Trades (Stove and Piano-Frame Makers) Board (1911) 10 Arbitration Reports (NSW) 355.
22.Ibid.
23.Ibid.
24.Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission on Industrial Arbitration in New South Wales (Piddington Inquiry), New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, 1913, Second Session, vol. 2, p. 770.
25. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, E245/110, Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No. 21 Board, Transcript of proceedings, 1913, pp. 11–12 (hereafter 1913 Stovemakers' Case); NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/4, Minutes of General Meetings, 19 February and 4 March 1912.
26. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/5, Minutes of General and Executive Meetings, 17 March, 12 May and 10 June 1913; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, E245/139, Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.16 Board, Transcript of proceedings, 1916, pp. 24–5 (Hereafter 1916 Stovemakers' Case); SRNSW: CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings of the Court of Industrial Arbitration; [2/302], Re Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.16 (Stoves, etc., State) Board - Application for variation of Constitution by SPFM&SEU, vol. 53, 1916, pp. 169 & 211–2; [2/314], Re Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.16 (Stoves, etc., State) Board - Application for consent to appeal by SPFM&SEU, vol. 65, 1917, pp.207–8; Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.21 Board (1914) 6 NSW Industrial Gazette 541; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of General and Executive Meetings, 15 December 1915.
27. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/5, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 15 September 1913; 1913 Stovemakers' Case, p. 12; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, E245/129, Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.16 Board, Transcript of proceedings, 1914, p. 37; 1916 Stovemakers' Case, p. 43; Hagan and Fisher, 'Piece Work', pp. 23–24.
28.Stovemakers' Award — Variation (1917) 11 NSW Industrial Gazette 1239; Stovemakers' Board Award — Variation (1917) 12 NSW Industrial Gazette 304; Stovemakers' Board Award (1917) 12 NSW Industrial Gazette 494; Stovemakers' Board Award — Variation (1917) 12 NSW Industrial Gazette 872.
29. SRNSW: CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings of the Court of Industrial Arbitration; [2/279], Re Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group Nos. 3 and 21 Boards - Submission by Chairman of same on question of jurisdiction, 1914, pp. 19390 & 19397.
30. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/8, Minutes of Executive Meetings, 1926–1928.
31. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/4–6, Minutes of General and Executive Meetings, 1912–1915; SRNSW: CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings of the Court of Industrial Arbitration; [2/276], Iron and Shipbuilding Trades Group No.21 Board's Award - Application for consent to appeal by the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union, vol. 30, 1914, pp. 17977 & 17981–3; [2/318], Re Minister for Labour and Industry v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union - Summons to show cause, vol. 69, 1918, p. 960 (hereafter 1918 Strike Prosecution); [2/323], Re Minister Labour and Industry v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Employees Union - Summons to show cause, vol. 74, 1919, pp. 45–6 (hereafter 1919 Strike Prosecution).
32. I. Bedford, 'The Industrial Workers of the World in Australia', Labour History, no. 13, 1967, p. 44; K.D. Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, 1852–1920, Department of Economic History, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, pp. 287–8 & 292; Macarthy, The Harvester Judgement, pp. 104–6 & 179; J.A. Merritt, A History of the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia: 1909–1952, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1967, pp. 74–5; I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of The Labour Movement in Eastern Australia 1900–1921, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979 [1965], pp. 83–91; M. Waters, Strikes in Australia: A sociological analysis of industrial conflict, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982, pp. 123–4; L. Taksa, ' "Defence not Defiance", Social Protest and the NSW General Strike of 1917', Labour History, no. 60, May, 1991, pp. 19–22 & 24–28.
33. 1918 Strike Prosecution, p. 951; 1919 Strike Prosecution, p. 188; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 30 January and 5 February 1917.
34. 1918 Strike Prosecution; 1919 Strike Prosecution; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6 Minutes of Executive Meetings, 23 and 27 June and 6 July 1916, and T23/2/11, Minutes of General Meeting, 28 June 1916.
35. Patmore, 'Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration', pp. 14 & 16–7; A. Frazer, 'Charles Gilbert Heydon 1905–1918', in Patmore, Laying the Foundations, pp. 95–6.
36. Buckley, The Amalgamated, pp. 278–9; W.J. Hargreaves, A History of the Federated Moulders' (Metals) Union of Australia 1858–1958, Worker Print, Sydney, n.d., p. 60.
37. L. Taksa, 'George Stephenson Beeby 1920–1926', in Patmore, Laying the Foundations, pp. 137–43.
38. SRNSW: CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings of the Court of Industrial Arbitration; [2/361], Moulders (State) Board: Application by the FMMU for an Award, v. 113, 1922, p. 414.
39. Buckley, The Amalgamated, pp. 287–8 & 292; I.W. Grant, Employers, Unions and Arbitration, New South Wales 1918–29, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 1979, pp. 99–101; Taksa, 'George Stephenson Beeby', pp.141–3.
40. 1919 Strike Prosecution, p. 50; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of General and Executive Meetings 1918–1922, see especially minutes of Executive Meetings 8 and 22 July 1918.
41. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 30 December 1918.
42. NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 2 October 1918 and 11 February 1919 to 18 July 1922, and Minutes of joint Shop Committee and Executive Meeting, 9 January 1919.
43. M. Rimmer 'Union Shopfloor Organisation', in G.W. Ford and D. Plowman (eds) Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations Perspective, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 123–4; M. Rimmer and P. Sutcliffe 'The Origin of Australian Workshop Organisation, 1918–1950', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 2, June 1981, pp. 216–39; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meetings, 11 February 1919 to 18 July 1922.
44. SRNSW: CGS 5342, Transcripts of proceedings of the Court of Industrial Arbitration; 2/338], Metters Limited v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union - Summons to show cause, vol. 89, 1920, p. 895; [2/339], Re Metters Ltd. v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union - Summons to show cause, vol. 90, 1920, pp. 468–92; [2/340], Re Metters Ltd. v. Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union - Application by the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union for variation of award, vol. 91, 1920, pp. 536–9 (hereafter 1920 Stovemakers' Case.); NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meetings, 28 and 31 May, and 20 June, 1920.
45.Metters Ltd. with the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders and Stovemakers Employees' Union (1920) 18 NSW Industrial Gazette 715; NBAC. SPFM&SEU, T23/2/6, Minutes of Executive Meetings, 12 July and 2 August 1920; 1920 Stovemakers' Case, pp. 521–309.
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