Bradley Bowden and Toni Bowden

'The women do the machinery': Craft, Gender and Work Transformation in the Brisbane Boot Trade, 1869–95

During the period 1869–95 the Brisbane boot trade not only provided work for an increasing number of the city's residents, it also gave rise to two of Queensland's more significant trade unions. Of these, one, the Amalgamated Operative Boot Trade Union, gave voice to male craftsmen seeking to defend their status as independent handicraft producers. The other, the Female Boot-Machinists Union, proved to be the largest and most enduring female industrial organisation established in Brisbane prior to 1900. Despite the commitment of both male and female bootmakers to the cause of organised labour, the relationship between the two groups was characterised by a fundamental disjuncture. In large part, this reflected the uneven and tardy introduction of mechanised production into the northern capital, as, prior to 1894–95, it was only the women who did 'the machinery'. In the end, this disjuncture left the cause of organised labour in a weakened state, despite the continuing growth in boot trade employment during the study period.

Introduction

By general consensus: 'The Queensland labour movement has no legend that surpasses that of 1891, the year in which the powerful bush unions clashed with the determined, well-organized pastoralists'.¹ Yet, in reality, by 1891 work on the pastoral frontier was already atypical of the life experiences of Queensland's workers. Far more typical were the experiences of Miss Nixon, a 21-year-old machinist employed at Hunter's Boot Factory. Like thousands of her counterparts, Nixon found work in Brisbane's expanding manufacturing establishments, whose fortunes prospered during the 1890s behind Queensland's tariff wall. By 1891, those engaged in the 'manufacture of fabrics', including footwear, were already the city's largest single occupational sub-category (other than domestics). All in all, the sector gave work to 2,576 people. Significantly, 1,597 of these were women, as mechanisation progressively reduced the need for skilled male tradesmen.² In the boot trade, however, this intrusion of machine work was, prior to 1895, largely restricted to one part of the production process — the fitting and sewing of boot uppers. In this section, as in the clothing trade, the operation of treadle and powered sewing machines became a female preserve. Other areas of boot manufacture, contrary to the situation applying in southern capitals, were spared exposure to a similar process of mechanisation. In consequence, as William Strickland, the Secretary of the Amalgamated Operative Boot Trade Union (OBTU), informed an 1891 inquiry with only a slight degree of exaggeration, it was 'the women [who] do the machinery'.³

The conditions under which this new female workforce laboured were appalling even by nineteenth-century standards. Miss Nixon's weekly wage amounted to just 20 shillings, less than half that of her male counterparts engaged in hand work.⁴ Although Hunter's Boot Factory, which occupied the northern half of Brisbane's current King George Square site, was the city's largest and best equipped boot manufactory, little thought had been given to worker comfort or safety. In describing 'the machinist room' in which Nixon toiled with 92 fellow workers, virtually all of them female, an inspector observed:

There is absolutely no ventilation ... while the effluvia from the gas and the exhalation from the crowd of employees must, I think, have an injurious effect on their health.... The sanitary arrangements are capable of very considerable improvement.⁵

Although Brisbane's female workers generally suffered such conditions in silence, those in the boot trade were different. In July 1890, they voted to establish the Female Boot-Machinists Union (FBMU), with Miss Nixon as Secretary. Within four months of its formation, the FBMU had 80 members, and included all the female machinists employed at Hunter's.⁶ Despite this, female bootmakers struggled to be recognised as a legitimate part of the union movement.

Lithograph of Hunter's Boot Factory at the corner of Albert and Ann Street, circa 1886–87
Described by contemporaries as 'the great factory', Hunter's employed over 300 workers in April 1889. Later, it became the principal industrial base for the Female Boot-Machinists Union. Occupying a large part of the current King George Square site in Brisbane, the building long remained a key feature of the inner-city landscape.
Collection: John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland.

This article will explore how workers within the Brisbane boot trade, male and female, responded to the development of large-scale boot factories within their industry between 1869 and 1895. In undertaking this chronicle, the principal sources will be the minutes of the OBTU (which survive in their entirety from the union's formation in 1888), contemporary newspaper accounts, and the testimony given by workers and employers to the 1891 Royal Commission into Factories and Shops. It will be argued that, throughout the study period, the relationship between Brisbane's male and female boot workers was characterised by a fundamental disjuncture. For the male 'makers and finishers' who dominated the OBTU and its predecessor organisation — and who were responsible for the hand-sewing of completed boots and the final polishing processes — the key issue was one of maintaining their status as independent producers. Between 1888 and 1895, circumstances unique to Brisbane favoured the obtainment of this objective. A protective tariff in 1888 increased the demand for Queensland-made boots and employers initially attempted to meet this demand without investing heavily in machinery. As the manager of the city's largest boot factory testified in 1891: 'There is not nearly the same amount of machinery used here as we use in Sydney'.⁷

While male craftsmen benefited from the tardy mechanisation of the Brisbane industry, factory employment brought their female counterparts into contact with campaigns directed towards the organisation of separate women's unions. Unfortunately, while the OBTU supported the establishment of a female machinists' union, this action was not followed by active interest in, or engagement with, female concerns. When, in 1894, the faltering FBMU was forced to seek formal amalgamation with the OBTU, female bootmakers once again found themselves denied industrial voice, as the latter body soon reverted to being an all-male concern. In consequence, union organisation and strategies within the Brisbane boot trade entered the twentieth century unreceptive to the pressing needs of female workers. In this we find the wider lessons of this now largely forgotten story: that a union commitment to principles based on one historical set of circumstances can become an impediment to union growth and renewal.

'The first encounter ... with machine competition': Bootmakers, Radicalism and Mechanisation

Boot and shoemakers were, throughout the centuries, one of the great artisan classes. Of early nineteenth-century England, E.P. Thompson writes: 'Leaving aside the textile industries ... the largest single artisan trade was that of shoemakers'.⁸ As a class, bootmakers were renowned for their independence. A literary member of one shoemaking family noted: 'For ever independent, shoemakers were a law unto themselves, mostly getting rousing drunk on Saturdays and Sundays, and never by long tradition working on Mondays'.⁹ The shoemakers' legendary independence of mind made them everywhere tribunes of the poor and dispossessed. Hobsbawm and Scott note in their classic essay on 'political shoemakers': 'The political radicalism of nineteenth-century shoemakers is proverbial'.¹⁰

As late as the early 1850s, boot and shoe manufacture was, as Clapham has recorded, one untouched 'by machinery since the dawn of civilisation'.¹¹ The progressive utilisation of the Howe and Singer sewing machine from the mid-1850s, however, heralded the beginning of the end. Over the next 40 years, a host of other machines followed the 'Singer' out of the United States, including the Blake-McKay sole-stitching machine, invented in 1864, and, after 1880, the Goodyear 'sew-round'.¹² Everywhere, such inventions hastened the establishment of a new production regime that involved a process of task breakdown and an accompanying 'feminisation' of a significant part of this previously all-male trade. Even in such places as Brisbane, where full mechanisation was late in arriving, boots and shoes now went through a five-stage production process. Firstly, the 'clicker' cut the 'upper' pieces for sewing by 'machinists and fitters'. While this work was being undertaken, a 'rough stuff cutter' cut the soles and heels. Then the 'upper' and sole were joined, either by a Blake Stitching Machine or, for better class shoes, a skilled 'maker'. Finally, the completed boot or shoe was handed to a 'finisher', who smoothed and polished the leather. Of these processes, making and finishing in particular remained the preserve of male craft workers, while the 'machining and fitting' of uppers was universally turned over to females.¹³

By the latter half of the nineteenth century the boot and shoe trade became famed for the campaigns waged by its craftsmen against the impact of mechanisation. Commons and his collaborators remarked of the United States: 'The situation in the shoe industry during the sixties is of special interest, as it represented the first encounter on a large scale of the skilled American mechanics with machine competition'.¹⁴ The Webbs were likewise fascinated by the capacity of boot workers to defend their interests in 'an industry which is being incessantly revolutionised'.¹⁵ Industrially, this resistance produced some of the largest and most effective trade unions of nineteenth-century Britain and North America. In Britain, the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives had over 30,000 members by 1890, enabling it to exercise, in the words of the Webbs, 'a very real measure of control over the machine boot trade'.¹⁶ Similarly, in the United States, the Order of the Knights of St Crispin (the patron saint of bootmakers) was, by 1870, 'the largest labour organisation in the country'.¹⁷ This organised resistance to mechanisation was, for Hobsbawm and Scott, the 'period of glory' for bootmakers.¹⁸

While the above accounts stand as classic studies of the role of shoemakers in labour history, they tend to overlook how craft control was being eroded by outwork as well as by mechanisation. As studies by Hirsch, Faler and Clapham have demonstrated, even prior to the invention of the sewing machine, the era of craft production was in decline, as manufacturers outsourced various aspects of production.¹⁹ During this era, 'outwork became the predominant ... form of capitalistic industrial organisation'.²⁰ Even here, a gendered division of labour was apparent. For example, in Lynn (Massachusetts), the leading American centre for boot manufacture, the process of 'stitching together the pieces that formed the upper part of the shoe ... was performed primarily by women'.²¹ It was these workers who were initially most disadvantaged by industrialisation, as machine sewing meant that one woman could produce far more uppers than previously. Consequently, female wages fell.²²

In Australia, the most significant study of gendered work relationships within the early boot trade is that undertaken into the Victorian industry by Raelene Frances.²³ Frances argues that, in Victoria, mechanisation did not alter 'the sexual division of labour'.²⁴ She offers three possible explanations for this. Firstly, she proposes, there 'seems to have been the boot factory's lack of appeal to female workers'. Then there was the obliging attitude of female workers who, despite forming their own Boot Operatives Society in 1890, proved to be 'more militant in men's causes than their own'.²⁵ This she attributes to perceptions that 'the defence of men's earnings was seen as the front line in the battle for the survival of the family economy'.²⁶ Finally, Frances observes that, after 1897, state wages boards perpetuated gender divisions. In consequence, 'the union officials and executive, all of whom were males, virtually ignored the female membership'.²⁷

While Frances' work highlights ambiguities in the relationship between gender, mechanisation and union organisation in the boot trade, in the absence of studies in other states we are unable to determine whether this was the typical Australian experience. In the case of Queensland, there has been a tendency to emphasise the tardiness of its industrial development.²⁸ However, as Linge has concluded, one of the salient features of late nineteenth century Australia was 'the rising significance of manufacturing in Queensland', where factory employment grew from 13,857 to 28,883 between 1888 and 1899.²⁹ Brisbane's clothing and boot industries were major contributors to this growth. By the turn of the century, 67 per cent of those employed in manufacturing were to be found in Brisbane, with 40 per cent of these engaged in 'clothing and textiles'. Of the latter, 29 per cent were in the boot trade.³⁰

First Stirrings: the Brisbane Boot Trade, 1869–76

Early in 1870, the Brisbane Courier remarked on the number of traditional bootmakers in Queensland, commenting: 'Even in the villages of the interior, and many of the pastoral stations, there are shoemakers' who could make enough boots 'to supply the population'.³¹ As such observations were being made, however, the Brisbane boot trade was already being transformed, following the imposition of a ten per cent protective tariff. This new era was heralded by the opening, in November 1869, of the colony's first mechanised boot factory. Established in Queen Street by the Sydney firm of James Hunter, its inauguration was greeted with both awe and consternation. After inspecting the factory's array of treadle-powered sewing and cutting machines, one journalist wrote 'that the economic theory of division of labour is carried out in its entirety'.³² So successful did Hunter's venture prove that by 1872 his methods were being replicated by other Brisbane firms: those of E.T. Neighbour, J. Farry and J.&G. Harris, as well as Blakey's Machine Boot Factory. The latter two firms, in particular, rivalled Hunter's in both size and technological innovation, each employing up to 200 operatives in full production.³³

Brisbane's boot tradesmen were quick to appreciate that, while mechanisation created new employment opportunities, it also threatened the principle of craft control. In order to 'resist all encroachments' on their craft, on 18 March 1873 'a largely attended meeting of shoemakers' resolved to establish the Brisbane Bootmakers Protection Union (BBPU).³⁴ By presenting a united front to the new factory producers, this body soon obtained employer agreement to a union 'Statement' for payment of work by piece rate. Under this schedule, unionised 'makers' were provided with a weekly income of between 42 and 46 shillings.³⁵

The insistence by Brisbane's bootmakers on payment by the piece was a standard response by craft workers seeking to preserve their status in the face of mechanisation. For such workers, the benefits of piecework were partly economic, partly psychological. Economically, an employer's agreement to piecework meant that the benefits of any increase in production due to a further expansion of mechanised techniques would immediately accrue to the workers. Conversely, the employer could only achieve a clear financial gain from mechanisation if there was an accompanying decrease in piece rates.³⁶ Psychologically, payment by the piece differentiated its recipients from mere wage labourers, confirming (at least in their own eyes) their status as independent producers, capable of exercising their own discretion regarding when and how they worked. As J. Hagan and C. Fisher commented: 'the decision to work or not to work was a private one, based on personal and not company needs'.³⁷ For both the BBPU and its successor, the OBTU, only pieceworkers were entitled to union membership. If this status was lost, expulsion was automatic.³⁸

Although the BBPU was declared to be in 'a very prosperous condition' in January 1874 with 160 members, trouble was around the corner. In October of that year, Harris and Hunter each began setting up 'one of the celebrated Blake sole sewing machines'.³⁹ Given that these machines had been imported 'at great expense', neither firm wished to see the rewards stemming from the increased output accruing to their unionised workers. In consequence, first Harris, then Hunter, demanded a 25 per cent reduction in piece rates.⁴⁰ Strike action promptly ensued, BBPU members stopping work on 29 October. In assessing the reasons for the dispute, the Courier recorded that it was due to 'uneasiness ... by the men' with 'a machine which does, with rapidity and economy, part of the work hitherto done by the men'.⁴¹ The implication was that the subsequent dispute was directed as much at limiting or halting the spread of such machines as in ensuring equitable piece rates for those employed in their use. Unfortunately for the workers concerned, the stoppage merely gave Harris and Hunter time to perfect the installation of the new machinery. On 23 November, the men returned to work defeated.⁴² For the employers, however, victory proved bittersweet, as the protective tariff upon which they had predicated their investments was cut in half during 1875. Reflecting the general state of the industry, by 1879 one boot proprietor was lamenting that his business had dwindled to a quarter of its pre-1875 size.⁴³ In this environment, the BBPU quietly went out of existence.

While this first period of mechanised production in the Brisbane boot trade was prematurely curtailed, it is important for a number of reasons. Most significantly, the industrial and economic cost of mechanisation in a low-tariff environment seems to have discouraged further investment in the industry. Of the firms that led the way in introducing new machinery between 1869 and 1874, only two, Hunter and Neighbour, remained as significant producers by the late 1880s. Even these firms appear to have let their stock of machinery run down, reverting instead to a reliance on handwork and/or outwork. The only significant exception to this trend was found in the pressing of heels and sole material (which required few workers), and in the fitting and machining of 'uppers' by sewing machines. Thus, even as late as 1891, it was noted: 'There is very little machinery in Hunter's; only what the pressmen and the girls work'.⁴⁴ In terms of motive power, the factory possessed just one 'gas-engine', which drove an exposed shaft connected by belts to the factory's sewing machines.⁴⁵ The situation at Neighbour's factory differed only in that motive power for the sewing machines came from a steam-powered contraption.⁴⁶ Elsewhere, things were even more primitive, as treadled-powered machines continued to predominate well into the 1890s.⁴⁷

While the first era of factory production in the Brisbane boot trade saw male boot workers espouse a model of unionisation based around resistance to craft 'encroachments' and support for a standardised system of piecework, the reversion to handicraft and/or outwork confronted them with new problems which are discussed below. While the historical record is, unfortunately, silent on the role of female workers during this period, the testimony of female machinists to the 1891 Royal Commission suggests that by the early 1880s the fitting and machining of 'uppers' had become a predominately, if not solely, female occupation.⁴⁸ There is no evidence, however, to suggest that, the BBPU engaged in any way with this emerging part of the workforce.

'The outdoor machinists were getting work all the time': Revival in the Brisbane Boot Trade, 1888–90

After an extended period of stagnation, the Brisbane boot trade witnessed a sudden reversal in its fortunes when, in 1888, duties on imported goods were raised from five to fifteen per cent. Stimulated by this change, the number of boot factories grew from 10 in 1885 to 21 in 1890.⁴⁹ Hunter's retained a position of pre-eminence as 'the largest factory in the colony', employing up to 300 by 1889 at its expanded premises in Ann Street (see lithograph of Hunter's factory).⁵⁰ Its major competitors in 1888–89 were the firms of Neighbour, Lawrence, Dickson and Astill, all of whom were situated either in, or adjacent to, the inner city. By 1891, these firms, which varied in size from 50 hands (Astill) to 150 (Neighbour), had been joined by a number of new entrants, the most significant of whom were Goldsworthy and Perkins, and Rose's Boot Factory.⁵¹ As indicated above, however, this expansion in factory employment was not driven by any significant increase in mechanisation, one industry participant remarking in 1891 that there was 'no more' machinery being used than previously.⁵² Instead, employers continued to rely on handwork for the making and finishing of women's shoes and higher class men's boots in particular. This, in turn, contributed to an expansion in the use of outwork, as employers sought to increase output without engaging in major technological changes. Thus, as the Courier observed during 1890, this produced 'two classes of workers, the in and out hands, the first being paid by time and the second by piece-work'.⁵³ While Hunter's factory directly employed 30 'makers' on piecework, most makers and virtually all finishers were outworkers. In reflecting back on the employment arrangements applying before union campaigns to curtail outwork, the OBTU's Secretary later recalled that 'nearly every one' of these latter categories had laboured 'in their own home'.⁵⁴

For makers and finishers, unregulated outwork confronted them with two interrelated problems. By effectively operating as 'dependent contractors', they received work at the whim of their employer. Not only were employers able to direct work away from individual craftsmen, they were also able to direct it towards 'improvers' who worked at lower rates. Second, where work was obtained, it tended to come in 'peaks' and 'troughs'. To maximise their income when work was available, finishers in particular turned to their own families, who would labour alongside the household head for up to 13 hours per day. While such practices provided short-term financial gains, they undermined the principle of craft control.⁵⁵ Significantly, however, outwork also threatened the job security and wages of female machinists. As Miss Nixon was to recall about the period between 1888 and 1890, 'out-of-door machinists' normally received work ahead of those inside the factories due to their willingness to work at lower rates. During one period, she observed: 'I lost a fortnight when the outdoor machinists were getting work all the time'.⁵⁶

Unfortunately for employers, increased demand soon resulted in a labour shortage, and in May 1890 the Brisbane Courier recorded that 'there is no unemployed labour in the ranks of the bootmakers'.⁵⁷ This problem was particularly acute regarding 'making and finishing'. Industrially, this placed Brisbane's 'makers and finishers', who were estimated to number 460 by 1891, in a virtually impregnable position. The ill-timed decision of Neighbour in February 1888 to reduce the rates at which work was renumerated crystallised bootmakers' attitudes, as a protest meeting attended by representatives of the Trades and Labour Council's Organising Committee resolved to 'start a Union and leave it open for any Branch of the Trade to become Members'.⁵⁸ From the start, the new organisation indicated that a curtailment of the practice of outwork would be one of its central objectives, committing itself to 'the establishment of healthy workshops' whereby employers would be obliged to 'find room and fixtures free of charge'.⁵⁹

The resultant organisation, the Amalgamated Operative Boot Trade Union (OBTU), soon distinguished itself as one of Brisbane's most militant and effective unions. Continuing the radical political traditions of bootmakers, the OBTU was one of the few unions to send delegates to the inaugural meeting of the Australian Labour Federation (ALF), held in Brisbane on June 1889. When this body promptly established the Brisbane District Council, the recently elected President of the OBTU, David Bowman, came forward to assume the chair.⁶⁰ From this position, Bowman began his meteoric rise, eventually becoming the leader of the state's parliamentary Labor Party. Even during the 1890s Depression, the OBTU's membership maintained their faith in a radical vision of a reorganised society. In July 1895, for example, the union reaffirmed that 'the only solution to free us as a class from capitalistic thraldom is state socialism'.⁶¹

If the OBTU proved a stalwart supporter of the unity of organised labour, divisions soon appeared within its own ranks. For, while the union declared itself 'open for any branch of the Trade', in practice it was dominated by male makers and finishers. Reflecting this, the industrial efforts of the union were initially directed towards the standardisation of the piecework rates being used by the various factories. During 1888–89, it was to this end that it focused its attention, waging successful campaigns against the firms of Neighbour, Lawrence and Astill.⁶² Such achievements, however, did nothing for those employed on wage labour. Unhappy with this state of affairs, on 8 October 1888 the bulk of the OBTU's wage-labour membership split away to form the Clickers and Blockers Union (CBU). While this body was also male dominated, it did accept female machinists. In consequence, its membership soon rose to 140 compared to the OBTU's 370.⁶³

If female boot factory workers found a temporary home within the CBU , they possessed a number of concerns of their own in which neither the OBTU nor the CBU showed much apparent interest. Of particular concern was the state of their wages. While wages for adult males started at 30 shillings, those for non-supervisory females ranged between five and 25 shillings.⁶⁴ Such low wages were particularly disadvantageous in Brisbane given that, unlike southern capitals, there was limited residential space in the inner city, due to industrial expansion or frequent flooding. In consequence, the vast majority of workers (including bootmakers) resided in the suburbs. Nor could the women generally access an extended family network, given the immigrant and transient nature of the city's population, which almost trebled to 93,657 in the decade to 1891.⁶⁵ This Brisbane peculiarity made travelling to work a major issue. A weekly return bus fare amounted to three shillings — 60 per cent of the weekly wage of the poorest paid female. Thus, in a typical response, a machinist at Rose's Boot Factory lamented: 'I cannot afford the bus'.⁶⁶

To add to their financial woes, female bootmakers also felt that they were discriminated against on the basis of their sex. When, for example, Miss Nixon was asked 'if a man were employed at your work would he receive more wages than you', she replied emphatically: 'Oh, yes, he would'.⁶⁷ The leadership of the OBTU, however, were, despite their later support for the unionisation of female machinists, opposed to any easing of the gendered division of labour within the trade. In testifying to the 1891 Royal Commission one prominent male bootmaker stated that he had, to his horror, actually 'seen the women driving the nails in [to shoes]'.⁶⁸ While there is little evidence that these practices were, in fact, widespread, it was unlikely he was alone among male OBTU activists in opposing any such violations of the status quo.

'We stayed in the factory for our own advantage': Conflict and Union Regulation, 1890–91

As the industrial grievances of their workers mounted, boot manufacturers found themselves under pressure on two fronts during the course of 1890, as both the OBTU and female boot workers took industrial action. The OBTU was the first to move, resolving in January 1890 to serve a 'Statement' on all manufacturers. While the 'Statement' included demands for a 25 per cent increase in piecework rates, it was soon evident that the union's principal objective was found in a supplementary log that 'urgently requested' the city's employers 'to find room in all the workshops so that all work may be completed on the premises'.⁶⁹ In supporting this stance, it was evident that individual makers and finishers had come to the conclusion that any continuation of outwork would merely result in their personal pauperisation. As the union's Secretary later conceded, the union 'went into the factory because we insisted on having all the work done inside ... we stayed in the factory for our own advantage, to see if we could get work'.⁷⁰

After the failure of prolonged negotiations, OBTU members struck work in support of their proposed 'Statement' on 23 May. Realising that they remained utterly dependent upon Brisbane's makers and finishers for the completion of their better class of shoes, three employers broke ranks and 'conceded all the demands of the statement, without reservation'. Similarly, another two employers were publicly perceived 'as wavering in the direction of unconditional surrender'.⁷¹ Such defections meant that the position of the remaining employers was untenable. In consequence, on 11 June 1890, the OBTU's membership was read a formal letter of capitulation. In this document, employers promised to have completed by 1 January 1891 arrangements that would allow for all work to be done within the factories.⁷² Not only had unionisation, as the OBTU's Secretary indicated, 'brought the men into the factories', it had brought them inside on union-dictated terms.⁷³ With the increased piece rates applying across all firms, and strict controls imposed on the use of juniors, in January 1891 the union stood at the height of its fortunes.

When the new engagement system was implemented, it was evident that its principal impact was to strengthen the status of makers and finishers as independent, handicraft producers. Whereas, previously, makers and finishers had normally received sufficient materials to work for a week at home, they now received materials from 'boxes' which they were free to make up at their own pace in individual 'stands'. When they completed their work, they 'shopped', or sold, it back to the factory at the union agreed price. While physically these new conditions were less comfortable than working from one's home — at Neighbour's 75 makers worked in a underground cellar a mere 41.5 feet by 32 feet — they did provide for equal opportunity in receiving work.⁷⁴ For management, however, the new production arrangements significantly reduced their ability to control the level of output, particularly given that they no longer had access to outworkers. In this they were confronting a problem that was common to workplaces where piecework applied. As Brown has noted: 'Wherever they [piecework systems] exist, managerial control is at a discount ... The sequence in which jobs are performed ceases to be wholly at the dictate of what is optimum for the company's manufacturing programme'.⁷⁵ A particular difficulty was evident in the area of children's shoes, for which makers had little liking. Indeed, a principal of Hunter's complained that if given such work a maker was likely to 'put his hat and coat on and leave them there until the maker thought it worth his while'.⁷⁶

If by June 1890 the skilled craftsmen in the OBTU had secured their industrial objectives, for female boot workers their foray into the world of independent union organisation was only beginning, as powerful forces within Brisbane's labour movement encouraged them to take their fate into their own hands. Of these, perhaps the most significant was found in the radical labour press around William Lane. Despite his attachment to a masculine labour ideal,⁷⁷ Lane and his supporters were by late 1889 actively campaigning for the acceptance of women workers within the workforce. In December 1889, for example, Lane criticised unionised printers for their opposition to female workers, commenting: 'A woman has every bit as much right to work and to live as a man has'.⁷⁸ When he became editor of the Worker, Lane continued this campaign, and the journal regularly published articles about the plight of women workers under the authorship of 'Lucinda Sharp', probably a pseudonym for his wife, Anne.⁷⁹

By August 1890 the campaign to have organised labour directly address the cause of female workers took material shape with the establishment of a Women's Section within the Australian Labour Federation (ALF). Under the formal leadership of May Jordan, the widow of a former government minister, this Section proposed to organise all women workers in a single body, internally divided along occupational lines. Women's unions were soon established in Brisbane and Maryborough, to be joined in early October by one from Townsville.⁸⁰ None of these bodies, however, proved capable of attracting significant numbers of women. In mid-November 1890 the combined membership of the Brisbane Women's Union's nine occupational divisions amounted to a mere 130 members. In part, this lack of success can be attributed to, as the Worker recorded, 'all sorts of threats being used to prevent the girls joining' the new women's unions.⁸¹

In her account of the establishment of the Brisbane Women's Union, Pam Young implies that it was female activists from outside the boot trade who were responsible for the formation of the Female Boot-Machinists Union (FBMU). She remarks: 'May Jordan, Emma Miller and other organisers also set out to find key people in industries employing women. In July 1890, Sarah Bailey and Miss Nixon, from Hunter's Boot Factory, successfully organised the machinists in their industry into a union'.⁸² However, while no direct record of the FBMU's formation exists, it appears that, contrary to Young's account, the primary impetus for the union's establishment came from within the boot trade, as the Worker recorded that the 'boot-machinists' were 'organised independently' of the Women's Union.⁸³ The OBTU's Committee of Management, in particular, actively supported this development. On 28 June 1890, for example, Bowman informed the union's membership that the Committee had decided to aid the formation of a female union, while two weeks later members were advised that a 'Machinists and Fitters' Union would be established on the following Saturday.⁸⁴

Whatever the FBMU's origins, once established it promptly decided to follow in the footsteps of the OBTU and demand an end to outwork. So successful was the union's campaign at its Hunter's factory stronghold that Miss Nixon testified that management had granted 'all the union asked'. Such gains were clearly understood to rest on the union's own efforts, as Nixon concurred with the assessment that 'if the boot machinists could not keep up the union' then they would soon 'go back to the machinery being done outside'.⁸⁵ These achievements acted as a beacon for female bootmakers. By the latter half of 1891, the FBMU was, like the OBTU, at the peak of its fortunes, as it extended its membership base from its original bastion at Hunter's to other factories.

If the OBTU's leadership was behind the FBMU's formation, this should not be seen as evidence of any meaningful concern with the industrial advancement of female workers. When, for example, in 1891, the OBTU's Secretary, William Strickland, was asked about the number of women working at Hunter's, his reply was: 'I don't know anything about them'. When queried further as to the safety conditions under which women laboured at Hunter's, he confessed: 'I was never in the machinists' room'.⁸⁶ In similar fashion, another leading OBTU activist remarked: 'I know nothing about the women'.⁸⁷ Given such attitudes the question presents itself: why did the OBTU bother to support female unionisation at all? Two possible explanations present themselves. First, the majority of members were appeasing the wishes of Bowman, who remained the principal contact point between the OBTU and the new union.⁸⁸ Second, that in fostering the FBMU, the male body was simply seeking to establish an auxiliary battle force. Seen in this light, the FBMU would, to cite Strickland, act 'in conjunction with' the OBTU, without requiring the latter body to become active advocates of female interests within the factories.⁸⁹ Either way, it would appear that the female machinists were, in practice, left to their own resources.

Nadir: Depression, Mechanisation and the Decline of Union Influence in the Brisbane Boot Trade, 1891–95

After more than two years of relative labour shortage, workers within the boot trade were suddenly confronted with a marked tightening of the labour market as the economy slipped into Depression. The boot trade was not spared from the effects of this downturn, as firms began to lay off staff and engage in other cost cutting measures. Not surprisingly, such cost cutting soon found them in breach of their recent industrial commitments.

The key battle came at Astill's Boot Factory during August–September 1891, when management refused to comply with union demands to curtail its use of 'boy' labour. Underscoring the significance of Astill's actions, other manufacturers warned 'that if Astill's is allowed to break the agreement ... they will have to break it also'.⁹⁰ In taking up the cudgels against Astill, the OBTU called on both the FBMU and the Clickers Union for support. Both agreed. When the dispute started at the beginning of September 1891, the labour press noted that 'bootmakers and machinists' had 'come out on strike' together, providing a rare example of active male-female industrial solidarity.⁹¹ Unfortunately, this display of unity was incapable of securing victory, as unemployed bootmakers broke union picket lines. Recognising that they were incapable of imposing their will on Astill, the OBTU quietly wound up the dispute during February 1892.⁹²

The defeat at Astill's proved a calamity for Brisbane's boot trade unions. By October 1892 it was apparent that a number of firms were following neither the agreed 'Statement' on piecework rates nor the limitations on apprentices, while another employer warned the OBTU that he could openly flout the union's wishes as 'he could get plenty of men from Sydney'.⁹³ When the firm of Allcock's locked out its unionised workforce in November 1892, the OBTU lamely observed that 'owing to the weak position of the Union, it would be almost an impossibility to fight the matter out'.⁹⁴ Not surprisingly, the men returned to work defeated after just five days.

If the period after the loss of the Astill's dispute was, for the OBTU, one of declining industrial influence, the situation was even worse for the FBMU. Although Miss Nixon still sought encouragement for her members at the OBTU's half-yearly meeting in July 1892, little meaningful support was forthcoming. By month's end it was tabled that the 'Machinists' Union ... was not in such a flourishing condition as could be desired'.⁹⁵ From holding a pre-eminent position in the ranks of Brisbane's female unionists in late 1890, by mid-1893 even the Worker discounted its existence, lamenting instead that 'there is no organised female labour in the colony'.⁹⁶ This observation, however, underestimated the commitment of at least a core of female machinists to their union. In January 1893, for example, Bowman informed the OBTU that the 'Machinist Union' was being 'well maintained by a few good members'.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, by March 1894 even the remaining die-hards were forced to concede that the FBMU could no longer maintain a separate existence, instead applying for and obtaining an amalgamation with the OBTU.⁹⁸

While the amalgamation of the OBTU and the FBMU could be portrayed as proof of the former's embrace of female concerns, the subsequent record suggests a continued disinterest in female affairs. Even experienced female unionists such as Miss Nixon were given no leadership position in the OBTU. Instead she, and her fellow FBMU activists, disappeared from the historical record. In the years after 1894, there were no females recorded as serving in any official capacity within the OBTU. Nor were any minuted as being in attendance at any meeting. In both practice and theory, the OBTU reverted to being an all-male union. Not until 1908 did the union once again seek to organise female machinists, and then only by suggesting that they 'fall into line with the Bootmakers as a Machinists and Fitters' Union'.⁹⁹

By late 1894 the OBTU was increasingly isolated. Reflecting the dissatisfaction with its narrow industrial focus, 'rough stuff cutters' left the union en masse in October 1891, while the collapse of the Clickers Union meant that this section was also unorganised by late 1892.¹⁰⁰ In these circumstances, the OBTU understandably sought to avoid open conflict with employers, even conceding a ten per cent cut in piece rates during April 1895. Yet, the union continued to refuse to compromise those things that distinguished its members from mere wage earners. When, during May 1893, makers and finishers at Goldsworthy and Perkins accepted weekly wage work they were warned that if they did not return to working by the piece they would be 'placed on the [union] Black List'.¹⁰¹ As a result, Goldsworthy and Perkins became a non-union shop. In conceding non-union shops in preference to even regulated wage labour, however, the OBTU opened a Pandora's box. As one proprietor advised, if 'Perkins had a free shop ... he also would have a free shop'.¹⁰²

The tragedy for Brisbane's bootmakers was that the OBTU's increasingly narrow industrial position occurred at a critical moment in the history of the industry. For, despite the general depression in the Australian economy, the mid-to-late 1890s was a period of extraordinary growth for the city's boot trade, as Queensland protective tariffs were raised to 25 per cent in 1894. This increase largely freed boot manufacturers from outside competition. As one official study noted, while many areas of Queensland manufacturing saw domestic producers strengthen their position: 'The decline in imports of boots and shoes ... was even more pronounced, the volume compared to the population in 1895 being only just one-fourth that of 1890'.¹⁰³ Reflecting the changed economic circumstances, the number of Queensland boot factories rose from 21 in 1890 to 35 in 1895, before peaking at 46 in 1900. Significantly, increases in both employment and output were largely concentrated in Brisbane. Of the 1,565 workers employed in Queensland's boot factories in 1900, 1,403 worked in Brisbane — almost double the number employed in the capital in 1891.¹⁰⁴

The problem for the OBTU was that this expansion was associated with an increase in machine work, as employers began to invest heavily in new equipment for the first time in 20 years. As Lawson observed, while rapid mechanisation was a feature of a number of Brisbane industries in the 1890s: 'It was the most extensive in the boot trade'.¹⁰⁵ In these circumstances, employers were unwilling to accept the continued restraints imposed by the remnants of the 1890 industrial settlement. Thus, when the OBTU called a general stoppage from 15 May 1895 in defence of the previous 'Statement', the issues at stake were more than simply a reduction in piece rates. Instead, both OBTU members and employers understood that, with large-scale mechanisation being planned, the outcome of the dispute would shape the circumstances in which new machines could, and could not, be introduced. As one OBTU leader informed a mass rally during the strike, 'the necessity for combined action on the part of the men' was required to ensure 'fair terms when certain machines arrived — an event which, he predicted, would shortly be witnessed'.¹⁰⁶

In taking up the gauntlet, the OBTU's craft members fought with their customary tenacity. Pickets were organised of the various boot factories, public processions and meetings held in city streets, and boycotts organised of 'black shoes'. While such tactics inconvenienced employers, they were incapable of forcing them to the negotiating table. At Perkins and Goldsworthy, the expelled makers and finishers bluntly rejected union entreaties to rejoin the ranks of organised labour, while by June picket lines had been abandoned at Hunter's and Rose's factories.¹⁰⁷ Female machinists also appeared to have remained aloof from the dispute. On 20 August the union was finally forced to endorse a return to work on employer terms after 14 weeks of resistance. For leading union activists, however, there were to be no re-engagements, as employers began 'victimising all men who had taken a prominent part during the strike'.¹⁰⁸

Müller's Boot Factory, 1896
The factory was one of many small to medium sized operations to flourish after the 1894 tariff increases. As with many other factories at this time, its workforce comprised a large number of young boys (see left and right foreground) and females (right of photo).
Collection: John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland

After 1895: 'A Sub-species of the factory operative'

At the end of August 1895 the OBTU's industrial organisation lay in ruins. Still, however, the union clung tenaciously to the image of the independent bootmaker that had sustained it throughout its existence. Before returning to work on 20 August, OBTU members were prohibited from accepting 'any position at weekly wages'.¹⁰⁹ At a strategic level, the union concluded that it was time to once more search for alternatives to employment in Brisbane's increasingly mechanised factories, resolving to establish 'a cooperative factory'.¹¹⁰ Such activities, however, merely obscured the need for the union to widen its industrial base. Although the Worker exhorted bootmakers to show all their 'combining powers' against the 'degrading' effects of mechanisation, the OBTU's leadership refused to embrace the organisation of female machinists and other wage earners.¹¹¹ This was despite the fact that the workforce of many Brisbane boot factories was increasingly made up of females and young boys (see photo of Müller's factory in 1896). Instead, the union's ALF delegate, D. Levy, moved a motion opposing 'the organisation of female workers' at the 1896 Convention of the Federation's Provincial Council, arguing that 'male workers' were better off focusing 'their attention upon their own sex'. In taking this stance, Levy discounted his union's amalgamation with the FBMU, stating: 'About six months ago it ceased to exist'. He went on to add that he 'had very little faith at present in the organisation of females', instancing 'the failure of the female machinists in the Brisbane boot trade'.¹¹²

In turning its back on female bootmakers, however, the OBTU was merely contributing towards its growing marginalisation during what was, after all, a period of dramatic growth and transformation within the industry. For, to the union's discomfort, employers had, as they had in 1874, used the 1895 dispute to re-equip their factories with the latest technology. In early 1896 the Worker recorded: 'During and after the strike much machinery was introduced into several factories, so much so in fact that one factory alone had sufficient to supply the whole of Queensland'.¹¹³ This new wave of mechanisation virtually eliminated handicraft in all but high quality bespoke work, reducing Brisbane's remaining craft bootmakers to what Hobsbawm and Scott have referred to as 'a sub-species of the factory operative'.¹¹⁴ Unfortunately for the union, its historic traditions had not prepared it for such an eventuality. In consequence, it was observed by early 1900 that, whereas the boot trade had been 'one of the best' organised industries in Brisbane 'up to a few years ago', it 'is now one of the worst, if not the worst'.¹¹⁵ Although the union's remaining activists laid 'all the blame' for this state of affairs 'on to the introduction of machinery', even the Worker attributed much of the union's decline to its inability to unite all bootmakers.¹¹⁶ While the organisation of female workers may not have delivered the OBTU victory in 1895, there is little doubt that such organisation would have left the union better placed to confront the new industrial realities that emerged in its wake.

Conclusion

In the 30 years after 1869, Brisbane's bootmakers lived through a process of industrial transformation that was, in its broad outlines, similar to that experienced by their co-workers in other Australian cities. In Brisbane, however, there were some notable departures from the historical patterns that Frances has identified in describing trends within the Victorian industry. Perhaps the most distinctive of these differences was the uneven and tardy introduction of mechanised techniques in the northern capital. After a period of rapid mechanisation and growth between 1869 and 1875, Brisbane manufacturers abstained from large-scale investment in capital equipment for almost 20 years, as the tariff regime that had underpinned early growth was dismantled. The principal occupational consequence of this was an exaggerated gendered division of labour, given that, prior to the mid-1890s, it was only the women who did 'the machinery'.

Within this gendered division of labour, male 'makers and finishers' found themselves in a position of relative labour market advantage, as employers depended upon them to assemble and finish by hand the materials being machined in increased quantities in their factories. While prior to May 1890 these craftsmen were largely employed as outworkers, between 1888 and 1895 they forged one of Brisbane's most powerful and lasting craft unions — the OBTU. However, this union tradition was flawed at two levels. Firstly, the union's industrial might rested on the employers' continued dependence on handwork. When this changed in 1894–95, the union was powerless to resist the erosion of its once influential position. As well, by building a union around the interests of handicraft workers, the OBTU only addressed the concerns of a shrinking part of the trade.

Industrially, the achievements of Brisbane's female bootmakers were no less remarkable than those of their male counterparts. The union founded by these women in July 1890, the FBMU, proved to be the largest, most effective and enduring female industrial organisation established in Brisbane prior to 1900. Between 1890 and 1894, the union's activists successfully fought for limitations on the use of outwork among machinists, while, at times, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the OBTU and the Clickers Union in defence of union principles. Despite such actions, however, the gendered division of labour remained sacrosanct.

In explaining the immutability of gendered relations within the Victorian industry, Frances has highlighted the significance of traditional family ties between male and female bootmakers that caused women unionists to place 'men's causes' before their own. She also proposed that boot factory work lacked appeal to female workers. In Brisbane, neither of these factors appears as significant as the uneven introduction of mechanisation, and the demands for female employment from a population that trebled during the 1880s. In general, mechanisation shaped female work at least a decade before most male workers found their working lives affected. Whereas female machinists were commonly housed in factories, and engaged on wage labour, even before the 1890 strike, it was only after this latter dispute that male makers and finishers entered the factories in substantial numbers. Even then, there was a marked physical separation between the two work groups, as men 'shopped' their work from individual stands in work rooms physically removed from those of female workers. So marked was this physical and psychological segregation that male union officials, when asked, could not even describe the number of females engaged in their own factory, or the circumstances under which they worked. Not surprisingly, these disassociated working experiences led to disconnected traditions of unionism. In the end this disjuncture left the cause of organised labour as a whole in a weakened state, despite the rapid growth of the Brisbane boot trade after 1894.

Endnotes

^1. R.J. and R.A. Sullivan, 'The Pastoral Strikes, 1891 and 1984', in D.J. Murphy (ed.), The Big Strikes, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1983, p. 80.

^2. 'Queensland Census of 1891', Queensland Votes & Proceedings (QVP), 1892, vol. 3, pp. 932–3.

^3. 'Testimony of William Strickland', Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Shops, Factories and Workshops (hereafter RCS), QVP, 1891, vol. 2, part 2, Q. 4867. Note: the statistical evidence on the number of females employed is contradictory. The 1891 census records just 65 female Brisbane bootmakers against 663 males. See 'Queensland Census of 1891', QVP, pp. 1112, 1138. However, testimony to the Royal Commission suggests that there were at least double this number employed. In November 1890 the number of unionised female bootmakers alone was recorded at 80. See Worker, 15 November 1890, p.4.

^4. 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, Q. 5112.

^5. 'Inspector's Report on Hunter's Boot Factory', Appended to RCS, p. 1132.

^6. 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, Q. 5184–8; Worker, 15 November 1890, p. 4.

^7. 'Testimony of William Baldry', RCS, Q. 11,798.

^8. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin, Harmonsworth, rev.ed., 1968, p. 259.

^9. H.E. Bates, The Vanishing World: an Autobiography, ISIS Publishing, Oxford, 1998, p. 10.

^10. Eric Hobsbawm and Joan W Scott, 'Political Shoemakers', in E.J. Hobsbawm, Worlds of Labour, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1984, p. 104.

^11. J.H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain: Free Trade and Steel 1850–1886, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967, p. 92.

^12. Clapham, Free Trade and Steel, pp. 94–5, 131; Paul G. Faler, Mechanics and Manufacturers in the Early Industrial Revolutions: Lynn, Massachusetts, 1780–1860, State University of New York, Albany, 1981, pp. 222–4, 20; John R Commons, David Saposs, Helen Sumner, E. B. Mittelman, H. E. Hoagland, John D. Andrews and Selig Perlman, History of Labour in the United States, Augustus M. Kelle, New York, 1966, pp. 76–7.

^13. This description is drawn from the Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, pp. 5–6. A similar description is found in Raelene Frances, The Politics of Work: Gender and Labour in Victoria, 1880–1939, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993, p. 44.

^14. Commons et al., History of Labour, p. 77.

^15. Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Industrial Democracy, 2nd ed., Seaham Labour Party Division, 1920, p. 396.

^16. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, 2nd ed., Longman, Green and Co., London, 1902, p. 423.

^17. Commons et al., History of Labour, p. 77.

^18. Hobsbawm and Scott, Political Shoemakers, p. 129.

^19. Susan E Hirsch, Roots of the American Working Class: the Industrialization of Crafts in Newark, 1800–1860, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1978; Faler, Mechanics and Manufacturers; J.H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain: the Early Railway Age 1820–1850, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 167–81.

^20. Clapham, The Early Railway Age 1820–1850, p. 178.

^21. Faler, Mechanics and Manufacturers, p. 23.

^22.Ibid., p. 226.

^23. Frances, The Politics of Work. An earlier study of the Victorian boot trade is to be found in Geoffrey Serle, The Rush to be Rich: the Story of the Colony of Victoria, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1971, pp. 106–8.

^24. Frances, The Politics of Work, p. 55.

^25.Ibid., p. 56.

^26.Ibid., p. 57.

^27.Ibid., p.107.

^28. N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861–1900, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1964, p. 184.

^29. G. Linge, Industrial Awakening: a Geography of Australian Manufacturing 1788 to 1890, ANU Press, Canberra, 1979, p. 712 and p. 754: Table A1.12.

^30. Ronald Lawson, Brisbane in the 1890s, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1973, p. 51.

^31.Brisbane Courier, 5 March 1870, p. 4.

^32.Queenslander, 30 October 1869, p. 3.

^33.Queenslander, 20 January 1872; Brisbane Courier, 3 March 1873, p. 5, 30 April 1874, p. 2, 31 January 1879.

^34.Brisbane Courier, 19 March 1873, p. 2.

^35.Brisbane Courier, 30 April 1874, p. 2.

^36. Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Industrial Democracy, p. 289.

^37. J. Hagan and C. Fisher, 'Piece-work and some of its consequences in the printing and coal mining industries in Australia, 1850–1930', Labour History, no. 25, November 1973, p. 30.

^38. See, for example, Queensland Amalgamated Operative Boot Trade Union (hereafter OBTU), 8 October 1888, Noel Butlin Archives (hereafter NBA) Box 49/1/1.

^39.Queenslander, 3 January 1874, p. 4 & 19 December 1874, p. 11; Brisbane Courier, 30 October 1874, p. 1.

^40.Queenslander, 19 December 1874, p. 11; Brisbane Courier, 30 October 1874, p. 1.

^41.Brisbane Courier, 5 November 1874, p. 2.

^42.Queenslander, 21 November 1874, p. 2.

^43.Brisbane Courier, 31 January 1879, p. 3.

^44. 'Testimony of William Strickland, OBTU Secretary',RCS, Q. 4870. Casual observers were sometimes confused as to the level of mechanisation. In 1889, the Boomerang, 13 April 1889, p. 13, noted: 'A boot factory is confusing ... Sometimes it seems all machinery and sometimes as if run entirely by hand'. It was, however, only the female work areas that were fully mechanised.

^45. 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, Q. 5109.

^46. 'Testimony of Miss Lizzie Morris', RCS, Q. 6831.

^47. See, for example: 'Testimony of Miss Peaperell, a machinist at Astill's Boot Factory', RCS, Q.5403–11.

^48. See 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, p. 926.

^49. M. Stubbs-Brown, The Secondary Industries of Queensland 1875–1900, BA Hons Thesis, University of Queensland, 1961, p. 37.

^50.Boomerang, 13 April 1889, p. 13.

^51.Boomerang, 11 February 1888, p. 11; RCS, Appendix A, pp. 943–5, 1132–4.

^52. 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4607.

^53.Brisbane Courier, 30 May 1890, p. 4.

^54.Boomerang, 13 April 1889, p. 13; 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4712.

^55.Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, p. 6.

^56. 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, p. 929, Q. 5359.

^57.Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, p. 6.

^58.OBTU Minutes, 7 February 1888, NBA T49/1/1.

^59.OBTU Special General Meeting Minutes, 24 February 1888.

^60.OBTU Minutes, 17 June 1889, NBA T49/1/1.

^61.OBTU Minutes, 1 July 1895, NBA T49/1/4.

^62.OBTU Minutes, 9 March 1888, 24 September 1888, 17 December 1888, NBA T49/1/1.

^63.OBTU Minutes, 8 October 1888, NBA T49/1/1; Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, p. 5; 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4596–7.

^64.Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, p. 6.

^65. Bradley Bowden, 'Transience, Community and Class: a Study of East Ward, 1879–91', Labour History, no. 77, November 1999, pp. 179–86.

^66. 'Testimony of Miss Bramburg', RCS, Q. 6124.

^67. 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, Q. 5168.

^68. 'Testimony of Ratcliffe-Nye', RCS, Q. 5067.

^69.OBTU Minutes, 27 January 1890, NBA T49/1/2; Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, p. 6.

^70. 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4714, 4865.

^71.Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1890, p. 6.

^72.OBTU Minutes, 11 June 1890, NBA T49/1/2.

^73. 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4627.

^74. 'Inspector's Report on Hunter's Boot Factory', RCS, p. 1132.

^75. Cited in Hagan and Fisher, Piece-work in Printing and Coal Mining, p. 28.

^76. 'Question from Alexander Hunter to William Hubbard', RCS, Q. 6472.

^77. Lane's attitudes to women have been subject to lengthy debate. See, Marilyn Lake, 'Socialism and Manhood: the Case of William Lane', Labour History, no. 50, May 1986, pp. 54–62; Bruce Scates, 'Socialism and Feminism: the Case of William Lane: a Reply to Marilyn Lake', Labour History, no. 59, November 1990, pp. 45–58; Bruce Scates, 'Socialism and Manhood: a Rejoinder', Labour History, no. 60, May 1991, pp. 121–4.

^78.Boomerang, 14 December 1889, p. 5.

^79. John Kellett, '"Lucinda Sharpe": Anne Lane?', Notes & Furphies, no. 30, April 1993, pp. 10–11.

^80.Worker, 1 September 1890, pp. 12, 14; Boomerang, 16 August 1890, p. 7 and 4 October 1890, p. 7.

^81.Worker, 15 November 1890, p. 5. Note: While this report states that the FBMU 'decided to join' the Women's Union, in practice it remained separate.

^82. Pam Young, Proud to be a Rebel: the life and times of Emma Miller, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1991, p. 47.

^83.Worker, 15 November 1890, p. 5.

^84.OBTU Minutes, 28 June 1890, 14 July 1890, NBA T49/1/2. Given the friendship between Bowman and Miller it is possible that the two were in cahoots in establishing the FBMU.

^85. 'Testimony of Miss Nixon', RCS, Q. 5333, 5341, 5340.

^86. 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4631, 4867.

^87. 'Testimony of Frederick Ratcliffe-Nye', RCS, Q. 5010.

^88. See, for example, OBTU Minutes, 25 July 1892, 23 January 1893, 7 August 1893, 27 November 1893.

^89. 'Testimony of William Strickland', RCS, Q. 4864.

^90.Worker, 17 October 1891, pp. 1–2.

^91.Boomerang, 12 September 1891, p. 18.

^92.OBTU Minutes, 31 August 1891, 22 February 1892. Boomerang, 26 September 1891.

^93.OBTU Minutes, 19 September 1892, 3 October 1892, 17 October 1892.

^94.OBTU Minutes, 21 November 1892.

^95.OBTU Minutes, 11 July 1892, 25 July 1892.

^96.Worker, 10 June 1893, p. 2.

^97.OBTU Half-Yearly Minutes, 23 January 1893.

^98.OBTU Minutes, 19 March 1894.

^99.OBTU Minutes, 15 September 1908, NBA, T49/1/5.

^100.OBTU Minutes, 19 October 1891, 14 November 1892, 15 December 1892.

^101.OBTU Minutes, 15 May 1893, 6 June 1893.

^102.OBTU Minutes, 21 August 1893.

^103. T. Weedon, Queensland Past and Present, Government Printer, Brisbane, 1898, p. 347.

^104. Stubbs-Brown, The Secondary Industries of Queensland, p. 37, Appendix XII; Queensland Census of 1891, pp. 1112, 1138.

^105. Lawson, Brisbane in the 1890s, p. 52.

^106.Brisbane Courier, 4 June 1895, p. 5.

^107.OBTU Minutes, 29 May 1895, 19 June 1895.

^108.Worker, 31 August 1895, p. 2.

^109.OBTU Minutes, 20 August 1890.

^110.OBTU Minutes, 1 July 1895, NBA T49/1/4.

^111.Worker, 1 February 1896, p. 2.

^112.Worker, 25 January 1896, p. 2.

^113.Worker, 1 February 1896, p. 2.

^114. Hobsbawm and Scott, Political Shoemakers, p. 129.

^115.Worker, 24 March 1900, p. 10.

^116.Worker, 24 March 1900, p. 10.

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