A ‘Cosy Relationship’ If You Had It: Queensland Labor’s
Arbitration System and Union Organising Strategies in
Rockhampton, 1916-57

Barbara Webster

Critics of the progressive decline in membership in Australian unions attribute the predicament to a failure to develop independent organising strategies during decades of passive over-reliance on preference clauses under a compulsory industrial arbitration system. To test the historical validity of these accusations, this article examines six major unions in Rockhampton during 40 years under a state Labor arbitration system. Using a broad definition of organising – recruitment of members, fostering membership participation and creating union awareness and presence in the workplace – this paper reveals two fallacies about union ‘dependence’. Firstly, not all unions relied on arbitration for organising: denied the privilege of preference or by choice, some adopted mobilisational strategies. Secondly, rather than being passively dependent on preference clauses, arbitrationist unions actively exploited the system. Through an intimate relationship between compliant unions and Queensland Labor’s apparatus, arbitration facilitated organising for and empowered those unions.

In the past decade, the Australian union movement has made a concerted effort to devise new strategies for union organising to stem a progressive, and now acute, decline in membership. From a peak of some 60 per cent in the 1950s, unionisation of the workforce has plummeted to only 25 per cent in 2000. 1 Industrial relations commentators direct much of their criticism for this predicament at unions themselves for failing to develop adequate recruitment strategies to cope with changing economic circumstances and increasingly deregulated workplace relations. Inability to adapt to these changes, critics claim, stems from complacency bred by years of reliance on Australia’s unique system of state-controlled compulsory arbitration. Under that regime, unions were supposedly ‘buttressed’ by preference clauses in awards which guaranteed membership with minimal organising effort. 2 In sheeting home much of the blame for the contemporary situation to the union movement’s adherence to ‘traditional labourism’, 3 these critics fail to appreciate the ways in which some unions actively exploited the arbitration system to facilitate organising. They also overlook other organising strategies used by unions in the arbitration era, either through necessity or choice. Investigating past strategies is unlikely to present any solutions for the current dilemma because social circumstances and practices have changed as profoundly as the political and economic. Rather, the intention of this paper is to shed light on the past for its own sake and to redress the gaps in historical knowledge. This paper begins from the viewpoint that union organising involves more than simply amassing membership. It also includes fostering rank-and-file participation in union affairs. Moreover, reflecting Bradon Ellem’s view that the best organising strategy is ‘the traditional base of trade unionism – the vigorous defence of wages and conditions’, 4 organising entails creating a strong union awareness and presence in the workplace to protect workers’ interests to the greatest possible extent.	1
Trade Unions, Arbitration and Organising
From a labour history perspective, research into trade unions and arbitration has focused on the origins and early development of the arbitration system and on the major strikes occasioned by its perceived or real failure. 5 The reality was that strikes and courtroom performances occupied only a minor part of union time, and even then it was more typical for those in the upper echelons of administration in metropolitan centres to be involved. Unions expended most time and energy on day-to-day functioning, 6 and the main engagement with arbitration for officials in the lower ranks of travelling organisers, local sub-branch officials and shop-floor delegates was in the workplace. Here, arbitration often played a significant role in recruiting and maintaining membership, facilitating checks on workers’ wages, hours and conditions, and resolving minor workplace disputes.	2
There has been little empirical investigation of how Australian unions organised historically or of what effect arbitration had on union organising. The industrial relations literature on unions and arbitration, though no less limited than labour history writing, is more theoretical, and the contemporary debate on union decline reflects what is known in the literature as the ‘dependency thesis’. Early critics of arbitration, such as H.E. Holland, believed that arbitration would render unions ‘mere machines … mere dues collectors and private policemen to see that the Courts (sic) awards were observed’. 7 These sentiments have been reiterated by others, but are most systematically argued by W.A. Howard. His fundamental assertion is that Australian unions were ‘called into existence’ by early registrars of the arbitration system to facilitate its operation and thereafter were dependent on that system for their functioning and resources. 8 There are differing views in the literature on Howard’s claims. Gerard Griffin and Victor Scarcebrook agree with the influence of federal arbitration on early union growth (albeit with some qualifications as to the role of the registrar) while Peter Sheldon refutes the connection for the mechanism established in New South Wales in 1901. Peter Gahan has examined dependency in relation to the influence of federal arbitration on union goals, behaviour, structure and involvement of members – some aspects of which come under the banner of organising. In a study of four unions, Gahan concludes that while the arbitration system ‘influenced the behaviour and characteristics’ of the unions, so too did a diverse range of other factors. 9	3
Howard’s argument relating more specifically to organising is that ‘quasi-judicial decisions benefiting workers took the place of protection through union organization’. With courts impartially determining wages and conditions, it became unnecessary to amass a large membership and to maintain a healthy strike fund. Moreover, he claims registration under the arbitration system gave unions the right to exclusive representation of certain groups of workers. Thus, unions had ‘minimal need to service members’ to attract them to the union. Similar to Holland, Howard concludes that unions under arbitration were ‘cogs in a bureaucratic machine’ rather than actively organising like their overseas counterparts in unregulated labour markets. 10 Howard’s assertions imply that, firstly, arbitration largely replaced organising in that unions no longer had to actively recruit or work at retaining membership by remaining vigilant to members’ interests. This presupposes that all unions relied on preference for recruitment. It also presupposes that employers, individual workers and even other unions abided by the terms of awards when often they did not. Secondly, Howard implies that arbitration disempowered unions by restricting their organising strategy. As Sheldon has rightly pointed out, the dependency thesis leaves no room for union agency. Integral to the labourist view of many unionists up to the 1950s was the belief that labourism was a device for empowerment of the working class and not the reverse. Unions played a crucial role in maintaining the Australian Labor Party (ALP) financially and numerically and also in shaping its policies for their benefit. Workers had the expectation that when Labor held office, as they did in Queensland almost continuously from 1915 to 1957, it would advance and protect working-class interests through sympathetic legislation. Under the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 and subsequent legislation, that generally proved to be the case. 11	4
None of the literature to date examines the influence of arbitration on union organising in Queensland. It concentrates instead on the New South Wales system established in 1901 and its federal counterpart set up in 1904. Apart from the Queensland system being partial to workers, there are other reasons why a study of union organising in Queensland is a valuable exercise for labour historians. Firstly, because of better terms and comparatively easy court access, far more Queenslanders worked under state awards than federal. Secondly, unions did not necessarily gain exclusive rights to recruitment upon registration under the state system. Thirdly, several of the major unions did not receive preference in their awards and therefore could not exploit that condition for organising. This research gives some insight into the relationship between organising and arbitration in Queensland by studying a selection of major unions in Rockhampton from 1916 to the late 1950s. In those decades, both the arbitration system and trade union strength reached their zenith, and Rockhampton was the largest provincial city in Queensland with a population of some 40,000 residents. Reflecting Rockhampton’s main economic activities of export meat production, railway workshops, port facilities, wholesale and retail distribution, and government administration, six major unions are discussed: the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (AMIEU); Australian Workers Union (AWU); Transport Workers Union (TWU); Waterside Workers Federation (WWF); and two ‘railway’ unions, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and Australian Railways Union (ARU).	5
This article is empirical in nature, but Tom Bramble’s recent model of union strategies since 1945 provides some useful characteristics for assessing organising methods in Rockhampton. Of the four strategies he identifies, two of them – what he terms ‘arbitrationist’ and ‘mobilisational’ – typified unions in the early post-war period and are therefore relevant to this work. According to Bramble, arbitrationist unions ‘enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Arbitration Court’ and maintained ‘deals’ with Labor governments. They demonstrated authoritarian and bureaucratic leadership with minimal rank-and-file participation, activism or shop-floor presence and strictly monitored awards and jealously defended union membership and boundaries. On the other hand, mobilisational unions exhibited characteristics including democratic and participative organisation, rank-and-file activism and shop-floor presence, and frequent use of mass meetings for decision-making. Like arbitrationist unions, they applied strict control to boundaries. Bramble does not specifically identify strategies for recruitment, but the omission of any competition for membership and inclusion of preference clauses for mobilisational unions indicates that he, too, assumes they enjoyed those privileges in common with arbitrationist unions. As this argument has already indicated, that was not necessarily the case in Queensland. 12	6
With these loose terms of reference, and by employing a broad definition of union organising, this work argues that, in Queensland at least, it is historically inaccurate to assert that unions depended on the arbitration system for organising. Firstly, some unions did use the powers and privileges of the system as the basis of their organising strategy; however, for other unions, arbitration played no role or was supplemented by other means. Secondly, rather than constraining and weakening unions which employed an arbitrationist strategy, as the dependency thesis claims, the Queensland system facilitated organising for and thereby empowered those unions.	7
The Queensland Arbitration System
Queensland was late in introducing a system of compulsory industrial arbitration. Although this was a leading plank in Labor’s fighting platform in Queensland in the late 1890s, the party could not effect that policy until it secured government in 1915. In 1908, a conservative government introduced regional wages boards and, following the general strike of 1912, the Industrial Peace Act of 1912 ushered in compulsory arbitration specifically to deter strikes. Like the previous wages boards, the new system of industrial boards and court did not recognise unions, even though they were bound by its awards and were liable for substantial fines for breaches and strikes. Both systems consistently favoured employers in their decisions and, when they did not, employers were known to use government influence to suspend determinations and dissolve boards. A decade after the new Labor government dismantled that system in 1916, the Employers Association of Central Queensland still advocated its return. 13	8
Compulsory arbitration was the centrepiece of a plethora of beneficial legislation introduced by Labor between 1915 and 1929 in what the party deemed ‘the Golden Age of Queensland Workers’. 14 In the parliamentary debate preceding its introduction, the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 was presented as a device to create ‘lasting industrial peace’ by preventing strikes before they occurred. Unlike the federal system, registered unions (and employers) could approach the new Queensland Arbitration Court at any time for an award, variation or interpretation without needing a pre-existing dispute. Notwithstanding the desire for industrial peace, Labor intended the new legislation primarily to benefit workers, as one local Labor candidate made clear in a 1915 election campaign speech. Reflecting this deeper motive, the first president of the court, and one of the legislation’s architects as crown solicitor from 1915, T.W. McCawley, was a student of the English Fabian movement. With this background, his friendship with Premier T.J. Ryan and an unusual and rapid rise to president, McCawley was clearly a political appointment. As the official court history has acknowledged, McCawley believed that arbitration should be an instrument for reform to advance the material interests of workers rather than simply to improve industrial relations. Motivated by these beliefs and intentions, Ryan and McCawley jointly laid the foundations of an arbitration system which, in the majority of cases, did favour unions over employers. 15	9
In Rockhampton, the Industrial Magistrate tended to find for unions in cases that came before him. Unions also had a staunch ally in the Industrial Inspector. One of the first appointees to the new Department of Labour, Henry Harris, was a former president and secretary of TWU’s forerunner, the Federated Carters and Drivers Industrial Union (FCDIU). On resigning his union position, Harris assured members he ‘would still be of great assistance to the Rockhampton Sub-branch’ in his new role. 16 On one occasion in 1924, when a subsequent officer did not administer the award to the satisfaction of the FCDIU, a complaint to Brisbane brought prompt intervention by the Chief Inspector, followed by the appointment of a local, Alfred Owen Poole, as a second Industrial Inspector in the city. Poole had family connections with the FCDIU executive as well as the local ALP. Although later transferred to Ipswich, Poole returned to Rockhampton in the 1930s and served as inspector into the 1950s. 17 In addition to the Queensland system being more partial to unions than employers, unions had direct influence on the tribunal itself. This arose through the long-term dominance of the AWU within the ALP in Queensland. With the reconstitution of the court as the Board of Trade and Arbitration in 1925, the appointment of one judge and two lay members opened the way for ‘a remarkable sequence’ of AWU appointments by Labor to industrial tribunals in Queensland. 18 This ‘tradition of AWU representation’ continued unbroken until 1952. 19	10
Unlike the federal sphere, the state system did not appear concerned about restricting the number of unions registered with the court, and several unions could be registered for the one calling. In the federal system, unless it was considered undesirable, the registrar was obliged to refuse an application if there was already a registered union to which workers ‘might conveniently belong’. 20 In Queensland, in contrast, an applicant union could be required to demonstrate why it was ‘not in the public interest or for other good reason’ to join an already registered body but, in practice, the onus was on existing registrants to oppose duplicate applications and to demonstrate that a new organisation would ‘unjustly affect’ it. 21 According to a judgment in 1927, railway unions had neglected to oppose rival registrations, with the result that several bodies were registered for the same callings in that industry. 22 The 1916 legislation also contained no power to grant preference to unions. The proposed bill had given the bench discretion to award preference to unions which registered under the new system as ‘an aid to industrial peace’; 23 however conservative politicians considered granting preference was ‘most pernicious’. To allow the act to pass through an obstructive upper house, its architects reluctantly expunged that clause from the legislation. 24 The following year, the court decided it had the power to grant preference without legislative backing, and from 1920 the practice became common in awards. A new conservative government proscribed preference in 1929 but, when Labor returned to office in 1932, it immediately reinstated the court’s power by an order-in-council, and later by legislation. 25	11
While the Labor government considered preference to unions was desirable in private industry, it did not have the same opinion where its position as the employer in the railways was concerned. Despite a pre-election promise by Labor in 1915, 26 railway unions were not accorded the same privilege as other unions. In 1927, the Board of Trade and Arbitration refused an application for preference by several unions on the grounds that it was necessary to withhold that benefit so that the Commissioner could ‘insist on getting from each Union any undertaking he want[ed] for the proper conduct of its members in relation to industrial disputes’. This ruling followed a resounding union victory in the crippling 1925 railway strike, in which all unions had taken direct action in contravention of court orders. 27 Through the arbitration system, the Labor government was determined to prevent any further combined strike action by playing one union off against another through withholding preference. The conditional application of preference conformed to Labor’s belief that it was a privilege and not a right. It should be extended to those unions which supported arbitration and withheld or removed from those which did not. Labourism was a two-way process: unions were expected to actively support Labor legislation introduced for their benefit. The AWU, with its intimate links to the ALP and industrial tribunals, demonstrated the greatest willingness to participate in the arbitration system, while the TWU also consistently supported that process in its industrial policy. 28 Both were accordingly rewarded by the system.	12
The differing positions of unions under arbitration, and even whether they had access to it, gave rise to a variety of organising strategies among Rockhampton unions. The following section outlines the methods employed by selected unions in the city in relation to membership recruitment and retention; rank and file participation; union awareness and presence on the shop floor; and, through that presence, the ability to effectively protect members’ rights and conditions in the workplace. Distilling the essence of each union necessitates some degree of generalisation of decades of union minutes, organisers’ reports, arbitration records and publications, local newspaper articles and the recollections of past unionists. However, where possible, specific examples have been given to illustrate methods used by each union. 29	13
Union Organising in Rockhampton
Australian Workers Union
One of the largest unions by membership in Rockhampton, the AWU covered a diverse group of semi-skilled and unskilled workers employed under a variety of awards. Public authorities such as Rockhampton City Council, Main Roads Department, Rockhampton Harbour Board and Rockhampton Fire Brigade, as well as large enterprises like the brewery and gas works, employed some of the AWU’s membership. Others worked in small businesses: hotels, cafés, soft-drink factories, hairdressers, boarding houses and commercial laundries. Preference clauses in all awards worked in Rockhampton assured the AWU of automatic recruitment, and this was made easier by the frequent inclusion of a check-off system where employers deducted union dues from wages. In Central Queensland, the AWU’s district headquarters were in Bundaberg in the heart of the southern sugar cane industry. From there, union officials effected the policies and decisions emanating from the union’s state office in Brisbane. 30 Reflecting this highly centralised method of operation, the union lacked the permanent local structure of the other major unions in Rockhampton. The AWU rarely conducted general meetings for its membership (which also included local Labor parliamentarians for political reasons), and did not adopt a shop-floor approach to organising. Instead, several AWU organisers constantly toured the city and surrounds, checking tickets and monitoring awards and conditions, particularly on the larger public construction work sites. Organisers referred any problems to the Industrial Inspector for resolution and, if major, the union routinely applied to the Industrial Magistrate to convene a compulsory conference. In the 1940s for instance, under the Local Authorities and Main Roads Award which specified that process for the settlement of disputes, the AWU protested Rockhampton City Council’s refusal to pay miner’s rates to 300 labourers working in sewerage trenches. When negotiations failed, the matter reverted to the Industrial Magistrate who ruled in the union’s favour. The AWU took similar action during the construction of a new traffic bridge across the Fitzroy River in 1947, again resulting in union success in court. 31	14
The AWU saw the TWU as a source for potential recruitment. In North Queensland, where the AWU originated as the Amalgamated Workers Association in 1907, the union laid an early claim to the carting industry so that it covered all road transport north of St Lawrence, only 150 km north of Rockhampton. Workers south of St Lawrence belonged to the TWU whose predecessor, the FCDIU, was firmly ensconced in Central Queensland before the AWU’s arrival. The newcomer did not readily accept its exclusion from the Rockhampton carting trade and never missed the chance to muscle into TWU territory and membership, whether by intimidation or deception. In 1939, one AWU organiser tried to bully owner-drivers working for the Main Roads Department into joining his union. He claimed that, under the Local Authorities and Main Roads Award, the AWU had preference even though the award shared preference for owner-drivers and contract drivers with the TWU. Both the Local Authorities and Main Roads Award and the Carting Award– State contained verbose and ambiguous preference clauses, but the TWU successfully defended its claim to the men by citing a 1927 case in which the bench ruled that the work fell under the carting award. Thus, the TWU had preference. The following year, the same organiser used the same pretext to give municipal sewerage scheme drivers two weeks notice to take out AWU tickets or face dismissal. The TWU successfully reclaimed its rightful membership on the same grounds. 32	15
The AWU organised no social functions for members or for their families, nor did it conduct any sickness or death benefit schemes. As the union always remained outside the broader trade union movement in Rockhampton and refused to affiliate with the Trades Hall Board, its members could not avail themselves of the lending library or other facilities at the hall as could members of most of the other large unions. The AWU was a ‘no frills’ union that offered its members nothing more than the basic function of unionism: the vigilant protection of their workplace interests by rigid policing of industrial awards. 33	16
Transport Workers Union
The Rockhampton Sub-branch of the TWU, initially the FCDIU, drew its early membership from the many drivers of horse lorries and carts in the wholesale, retail and food distribution sectors of Rockhampton. The federal court granted the union’s first award in 1919, but this proved very disappointing in terms of hours and rates of pay. The FCDIU immediately approached the state bench and, by 1921, had secured a satisfactory award which also granted it preference in the carting trade. Each new recruit to the industry had 14 days to join the union or face dismissal. The secretary-organiser from 1915 to 1953, Frank Conlon, constantly patrolled the union’s domain, checking that employers and employees alike abided by that prized clause. Conlon also kept a hawkish eye on members of the Storemen and Packers Union who, in small businesses, usually also did some deliveries. Should the balance of duties tilt towards driving, Conlon quickly insisted on the application of carting award with either the purchase of his ticket or the employment of a separate driver. Working family members provided another source of membership for the union. Conlon identified several brothers, sons and aged fathers claiming to be partners in small businesses but who, according to the award, required union tickets. 34	17
The Carting Award–State initially secured for the FCDIU only the membership of drivers and assistants engaged in the transportation of goods. Drivers of passenger vehicles, such as trams, buses and taxis, as well as their attendants, all worked under an award covering steam engine drivers. It appears the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Association (FEDFA), which was party to a variation handed down by the court in 1917, had either never achieved or never sought preference in that award. In 1926, after joining with kindred southern unions to form the Amalgamated Road Transport Workers Union (ARTWU), the carters’ union laid claim to workers in motorised and horse-drawn passenger transportation. The separate new award covering those occupations gave joint preference to ARTWU and FEDFA. However, in 1928, FEDFA was removed from the award and the court directed all existing members to take out ARTWU tickets when their annual FEDFA tickets expired. ARTWU thereby swelled its ranks with new members from Rockhampton’s private bus companies the following year. When the city council replaced its steam tram service with diesel buses in 1939, the union further expanded its membership to an extent that warranted the formation of a separate passenger transport section. 35	18
Despite the TWU amassing a large membership through preference, there was little rank-and-file participation in union affairs. Monthly meetings drew about 30 members on average, but sometimes lapsed for want of a quorum. Most decisionmaking emanated from a committee that deferred to the secretary on all industrial matters and he, in turn, deferred to the state secretary in Brisbane. Shop-floor activism consisted mostly of ‘tip-offs’ to the union about irregularities concerning time and wage books. Frank Conlon developed a reputation for lightning raids on work sites where, under carting awards, he had the right not only to enter and converse with members during rest breaks, but also to inspect the books ‘at any reasonable time’. 36 Conlon assiduously policed awards, beginning his day as early as 4.30am and working on weekends to catch anyone contravening the stipulated hours. He routinely called on the Industrial Inspector to investigate suspicious matters and, if a breach of the award had occurred, both employer and unionist faced a fine. The TWU regularly instituted disciplinary proceedings, while the arbitration act allowed the union to impose fines and, if necessary, to sue for their recovery if outstanding. In almost four decades as secretary, Conlon contested no election for his position. According to union rules, he maintained the post ‘during the pleasure of the members’ 37 and, in their opinion, the secretary delivered the goods: the members’ interests were well served through Conlon’s unwavering belief that his job was ‘to keep members in work; strikes don’t pay’. 38	19
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union
Another of Rockhampton’s largest unions, and by far the most industrially active and organisationally complex, the AMIEU covered both retail and export meatworkers. The latter group – some 1,250 at the height of the kill season – were a captive body for recruitment at Central Queensland Meat Export Company’s Lakes Creek Meatworks. The AMIEU export section entered arbitration only very reluctantly, after having being forced into that arena by the combined meat companies in 1918. The union’s preferred bargaining strategies were negotiation and direct action, though it willingly accepted arbitration when more advantageous. The first Meat Export Award–State in 1918 gave preference to unionists, however this only reiterated what the union had obtained by agreement in 1911. In exchange for preference, the union undertook to supply all labour for the meatworks and, from 1919, secured a further agreement to supply labour directly from Trades Hall on a daily basis. Union-controlled pick-ups effectively constituted a ‘closed shop’ policy at ‘The Creek’. To have any chance of work, a prospective meatworker required a union ticket before employment to be selected ahead of outsiders looking for a day’s casual work. The union lost preference and supply rights for several years after the 16-week 1946 strike and management was able to select its own labour. In the face of competition from free labour – not enough to operate the plant, therefore union labour was still required – the AMIEU adopted harsh tactics to force ‘scabs’ out of the works. Official policy consisted of ostracism inside and outside the plant, but it was victimisation that proved most effective in eradicating non-union labour and forcing management to accept union-supplied labour again. Publicly denied but tacitly condoned by the union, these ‘persuasive’ techniques included bashings, ‘accidental’ locking in freezers, destruction of personal property and contamination of lunches with dilute acid and human waste. 39	20
The AMIEU exploited the close social context of the local community to promote a strong union culture among meatworkers. Many of them lived in the vicinity of the export shed and, as meatworking was often a generational occupation, complex family networks developed at Lakes Creek and the suburbs in North Rockhampton. The union traditionally raffled the working outfit of a deceased member to raise funds for his widow and, in 1910, introduced a funeral fund for export workers. During strikes, the AMIEU issued food vouchers to members with dependents. Each year, almost every family joined in the annual union picnic with up to 5,000 people crowding into several trains for the trip to the seaside, accompanied by the Lakes Creek Brass Band. Union participation in the works’ ambulance team and official representation on the Lakes Creek charity committee, school committee and progress association, also extended the union presence and awareness into the general community. 40	21
At the meatworks, the AMIEU operated a delegate system to rigorously monitor conditions and oversee awards. Each elected departmental delegate relayed instructions and complaints between workers and the staff foreman, alerted the union to any problems and gave a report at the monthly general meeting. Whenever negotiation between the AMIEU secretary and management failed to a resolve minor dispute, the union resorted to ‘irritation tactics’. These included a ‘go slow’, surreptitious stopping of the chain, or a lightning 24-hour strike at a critical stage of production, for example when the wagons were iced up for railing export meat to the wharves. For the sake of continued through-put, management usually conceded to union demands, but when they did not, as occurred on the matter of working mandatory overtime in 1948, the union proceeded directly to the Industrial Magistrate to arrange a compulsory conference. 41	22
The AMIEU took no strike action without a majority vote at an on-site ‘All Up’ or mass meeting. The union also encouraged members’ attendance at general monthly meetings but, while turnouts were high in the early decades, they dwindled in later years, and even a free keg of beer failed to attract more than 40 or 50 members to meetings. This latter-day apathy is probably attributable to the fact that, after the creation of a Works Board of Control in 1942, most decisions concerning the meatworks were made in that arena. General meetings became primarily vehicles for reading reports and disseminating information to members. There was little incentive – other than the keg – to travel the five miles or so from Lakes Creek into the city, at night, with no public transport. According to one former member, grass-roots interest in union affairs also declined as the AMIEU progressively won better wages and conditions for workers. On the other hand, women employed in the canning department received no encouragement whatsoever to attend meetings, and the few who did found their presence at what was considered ‘men’s business’ greeted with surprise and disdain. Nor did the union easily accept activism among the rank and file. It administered heavy fines for unofficial stoppages and resisted other behaviour that might challenge union authority. Even the belated formation of the internal Board of Control at the meatworks took four years of rank-and-file agitation to achieve because the AMIEU Central District Council feared the new body might threaten its power. The Board of Control, thereafter, was the main vehicle for rank-and-file input to the union on matters relation to the meatworks. 42	23
part from during the feverish Groupers- versus-’Communists’ years in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were few aspirants for Central District AMIEU office, other than the same well-entrenched officials. One District Secretary, Len Haigh, maintained his position with a large majority export and retail vote from 1925 until his death in 1953. There was a belief among some members that these officials ‘did a good job’ and warranted re-election without opposition, but others saw the outcome as something of a foregone conclusion, which the sobriquet of ‘Fiddle Frank’ for the long-time returning officer, Frank Robertson, indicates. Nevertheless, unionists turned out in strength for annual elections because that was part of the union culture fostered by strong social and neighbourhood ties in the export meatworker community. 43	24
Waterside Workers Federation
Unlike the AMIEU, the WWF could not rely on a closed shop or even preference for its source of membership. The federal award, first obtained in 1914, did not contain a preference clause but, after the union approached the Queensland court, the 1921 state award granted that privilege. Even so, preference could not be relied on for union membership. Stevedores could pass over members at the twice-daily pickup by citing another clause in the award, inserted at the employers’ insistence, which permitted the exclusion of anyone considered incompetent or who did not work to the satisfaction of the employer. Through this mechanism, virtually anyone could find employment on the wharves without a union ticket. The union, therefore, resorted to other methods to force free labourers into the union, or at least prevent them obtaining work. Some of the outsiders were meatworkers looking for a job after the close of the kill season. The WWF, therefore, reached an agreement with the AMIEU to insist that, in the spirit of unionism, its members should also take out a WWF ticket if they intended lining up at the wharf in the slack. Against other non-WWF ticket holders, the WWF exerted pressure on the shipping companies. On one occasion in 1924, at the peak of exports from the meatworks with around-the-clock boat loading, WWF members refused to work outside the hours of 8.00am - 5.00pm. This included travelling time by rail to the deep-water facilities at Port Alma, some 60 km away at the mouth of the river, so that, allowing for breaks, the employers had only a few hours work from the men each day. The action forced a compromise: stevedores selected at the morning pick-up and the union did so from its members at the afternoon pick-up. At other times, the union refused to work with nonunionists, particularly after 1932 when the federal court, into whose jurisdiction the union was unwillingly returned in 1928, removed preference from the award. In 1942, the Curtin Labor government gave the WWF the right to supply labour under the Stevedoring Industry Commission (SIC). Only with that absolute power could the union be assured of total recruitment among wharf labourers. 44	25
Like the AMIEU, the WWF exerted both positive and negative social pressure to attract membership and to inculcate a strong union culture on the wharves. It operated social and fishing clubs, had a cricket club in the local warehouse competition, and maintained a brass band. For wharfies’ families, the WWF conducted an annual picnic at the seaside and a children’s Christmas party. It also provided death and sickness benefits and, in addition to their extensive family and local community networks in the suburbs near the wharves, union members could rely on practical help from the WWF ladies’ auxiliary in times of domestic need. As a negative incentive, refusing to work with an outsider in a gang and even ‘accidental’ injuries proved effective recruitment measures. Wharfies also lived together for up to a week at a time at Port Alma. In that isolated and confined dormitory environment amid the sand-fly ridden mangroves and saltpans, a non-unionist would find the hostile atmosphere intolerable. 45	26
The WWF established a democratic union structure, encouraging and receiving strong rank-and-file support. Their relatively small numbers – 300 in the early decades but decreasing with the progressive decline in port trade from the 1920s – and close social ties in the industry helped foster an egalitarian outlook. At least 50 per cent turned up to regular meetings where primary decisions were made, and there was almost total support for annual elections. Like the AMIEU, WWF members returned the same officials year after year. One full-time secretary, E.B. ‘Pa’ Purnell, held office for 39 years until his retirement in 1938. Far from constituting an oligarchy, the secretary and executive committee coordinated rather than controlled union affairs, and acted more as a delegation to shipping companies and merchants on their members’ behalf. While the local union rules contained ‘Hints for Job Delegates’, in practice there was no formal shop floor organisation or election of delegates as with the AMIEU. The highest union official on a job (usually a committeeman) kept a watchful eye on proceedings, routine or otherwise. If a problem arose in the absence of an official, members chose an ad hoc delegate from their ranks. This system proved workable for a comparatively small and concentrated workforce operating in gangs with strong social links. Moreover, it reflected union egalitarianism and the belief that responsibility for vigilance rested with everybody in the interests of the union and fellow workers. Whenever a contentious issue arose, the officer or ad hoc delegate alerted the WWF secretary who, after investigation, contacted the relevant authority if necessary. In issues of health and safety, the secretary withdrew union labour in contravention of the award. With no effective preference under the state award and no preference at all to lose under the federal award until 1942, there was little incentive not to strike other than the fine incurred. 46	27
‘Railway’ Unions: Amalgamated Engineering Union and Australian Railways Union
The largest single employer in Rockhampton was Queensland Government Railways. While the administration professed the principle of unionism and expected new appointees to join a suitable industrial organisation within a month of commencement, there was no formal requirement for employees to possess a union ticket. As already pointed out, railway unions faced the dual problems of duplicate registrations for the one calling and the absence of preference. These restrictions, and the plethora of different trades, skills and tasks in the workshops (which alone contained some 1,250 men) and in other sections of the railway, meant that 25 or so unions co-existed at the one work site. The Mechanical Engineering Award–State, under which the administration sometimes placed metalworkers when its pay rates were lower than the Railway Award–State, gave a blanket preference to any of the five or so unions registered for ‘metal’ callings. As a result, there was persistent and sometimes intense competition for membership amongst railway unions. The main tradesmen’s union in the workshops was the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), first founded locally in 1888 and comprised of fitters and sheet-metal workers. The union relied on notions of trade elitism and craft ‘brotherhood’, both reflected in the initiation ritual, as well as peer pressure to convince new employees that joining the AEU was the appropriate step to take to cater for their distinctive workplace interests. The union also offered sickness and death benefit schemes while, in the local branch at least, members could obtain small loans if in great need. The AEU distributed a monthly journal aimed at fostering trade skills as much as promoting the union’s industrial goals. It organised periodic socials, and maintained a welfare committee to visit sick members in hospital and to welcome immigrant ‘brothers’ from the counterpart organisation in Britain. 47	28
In contrast to the exclusivity of the AEU, the ARU was an all-grade union that claimed to cater for everyone, from the lowest lad porter to the General Manager. In reality, it attracted mostly labourers excluded from other unions, and tradesmen and other skilled workers who possessed radical ideological or egalitarian outlooks. The ARU’s appeal was that it was a ‘no-frills, fighting union’ in which members’ dues went solely to support industrial campaigns. One of its chief targets was the Amalgamated Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE), as engine crews were the critical element in any strike action. Without their cooperation, strikes failed and the AFULE, to which most drivers belonged, had both a dislike for striking and a reputation for non-cooperation with other unions. The ARU also used persuasive rhetoric and personal canvassing to poach from other unions which, it claimed, did little to defend workers’ interests. 48 The AEU warned its members on one occasion to be alert to ARU attempts to ‘white-ant and steal … members’. It cautioned: ‘Every trick is being adopted, not for the advantage of the members but simply to swell the numbers of the ARU.’ 49 To win back members who had been ‘body-snatched’, trade-based and sectional unions rightly claimed that the ARU’s broad coverage rendered it useless for handling the greatest problem in the railway: demarcation disputes. 50 The AEU had a similar problem among metal workers, however. The constant bickering between the two unions, and lack of effective action by either of them against the coppersmiths in 1940, led the tinsmiths to form yet another union to cater for their exclusive interests. 51 According to the ARU, other unions spread ‘poisonous propaganda’ that ARU membership jeopardised promotion prospects because their union initiated most of the industrial strife in the railway. 52 In counterattacking, the AEU and others denounced the leftist-leaning leadership of the ARU as ‘commie-dominated’, even though communism never found a strong footing in Rockhampton. The only union immune from ARU predation was the Boilermakers Society, after a tussle over membership ended in an acrimonious court battle which the all-grade union lost at substantial financial cost. 53	29
Irrespective of ARU claims about complacency on the part of other unions, the AEU, like the ARU, operated a steward system on the shop floor. Stewards’ duties included monitoring conditions, watching for demarcation issues, collecting dues, distributing journals and encouraging participation in union activities. The ARU had a full-time secretary-organiser located in an office opposite the railway yards. He regularly patrolled the grounds, defending union interests, and extending membership and territory at every possible opportunity. General meetings held at night in the Trades Hall resulted in an apathetic attendance for both unions, despite encouragement by officials for rank-and-file involvement. Both unions overcame this lack of grass-roots participation by conducting on-site meetings under the water tank. In matters of shared interest, the combined unions often held mass meetings on the nearby gasworks flats. Workers in private industry generally regarded conditions in the railway as being far better than their’s ‘outside’, largely because the AEU and ARU took active steps to approach the General Manager on any contentious issue. Often, they temporarily buried their rivalry and did so in concert for added strength. 54	30
Arbitration and Organising Strategy in Rockhampton
From these cameos of past union organising in Rockhampton, it is clear that the strategies adopted varied from one union to another. In terms of Bramble’s characteristics and methods employed to recruit members, the most overtly arbitrationist in its organising strategy was the AWU. It amassed its membership through preference granted by the court and, at times, attempted to expand into the rightful territory of other unions by dubious interpretation of preference clauses. The union neither encouraged nor created opportunities for rank-and-file participation in union affairs. However, on the shop floor, touring organisers ensured union interests were protected by the arbitration system, especially through union rights to enter work sites and, in some cases, to inspect time and wage books. Eschewing direct action, the AWU routinely summoned the Industrial Inspector and pursued problematic matters through the Industrial Magistrate when necessary. The TWU similarly demonstrated arbitrationist strategies for recruitment by relying on preference clauses to ensure the coverage of all drivers and by competing for additional members through new awards. It also exploited union rights under the award for the secretary to enter and inspect time and wage books. This allowed effective policing of the workplace with the aid of the Industrial Inspector. With a firm policy of abiding by arbitration, there was little perceived need to involve members in union affairs beyond paying their dues and complying with the award.	31
At the other end of the spectrum were the railway unions, which lacked both preference and claims to membership under the arbitration system. Of necessity, those unions adopted mobilisational strategies to build their memberships. They employed a variety of positive and negative incentives to recruit workers into the union and away from rivals. Railway unions also took responsibility for monitoring workshop conditions and taking up issues directly with the administration. The WWF similarly adopted a mobilisational method of organising due to the lack of an effective preference clause and, under the federal system, no preference at all, until given the right to supply labour by the SIC in 1942. Industrial and social pressure, and some cooperation from the AMIEU, assisted the WWF to recruit on the wharves, and a strong sense of community among wharfies encouraged high rates of rank-and-file involvement at union meetings and in the workplace. The AMIEU, in contrast, employed elements of both organising strategies according to need. While possessing maximum opportunity for recruitment through preference and supply rights under the award, the union reinforced these with social pressure to mobilise meatworkers. It used the latter approach to great effect when the court withdrew preference privileges in the mid-1940s. On the shop floor, the AMIEU strategy was essentially mobilisational in assuming responsibility for overseeing the terms and conditions of awards with an active and vigilant delegate system. Only when the preferred bargaining means of negotiation and petty direct action failed did the AMIEU call for intercession by the Industrial Magistrate. Rank and file participation in union affairs is more problematic to assess. The union encouraged attendance at general meetings – for male members at least – but, apart from mass meetings, this did not equate with internal union democracy. The Board of Control and the delegate system provided an avenue for rank-and-file participation in matters relating to the meatworks, but the higher levels of the union, the District AMIEU, remained largely the province of an authoritarian leadership.	32
On this evidence from Rockhampton, claims that unions in the past relied upon arbitration for membership lack a consistent foundation. Some unions clearly did, but others did not. Nor, as Howard implies, did arbitration do away with the need for unions to provide an efficient service to win and retain members. The railway unions, the WWF, and even the AMIEU offered a range of inducements to memberships: material and social, positive and negative. They also provided a strong and watchful union presence in the workplace and acted on their own initiative as and when needed. These unions, which covered a significant proportion of Rockhampton’s workers, cannot be said to have been dependent upon arbitration for their organising strategy. The arbitration system itself may have been bureaucratic, but these unions were far from ‘cogs’ in that machine. Further refuting Howard’s accusations of dependency, the AWU and TWU may have gained their membership through preference clauses, but even they cannot be dismissed as ‘cogs’ because they actively used the system for their own benefit. They were not, as Holland claimed, simply ‘private policemen’ for the State. The AWU and TWU exploited union rights and powers to ensure compliance with awards by employers, other unions and individuals. This was not in the interests of the State, but in the interests of the union and its members. Labor introduced the arbitration system into Queensland to advance the cause of workers and, together with other terms extended to unions, such as rights of entry and inspection, it empowered them to that end. This authority overcame four problems commonly associated with the particular sites and dispersed membership covered by the AWU and TWU.	33
Firstly, many were small firms where employees might otherwise accept unfavourable terms and conditions through misplaced loyalty, ignorance, intimidation, or outright bullying. The minutes of the early carters’ union indicate this was sometimes the case before state awards, as does the hankering of the employers’ association to return to a wages board system where unions had no formal standing or power. With only a few members at each site, the task of monitoring the workplace fell to the secretary and organiser and, through them, to the Industrial Inspector. Secondly, a low ratio of employees to management decreased union awareness among workers in these places. The regular appearance of the union secretary or organiser served as a constant reminder to both workers and employers of the union’s role, strength and pervasive nature. The sight of Inspector Poole and union officials cycling in tandem around Rockhampton ‘on the prowl’ was not uncommon both inside and outside normal working hours. 55 Thirdly, and related to the last point, at those sites workers did not develop the same union consciousness or mentality as employees at the meatworks, railway and wharves, where the economic activities had potential for effective direct action to force concessions from employers. Lastly, workers whom the AWU covered on public construction sites and with the municipal council were often employed as day labour and shifted from site to site on a regular basis. This situation did not encourage the development of strong and stable shop-floor activism, and necessitated the regular supervision by union organisers to ensure award conditions were met. Arbitration addressed those problems and, under the system set up by Labor, altered the balance of power unashamedly in favour of unions.	34
This study of organising strategies employed by Rockhampton unions, not only to recruit membership but also to encourage participation and create a strong union awareness and presence in the workplace to protect workers’ interests, illuminates the diversity of methods used throughout Australia and the particular features of organising fostered by the Queensland arbitration system to the 1950s. It dispels the idea that unions unvaryingly relied on arbitration for their membership and grew complacent with that surety. It also refutes the earlier assertions of Howard and others about union dependency on arbitration. Those unions that did use arbitrationist strategies found the privileges extended to them under that system facilitated organising for a dispersed membership and empowered them in what would otherwise have been an industrially weak position. With the Queensland court’s demonstrable partiality to unions supporting arbitration, those like the AWU and TWU enjoyed more than ‘a symbiotic relationship’ with the arbitration system as Bramble claims. In Rockhampton, they also possessed what one former ARU official alleges was a decidedly ‘cosy relationship’ with it. 56 Other unions, like the ARU, were denied that intimacy by either choice or circumstance and looked to their own initiative.	35
Endnotes 1. S. Deery, D. Plowman, J. Walsh and M. Brown, Industrial Relations: a Contemporary Analysis, Irwin/ McGraw Hill, Roseville, 2001, p. 217. 2. M. Hearn, ‘The Australian Labour Movement and Industrial Relations, 1986-1996’, in M. Costa and M. Hearn (eds), Reforming Australia’s Unions: Insights from Southland Magazine, Lloyd Ross Forum/ Federation Press, Leichhardt, 1997, pp. 4-5. 3. Unions 2001: A Blueprint for Trade Union Activism, Evatt Foundation, Sydney, 1995, p. xiii. 4. B. Ellem, ‘Organising Strategies for the 1990s: Targeting Particular Groups: Women, Migrants, Youth’, in M. Crosby and M. Easson (eds), What Should Unions Do? Pluto Press/Lloyd Ross Forum, Leichhardt, 1992, p. 359. 5. See, for example: S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds), Foundations of Arbitration: the Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration 1890-1914, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989; D. Murphy (ed.), The Big Strikes Queensland 1889-1965, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1983. 6. D. Murphy, ‘Introduction’, in A. Dawson and D. Murphy, Points and Politics: a History of the Electrical Trades Union of Queensland, Colonial Press, Brisbane, 1977, p. 9. 7. H.E. Holland, 1908, quoted in G. Griffin and V. Scarcebrook, ‘The Dependency Theory of Trade Unionism and the Role of the Industrial Registrar’, Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol. 16, no. 1, March 1990, p. 22. 8. W.A. Howard, ‘Australian Trade Unions in the Context of Union Theory’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 19, no. 3, 1977, p. 255. 9. Griffin and Scarcebrook, ‘The Dependency Theory’, p. 29; P. Sheldon, ‘Arbitration and Union Growth: Building and Construction Unions in NSW, 1901-1912’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 35, no. 3, 1993, p. 395; P. Sheldon, ‘The Missing Nexus? Union Recovery, Growth and Behaviour during the First Decades of Arbitration: Towards a Re-evaluation’, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 26, no. 104, 1995, p. 437; P. Sheldon, ‘Compulsory Arbitration and Union Recovery: Maritime Related Unions, 1901-1912’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 40, no. 3, 1998, p. 422; P. Gahan, ‘Did Arbitration Make for Dependent Unionism? Evidence from Historical Case Studies’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, no. 4, December 1996, p. 692. 10. W.A. Howard, ‘Trade Unions and the Arbitration System’, in B. Head (ed.), State and Economy in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 240, 243, 244, 249. 11. Sheldon, ‘The Missing Nexus?’, p. 418. 12. T. Bramble, ‘Australian Union Strategies since 1945’, Labour and Industry, vol. 11, no. 3, April 2001, pp. 10, 13. Bramble’s other strategies are ‘corporatist’, typical of 1983-93, and ‘activist’, since 1995. 13. Industrial Peace Act of 1912, Queensland Statutes, 1913, vol. 7, p. 5467; R.J. Howartson, They’ll Always Be Back: a Chronicle of Events Relating to Industrial Relations Tribunals in Queensland to 1960, Industrial Court and Industrial Relations Commission, Brisbane, 1998, pp. 53, 77, 102; Daily Record, 12 February 1912; Employers’ Association of Central Queensland, Tenth Annual Report, Rockhampton, 1926, p. 3. 14. J. Larcombe, Notes on the Political History of the Labour Movement in Queensland, The Worker, Brisbane, 1934, p. 49. 15. Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, Queensland Statutes, 1916, vol. 9, p. 7538; E.G. Theodore, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1915-1916, vol. 120, p. 577; Morning Bulletin (MB), 23 April 1915; D. Murphy, ‘Labour Relations–Issues’, in D. Murphy, R. Joyce and C. Hughes (eds), Labor in Power: the Labor Party and Governments in Queensland, 1915-57, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1980, pp. 248-249; Howartson, They’ll Always Be Back, pp. 172-173. 16. Federated Carters and Drivers’ Industrial Union (FCDIU) Rockhampton Sub-branch Minutes, 8 November 1915. Central Queensland University, Capricornia Central Queensland Collection (CCQC) P/16 1952 3. 17. G. Lawson, State Secretary, to F. Conlon, Rockhampton Sub-branch Secretary, FCDIU, 22 January 1924, loose insert, Minutes, 1921-1925, CCQC P16/1952 3; Queensland Industrial Gazette (QIG), 1937, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 248. 18. Howartson, They’ll Always Be Back, p. 286. 19. R. Fitzgerald and H. Thornton, Labor in Queensland: From the 1880s to 1988, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1989, p. 38. 20. O. Foenander Trade Unionism in Australia: Some Aspects, Law Book Co. of Australia, Sydney, 1962, pp. 44-45; Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904, s. 59, Acts of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1904, pp. 15-41. 21. Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, s.26 (3), Queensland Statutes (QS), 1916, vol. 9, p. 7564. 22" href="#ref22">22. Railway Award–State, Judgment, Queensland Government Gazette (QGG), 1927, vol. 129, no. 116, p. 1589. 23. Howartson. They’ll Always Be Back, p. 173. 24. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1916-1917, vol. 123, p. 513; Howartson, pp. 153-54. 25. Ibid., pp. 177, 307, 316 and 318; Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1932, s. 8(2), QS, 1932-1933, vol. 17, p. 422. 26. D. Murphy, ‘Trade Unions’, in Murphy (ed.), The Big Strikes, p. 39. 27. Railway Award–State, Judgment, QGG, 1927, vol. 129, no. 116, p. 1591. 28. Fitzgerald and Thornton, Labor in Queensland, pp. 8, 9 and 38; J. Guyatt, ‘The Affiliation of Unions’, in Murphy, Joyce and Hughes, Labor in Power, p. 466; B. Bowden, Driving Force: the History of the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia 1883-1992, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1993, p. 62. 29. See also B. Webster, Fighting in the Grand Cause: a History of the Trade Union Movement in Rockhampton, 1907-1957, PhD Thesis, Central Queensland University, Rockhampton, 1999. 30. For example, Local Authorities and Main Roads Award–State, QGG, 1937, vol. 149, no. 1, p. 3; Australian Workers’ Union (AWU), District Membership Rolls, 1916-1957. AWU Bundaberg. 31. Evan Schwarten, former Trustee, Rockhampton Trades Hall Board, interviewed by Author, 10 May 1996; Local Authorities and Main Roads Award–State, QGG, 1937, vol. 149, no. 1, p. 4; AWU Branch and District Secretaries’ Reports, 1940, p. 31 and 1947, p. 97. AWU Brisbane. 32. Bowden, Driving Force, p. 31; Local Authorities and Main Roads Award–State, QGG, 1937, vol. 149, no. 1, p. 4; Local Authorities and Main Roads Award–State, Judgment, QIG, 1927, vol. 12, no. 8, p. 531; Transport Workers’ Union (TWU) Rockhampton Sub-branch Minutes, 9 October 1939, 14 October and 11 November 1940. CCQC P16/1954 1. 33. E. Schwarten interview; Edgar Williams, former AWU State Secretary, interviewed by Author, 7 July 1995. 34. Carters’ Award, Commonwealth Arbitration Reports (CAR), 1919, vol. 13, p. 879; FCDIU Rockhampton Sub-branch Minutes, 19 September and 6 October 1919. CCQC P16/1952 4; Carters’ Award–Southern and Central, Judgment, QGG, 1921, vol. 116, no. 81, p. 769; FCDIU Rockhampton Sub-branch Minutes, 13 February 1928. CCQC P16/1952 7; Amalgamated Road Transport Workers’ Union, Rockhampton Sub-branch Minutes, 9 July 1928. CCQC P16/1952 7. 35. Engine Drivers, Firemen, &c., Board Award, Central Division, QIG, 1917, vol. 2, no. 6, p. 356-361; Motor Drivers, &c Award–Southern and Central, QIG, 1926, vol. 11, no. 11, pp. 935-937; Motor Drivers, &c Award–Southern and Central, QIG, 1928, vol. 13, no. 4, p. 220; TWU Minutes, 19 April 1939, p. 261. CCQC P16/1952 2. 36. See for example, Carting Trade Award-Southern and Central Divisions, QGG, vol. 146, no. 96, p. 1362, s. 23(2). 37. TWU Minutes, 14 November 1949. CCQC P16/1954 2. 38. MB, 9 March 1954. 39. Meat Export Award–State, QGG, 1918, vol. 110, no. 104, pp. 142-143; AMIEU Central District Minutes, 7 January 1919. CCQC J19/940 4; Colin Maxwell, former AMIEU Central District Secretary, interviewed by Author, 20 June 1996; AMIEU Central District Committee Minutes, 27 October 1927 and 15 March 1928. CCQC J19/940 7; MB, 6 June 1947; C. Maxwell interview; Mark Hinchliff, former General Manager, interviewed by Author, 23 November 1995. 40. Australasian Federated Butchers’ Employees’ Union Minutes, 3 May 1911. CCQC J19/940 1; Webster, Fighting in the Grand Cause, ch. 9. 41. C. Maxwell interview; Meat Export Award - State, Judgment, QIG, vol. 33, no. 4, December 1948, pp. 2064-65; Hinchliff interview. 42. C. Maxwell interview; Ewart Maxwell, former AMIEU member, interviewed by Author, 20 November 1995; Allan Reynolds, former AMIEU member, interviewed by Author, 6 June 1996; Bonnie Schwarten, former AMIEU member, interviewed by Author, 16 May 1996; AMIEU Minutes, 5 June 1939 and AMIEU CDC Minutes, 2 April 1942. CCQC J19/941 2-3. Most other export sheds had a Board of Control from before the 1920s. 43. Joe Underdown, former AMIEU District Organiser, interviewed by Author, 7 June1996; Les Hagstrom, former AMIEU member, interviewed by Author, 6 June 1996; C. Maxwell interview; E. Maxwell interview. 44. Waterside Workers’ Award, CAR, 1914, vol. 8, p. 53; Waterside Workers’ Award–State, Judgment and Award, QGG, 1921, vol. 116, no. 268, p. 1799; WWF Minutes, 25 February 1948. Noel Butlin Archive Centre (NBAC) Z387/33/2; MB, 18 December 1957, 30 October and 4 November 1924; Waterside Workers’ Award, CAR, 1932, vol. 31, p. 23. 45. Webster, Fighting in the Grand Cause, ch. 9; Harry Boyd jnr, former WWF Committee member, interviewed by Author, 6 January 1999; Norm Draper, former WWF member, interviewed by Author, 17 December 1998. 46. WWF Minutes, 28 July 1937. NBAC Z387/33/1; Les Yewdale, former WWF Branch Secretary, interviewed by Author 29 June 1995; WWF Minutes, 5 January 1939 and 17 December 1952. NBAC Z387/33/1-2; Rules of the Waterside Workers; Federation of Australia, Rockhampton Branch, Oxford Press, Rockhampton, 1935, pp. 26, 35 and 35; Boyd interview. 47. Report of the State Secretary to Thirteenth Conference of the Australian Railways Union held in Rockhampton on 31 October 1934, p. 1. John Oxley Library, Brisbane; Bob Cole, former AEU/ ARU/Sheetmetal Workers’ Union member, interviewed by Author, 28 April 1995; Mechanical Engineering Award–State, QGG, 1926, vol. 126, no. 156, p. 1735; Jack Treacy, former AEU Rockhampton No. 1 Branch Secretary, interviewed by Author, 29 June 1995; Austin Vaughan, former AEU State Secretary, interviewed by Author, 22 November 1995. There were two AEU branches in Rockhampton from 1944: No. 1 branch (for railway employees) and No. 2 branch (for ‘outside’ metal workers). 48. Frank Campbell, former ARU District Secretary, interviewed by Author 1 July 1995. 49. Amalgamated Engineering Union Monthly Journal, Dec 1925, p. 18. 50. Treacy interview. 51. Cole interview. 52. Central District Report, ARU State Council Minutes, 15 September 1926 and 29 July 1927. Rail, Tram and Bus Union Archives, Brisbane. 53. J. Egerton, former Boilermakers’ Society State Secretary, interviewed by Author, 21 June 1995. 54. Treacy interview; Campbell interview. 55. E. Schwarten interview; Cole interview. 56. Campbell interview.

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