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Philippe Roger | Global Anti-Americanism and the Lessons of the "French Exception" | The Journal of American History, 93.2 | The History Cooperative
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September, 2006
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Global Anti-Americanism and the Lessons of the "French Exception"


Philippe Roger



It would be hard not to agree with Rob Kroes's strong, emotional depiction of the growing European hostility toward American policies in the wake of the Iraq crisis. All polls confirm what seems obvious: America's image abroad has been rapidly deteriorating in direct connection with a policy seen as (check one or more): ill motivated, politically naïve, hazardous for the region and the rest of the world, not to speak of illegitimate in the eyes of international law. Does that mean that Europeans, at least "old Europeans," are now unified under the banner of anti-Americanism? The answer would have to be a qualified one. 1
      Empirical data drawn from numerous opinion polls taken in the past five years show a general surge in negative opinions and feelings. But when read more carefully, the data also show interesting discrepancies or exceptions. It is worth noting, for instance, that in the polls taken by the U.S. State Department in the fall of 2002 (which showed strong evidence of the surge of adversarial views in Germany and Great Britain), France, which was in the forefront of political opposition to the Bush administration, showed no sign of aggravated anti-Americanism, with negative opinions staying at the same level as before the diplomatic crisis (a 1 percent variation, irrelevant in such polls).1 I recall this episode to suggest that although the international crisis over Iraq did damage public views of the United States in (almost) all countries (Russia was a remarkable exception) and seemed to cast Europe in a single mold, it would be premature and probably unwise to speculate about the long term. The high negative ratings of 2002 have fluctuated, sometimes dramatically, in countries such as Great Britain or even Italy, as a consequence of the countries' stages and forms of involvement in the war and the no less fluctuating ratings of their respective leaders. Opinion polls taken at times of crisis and phrased in the most simplified terms (approve/disapprove, good image/bad image) are hasty pictures of a fast-moving situation. Are those high negative ratings here in Europe to stay, or will they deflate like so many speculative bubbles? Will the negative image of America linger on, say, in Germany or Italy or even Spain (which has become a serious contender for first place in its hostility toward the United States, above the all-time leader: France) if and after the American presidency changes hands? The reelection of George W. Bush has deprived us of a quick answer. 2
      Even more interesting, in my view, is the French and, to a lesser extent, European perception of a widening gap between America and Europe in values. A poll taken in France in 2004 (ironically, in connection with a symposium on "shared values" held at the French National Assembly during the commemoration of D day) confirmed what we had learned in 2000, before the Iraq crisis, from a State Department survey: The French regarded themselves as not sharing Americans' ideas about family (58 percent), ethics (69 percent), work (76 percent) and, of course, life-style (81 percent), with democracy faring a little better at 49 percent and religion becoming a major topic of contention (in a 2002 survey, 65 percent of the French regarded the Americans as "too religious"). Looking back at pre–Iraq war polls is a good safeguard against falling prey to historical amnesia; in France the war only added collateral damage to a preexisting bleak picture of America.2 . . .

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