| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 93.1

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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 93.1 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration. By Gunnar Skogmar. (New York: Palgrave, 2004. xii, 331 pp. $65.00, ISBN 1-4039-3899-7.)

The Scandinavian scholar Gunnar Skogmar argues in this book that "a dominant consideration in the American support of European integration was the wish to prevent, retard or minimize nationally controlled nuclear weapons in Germany and France, and developments towards a European 'Third Force' outside nato" (p. 3). While not ignoring the political and economic forces for European integration, the author concentrates on the much-overlooked nuclear dimension of European integration. He convincingly shows in his very detailed and carefully argued study that "integration of the nuclear sector was a part of and a stage in the process towards European political and economic integration" (ibid.). In fact, Skogmar is convinced that between 1953 and 1957—the main period he focuses on—America's European policy was dominated by two major goals: integration for political, economic, and general military reasons and atomic nonproliferation to ensure that within the western camp, with the exception of Britain, only the United States was able to have a finger on the nuclear trigger. In particular, policy makers sought to ensure that Germany did not possess or control nuclear weapons. German nuclear capacity, Washington thought, might well be dangerous in its own right and would certainly upset the western allies and possibly scare the Soviet Union into unpredictable acts.

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