| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 90.2

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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 90.2 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939: Imperial Crossroads. By Greg Kennedy. (London: Cass, 2002. xiv, 313 pp. $57.50, ISBN 0-7146-5188-5.)

Based on impressive documentary research, Greg Kennedy's detailed study of strategic policy making argues persuasively that "the basis of the 'special relationship' of the Grand Alliance had been formed in the Far East by the events between 1933 and 1939" (p. 267). Already established as an expert on British naval planning, Kennedy here clearly demonstrates how strategic policy emanated from slowly developed subcabinet-level relationships of trust among naval officers, diplomatic representatives, and other government officials on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, whose work then informed policy formulation at the top levels of government. While not ignoring the importance of common cultural values, he emphasizes that the trust rested firmly on unsentimental balance-of-power appraisals on both sides, centering ultimately on the perceived common interest: containing aggressive moves by the Japanese that might threaten the two powers' respective positions in East Asia, and most especially in China. Finally, beginning with the American recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, he devotes much space to a fresh look at how the appraisal of Soviet capabilities and intentions fit into the balance-of-power considerations of both American and British planners.

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