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Book Review | The Journal of American History, 86.2 | The History Cooperative
86.2  
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September, 1999
 
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Book Review



Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War. By Campbell Craig. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. xviii, 216 pp. Cloth, $47.50, isbn 0-231-11122-3. Paper, $19.50, isbn 0-231-11123-1.)

Between the theory and practice of nuclear war lies a dark and dangerous ground. Only one person has ever crossed it, and when Harry S. Truman did so, in 1945, the theory scarcely merited the name. Things changed with the introduction of fusion bombs and long-range missiles, which required the custodians of these terrible tools to think very hard about the conditions under which they might be used. 1
     Dwight D. Eisenhower did so, as Campbell Craig makes clear. Craig explains how Eisenhower wrestled with the conundrum central to the era of thermonuclear weapons: how to use weapons so powerful they are unusable in any traditional sense. The former general had won the presidency on the strength of his war practice, not his war theory, but in office he was obliged to bone up on the theory. Dissatisfied with the state of the art, Eisenhower broke new ground. . . .


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