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Through the Back Door: Evading the Chinese Exclusion Act along the Niagara Frontier, 1900 to 1924

WILLIAM H. SIENER


      IN 1914 JOHN CLARK, the U.S. immigration commissioner in Montreal, dubbed Canada and the St. Lawrence River valley "the back door route" for immigrants to the United States. Others had argued previously that stronger steps should be taken to guard the back door. In 1891 O. L. Spaulding, acting secretary of the Treasury, complained that "an increasing number of aliens are now landing at Canadian ports and then entering the United States by Rail, thus practically avoiding all effective scrutiny." U.S. officials repeatedly accused Canadian steamship and railroad companies and even Canadian Customs authorities of conspiring to evade American immigration laws to bring undesirable immigrants to the United States by way of the St. Lawrence and inland ports of entry. The U.S. government was also concerned that Canadian routes might be used to avoid American quarantines against infectious diseases.1 1
      Clark's concern is indicative of both the importance of the transnational regional economy of the Buffalo-Niagara region and of the rise of a racialized, anti-immigrant ideology in the United States. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as now, a binational social and commercial community existed along the Niagara Frontier. It was, and is, a prime border crossing, closely linked to the U.S. and Canadian industrial heartlands. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Buffalo was a major population, transportation, and industrial center, driven by the massive Lackawanna Steel plant and related manufacturing operations in the foundry, machine parts, automobile, aircraft, and electrochemical industries. Railroads touted the route through Buffalo and southern Ontario as the shortest route between the United States' East Coast and midwestern cities like Chicago and Detroit. Flour milling and meatpacking contributed significantly to the economy. Five hundred freight trains departed daily.2 It was the third most important destination for Canadians migrating to the United States. Buffalo's iron and steel plants and its agricultural implement and vehicle manufacturers attracted significant numbers of professionals, management, and semiskilled workers in addition to laborers from nearby Canadian cities like Toronto and Hamilton and from the more distant Montreal.3 In 1900, 16.5 percent of Buffalo's foreign-born population was Canadian. Only the German- and Polish-born populations were greater. Of the 17,242 Canadian-born Buffalonians, almost 96 percent were Anglo-Canadians.4 2
      Ordinary travel between the United States and Canada involved large numbers of workers going back and forth between homes in Buffalo and jobs in Canada. Structural steel workers, railroad laborers, and cannery workers crossed the border for jobs in Bridgeburg, Ontario; Shipyard, Ontario, two miles downstream; and other small towns on the Niagara Peninsula. As many as two hundred workers at a time took shuttle trains from Buffalo to Bridgeburg each day. The official charged with monitoring Chinese immigrants, Chinese Inspector Harry Landis, reported that 2,700 cannery workers made eight thousand trips across the border each year. A newly opened blast furnace in Port Colborne was expected to further increase the volume of cross-border commuting, as was the expansion of the Welland Canal. In addition to passenger traffic, railroad freight traffic was enormous. Over twenty thousand freight cars from the western United States, and still more originating in Canada, crossed the border at Niagara Falls in 1912.5 3
      Added to regular business travel was a huge volume of seasonal recreational travel by train and boat across the border. Traffic from Buffalo visited numerous Ontario destinations. The Crystal Beach steamer, carrying 3,500 people each trip, made multiple daily crossings. In addition there were hourly trips to Erie Beach by boats with a capacity of 1,500; semiweekly excursions to Port Colborne, Dunnville, Port Dover, and Port Maitland; and trips to Fort Erie, Ontario, by two ferries with a capacity of 750 passengers and fifteen to twenty vehicles every twenty minutes. Twenty-seven daily trains carrying nearly 2,500 passengers also crossed the border, as well as special trains carrying passengers to the Fort Erie Racetrack; Queen Victoria Park in Niagara Falls, Ontario; and various other Canadian destinations.6 4
      Geographer Randy William Widdis and historian Bruno Ramirez have documented what Widdis refers to as a "raging flood" of immigrants from rural Canada to the urban United States. British migrants entering the United States via Canada and Anglo-Canadians often commanded higher-status jobs than their French Canadian counterparts. British re-migrants included a significant proportion of professionals, management employees, and semiskilled workers in addition to laborers. Anglo-Canadian workers earned higher average weekly wages than native-born American workers. Both groups, especially English-speaking Canadians, according to Ramirez, were rapidly absorbed and became virtually invisible among the American population.7 Economic requirements, as well as cross-border cultural and kinship ties created by short-distance moves in the Great Lakes region, created a borderlands region. As opposed to borders, "lines symbolizing differentiation," borderlands are "zones of mediation" where "various economic, social, and family networks ... serve to integrate communities on both sides of the boundary."8 5
      One of the principal obstacles to this economic and social integration was the rise of a restrictive ideology in the United States based on race. A growing body of scholarship argues convincingly that with the passage of the first Chinese Exclusion Act in May 1882, the United States began a transformation, in Erika Lee's words, from "a nation of immigrants that welcomed foreigners without restrictions, borders, or gates" to "a gatekeeping nation." The act, renewed and amended in 1892, 1902, and 1904, ushered in immigration restrictions based on race and nationality, a policy that shaped the American national makeup and identity. Race, borders, and immigration policy were all intertwined at the beginning of the twentieth century, Lee contends. Only by examining Chinese immigration and exclusion from the perspective of the borders can the racialization of U.S. immigration policy be fully understood, she argues. Mae Ngai develops the argument further. She demonstrates that, while Mexicans were originally considered "white" under United States law, their identity was increasingly racialized, so that by 1930 the Census Bureau enumerated them as a separate racial group. The same sort of racialization occurred less on the northern border, according to Bruno Ramirez, although both he and David R. Smith point out that French Canadians in New England suffered similarly to Mexicans. They were accused of working for substandard wages and threatening American jobs and living standards. Massachusetts commissioner of labor statistics Carroll D. Wright even dubbed the French as "the Chinese of the Eastern States."9 6
      Growing fears of racial and ethnic groups perceived as different and unassimilable, and of the destructive diseases, political ideas, and moral standards they might bring, transformed the United States. By 1890, Roger Daniels writes, immigrants "dominating the core of American cities" was a concern for Americans of virtually every political stripe, and anti-immigration sentiment was ubiquitous. The era was "a time in which things grew a little worse, a time when nativism and racism gained strength and acceptance at all levels of society."10 7
      Political and economic changes in China as well as job opportunities in the eastern and midwestern United States motivated many Chinese to take the enormous risk of attempting a dangerous entry into a country many thousands of miles from home, where, because of their race, they were not welcome.11 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibited any Chinese laborer from coming to the United States for a period of ten years and forbade any court in the United States from admitting Chinese to citizenship. The few exceptions were protected by the Angell Treaty of 1880. The act slowed legal immigration to a trickle.12 However, along the Canadian-American border on the Niagara Frontier, repeated attempts to close the back door failed for a variety of reasons. While the door was periodically closed, it was consistently left unlocked. 8
      Preventing the entry of "undesirable" immigrants in an area with a thriving bi-national regional economy posed a dilemma for United States immigration officers. The 1891 immigration law and subsequent modifications charged inspectors with enforcing regulations along the borders of Canada, Mexico, and British Columbia "so as not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay, impede, or annoy passengers in ordinary travel between said countries."13 In other words, agents were expected to keep the border simultaneously closed yet open. 9
      The task was virtually impossible. For example, in the summer, passengers on Toronto to Lewiston, New York, boats sometimes disembarked at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, then attempted illegal entry into the United States. With nearly 54,500 passengers traveling on the steamers in May and June 1914, the possibility of either bringing commerce to a standstill or allowing illegal immigrants into the country was significant. During the 1915 season, almost 271,000 passengers took the boats. Fears at the beginning of World War I that illegal immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and draft evaders would use the same routes encouraged efforts to close the border, which immediately brought cries of hardship from businesspeople on both sides. Railroad executives protested that immigration inspectors awoke passengers, and amusement park operators complained of inconveniences for their Buffalo patrons and threats to their profits. The mayor of Toronto complained that members of his city's baseball team were detained at the border, delaying the opening of the 1918 International League season.14 10
      Canadian authorities bristled at an American proposal to station American customs officers in Canada to inspect immigrants arriving in Canada bound for the United States. Canadian railroads and steamship lines urged adoption of the policy as better than alternative American plans to inspect all trains at the border or to restrict immigrant passenger traffic to four or five points along the border. Either alternative would disrupt normal business too much and lead to "a very great deal of friction and irritation" between the United States and Canada. Nevertheless, the Canadian government rejected the proposal as a threat to Canadian sovereignty and declined responsibility for enforcing any foreign laws. In 1894 the United States government entered into an agreement, known as the Canadian Agreement, with Canadian transportation companies that allowed American immigration inspectors to enforce U.S. immigration laws on arriving steamships and at designated border points.15 11
      The Canadian Agreement, as David R. Smith has argued, recognized that, while the Canadian-American political border regulated the flow of goods between the two nations, it was permeable to the flow of labor. By moving U.S. immigration enforcement away from the border, the agreement both facilitated the flow of "racially desirable" European labor to the United States and assisted Canadian authorities in their desire to exclude southern and eastern European immigrants from Canada. 12
      In 1885 the Canadian government passed its first federal law against Chinese immigration. Unlike the American law, Canada's Chinese Immigration Act imposed a head tax of fifty dollars to restrict immigration and limited the number of Chinese that could be carried by vessels coming to Canada. The somewhat less restrictive Canadian legislation encouraged Chinese immigrants first to enter Canada, then cross into the United States across the vast, often unpatrolled border between the two nations.16 13
      Recent scholarship has examined many of the implications of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Studies have presented insights about American politics and its passage, its impact on the formation of Chinese communities in the U.S., and various tactics used to circumvent the law. Scholars have shown that legal action against the law pioneered civil rights activity and revealed the extent to which racism pervaded American attitudes at the beginning of the twentieth century.17 This essay is a case study of how international groups of traffickers sought to thwart the Chinese exclusion laws on the Niagara Frontier. Historian Erika Lee has pointed out that trafficking in Chinese immigrants was especially well-organized and profitable at Buffalo.18 This article will demonstrate that the organization developed along the Niagara Frontier border to facilitate evasion of the Chinese Exclusion Acts comprised the sort of economic, social, and family networks discussed by Widdis and Smith. The networks included members of Buffalo's waterfront underclass, low-level government officials, and railroad workers. They also included elected officials on both sides of the border, members of the legal community, and those in the judiciary who either participated in or tacitly condoned the evasion. The essay shows how enforcement machinery and methods evolved on the border to combat evasion. It also shows that racism, as Lee has pointed out, dehumanized Chinese immigrants and encouraged their treatment as commodities.19 It argues, however, that racism was not sufficient to explain fully western New Yorkers' response to the exclusion laws. Opportunities for financial gain, job competition, and the fact that many immigrants were transients in the region played roles in explaining why enforcing the border was an elusive goal. 14
   

ENFORCEMENT

 
      Activating the Chinese exclusion laws required the creation of enforcement procedures and mechanisms. Those that were adopted negatively impacted both people attempting to enter the country legally and those who were excluded by law. As enforcement of the exclusion laws evolved, would-be travelers were subjected to extensive interrogations and paperwork to ensure their right of reentry to the United States. The process of interrogation was repeated on their return from China. The travelers themselves bore the burden of proving that they were who they claimed to be, and they were assumed by authorities to be attempting to evade the law. The process often involved incarceration at the limited number of entry points allowed to Chinese. All of this applied even to those who were U.S. citizens. 15
      The process deprived citizens of their civil rights and put them under severe emotional stress. The case of Lai Gow Len is representative. Lai Gow Len, who did business under the American name of H. T. Light, came to the United States in 1882 and lived in Oregon and Washington before coming to Buffalo in about 1900. He opened a restaurant at 476 Michigan Street and operated it for about two years before leaving to visit China. He also sold "fancy goods" at the Pan-American Exposition in 1901 from a stand in one of the buildings on the grounds. Upon his return from China, Lai applied for reentry at Malone, New York. Before he finally was admitted, he was imprisoned for over a month, had to hire an attorney, and sought the intervention of a U.S. Commissioner to plead his case.20 16
      Lai made two mistakes before departing for China. He sought advice from the immigration inspector at Buffalo, John DeBerry, about the papers he would need to ensure his eligibility for reentry. DeBerry told him that since he was a merchant, he did not need formal reentry papers. Lai then left his business in the hands of a cousin, Lai Bing Kue. Witnesses on Lai Gow Len's behalf testified that the cousin had sold off the merchandise in the store and never replaced it, making it difficult for Lai to prove his status as a merchant. According to Chinese Inspector Frank S. Pierce, Lai Bing Kue was "a sneak who would not hesitate to do all in his power to make it impossible for his cousin to re-enter the country" so that he could keep all of the property.21 17
      The outcome of Lai Gow Len's case ultimately hung on what constituted a "merchant." The government determined that a restaurateur was not a merchant and therefore denied Lai readmission. A series of witnesses then testified that Lai had always sold other goods, as a merchant.22 18
      The roster of witnesses reveals much about the relationship between Buffalo's Chinese community and the broader one. Louis Ullman, a United States commissioner since 1894, became "interested in an un-official way" when the case was called to his attention "by a relative of this Chinaman, who, besides being a tenant of mine, has been very useful to us as an interpreter in cases arising under the Chinese Exclusion Law." Despite the condescension of Ullman's remark that Lai's cousin, Walter Light, his tenant, was "in all respects a worthy Chinaman," it was the personal relationship with him that induced him to write the lengthy brief that finally won Lai's return to Buffalo.23 19
      Interestingly, several men eventually identified as traffickers in illegal immigrants testified in Lai's behalf. Chinese Inspector Edward Baltz knew Lai before joining the government service and sold him produce for the restaurant. He confirmed that Lai was a bona fide merchant and that at various times he had loaned money to other Chinese to buy businesses. He also confirmed the changes in the store during Lai Bing Kue's tenure, accusing the latter of operating an opium den there. Lai Gow Len was close enough to Baltz that he gave Baltz a framed picture of himself.24 20
      Charles W. Roth and George Schwartzenburg also spoke in Lai's favor. Roth claimed that Lai sold Chinese woolen goods and jewelry and "was one of the best type of Chinese, inoffensive and strictly attended to his business."25 21
      Other case files shed additional light on the Chinese community in Buffalo. Chinese men there were typically dry goods merchants, grocers, restaurateurs, or laundrymen, many of whom owned their own businesses. While small, the businesses were stable and prosperous, partly owing to strong ties of kinship within the community. When an individual traveled to China, he regularly left his interest in the business in the hands of a relative as a loan. This offered the advantages of maintaining the business's continuity and having operations in the hands of a trusted manager. Travelers also believed that creating a debt to collect improved their chances of being able to return to the United States.26 22
      Several cases illustrate these points. Wong Moon Sing owned a laundry in Buffalo that he sold to Ng Sung on credit when he returned to China in 1909. At the same time he lent Wong Get $450 to invest in a Main Street restaurant. Ng Sung agreed to repay Wong Moon Sing the $620 purchase price for the laundry when the latter returned from China. Government appraisers examined the laundry and restaurant and found them both to be well equipped and doing brisk business. The laundry did about sixty dollars per week in business, and the owner paid fifteen dollars a month in rent. Wong Moon Sing actually bought the laundry back from Ng Sung when he returned from his 1909 trip. The two then struck a similar deal in 1913, when Wong Moon Sing again went to China. "Have you any written documents or other evidence of the sale of your laundry to Ng Sung?" asked the government inspector in 1913. Wong Moon Sing replied, "No, he is an old friend of mine and we perfectly understand each other and trust one another. It is the way with our people. It is not necessary to make any documents. He will pay me."27 23
      In a similar transaction, Wong Kung bought a laundry on Northampton Street in Buffalo from Tom Lee in 1903. When he decided to visit China in 1912, he sold the laundry to Wong Ah Bow, a distant cousin, with payment due on his return from China. He also lent Wong Ah Bow two hundred dollars to send to China to build a house. In addition, Wong Kung had five hundred dollars deposited in the Erie County Savings Bank. Jung King Wing, born in China, was first admitted to the United States as a merchant's son in 1911. He invested in a Rochester restaurant in 1923, sold the interest three years later, and took a job in another restaurant as head waiter. In 1927, prior to making a visit to China, he moved to Buffalo and lent one thousand dollars to Young Fun so that Young could move his laundry.28 The examples of Chinese immigrants operating successful businesses and acquiring significant wealth are repeated numerous times in the case studies. Pictures attached to the applications for return certificates reflect the growing prosperity of the men and, ironically, their acculturation to American fashion. 24
      Moreover, a number of the men registered for the draft and served in the U.S. armed forces during World War I. Swan Street laundryman Wong Git Hong, for example, registered for the draft at the Buffalo Federal Building, although he was never called up. Louie Wong, however, did serve in the U.S. Army, receiving an honorable discharge in December 1918, and Wong Moon Lim served in the U.S. Navy at Great Lakes Naval Station.29 25
      Despite evidence of their working successfully in the city and serving the country in wartime, Buffalo's Chinese continued to be depicted in a largely negative way in government reports and the newspapers. Newspaper stories regularly highlighted incidents involving Chinese with opium and gambling. In one raid, six Chinese men were reported to be "industriously smoking opium." In another, four others were held for selling the drug. In another case, a Chinese laundryman was fined fifty dollars for accosting a piano player who had stolen his opium pipe. Government agents also linked Chinese to drugs and prostitution, arguing that the restaurants and public halls where men stayed prior to departing for China were also brothels and opium parlors.30 26
      In the nineteenth century, Buffalo's Irish canal workers had also been denigrated for drunkenness, brawling, crime, and disease and were relegated to the worst jobs and urban slums.31 Unlike the Chinese, as Ronald Takaki points out, the Irish and other Europeans, by learning the language, adopting American dress, and acquiring property could eventually blend in with the host society. Visibly different in physical appearance, barred from acquiring the vote, and forbidden to bring their wives and children to the United States, the Chinese remained strangers in their adopted communities and subject to definition by them.32 27
   

EVASION

 
      From time to time, members of Buffalo's Chinese community, such as restaurateur Ng Fook, brought sons back with them after visits to China. Consequently, Ng Tung and Ng Hoo joined their father in Buffalo in 1916 and 1920. Others attempted to enter the United States illegally at Buffalo. Many of them were headed for Chicago, New York, and Boston, taking advantage of the extensive rail network from Buffalo to industrial centers in the Northeast and Midwest. Most testified that they had come to the United States for jobs. One even swore that he had pledged to work for ten years without recompense for the syndicate that paid his way.33 28
      These men represented a lucrative opportunity to individuals on both sides of the relatively open Canadian-American border. Assisting Chinese across the border could bring handsome monetary rewards. After landing in Vancouver and paying the head tax, many Chinese immigrants boarded trains for Toronto and Montreal. In Toronto traffickers met them and escorted them by train to Fort Erie or one of the other Canadian towns along the Niagara River. Once there, smugglers hid them in barns, sheds, or other outbuildings until they deemed it reasonably safe to make the attempt to cross the border to Buffalo.34 29
      Newspaper reporters and smugglers testified that Chinese in Canada and the United States headed a "smuggling trust." According to them, Chinese residing in Montreal organized the immigrant traffic in collaboration with wealthy Chinese merchants in Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and New York. Jim Lee, the so-called mayor of Chinatown in Buffalo, claimed to have made four thousand dollars during the Pan-American Exposition year of 1901, much of which, implied local newspapers, was from trafficking in illegal immigrants. Government officials had been concerned before the Exposition that the volume of people traveling to Buffalo and the number of foreign performers employed in Exposition attractions would create conditions conducive to illegal entry, as they claimed similar circumstances had at earlier expositions in Philadelphia, Chicago, Louisville, Nashville, and Omaha.35 30
      Chester Koy, the U.S. government interpreter in Buffalo, himself Chinese, commented that white men leading Chinese across the border were simply employees of the syndicate. Chinese immigrants also testified to these arrangements. For example, Ying Chong Co., on Yonge Street in Toronto, reportedly arranged for immigrants to travel to "Little Victoria" opposite Black Rock, New York, where white men met them to take them across the border. Informants identified Se Sing Co. of Montreal as the "headquarters for the supply of all Chinese destined to the United States from eastern Canada." The company moved its charges close to the border through a network of Chinese-owned laundries. The Chinese then contracted with waterfront toughs in Buffalo to bring immigrants across the border.36 31
      Typical crossings were late at night. Traffickers loaded the Chinese into overcrowded rowboats to take them to points along the American shore, a particularly risky operation, given the river's treacherous currents. Two incidents starkly illustrate the risks. Lum Yung Yen, Chin Ching Wee, and Moy Foo Yick all lost their lives in a tragic accident on December 4, 1903. Just after 6 a.m., a large wagon carrying eleven Chinese men who had been rowed across the icy Niagara River started up the hill at the bottom of Breckenridge Street in Buffalo. When the wagon got part way up the hill, the tongue snapped and it rolled backward into the Erie Canal. The drivers jumped from the wagon and ran away, leaving the Chinese to fend for themselves. Workers from a nearby factory helped seven to safety. Four others were drowned or not accounted for. Lum and Chin were buried in Forest Lawn Cemetery within days. Moy's body was not recovered for almost six months, when it was found floating in the harbor at the foot of Ferry Street in Buffalo. Cemetery records show that Lum was disinterred in 1913 and returned to China for burial.37 32
      Chung Ben and Mark Wing Gee, "with 9 or 10 other Chinamen and three white men," attempted a crossing on November 12, 1908 during a snowstorm. All were
shipwrecked on the Rip-rap of the Breakwater ... opposite the foot of Michigan Street about 1:30 this morning. The three white men escaped and four Chinamen succeeded in saving their [own] lives.... On account of the rough condition of the water about the breakwall, body of deceased and one other Chinaman was not recovered until about 5.20 this P. M. ... Body showed no signs of drowning but had sustained wounds of the forehead and scalp, also numerous contusions of the body, and a fracture of the left thigh.
 The medical examiner concluded that death was "from shock and exhaustion [from being] ... Dashed against breakwall in overturning of boat."38		 33
      The crew of the harbor dredge Atlas finally discovered Mark Wing Gee's body the following April, "with nothing on except neck band of the shirt, socks and right shoe, [it] was badly decomposed. All of the left cheek missing, exposing the lower jaw bone." The Medical Examiner speculated that the body "was probably forced near the surface by the action of the ice jam. In order to release it 2 or 3 large rocks had to be removed."39 Others, like the four Chinese found frozen in a box car in 1914, sought entry in ways that proved just as deadly.40 34
      The experiences of Chinese border crossers stand in stark contrast to those of Irish counterparts as described by Richard Dunlop. In the late nineteenth century, many Irish emigrants fled Ireland for Canada, then crossed the Niagara River border to the United States. The white, Irish border crossers were harbored by sympathetic families, like that of future U.S. Attorney and O.S.S. chief William J. Donovan.41 35
      Reports of the tragedy in December 1903 described above reveal much about how the traffickers operated. "Kid West" headed the group of smugglers, which also included Mrs. May Simpson, who operated a boardinghouse at the corner of Clinton and Ellicott Streets in Buffalo near Buffalo's Chinatown.42 36
      Simpson had gone to Olean, south of Buffalo, in November 1903 to make arrangements with a farmer to hide Chinese in his barn until they could be put on a westbound Erie Railroad train. She attempted to bribe acting Olean police chief Timothy Hassett to prevent him from arresting the immigrants. Instead, Hassett notified authorities in Buffalo to watch for the smugglers.43 37
      Shortly after the accident on December 4, Buffalo police picked up William Dingman and subsequently arrested West just as he was about to leave on the ferry for Fort Erie. At a Christmas Eve hearing before U.S. Commissioner George P. Keating, the captured Chinese identified Dingman as the man who had rowed them from Fort Erie and West (also known as Frank A. Fisher) as the man who had offered to bring them into the United States from Toronto for one hundred dollars each. George Mumford, a Fort Erie liveryman, testified that he was West's Canadian collaborator. He regularly met immigrants at the railroad station, drove them to his house, secreted them there (in this case for twelve days), and then delivered them to the boats. In further testimony about the incident, Chinese Inspector Jeremiah O'Leary related that he had met "Kid West" on a train taking four Chinese from Hamilton to Caledonia, Ontario. West, "one of the old-timers in the Chinese smuggling business," told O'Leary that he had lived for several months at Mrs. Simpson's boardinghouse.44 38
      Both Mrs. Simpson and Fisher were arraigned before U.S. Commissioner Keating. Mrs. Simpson waived examination, and her case was presented to the federal grand jury. Edward Mullen, a Broadway saloon keeper, posted bond for Simpson. Fisher pled not guilty. Unable to post bond, and with a great deal of testimony linking him to the case, he was jailed. Both West and Simpson were convicted of conspiracy in January 1904. West was fined $500 and sentenced to two years in Auburn State Prison. Simpson received a six-month sentence and $250 fine.45 39
      Most of the men who brought immigrants across the border held unskilled, low-status, poor paying, transient jobs. Once they brought immigrants across the border, other Chinese helped move them to final destinations in the United States. Dingman was typical of many who trafficked in human lives along the border. He worked at different times as a fisherman, fishmonger, poolroom operator, and saloon keeper at the foot of Ferry Street. His saloon was a dive frequented by thugs who intimidated ferry passengers and used dynamite to kill the fish that they sold. His colleagues, George Hanney and Edward Baltz, had similar experience. Hanney had also been a saloon keeper and a laborer in one of Buffalo's grain elevators before turning to trafficking. Baltz, a Chinese inspector between 1902 and 1904, was dismissed from the service after being implicated in smuggling. Before joining the Immigration Service he had worked in carnivals, parachuting from a balloon to thrill the "Rubes at the county fairs." After his dismissal, he worked as a fishmonger and a sauerkraut maker.46 40
      Others engaged in trafficking worked as hotel or boardinghouse operators and employees, drivers or chauffeurs, a salesman, a telegraph operator, and low-ranking government officials. All could easily have been tempted by the financial windfall that smuggling promised. The newspapers reported that smugglers received between $50 and $125 for each immigrant who successfully reached New York or Chicago. Chinese Inspector Thomas Thomas estimated that one smuggler brought five or six immigrants to the border once a week, and occasionally twice a week. If Thomas's information was correct, a smuggler could make from $250 to $750 dollars in a normal week, and twice that on occasion. By 1914 smugglers were asking as much as $250 per immigrant. In contrast, Edward Healey, hired by the government as a special agent for $2.50 a day, made at most $17.50 a week. The rewards from smuggling were potentially enormous in an era when the maximum salary for a Buffalo police patrolman was $900 per year and for a state fish and game protector $2 a day.47 41
   

ORGANIZATION

 
      Trafficking along the Niagara Frontier was built around several families with fluid business interconnections. The O'Brien and Roth families were the principals in one of the largest operations. In March 1900, U.S. marshals and Buffalo police raided the saloon-hotel operated by James O'Brien and Daniel Crowley at 514 Front Street in Buffalo and captured four Chinese in a room above the bar. U.S. Commissioner Sherman S. Jewett ordered the Chinese, who testified that they had paid $210 to be brought across the river, deported. The saloon keepers, reportedly active in nineteenth ward politics, were held on $1,500 bail but were soon released. Crowley left the partnership the next year, but O'Brien continued to operate the bar until 1904 or 1905. Thomas W. O'Brien was a carpenter living at the Front Street address on and off until 1904. He later continued the family smuggling business, and Inspector Frank S. McCullough named him "one of the most notorious and most successful smugglers that ever operated in this vicinity."48 42
      O'Brien also operated a short-lived wine, liquor, and cigar store at 382 Front Street with Joseph Roth. The Roths, including brothers Richard, Frank, and Charles, were longtime traffickers. Chinese Inspector-in-Charge Frank S. Pierce speculated in 1903 that a number of Chinese captured in Weehawken, New Jersey, were "Roth's men." Charles was arrested in July 1908 while attempting to bring eight Chinese across the border. Various members led the O'Brien-Roth organization between 1900 and 1908.49 43
      The relative openness of the border, along with the help of collaborators on the Canadian side, were crucial to the smugglers' success. By 1908, when Thomas W. O'Brien assumed control, U.S. officials had pieced together intelligence about his syndicate. Thomas, nicknamed "Ducky" because he had been employed by the state as deputy game warden, typically met immigrants in a storefront on Queen Street in Toronto and took them by train to either Stevensville or Bridgeburg, Ontario. From there he normally drove them to Fort Erie and hid them in the barn of a Mr. Hawkins until they could be rowed across the Niagara River.50 44
      Edward Hawkins operated a hotel at the Canadian end of the International Railway Bridge in the 1880s, and by 1891 he ran a livery and sales stable in the village of Fort Erie. In 1892 he was elected to the village council, and from 1901 to 1902 and 1905 to 1906 he was the reeve, or chair, of the village council. Hawkins's property was convenient to Erie Beach and the International Bridge, both points of departure from Fort Erie to Buffalo. Moreover, his barns and stables provided convenient hiding places for Chinese emigrants awaiting transportation. Chinese Inspector Arthur M. Gentry testified to frequently seeing Ducky and Hawkins together with Chinese people in Fort Erie. Inspector Leonard S. Coyne elaborated, saying that he "saw the Chinamen driven up to the barn of one Hawkins many times. I have seen the Chinamen taken to the waterfront to be put in a row boat." Carl "Gamey" Wilson, a Fort Erie customs broker, was a regular conspirator with the Hawkins family.51 45
      Hawkins actively assisted illegal immigrants throughout the period before World War I, apparently bringing the mayor, Louis Douglas, into the business. On one occasion U.S. immigration authorities accused Fort Erie politicians and officeholders of raising the money to release one suspected smuggler on bail.52 46
      Another former Chinese inspector in Buffalo, William Riley, headed a rival group. Using his knowledge of Immigration Service tactics and the intelligence that he bought from railroad employees, the police, and the telephone operators in the Chinese Inspectors' office, Riley organized his activities differently from O'Brien's. He avoided Fort Erie, preferring, instead, to bring aliens from Toronto via the Grand Trunk Railway to Windmill Point and Fort Erie Grove (Erie Beach) on the Canadian shore of Lake Erie. Riley, like O'Brien, had arranged particular places to secrete Chinese on the Canadian side of the river until they could be rowed across the border. "Kate Woods' Place" was one such location. Probably the property in the lakeshore concession, lot 7 belonging to "Cath. Woods," the site was adjacent to the Grand Trunk line, just east of Rose Hill station, and on Lake Erie, sharing the advantages of Hawkins's property.53 47
      Enforcement officers seriously disrupted O'Brien's and Hawkins's activities in the spring of 1908. On March 25 they captured three Chinese being transported by O'Brien at the Exchange Street Station in Buffalo. At Bridgeburg, Ontario, the immigrants had left the Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo train that had brought them from Toronto. They were then rowed across the border and boarded a New York Central train. Agent Thomas had followed them on the T. H. & B. train and eventually made the arrest. Inability to attract much more business, coupled with the fear that immigration agents were getting too close to breaking the organization, caused O'Brien to curtail operations.54 48
      On the night of August 1, 1908, inspectors Pierce and Thomas chased and captured five Chinese and two smugglers on River Road in Tonawanda near the Wickwire Steel plant. The Chinese, who had been rowed across the Niagara, were promptly ordered deported to China by Commissioner Keating. A federal grand jury eventually indicted Charles Slosberg (or Schlossberg) and Henry Reichell (or Roschell) in the incident. Ducky O'Brien, too, was indicted, although he had escaped capture by jumping from Slosberg's car and fleeing to Canada.55 49
      Riley had considerable success in the spring and early summer of 1908. He operated with a great deal of bravado, even sitting down on a train next to Inspector Thomas and engaging him in conversation about Chinese and smuggling. Nevertheless, Riley's luck, too, began to go bad by July. Five men he was bringing into the United States were arrested on Buffalo's east side. At nearly the same time, Riley's confederates, Charles Roth and Thomas Roach, were arrested after trying to bring eight Chinese into Buffalo near the harbor breakwater. Moreover, in the summer of 1908, government agents were able to acquire a motor launch to patrol the shore. Their new mobility discouraged several groups from trying the crossing, forcing them to return to Toronto. To avoid the launch, Riley moved his operation to St. Catharines, Ontario, on Lake Ontario, and began taking more precautions to keep his own movements secret from government agents. All of this gave Inspector Gentry "the satisfaction of knowing that we are causing him considerable trouble and expense." By early July, Riley was reportedly "very quiet" until his arrest on August 30, 1908 and his impending hearing on the morning of September 4.56 50
      Indeed, by the end of 1908 the smugglers who were known to have been active during the year were either indicted and in jail, had fled to Canada, or had been intimidated into inactivity while awaiting the fate of those facing trial. Henry Reichell, Charles Slosberg, and Charles Roth were all convicted in U.S. District Court. Thomas Roach (or Roche) pled guilty. Judge John R. Hazel did not consider any of them leaders of the traffic and assigned relatively light sentences and fines. Ducky O'Brien received slightly harsher treatment. On the night of December 3–4, Chinese Inspectors Coyne and McCullough spotted him entering the saloon that he had previously owned at 514 Front Street and promptly arrested him. At his arraignment in District Court, O'Brien pled guilty, and Judge Hazel sentenced him to a year in the Erie County Penitentiary but fined him only one dollar.57 51
      United States officials declared the border secure as far as Chinese immigration was concerned at the end of 1908. The claim was premature. A smuggling attempt succeeded in LaSalle, near Niagara Falls, in December 1908. A smuggler interviewed in Toronto reported that there were no fewer than five companies of smugglers still operating on the border. Agents captured seven Chinese found in a Lackawanna Railroad boxcar in Port Morris, New Jersey, after the car passed through Black Rock. A Chinese man disguised as a French tourist was turned back at the Lower Steel Arch Bridge in Niagara Falls in February. Chief Inspector Pierce captured four Chinese near Rochester at the end of February 1909.58 52
   

THE POROUS BORDER

 
      The Niagara border was never successfully closed to illegal immigrants. If Inspector Thomas's estimate above is correct, then a single smuggler could bring three hundred people into the United States in a year. Statistician C.?Luther Fry argued that a minimum of 7,167 Chinese were brought across the U.S. border illegally between 1910 and 1920. Even if his estimate of about 720 people per year is low, and Thomas's estimate of three people per trafficker along the Niagara Frontier is high, it is still reasonable to assume that traffic on the Niagara remained significant and that many more immigrants entered the United States by that route than were apprehended. As World War I approached, one immigration official called enforcement of the exclusion laws along the Niagara border "a farcical affair." The territory stretched as far as Rochester, leading the officer to conclude that "when I look over this vast stretch of boundary line and think of the number of boats and the cordon of men that would be necessary to actually guard it as it should be guarded to keep Chinese from crossing, I become quite pessimistic as to what we may hope to accomplish."59 53
      Local authorities regularly complained of being understaffed. The problem was particularly acute during the summer excursion season and grew with the expansion of industry on the Canadian side of the border. Regional superiors were convinced of the need for more personnel and offered their support. John Clark, the U.S. Immigration Commissioner in Montreal, wrote Washington that "in his endeavors to properly handle the regular immigration work ... and at the same time to so assign the help under his control as to cope with the operations of the gangs of Chinese smugglers that infest the Canadian frontier opposite Buffalo, the Bureau may be assured that the Inspector in Charge [in Buffalo] ... is worked to the limit."60 54
      The traffickers held the upper hand in thwarting government policy. Pitted against them until 1903 was a variety of local and state officers, assisted occasionally by U.S. Treasury special agents. Legislation originally charged customs inspectors at U.S. ports of entry with enforcing the provisions of the Exclusion Act. The Immigration Act of 1882 gave the Treasury Department responsibility for enforcing other immigration restrictions and authorized the secretary of the Treasury to contract with the various states to provide enforcement officers. Congress first authorized paid immigration inspectors for each customs district in the Immigration Act of 1891. Accordingly, at the beginning of the twentieth century, enforcement fell to John R. DeBerry, the sole United States immigration inspector in Buffalo. He relied on assistance from U.S. marshals, deputy customs collectors, and the Buffalo police. Even state fish and game officers aided in enforcing the law. In 1903 Congress charged the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor with enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Act. The same year, Chinese Inspectors were first appointed in Buffalo. Since 1896, Niagara Falls, New York, had been the only base of operations for federal Chinese Inspectors. The five inspectors stationed in Buffalo quickly began to patrol railroad stations and popular passenger routes in and around the city, making arrests near the city's International Railroad Bridge and as far south as Dunkirk, approximately forty-five miles southwest of the city.61 55
      They faced a virtually impossible task. The Niagara Frontier alone offered a lengthy shoreline that provided ample opportunities to land immigrants, as one official estimated that sixty-five miles of shore was accessible to small boats. Once landed, immigrants had ready access to an impressive transportation network to get them away from the border. In 1908, 125 passenger trains operated by twenty-six railroads left Buffalo each day. Once across the river at Buffalo, smugglers could put their charges on Chicago-bound trains traveling along the southern Lake Erie shore, or on eastbound trains to Boston and New York. The Erie Canal, too, afforded transportation away from the border to eastern cities.62 56
      Traffickers' operations were fluid. The personnel involved, points of departure from Canada, and points of landing in the United States changed, depending on how the Immigration Service deployed its resources. At different times they used the entire length of the Niagara River to carry on their activities. One official complained in 1914 that despite considerable expense, the U.S. government had only succeeded "in making the smugglers shift their operations from a convenient point to a less convenient one ... to jail a few smugglers and deport a few Chinese and [agents] must then endeavor to guess where the same or other smugglers are commencing to violate the law next."63 57
      We have seen how William Riley shifted operations to confound immigration officials. When the situation warranted, smugglers could take more drastic steps, changing routes to crossings at Black Rock rather than Detroit and vice versa. If the Fort Erie to Buffalo route was too closely guarded, Grand Island, in the Niagara River north of Buffalo, provided a convenient alternative to move immigrants, Chinese and Polish, from the Canadian shore to LaSalle, New York. Alternatively, Dingman and his associates and Curley Roberts, a Buffalo ward politician, and his Niagara Falls associate, Jack Desplaines, brought immigrants from Chippawa Creek on the Canadian side to LaSalle by water, avoiding Grand Island.64 58
      If the routes on the Niagara River above the Falls became too risky, smugglers shifted operations to the lower river. The route from Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, to Youngstown, New York, at the northern end of the Niagara River where it enters Lake Ontario, was attractive because it was guarded only by a customs inspector who worked exclusively during the day. When a Chinese man reputed to have been involved in smuggling operations in St. Catharines opened a new laundry in Niagara-on-the-Lake in the summer of 1914, agents became more concerned. Not only Chinese, but thirty-eight Bulgarians, they feared, would succeed in entering the U.S. if a motorboat were not transferred from Buffalo to prevent it.65 59
      While the thriving commerce allowed their adversaries to act with comparative freedom on each side of the boundary, U.S. government agents had no jurisdiction in Canada. In order to give themselves the best chance of intercepting illegal aliens, the Chinese inspectors established stakeouts in Canada to observe smugglers' operations. By the summer of 1908 an inspector had been stationed in Toronto, giving border agents descriptions of illegal immigrants and advance information as to when they could be expected near Buffalo. Of course, American agents operating on Canadian soil could only gather information and forward it to colleagues on the New York side of the border for action.66 60
      Agents sought more than passive observation and advance warning could give. While they could observe operations, they could not always clearly identify smugglers or immigrants when the best they could do was to watch activity from across the street. They petitioned Washington for authority to hire an undercover agent to infiltrate the smugglers' operations, to "mix with the same class of people that the smugglers and their helpers are drawn from, with the object of learning their plans, and following them from the start of operations." Local agents fastidiously objected to "frequenting the same class resorts, mixing with an undesirable class of people," and "most important," spending part of their salaries to mix with the smugglers themselves. Chinese Inspector-in-Charge Frank S. Pierce secured permission to hire an unemployed iron molder, Edward Healey, as a temporary undercover agent in the summer of 1908. As Healey knew and was known by "the people of shady reputation in this neighborhood," he won the confidence of the smugglers and was able to gather information that Pierce claimed was "utterly impossible for us to get ... by ourselves."67 61
      According to Pierce, Healey proved valuable in the arrest of a number of immigrants and smugglers. It was Healey's information that led to the breakup of Ducky O'Brien's operation in August 1908 and on several occasions brought agents close to being able to arrest O'Brien himself. Moreover, Pierce credited Healey with providing information that allowed Chinese inspectors to thwart two more planned border crossings before they occurred.68 62
      Corrupt officials and agents frustrated enforcement. While Thomas O'Brien, Edward Baltz, William Riley, and the Hawkins clan were the most notorious examples of government officials who left their positions for more lucrative opportunities trafficking in illegal immigrants, officers speculated that others were either involved with, or would join, the smugglers. Informants alleged that U.S. immigration officials sold certificates, for fifteen dollars each, verifying that an immigrant was, in fact, native born. Elected officials on both sides of the border, corrupt police officers, and compliant railroad employees all undermined the government's ability to enforce its restrictive immigration policies.69 63
      Through political connections, another smuggler who had fled to Canada was able to bring pressure to bear on Buffalo's police chief to prevent his record being passed on to Canadian immigration authorities. U.S. immigration officials even accused the Buffalo police of assisting the fugitive's flight to Canada. District Attorney Wesley Dudley distrusted local police so much that he hired private detectives to gather evidence that should have been collected by the police.70 64
      Immigration officials claimed that relatives of Buffalo police officers were close associates of O'Brien, Dingman, and others. Police chief Regan's nephew reportedly owned the building that headquartered the Rileys, and the police had been ordered not to enforce certain ordinances there. Police cooperation with the smugglers was so active, one officer opined, that police passed them information, protected places where immigrants were to be landed, and fired signal flares to warn smugglers if any Chinese inspectors were in the area. "The Police are more friendly to the smugglers than to us," one inspector commented.71 65
      Added to all of this were railroad workers willing to assist the smugglers for a fee. Railroad car checkers sold seals to smugglers so that they could re-seal boxcars after introducing immigrants to the cars. Inspectors accused conductors, porters, switchmen, engineers, and firemen of assisting smugglers in introducing Chinese into passenger cars while trains stopped in a tunnel under Washington Street in Buffalo.72 66
      Local judges took a cavalier attitude toward the exclusion laws. A judge assessed "a light fine, and a sentence of one day in jail" on Curley Roberts after Roberts pled guilty to illegally bringing Chinese across the Niagara River in 1900. The inspector in charge at Buffalo wrote Commissioner Clark, "Smuggling is not considered such an awful crime, you know that. Big people, rich people, smuggle when they get a chance. So do little ones. The Judges do not consider it much of a crime." Sentences for smuggling were often short, and fines low.73 67
      Judge Hazel's light sentences regularly frustrated enforcement officers' attempts to get smugglers behind bars. Inspector-in-Charge Landis hoped to put Buffalo restaurateur Harry Chin out of business by charging him with preparing opium for use and operating a brothel rather than for smuggling. "Possibly [he] can be put out of temptation's way," wrote Landis. But, he continued, "this is doubtful, ... for Judge Hazel usually imposes a small find [sic] in such cases." On sentencing two minor figures in one smuggling case, Hazel himself wrote, "I find it hard to impose punishment in these cases, according to the fact that no moral terpitude [sic] is involved." After the two men assured Hazel that they had never been involved in bringing Chinese into the country before, and would never do it again, the judge sentenced them to six months in the penitentiary.74 68
      Riley, arrested on August 30, 1908, was back in business soon enough to participate in the fatal incident of November 12. He escaped to Canada with Edward Baltz and George Hanney. Baltz and Riley attempted to establish residence in Canada. Riley's wife joined him in Fort Erie. An embargo on animals imposed because of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease thwarted Baltz's attempt to bring his wife across the border because, in addition to household goods, she also tried to bring the family dog. Baltz and at least one of the others took up residence in Toronto, but they found it too expensive for comfort. Then, for some reason, Riley returned to the United States in March 1909. He was arrested as he stepped onto the Ferry Street dock, pled guilty to smuggling charges, and sought clemency. However, District Attorney John Lord O'Brian, calling Riley's leaving the Chinese on the breakwall when he escaped "an act of wanton cruelty," convinced Judge Hazel to impose the maximum sentence, a year and a day in prison.75 69
      Because sentences were short and convicts quickly reentered business when released from prison, there was a substantial continuity of leadership among the gangs from the turn of the century to World War I. In contrast, government agents were regularly reassigned to new posts. Inspector Landis complained in January 1914 that "May and White, who pleaded guilty to Chinese smuggling in July 1912 are back in the game." After serving time, Ducky O'Brien and William Riley, too, were soon back in business. Ducky, identified as the "Mayor of the Waterfront" by Landis, reportedly got a cut of the profits from each of three gangs operating on the Buffalo waterfront. Willie Riley and his brother Jack headed one gang and worked with the other two. Dingman, too, was involved. The old cross-border relationship with the Hawkins family remained intact, as did the connection with Gamey Wilson. "Curley" Roberts was another trafficker active for many years. Mentioned by government agents as early as 1900 and identified as a ward politician, confidence man, and racehorse tout, Roberts continued to operate in Buffalo and Niagara Falls for at least another fourteen years.76 70
   

EBB AND FLOW

 
      Smugglers' strategy evolved throughout the period before World War I. While still using small boats to bring people into the U.S. when possible, more and more they used sealed railroad boxcars to bring immigrants into the country. Smugglers broke the seals on boxcars bound for U.S. destinations, introduced illegal immigrants into the cars, then re-sealed the doors with similar seals. The practice grew dramatically because, as John Clark put it, "the actual smuggler takes little or no risk at all." By 1913 the method had grown to the point that Clark called it "the practice found most difficult to deal with."77 71
      The government countered with a new strategy of its own. In April 1914, at Inspector Richard H. Taylor's urging, the government adopted a new plan for enforcing the exclusion laws. Taylor assumed direction of a limited number of agents from around the nation reputedly skilled in detective work. Other agents continued to report to local inspectors-in-charge of various districts. Taylor's special force operated throughout the United States on the assumption that the only way to enforce the borders was "by actively checking up Chinese throughout the interior of the country and arresting and deporting those found without the certificates required by law."78 72
      Taylor claimed great success for his plan. Between April and November 1914, he held that across the country criminal proceedings had been brought against seventy-five "persons found to be engaged in the illegal importation of contraband Chinese." Of those, sixty-three had been arrested and thirty-two convicted, while thirty awaited trial, eleven were fugitives, and one was acquitted. In addition, four hundred Chinese were arrested either at the border or at interior points as a result of detective investigations.79 73
      On the Niagara Frontier, Taylor requested in May 1914 that Buffalonians Edward Geenan, Gamey Wilson, Richard Bleakley, and Orman Weaver be prosecuted for bringing Jeung Bow, Ho Jun Lay, and Lum Chin Yuk into the United States on May 16. Geenan fled "for parts unknown" as soon as he learned he was under suspicion, and the other three were beyond the U.S. government's reach in Canada. On June 2, agents arrested Ducky O'Brien. Taylor declared that "as the principal smugglers in this section are either in jail or fugitives from justice, which has put a stop to smuggling along the Niagara frontier ... I am ready to proceed elsewhere."80 74
      Taylor's declaration was premature. Even as O'Brien awaited trial, the Riley brothers bragged that "they were too smooth" for agents to catch them. The fugitives in Canada were pursuing their business in Fort Erie and Toronto. By late December 1914 and early 1915, smuggling operations had largely returned to normal. The Rileys, Dingman, and others regularly brought immigrants across the river. Taylor admitted that "smugglers are again successfully operating in [Buffalo, Niagara Falls, and Fort Erie]."81 75
      With trafficking again on the rise, Taylor's plan came under fire from local inspectors-in-charge and the commissioner of immigration in Montreal. They argued that the plan divided authority and further demoralized an already-demoralized force, and they recommended that the plan be discontinued. John Clark urged that "control of the work [of enforcing the Chinese exclusion laws] be restored to the regular inspectors ... to the end that [the] feeling of indifference now permeating the regular force ... be wiped out, and the smugglers made to feel the effect of a force of thirty officers under competent leadership, working to a common end." He was overruled in May.82 76
      His plan endorsed, Taylor again reported success in August, attributing it to the effective use of patrol boats on the Niagara River. His optimism was tempered by continuing reports that traffickers remained active and that depressed labor conditions in Canada and the Caribbean were likely to put additional pressure on immigration officers across the country.83 77
   

CONCLUSION

 
      With the onset of World War I, American immigration officials faced new challenges on the interior border. While agents remained vigilant for Chinese attempting entry along the Niagara Frontier, they became ever more wary of other groups of aliens. Germans and Austrians were reportedly massing along the Niagara to flee Canada because of persecution in Toronto. "Italians and Polaks" were using old Chinese immigration routes to enter the United States across Squaw Island at Buffalo. Somewhere between 103 and 300 Bulgarians were supposed to be waiting along the river for an opportunity to enter the United States at Youngstown. Officials also feared unemployed aliens at the Welland Canal,84 causing Clark to plead for more agents on the Niagara Frontier. Reduced activity at Atlantic ports should free agents for assignments at interior ports, he argued, and asked, "Can you not detail immediately two inspectors, a clerk, and an interpreter in German, French, and Slavic languages?"85 The language skills Clark sought reveal changing priorities. 78
      Immigration restriction in the United States after World War I and the emphasis that Congress placed on national sovereignty, state territoriality, border control, and possession of documents was part of a global trend. Much of the literature about U.S. border enforcement has focused on the U.S.-Mexican border and on the Canadian boundaries with New England and Michigan. Historians have agreed that the Mexican border was increasingly racialized; it was redefined as a racial and cultural boundary. There, "Federal officials self-consciously understood their task as creating a barrier where, in a practical sense, none had existed before." As on the Canadian border, a borderlands region existed in which populations intermingled and where Mexicans had a claim to be.86 Except in the case of Chinese immigrants in the North until World War I, concern about the border remained largely a matter of collecting taxes on dutiable imports.87 By examining efforts to avoid constructing barriers on the northern border to limit Chinese entry, this essay shows that in the northern borderlands, race played a different role in border enforcement than in the southwestern U.S.. Along a border dividing nations sharing a similar racial background and ethnic biases, borderlands relationships militated against border restrictions, even in the case of migrants deemed "undesirable." 79
      Both Erika Lee and Mae Ngai have pointed out that newspapers and government reports regularly associated Chinese and Mexican border crossers with liquor, drugs, and other bootlegged goods as part of a process of racialization that set them apart from the rest of the community. Language reinforced the distinction, as major newspapers, including those in Buffalo, used words like "Chink," "Celestial," "Chinaman," "heathen," and "wily" to refer to the Chinese.88 One report described a Chinese man as using his "long, talon-like nails" to resist capture, suggesting a demonic rather than human figure. The discussion is reminiscent of Edmund Morgan's description of "Virginians beginning to move toward a system of labor that treated men as things," a movement that ended with the racialization and degradation of African American labor in the South.89 Clearly, racial caricaturizations of Chinese border crossers allowed traffickers to think of them more as commodities than humans. How else can one explain Riley's cruel abandonment of his charges in November 1908? The habit of labeling Chinese as "contraband" rather than as immigrants reinforced the notion in official circles that even those with a legal claim to enter were outside the legitimate labor market and should be treated differently. 80
      It is ironic, given this racialization of national policy, that at the end of the nineteenth century it was Canadians who drew the most criticism from Buffalo workers. When questioned by the Immigration Investigating Commission in 1894, Buffalo's organized labor leaders almost universally condemned Canadian day and seasonal workers for depressed wages and poor working conditions in the city. Canadians were "more injurious to this country in every way than the influx of Europeans via Canada," according to one witness, reflecting the view of other witnesses as well. Moreover, testimony asserted, Canadians refused to join unions and spent little money in the U.S., thus undermining both organized labor and the local economy. One union leader complained that in Detroit and Buffalo, Canadians even sent their laundry across the border. Unlike the Germans and Poles, who also drew fire for entering the United States via Canada to avoid close inspection at New York, Canadians were threatening precisely because they were so much like Americans. According to Stuart Reid, president of the Buffalo Central Labor Union, the Canadians "talk as we do, and act as we do, and, owing to the very able manner in which our immigrant inspector has been acting of late, they do not want to let us know who they are." The report concluded that "American workingmen ... ask protection against this Canadian invasion," in part by requiring naturalization of Canadians seeking work in the United States.90 81
      The resentment against temporary Canadian workers contrasted with attitudes toward Mexican workers whose temporary stay in the Southwest was seen as an advantage. On the Niagara Frontier, Chinese border crossers were viewed more like the Mexicans in the south. They were temporary residents who moved on to other locations. Neither those who stayed, nor those who went on, constituted a threat to local workers. Perhaps this explains, too, the willingness of judges and local officials to condone trafficking to the extent that they did. Even those individuals who were convicted of drug and other crimes were seen not as threats, but as "colorful figures" in the city's life.91 82
      Outside official federal government circles and the newspapers, a gatekeeping attitude did not always prevail. For the waterfront underclass that provided operatives, trafficking was simply a business opportunity that allowed for increased income. True, race was an essential part of the traffic insofar as it allowed the traffickers to deal with immigrants as goods that could be abandoned when it was expedient, rather than as people to be cared for. Still, the concern that Chinese were so radically different as to be threats to the nation's security was either absent or not articulated. In fact, there is some evidence that some close cross-cultural relationships evolved.92 83
      Attitudes in the Niagara borderlands were partially conditioned by the fact that the local Asian community remained small. Buffalo had a tiny Asian population. Of a total of 155,134 persons in 1880, Buffalo was home to only five Chinese and Japanese, or a miniscule .003 percent of the whole. Only one other lived in all of Erie County. By 1910 Buffalo's population had grown to 542,159, only fifty-four of whom were Chinese, and another fifteen Japanese, for a still-tiny .015 percent of the whole.93 Many of Buffalo's Chinese had been born in the United States and raised in China. They were, therefore, American citizens. Most were males who had wives and children in China, and many periodically returned to China to visit families. In contrast to the Mexican borderlands, where large numbers of agricultural workers willing to work for low wages were demanded by employers, the Niagara region's local labor market did not particularly require the skills that Chinese immigrants were perceived to bring. Canadian and European immigrants supplied needs not met by native workers. 84
      Wartime fears presaged the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 and the national origins quota system it created. The act established a concept of "racialized foreignness" that defined Europeans according to various degrees of "whiteness" but separated out non-Europeans as racially different and, therefore, not assimilable. It had predictable outcomes on the Niagara Frontier. Police raided establishments in the Italian neighborhood of Niagara Falls, New York. As had been the case with the Chinese earlier, immigrants were regularly associated with prostitution, illegal drinking, and mysterious "un-American" organizations like the Black Hand and radical political groups. Private vigilantes attempted to supplement law enforcement agencies' efforts to restrict immigration, block liquor traffic, and police disorderly houses. The American Legion denounced the American Civil Liberties Union as "an un-American organization with Bolshevik Sympathies." The Ku Klux Klan leader, the Reverend L. E. H. Smith of Buffalo, organized vigilantes to join federal agents in capturing a converted subchaser attempting to bring whisky and ale into Buffalo from Canada. The KKK threatened Niagara Falls residents with notes saying, "Your absence from the city is desired, you are not 100 percent American."94 85
      With the advent of prohibition in January 1920, bootlegging liquor supplanted assisting illegal immigrants as the leading business of smugglers. Statistics from Detroit reveal the importance liquor smuggling had assumed by 1925. That year thirty-six smugglers, four of whom were bringing Chinese into the U.S., were apprehended. In addition, thirty-seven automobiles used in smuggling, valued at $57,500, thirty-nine boats worth $8,900, liquor valued at $46,050, and two hundred and seventy-five illegal immigrants were taken into custody. When smugglers did turn to human trafficking, it was because that did not necessitate the up-front investment that liquor smuggling required. It was also an alternative that helped smugglers augment income from liquor traffic. Since it was a secondary activity, undertaken by "freebooters" or "price cutters" as opposed to "reputable bootleggers [sic!]," the lives of immigrants in their care were at greater jeopardy than ever before.95 86
      The local press regularly reported incidents of "bootlegging" aliens, including Chinese, across the Mexican border and welcomed the acquisition of machine gun–equipped speedboats by the Border Patrol, established in May 1924, to police the Niagara River. Fines of from twenty-five dollars to one hundred dollars imposed on liquor smugglers imply that the return on sales of smuggled liquor were higher than the ten dollars that a river man could now expect for bringing an illegal immigrant across the border. It was actually his involvement with narcotics smuggling that finally did in William Dingman in 1924. Agents arrested him in Newark, New Jersey, and took a huge amount of opium into custody. News accounts linked him to several Buffalo and nationwide Chinese organizations, indicated that he spoke fluent "Chinese," and claimed that he had been responsible for bringing hundreds of illegal immigrants, Chinese and others, into the country in the previous thirty years.96 87
      The U.S. Commissioner of Immigration in Montreal reported that in 1922, Canadian border smuggling reached a historic high. "Dope, liquor, Chinese, and alien smuggling" was a lucrative business carried out by international gangs with unlimited funds and access to the most powerful boats and autos.97 As time passed, though, fewer crossings on the Canadian border were organized by gangs. Indeed, at one point agents at Buffalo claimed that illegal traffic there had slowed to "an almost imperceptible minimum." It is doubtful that Canada's passing, in 1923, under pressure from the United States, a Chinese exclusion law similar in scope and spirit to the American statute was responsible for the decline at Buffalo. Agents in Detroit reported a simultaneous increase in traffic, saying that "the smuggling of Chinese across the Canadian border is by no means under control." It is reasonable to suspect that the preferred route for illegal entry, rather than the volume of traffic, had changed. Nevertheless, by 1924 activity at Buffalo was not of sufficient consequence to be mentioned separately in the commissioner-general of immigration's annual reports.98 88
      As Americans became more fearful of anything and anyone "foreign," immigration restrictions became broader and more complex. The increasing complexity of American immigration law, though, did not provide protection for Americans. It did, though, bring profit for those who helped others evade the laws along with great danger for prospective immigrants. With each increment of exclusionary border policy, culminating with Prohibition in 1920 and the National Origins Quota system in 1924, new, more lucrative opportunities opened up for individuals engaged in bringing illegal goods or excluded immigrants across the U.S. border. As the Commissioner-General of immigration noted in 1923, each new restriction "promoted the alien smuggling industry and furnished new and multiplied incentives to illegal entry" (emphasis added). In short, American policy itself created easier, more remunerative opportunities for profit than bringing Chinese across the border.99 89


NOTES

      I wish to thank a number of scholars whose insightful comments have helped improve this essay: Craig N. Canning, David A. Gerber, Edythe Ann Quinn, Edward Rhoads, and Lillian S. Williams, as well as John J. Bukowczyk and the anonymous readers from the Journal. The Canadian Consulate-General, in Buffalo, New York, generously supported early research on the project.

1.  [John Clark], Montreal, to W. B. Wilson, Washington, DC, December 8, 1914, United States, National Archives, Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereafter cited as USNARA), Subject Correspondence 1906–1932, RG 85 Entry 9, Box 219, File 53531/112; O. L. Spaulding, acting secretary of the treasury, Washington, DC, to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, December 14, 1891, Canada, National Archives, Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 70, file 3247 part 1–A; A. M. Burgess, deputy minister of the Interior, Ottawa, to John Haggart, acting minister of the Interior, Ottawa, September 2, 1893, ibid.; Lord Knutsford, London, to Lord Stanley, Ottawa, February 25, 1891, Canada, National Archives, Governor-General Papers, RG 7, series G-1, vol. 225, file 34; Draft Reply, January 29, 1900, to a United States Complaint alleging violation by Canadian customs officials and officials of the Canadian Pacific Railway of the Chinese Exclusion Law, April 14, 1900, Canada, National Archives, Orders in Council, RG 2, vol. 796; Order in Council 2421, September 12, 1892, Canada, National Archives, Orders in Council, RG 2, series A-1–a.)

2.  Thomas E. Leary and Elizabeth C. Sholes, From Fire to Rust: Business, Technology and Work at the Lackawanna Steel Plant, 1899–1983 (Buffalo, NY, 1987), 23, 25; Mark Goldman, High Hopes: The Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York (Albany, NY, 1983), 216–19.

3.  Bruno Ramirez, Crossing the 49th Parallel: Migration from Canada to the United States, 1900–1930 (Ithaca, NY, and London, 2001), 102, 178.

4.  U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census of the United States, Taken in the Year 1900, vol. 1, Population, part 1 (Washington, DC, 1901), clxxvi.

5.  John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, February 25, 1913, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52150/4.

6.  Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to United States Commissioner of Immigration, Montreal, May 1, 1913, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52999/31; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to United States Commissioner of Immigration, Montreal, October 29, 1913, ibid.

7.  David R. Smith, "Structuring the Permeable Border: Channeling and Regulating Cross-Border Traffic in Labor, Capital, and Goods," in Permeable Border: The Great Lakes Basin as Transnational Region, 1650–1990, by John J. Bukowczyk, Nora Faires, David R. Smith, and Randy William Widdis (Pittsburgh, PA, and Calgary, Alberta, 2005), 120–21, 142–43; Randy William Widdis, With Scarcely a Ripple: Anglo-Canadian Migration into the United States and Western Canada, 1880–1920 (Montreal, Quebec, and Kingston, Ontario, 1998), 5, 6, 27, 53–66; Ramirez, Crossing the 49th Parallel, 32, 102, 178; Bruno Ramirez, "Canada and the United States: Perspectives on Migration and Continental History," Journal of American Ethnic History 20 (Spring 2001): 59–62.

8.  Widdis, With Scarcely a Ripple, 27.

9.  Erika Lee, At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943, (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003), 152; Erika Lee, "The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882–1924," Journal of American Ethnic History 21 (Spring 2002): 36–62; Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 2004), 7–10, 27, 71; Ramirez, Crossing the 49th Parallel, 50–51; Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882 (New York, 2004), 3–26; Roger Daniels, Not Like Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890–1924 (Chicago, 1997), 17, 39–40; Smith, "Structuring the Permeable Border," 138–39, 142.

10.  Daniels, Not Like Us, 46–48.

11.  In nineteenth-century China, food production failed to keep pace with a burgeoning population. Moreover, high taxes attributable to Chinese losses in the Opium Wars, and the Boxer Protocol of 1901 ending the Boxer Uprising (1899–1901), conspired to encourage thousands of Chinese to seek opportunity overseas. Many hoped quickly to improve their financial circumstances and return home. The Canadian government already reported in 1903 that the number of Chinese immigrants to Canada had increased by almost one-third between 1901 and 1902, despite the fact that the government had doubled the head tax from $50 to $100 in 1900. It was raised to $500 in 1903. June Mei, "Socioeconomic Origins of Emigration: Guangdong to California, 1850–1882," Modern China 5 (October 1979): 463–501; J. A. G. Roberts, A Concise History of China (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 173–204; The Evening News (Buffalo, NY), January 29, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 3; Peter S. Li, The Chinese in Canada (Toronto, 1998), 17–20, 41.

12.  Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), 214–16; Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History, 7th ed. (New York, 1963), 559–61. The Angell Treaty significantly changed provisions of the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 that had allowed Chinese people to emigrate freely to the United States. The new treaty recognized the United States's right to regulate and restrict Chinese immigration, but not to cut it off entirely. See Gyory, Closing the Gate, 26–28; Lee, At America's Gates, 117–19. In 1882, 39,579 Chinese entered the United States. Only ten entered in 1887, and the number remained well below pre-1882 levels even after the exclusion laws were repealed in 1943.

13.  "An Act in Amendment of the Various Acts Relative to Immigration and the Importation of Aliens under Contract or Agreement to Perform Labor," Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December 1889, to March 1891..., vol. 26 (Washington, DC, 1891), 1084–1086.

14.  John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, June 4, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53935/15; John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, July 7, 1914, ibid.; John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, February 19, 1916, ibid.; Edward Chambers, United States Railroad Administration, to William B. Wilson, secretary of labor, May 16, 1918, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 54410/318; Robert Stedler, Buffalo, to United States Office of Immigration, Montreal, [May 1918], ibid.; Robert Stedley (sic) to John H. Clark, May 14, 1918, ibid.; Telegram, T. L. Church, Mayor of Toronto, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, May 17, 1918, ibid.

15.  Spaulding to the Secretary of State, December 14, 1891, Canada, National Archives, Immigration Branch, RG 76; Lyndwode Pereira, assistant secretary of the interior, Ottawa, to E. M. Clay, dominion immigration agent, Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 14, 1893, ibid.; Order in Council 1376H, September 17, 1892, Canada, National Archives, Orders in Council, RG 2, series A-1–a; Erika Lee, "Enforcing the Borders: Chinese Exclusion along the U.S. Borders with Canada and Mexico, 1882–1924," Journal of American History 89 (June 2002): 75.

16.  This is not to say that the $50.00 head tax was not restrictive. The head tax on immigrants to the United States at the time was $.50. The Canadian tax was meant to be restrictive; the American tax was intended to finance the processing of immigrants. Nevertheless, even after the Canadian tax was doubled in 1900, the number of Chinese immigrants continued to rise. One thousand more Chinese entered Canada in 1902 than in 1901, an increase of 29 percent. News, January 21, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 5; Li, The Chinese in Canada, 34, 158 n. 3.

17.  See, for example Sucheng Chan, ed., Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882–1943 (Philadelphia, 1991); Iris Chang, The Chinese in America: A Narrative History (New York, 2003); Gyory, Closing the Gate; Lee, At America's Gates.

18.  Ibid., 156, 175.

19.  Lee, "Enforcing the Borders," 68, 72.

20.  Louis L. Ullman, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, New York, NY, February 9, 1904, USNARA, Northeast Region, New York, NY (hereafter cited as NARANY), Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #34/310–Lai Gow Len; Examination of Lai Gow Len, Malone, NY, January 13, 1904, ibid.; Charles L. Bullymore, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, NY, January 15, 1904, ibid.; Examination of Edward Baltz, Buffalo, NY, January 16, 1904, ibid.; Lawrence O. Murray, Washington, DC, to F. W. Berkshire, NY, March 12, 1904, ibid.

21.  Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, NY, January 26, 1904, ibid.

22.  F. W. Berkshire, NY, determination In re Lai Gow Len, alias H. T. Light, January 30, 1904, ibid.

23.  Ullman to Berkshire, February 9, 1904, ibid.

24.  Examination of Edward Baltz, Buffalo, NY, January 16, 1904, ibid.; J. A. Anderson, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, NY, January 20, 1904, ibid.

25.  Deposition of George Schwartzenburg, Buffalo, NY, February 11, 1904, ibid.; Deposition of Charles W. Roth, Buffalo, NY, February 18, 1904, ibid.

26.  In addition to creating debts, some travelers were also at pains to show that their property included bank accounts. See, for example, Deposition of Robert D. Young, Buffalo, NY, August 13, 1912, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #75/98–Wong Kung; Examination of George B. McPhail, Buffalo, NY, August 17, 1924, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #61/362–Wong Kam Wah.

27.  Examination of Wong Moon Sing, Buffalo, NY, November 23, 1909, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #47/404–Wong Moon Sing; Ansel W. Paine, Buffalo, NY, to David Lehrhaupt, Buffalo, NY, December 6, 1909, ibid.; Examination of Wong Moon Sing, Buffalo, NY, January 9, 1914, ibid.

28.  Examination of Wong Kung, Moon Wong and Wong Ah Bow, Buffalo, NY, August 8, 1912, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #75/98–Wong Kung; Deposition of Robert D. Young, Buffalo, NY, August 13, 1912, ibid.; Testimony in the matter of the application of Jung King Wing for return privileges as a laborer, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #110/380–Jung King Wing.

29.  Preinvestigation interrogation of Wong Git Hong as applicant for a native return certificate, Buffalo, NY, October 21, 1922, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #12/592–Wong Git Hong; Examination of Wong Yung Nuey, Buffalo, NY, October 7, 1919, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #34/298–Wong Yung Nuey; Examination of Wong Moon Lim, Buffalo, NY, June 28, 1921, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #6/5–Wong Moon Lim.

30. Buffalo (NY) Commercial, January 9, 1899, 9, col. 3; ibid., December 26, 1901, 9, col. 5; ibid., January 3, 1902, 9, col. 4; ibid., March 31, 1900, 13, col. 3; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to John H. Clark, Montreal, April 14, 1914, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1K.

31.  David A. Gerber, The Making of an American Pluralism: Buffalo, New York, 1825–1860 (Urbana, IL, and Chicago, 1989), 122–23. See also Peter Way, Common Labour: Workers and the Digging of North American Canals, 1780–1860 (Cambridge, 1993), esp. 45, 165, 165–87. Way has shown that in the 1830s and 1840s, a fluid, cross-border unskilled labor force of canal workers developed along the Niagara Frontier, with workers crossing and recrossing the border in response to fluctuating labor markets.

32.  Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston, 1989), 12–18.

33.  Examination of Ng Fook and Ng Tung, Buffalo, NY, March 25, 1920, NARANY, Chinese exclusion acts case files, 1880–1960, RG 85, Case #105/283–Ng Fook; Examination of Ng Fook, Buffalo, NY, October 8, 1925, ibid.; News, August 3, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 4; ibid., August 7, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 4, col. 4; Buffalo (NY) Courier, November 29, 1901, 6, col. 1; W. H. Ottis, Brooklyn, NY, to T. V. Powderly, Washington, DC, December 27, 1900, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 52730/53; Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, Brooklyn, NY, October 20, 1903, USNARA, RG 85, Series CHINEXCL, file 19/1490, http://www.nara.gov:80/cgi/starfinder (retrieved February 11, 2000) (hereafter referred to as CHINEXCL). The Chinese who faced deportation hearings before the United States Commissioner in Buffalo often carried railroad tickets and addresses of contacts in the cities to which they were headed. Contacts were most often relatives whom the captives were petitioning for money. New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Chicago, and Washington, DC, were the addresses to which immigrants sent correspondence, or from which they received it. Some immigrants also carried names and addresses of Chinese contacts in Mexico. One had a railroad ticket from Hutchinson, Kansas, to Boston, and another a ticket from Forth Worth, Texas, to Boston. See enclosures in Charles L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, August 3, 1908, USNARA, RG 85, Entry 9, File 52165/1, Babcock Investigation (hereafter cited as Babcock File). The News reported that corruption in the Immigration Service had allowed hundreds of Chinese to enter the United States across the Mexican border. See News, November 2, 1908, 1, col.5.

34. Courier, November 29, 1901, 6, col. 1.

35.  W. H. Ottis, Swanton, Vermont, to F. H. Larned, Washington, DC, December 14, 1900, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, file 52730; [W. H. Ottis], Buffalo, NY, to "My Dear Chief" [F. H. Larned?], March 1, 1901, ibid; Buffalo (NY) Times, January 18, 1903, 38, cols. 1–4; Courier, October 19, 1902, 13, cols. 3–5; Buffalo (NY) Daily Express, April 30, 1904, 7, col. 3; News, February 1, 1904, consulted at the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library, Local History Division, in "Buffalo Scrapbooks: Buffalo's Foreign Population," vol. 1, 8–10.

36. News, November 18, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 1, cols. 7–8; W. H. Ottis, Brooklyn, NY, to T. V. Powderly, Washington, DC, December 27, 1900, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 52730/53; Earl F. Coe, Port Huron, MI, to Richard H. Taylor, Seattle, WA, August 5, 1914, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1R; G. R. Ohlin, Buffalo, NY, to Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, January 7, 1914, USNARA, RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1; Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, May 11, 1914, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1K; Dodds to [Landis], Buffalo, NY, January 16, 1914, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1; Dodds to [Landis], Buffalo, January 22, 1914, ibid.; Dodds to [Landis], Buffalo, NY, April 10, 1914, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1K.

37. News, December 4, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, cols. 1–2; 3 o'clock ed., 1, cols. 1–2; ibid., December 10, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 1, col. 4; Medical Examiner's Report, Moy Foo Yick alias Fong Man Long, May 27, 1904, Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society, COO-1, Erie County Clerk's Office, Coroner's Inquests: Smuggling Chinese and Other Cases, 1889–1921 (hereafter cited as Coroner's Inquests); Personal Communication-Facsimile, Janice Burnett, Forest Lawn Cemetery, Buffalo, NY, to author, February 5, 2001; Personal Communication-Electronic Mail, Janice Burnett, Forest Lawn Cemetery, Buffalo, NY, to author, March 16, 2001. Lum was one of eight Chinese men disinterred from Forest Lawn in April and May 1913 and returned to China.

38.  Medical Examiner's Report, Chung Ben, November 12, 1908, Coroner's Inquests.

39.  Medical Examiner's Report, Mark Wing Gee, April 28, 1909, ibid.

40.  Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, January 22, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1.

41.  Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), 9, 13.

42. News, December 8, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 8; 5 o'clock ed., 8, col. 1; ibid., December 10, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 6; ibid., December 16, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 1.

43. News, December 9, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 1, col. 2; ibid., December 12, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 5, col. 5–6; ibid., December 16, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 1; ibid., December 23, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 2.

44. News, December 17, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 1, col. 3; ibid., December 23, 1903, 12 o'clock, 1, col. 2; ibid., December 24, 1903, 5 o'clock, 6, col. 4.

45. News, December 18, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 6, col. 2; ibid., December 23, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 8, col. 3; ibid., December 24, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 6, col. 4; The Buffalo Directory 1903 (Buffalo, NY: Courier Co., 1903) (Buffalo Directories hereafter cited as Buffalo Directory [year]); Buffalo Directory, 1904, 1906, 1907, 1908; Frank S. Pierce, Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, Chinese Inspector in Charge, New York, NY, January 23, 1904, NARANY, RG 85, Chinese Exclusion Act Case Files, 1880–1960, Case # 34/310– Lai Gow Len.

46. Buffalo Directories, 1903, 1904, 1906, 1907, 1908; Daily Express, March 15, 1909, 6, col. 7; News, December 11, 1908, 5 o'clock ed., 1, c. 1, 8, col. 2; ibid., December 31, 1908, 3 o'clock ed., 1, cols. 4–5, 7, cols. 2–3.

47.  Thomas Thomas, Buffalo, NY, to C. L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, July 11, 1908, Babcock File; Arthur M. Gentry, Buffalo, NY, to C. L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, July 14, 1908, ibid.; News, January, 26, 1903, 5 o'clock ed., 7, col. 2; ibid., February 19, 1909, 5 o'clock ed., 7, col. 5–6; G. R. Ohlin, Buffalo, NY, to Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, January 7, 1914, USNARA, RG 85, Entry 9, File 53788/1.

48. Commercial, March 3, 1900, 13, col. 2; ibid., March 6, 1900, 9, col. 3. The newspapers identify Crowley as "Dennis," but he is identified in both the U.S. Census and in city directories as "Daniel." Crowley, thirty-eight years old in 1900, and O'Brien, twenty-seven, were both first-generation Irish Americans. They lived at the Front Street address with Crowley's wife and two daughters along with two boarders, Michael Cotter, teamster, and Jacob Bittel, machinist. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Manuscript Census Schedules of the Twelfth Census (1900), Buffalo, NY, consulted on microfilm at the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society; F. S. McCullough, Buffalo, NY, to C. L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, July 9, 1908, Babcock File; Buffalo Directories 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904.

49.  Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to F. W. Berkshire, Brooklyn, NY, October 5, 1903, CHINEXCL; Pierce to Berkshire, November 17, 1903, ibid.; C.L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, August 3, 1908, Babcock File; Buffalo Directory, 1901.

50. Courier, March 3, 1900, 3, col. 2; News, August 3, 1908, 1, col. 4; Express, August 2, 1908, pt. 3, 13, col. 6; Thomas to Babcock, July 11, 1908, Babcock File; Leonard S. Coyne, Buffalo, NY, to C. L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, July 11, 1908, ibid.; McCullough to Babcock, July 9, 1908, ibid.

51. Farmers and Business Directory for the Counties of Brant, Haldimand, Lincoln, Norfolk, Welland, and Wentworth, 1891 (Ingersoll, ON, 1891), 505; Farmers and Business Directory for the Counties of Haldimand, Lincoln, Welland, and Wentworth (Hamilton, ON, 1918), 230; Lovell's Directory, Province of Ontario, 1882 (Montreal, 1882), 1008 (typescript); Ontario Gazetteer and Directory, 1888–1889 (Toronto, 1888), 494 (typescript); Ontario Gazetteer and Directory, 1895 (Toronto, 1895), 293 (typescript); Ontario Gazetteer and Business Directory, 1901–1902 (Ingersoll, ON, 1902), 306 (typescript); Ontario Gazetteer and Directory, 1905–1906 (Ingersoll, ON, 1906), 303 (typescript); Ontario Gazetteer and Directory, 1910–1911 (Ingersoll, ON, 1910), 326 (typescript) (cited hereafter as Fort Erie Directory [year]); Ernest Cruikshank, A Century of Municipal History, 1792–1892, part 2, 1841–1892 (Welland, ON, 1892), 67; Jane Davies and Joan Lyons Felstead, eds., Many Voices, A Collective History of Greater Fort Erie (Oshawa, ON, 1996), 79–80, 296; Gentry to Babcock, July 14, 1908, Babcock File; Coyne to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to [John H. Clark], Montreal, April 14, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1K.

52.  Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to Richard H. Taylor, Seattle, WA, July 10, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1S; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to Richard H. Taylor, Los Angeles, August 13, 1914, ibid.; John W. Howell, Buffalo, NY, to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, February 12, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1.

53.  Pierce to Berkshire, October 5, 1903, CHINEXCL; Babcock to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 3, 1908, Babcock File; McCullough to Babcock, July 9, 1908, ibid.; A. R. Archibald, Buffalo, NY, to Chas. L. Babcock, Buffalo, NY, July 11, 1908, ibid.; Coyne to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.; Thomas to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.; Gentry to Babcock, July 14, 1908, ibid.; Fort Erie Directory 1891, 511; Davies and Lyons, eds., Many Voices, 46–47; H. R. Page, Illustrated Historical Atlas of Lincoln & Welland Counties, Ontario (Toronto, 1876), 61.

54.  Coyne to Babcock, July 11, 1908, Babcock File; Thomas to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.; Gentry to Babcock, July 14, 1908, ibid.; McCullough to Babcock, July 9, 1908, ibid.; Archibald to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.

55. News, August 3, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 4, col. 1, 1, col. 4; ibid., August 7, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 4, col. 4; Express, August 3, 1908, 7, col. 2; Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, August 4, 1908, USNARA RG 85, Entry 9, 52095/1, Re: Illegal Chinese Immigration (hereafter cited as Pierce File); Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to Chinese Inspector in Charge, New York, NY, September 26, 1908, ibid.; Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to Chinese Inspector in Charge, New York, NY, October 24, 1908, ibid.

56. News, August 31, 1908, 5 o'clock ed., 1, col. 3; Babcock to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 3, 1908, Babcock File; Thomas to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.; McCullough to Babcock, July 9, 1908, ibid.; Gentry to Babcock, July 14, 1908, ibid.; Archibald to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.

57. News, August 10, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 4, col. 4; ibid., August 31, 1908, 5 o'clock ed., 1, col. 3; ibid., November 20, 1908, 5 o'clock ed., 6, col. 1; ibid., November 25, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 10, col. 6; ibid., December 1, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 12, col. 2; ibid., December 4, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 1; Daily Express, December 5, 1908, 7, col. 7.

58. News, December 14, 1908, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 4; ibid., December 31, 1908, 3 o'clock ed., 1, cols. 4–5, 7, cols. 2–3; ibid., February 18, 1909, 12 o'clock ed., 4, col. 1, and 3 o'clock ed., 5, col. 1; ibid., February 20, 1909, 3 o'clock ed., 1, col. 7.

59.  C. Luther Fry, "Illegal Entry of Orientals into the United States between 1910 and 1920," Journal of the American Statistical Association 23 (June 1928): 173–77; A. W. Parker, Montreal, to A. Caminetti, Washington, DC, July 31, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53935/15.

60.  John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, January 18, 1912, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52999/31. See also Clark to Commissioner-General, January 8, 1912, ibid.; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to [John H. Clark], Montreal, May 1, 1913, ibid.; Landis to [Clark], October 29, 1913, ibid.

61.  "An Act to Regulate Immigration," Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December, 1881, to March, 1883..., vol. 22 (Washington, DC, 1883), 214–15; "An Act in Amendment of the Various Acts Relative to Immigration and the Importation of Aliens under Contract or Agreement to Perform Labor," Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December 1889, to March 1891..., vol. 26 (Washington, DC, 1891), 1084–86; "Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 13, 1895," Statutes at Large of the United States of America from August 1893, to March 1895..., vol. 28 (Washington, DC, 1895), 390; "Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 13, 1903," Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December 1901, to March 1903..., vol. 32 (Washington, DC, 1903), 450; "Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 13, 1904," ibid., 1112; "An Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and Labor," ibid., 826–31; "Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 13, 1907," Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December 1905, to March 1907 (Washington, DC, 1907), 722; "Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 13, 1908," ibid., 1329; Commercial, March 3, 1900, 13, col. 2; ibid., March 9, 1900, 7, col. 5; ibid., March 23, 1900, 11, cols. 5–6; ibid., March. 24, 1900, 13, col. 3; Courier, November 14, 1901, 8, col. 2; Buffalo Directories, 1900–1903; Directory of the City of Niagara Falls for 1896 (Niagara Falls, NY, 1896), 208; Buffalo Directory 1903, 63–64; News, January 29, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, col. 3; ibid., February 2, 1903, 12 o'clock ed., 1, cols. 7–8; ibid., January 13, 1904, 5 o'clock ed., 8, col. 3.

62.  Babcock to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 3, 1908; McCullough to Babcock, July 9, 1908, Babcock File.

63.  Parker to Caminetti, July 31, 1914.

64.  G. Oliver Frick, Detroit, MI, to [John H. Clark], Montreal, February 13, 1909, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52150/4; Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, January 16, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1; Dodds to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, January 18, 1914, ibid.; Howell to Inspector in Charge, February 12, 1914, ibid.; Dodds to Taylor, July 10, 1914; W. H. Ottis, NY, to "brother Larned," April 6, 1901, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52730/53.

65.  Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to [John H. Clark], Montreal, January 29, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1; Richard H. Taylor, Seattle, WA, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, July 20, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1M; Parker to Caminetti, July 31, 1914.

66.  Thomas to Babcock, July 11, 1908, Babcock File; Babcock to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 3, 1908, ibid.; Archibald to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.; Coyne to Babcock, July 11, 1908, ibid.

67.  Archibald to Babcock, July 11, 1908, Babcock File; Frank S. Pierce, Buffalo, NY, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, June 17, 1908, Pierce File; Pierce to Chinese Inspector in Charge, September 26, 1908, ibid.

68.  Pierce to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 4, 1908, Pierce File; Pierce to Chinese Inspector in Charge, September 26, 1908, ibid.; Pierce to Chinese Inspector in Charge, October 24, 1908, ibid.

69.  Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to United States Commissioner of Immigration, Montreal, February 12, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1; W. H. Ottis, St. Albans, VT, to T. V. Powderly, Washington, DC, December 8, 1900, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52730/53; [Ottis], Brooklyn, NY, to [F. H.] Larned, December 26, 1900, ibid.

70.  Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, to U.S. Commissioner of Immigration, Montreal, August 18, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1S; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, February 20, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/J.

71.  Richard H. Taylor, Buffalo, NY, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, August 24, 1914 RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1S; [Harry R. Landis], Buffalo, NY, to [John H. Clark], Montreal, August 18, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1S; Howell to Inspector in Charge, February 12, 1914; Landis to United States Commissioner of Immigration, February 12, 1914, ibid.; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to United States Commissioner of Immigration, Montreal, February 20, 1914, ibid.

72.  John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, February 25, 1913, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52150/4; Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to [Harry R. Landis], Buffalo, NY, February 18, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1.

73.  W. H. Ottis, Brooklyn, NY, to T. V. Powderly, Washington, DC, December 27, 1900, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52730/53; Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, February 12, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1.

74.  Harry R. Landis, Buffalo, NY, to United States Commissioner of Immigration, Montreal, April 14, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1K; Opinion of Judge Hazel in United States vs. Melvin Tucker, John Oberst, United States District Court, Rochester, NY, June 18, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1H.

75. News, December 11, 1908, 3 o'clock ed., 1, col. 1, and 8, col. 2; ibid., December 31, 1908, 3 o'clock ed., 1, col. 4–5, and 7, col. 2–3; ibid., March 2, 1909, 3 o'clock ed., 1, col. 1; ibid., March 22, 1909, 3 o'clock ed., 1, col. 4; Express, March 23, 1909, 8, col. 2.

76.  John H. Clark, Montreal, to [Daniel J. Keefe], Washington, DC, January 21, 1910, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52999/31; Daniel J. Keefe, Washington, DC, to [John H. Clark], Montreal, November 3, 1910, ibid.; Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to [Harry R. Landis], Buffalo, NY, January 18, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1; John W. Howell Jr., Buffalo, NY, to [Landis], Buffalo, NY, February 12, 1914, ibid.; Dodds, to Inspector in Charge, Buffalo, NY, February 19, 1914, ibid.; Landis to United States Commissioner of Immigration, April 14, 1914; Ottis to Powderly, December 27, 1900; Ottis to "brother Larned," April 6, 1901, ibid.; Babcock to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 3, 1908, Babcock File; Ohlin to Landis, January 7, 1914.

77.  G. Oliver Frick, Detroit, MI, to L. T. Plummer, Chicago, April 21, 1908, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52107/3; Frick to John H. Clark, Montreal, September 26, 1908, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 52150/4; Clark to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, October 13, 1908, ibid.; Frick to Clark, February 13, 1909, ibid.; Clark to Commissioner-General of Immigration, February 25, 1909, ibid.; Clark to Commissioner-General of Immigration, February 25, 1913, ibid.

78.  Parke to Caminetti, July 31, 1914.

79.  [Richard H. Taylor], Washington, DC, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, November 9, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1U.

80.  Richard H. Taylor, Buffalo, NY, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, May 25, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1C; Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to Richard H. Taylor, Buffalo, NY, June 7, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1L; Taylor to Commissioner-General of Immigration, June 18, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1H.

81.  Taylor to Commissioner-General of Immigration, August 24, 1914; Samuel D. Dodds, Buffalo, NY, to Taylor, Washington, DC, December 5, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1U; Memorandum for the Commissioner-General of Immigration regarding Chinese Smuggling Operations, January 11, 1915, ibid.

82.  Parke to Caminetti, July 31, 1914; John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, March 8, 1915, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1V; Alfred Hampton, Washington, DC, to Clark, Montreal, May 11, 1915, ibid.

83.  Richard H. Taylor, Buffalo, NY, to A. Caminetti, Washington, DC, August 30, 1915, ibid.; Hampton to Clark, May 11, 1915, ibid.

84.  John H. Clark, Montreal, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, Washington, DC, August 7, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53935/15; Landis to [John H. Clark], January 29, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53788/1; Parker to Caminetti, July 31, 1914.

85.  Landis to [John H. Clark], January 29, 1914; Telegram, Clark to Immigration Bureau, August 7, 1914, USNARA RG 85 Entry 9, File 53935/15; Clark to Commissioner-General of Immigration, March 15, 1915, ibid.

86.  Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 10, 62–67.

87.  Smith, "Structuring the Permeable Border," 130–39; Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 27–30.

88.  Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 62; Lee, "Enforcing the Borders," 63–68.

89.  Edmund S. Morgan, "The First American Boom: Virginia 1618–1630," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 28 (April 1971): 198.

90. Report of the Immigration Investigating Commission to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury (Washington, DC, 1895), 31–34, 110–11.

91.  See, for example, the obituary of Harry Chinn (or Chin), The Times, June 19, 1929, 17, cols. 2–6.

92.  For examples of such relationships, see page 40 above.

93. Statistics of the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census (Washington, DC, 1883), 402, 422, 453; Fourteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1920, vol. 2, Population 1920 (Washington, DC, 1922), 47, 50, 76.

94. Niagara Falls (NY) Gazette, July 18, 1924, 7; ibid., August 27, 1924, 1; Courier, July 12, 1924, 14, col. 1–2; ibid., July 14, 1924, 16, col. 1; ibid., July 18, 1924, 8, col. 2–3, and 16, col. 4–5. For L. E. H. Smith's Klan activities, see Shawn Lay, Hooded Knights on the Niagara: The Ku Klux Klan in Buffalo, New York (New York, 1995).

95.  U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1923 (Washington, DC, 1923), 23; U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1925 (Washington, DC, 1925), 8; U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1927 (Washington, DC, 1927), 15.

96. The Gazette (Niagara Falls, NY), July 14, 1924, 16; ibid., July 17, 1924, 2; ibid., July 19, 1924, 1; ibid., August 27, 1924, 1; Courier, July 12, 1924, 2, col. 7; July 15, 1924, 15, col. 3 and 16, col. 1; New York Times, July 29, 1924, 36.

97.  U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922 (Washington, DC, 1922), 13.

98.  U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1923, 24–25; U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1924 (Washington, DC, 1924); Lee, "Enforcing the Borders," 58, 78.

99.  U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1923 (Washington, DC, 1923), 15.

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