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Reviews

Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession, by Russell McClintock. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 388 pages. $35.00, cloth.

In this exquisitely detailed book, Russell McClintock provides a rich examination of the Northern response to secession, from November 1860 through April 1861. McClintock thoughtfully probes the reactions of various Northern constituencies to reveal the confusion, uncertainty, shock, miscommunication, anger, and fear. The result is an excellent history that offers one of the best examinations of the North during the secession crisis since David Potter's 1942 Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis and Kenneth Stampp's 1950 And The War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis.

McClintock carefully explores the sharply divided Northern response to secession in the weeks and months following the November 1860 election. He traces reactions in state capitals, newspapers, Congress, and among ordinary citizens of all political persuasion. McClintock argues that throughout the winter and into the spring, Northerners passionately debated whether to accept secession, compromise in the hope of preventing disunion, or use force to maintain the Union. He finds that, despite the partisan differences, the vast majority of Northerners eventually came to understand that they wanted the same end; preservation of the Union. McClintock also finds that, despite the intense debate and political maneuvering, the ultimate decision for peace or war rested with Abraham Lincoln. Recalling Charles Ramsdell's 1937 article on Lincoln and Fort Sumter, but without the accusatory tone, McClintock argues that Lincoln arranged events in such a way so that the Confederacy would have to open the hostilities.

One of the strengths of McClintock's book is his careful depiction of the chaos, uncertainty, and miscommunication occurring as different constituencies in the North attempted to make sense of the unfolding events. McClintock is very effective in laying out how vaguely understood were the alternative courses of action for the North, how not all plans for dealing with secession were logical, and how the solution to one dilemma only created another. He is equally good in describing the confusion that existed among Republican Party leaders. For example, McClintock shows how various Congressional Republicans worked at cross-purposes on various compromise plans in early December while state party leaders and local newspapers simultaneously demanded a firm response to secession. McClintock does what few historians are able to do; he is able to shed the burden of inevitability that plagues many narratives and builds a sense of suspense and tension as he leads us through the secession crisis.

McClintock is also very effective in presenting the possibility of disunion without war as a viable solution to the crisis for many Americans. The "Conciliationists," mostly Democrats, but also some Republicans, argued that coercing the seceded states back into the Union would destroy the federal system. According to McClintock, these individuals were willing to let the seceded states go rather than use force to keep the Union together. They argued that the remaining United States and the new Confederate States of America could peacefully and profitably co-exist much like the Zollverein of the independent German states. In examining the "Conciliationists," McClintock reminds us that the Union was more fragile and less certain in the middle of nineteenth century than we often assume.

In analyzing the Northern decision for war, McClintock carefully examines the role of Abraham Lincoln. He finds that, like the North as whole, Lincoln initially misunderstood the depth of Southern disunionism. He also finds that the President-Elect's tentative first steps toward leadership revealed his capacity for partisan politics and his skill in managing a divided party. Nevertheless, according to McClintock, Lincoln agonized over making a decision about secession and delayed, postponed, and hoped for the impossible to happen. Lincoln's "masterly inactivity" was in fact no policy at all as he tried to find a balance between firmness and magnanimity. In the end, the North lurched toward war, and Lincoln played a central role in that decision making process.

There is much to praise in Lincoln and the Decision for War. McClintock's understanding of nineteenth-century America's political culture and his analysis of political parties provide valuable insights into the Secession Crisis. Likewise, his careful examination of the roles of Stephen Douglas, James Buchanan, William Seward, Abraham Lincoln, and other political leaders helps the reader gain an understanding of the broad range of perspectives in the North. More importantly, it is McClintock's sensitivity to the uneven and often confused process of decision making and to the central role of Lincoln's decision to remain uncompromising in his positions against slavery that sets this book apart from others. Although the book may not be appropriate for students below the college level, all teachers, regardless of the level at which they teach, should read this book to gain a rich understanding of this complex and critical period in our history.


Southern Illinois University Edwardsville	Stephen Hansen

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