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Review
| Deadly Enemies, directed by Susan Lambert. First Run/Icarus Films. 51 minutes, color, 2004. $390 sale, VHS/DVD; $75 rental, video. Order at www.frif.com.
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| American students' historical understanding of terrorism often begins with 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax scare. Thus a film that links the present danger of bio-terror to the historical development of biological weapons could be most welcome in our classrooms. Susan Lambert's film, Deadly Enemies, addresses this need with a clear narrative that roots bio-terror firmly in the secret laboratories of the cold war. The film is engaging but it also has some unfortunate drawbacks that may limit its pedagogical value. Teachers may find it useful for shock effect and entertainment, qualities accentuated by the filmmaker's campy style. She uses black and white footage from the 1950s and 1960s which often is both cute and terrifying. More recent events, however, are taken more seriously, and the film ends on a somber note, the death of David Kelly in the woods, in the midst of controversy over bio-weapons in Iraq. |
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Although the film makes an admirable effort to uncover the secret history of biological weapons, it glosses over much of the story. There is considerable literature now about the biological weapons programs conducted by Japan during World War II, for example, but viewers will learn almost nothing about it here. Iraq also receives very little mention, which may come as a surprise. Instead the focus is upon the United States and the Soviet Union. The film makes extensive use of interviews of a few key individuals, but their importance in guiding the story is marred by the fact that these talking heads are not identified initially, and although later they are mentioned by name, these names do not appear on the screen. If teachers hope to use this film as a teaching tool, they will be disappointed to find precious little specific information on the screen, which makes it impossible for even the most attentive students to take notes. Also, dates too seldom are given. This seems problematic in a film whose coverage stretches over half a century. |
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What students will learn from this film is the story told by a few of the same people who were interviewed for the NOVA documentary, "Bioterror," that aired on PBS in 2002. Two of these talking heads, Bill Patrick and Kanatjan Alibekov, were the leaders of American and Soviet bio-weapons programs. Patrick tells about the work done while he was head of development at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the U.S. Army's center for bio-weapons development, while Alibekov adds the Soviet perspective. Both of them testify to their sense of duty during those years, and Patrick shares his indignation at protesters who singled out Fort Detrick as an evil place. Alibekov and his colleague Sergei Popov (also interviewed) defected during the last years of the Soviet Union, in part because they believed that the scale of the Soviet bio-weapons program far exceeded that of the United States. Now they are working on the same subjects to help defend the United States against terrorists. Also interviewed are Matthew Meselson, who has lobbied for a comprehensive ban on research in this field, and David Kelly, the weapons inspector who died in an apparent suicide not long after being interviewed for this film. Kelly, who inspected Soviet facilities during the Gorbachev years, played a crucial role in bringing the Soviet weapons program to light after he was informed about the vast scope of the project by Soviet defector Vladimir Pasechnik. |
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The most disturbing aspect of this subject, which is justly highlighted in the film, is the problem of proliferation and the continued development of bio-weapons. The Soviet Union has not existed for over a decade, but the fate of its weapons, such as the 4,500 metric tons of anthrax it developed by the late 1980s, remains an open question. Smallpox's eradication was announced in 1981, but Alibekov notes that this was seen by the Soviet Union as an unprecedented opportunity for using it as a weapon; thus, the Soviets had, and now the Russians have, the capability to use smallpox as a weapon. What has happened to all this material? Can terrorists gain access to it? To what extent are biological weapons being designed for offensive use? The film provides no answers. President Nixon renounced offensive biological weapons in 1968, observing that mankind already possessed too many of the seeds of its own destruction. But as David Kelly said in his interview, there is no clear delineation between offensive and defensive bio-weapons. |
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| California State University, Long Beach |
Jacob Darwin Hamblin |
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