Book Review

In Warm Sands, Eric W. Mogren examines the evolution of federal policies associated with managing tailings generated in the course of uranium production. He argues that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), worried about eroding the nation's faith in nuclear power, initially downplayed health- and pollution-related concerns associated with those tailings. As a result, industrial practices that would have been relatively inexpensive to implement in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to costly remediation actions in the 1980s and 1990s.	1
State and federal health officials first turned to the AEC with concerns in the 1950s. They did so after discovering higher than normal concentrations of radium downstream from uranium mills located on the Colorado Plateau. However, the AEC expressed little interest in their findings. Existing laws gave the agency responsibility for managing material that had a radioactive content over .05 percent, but the concentration of radioactive material in the tailings fell below this threshold. Health officials, though, continued to press for federal action, and unfavorable publicity eventually motivated the AEC to take action.	2
In the 1960s, the pattern was repeated. This time, the AEC brushed off concerns associated with radon gas emanating from tailings and even condoned the use of tailings as construction material. Only after health officials documented high radon levels in and near structures that used tailings did the AEC agree to address the problem, ultimately leading to the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project of 1978.	3
Mogren is more critical of what he sees as the AEC's technical arrogance and hypocritical logic than he is of their inaction. He describes how the uranium boom of the 1950s was the direct result of federal efforts to secure a domestic uranium supply during the Cold War. The AEC set prices high enough to generate interest and was the sole purchaser of uranium produced by companies. Yet, when state officials complained about problems caused by this industrial activity, the AEC posited that the federal government was simply a purchaser of material and had neither the authority to dictate industrial practices nor responsibility for fixing whatever concerns existed. At the same time, the AEC aggressively defended its image as the agency most able to protect the public from radiological hazards and the technical authority on anything related to atomic matters.	4
This general argument about the AEC is, of course, nothing new. A more important contribution of this book is the opportunity to view another thread in the evolution of federal environmental policy. Mogren does a good job tracing the scale, geography, and economics of uranium mining—and coupling that story with health and safety concerns—throughout the twentieth century. In addition, the strategic role of the Colorado Plateau in domestic uranium mining makes this story an important part of that area's environmental history.	5
The book has several weaknesses or, rather, missed opportunities. Most serious is Mogren's tendency to view the tailings problem in isolation. UMTRA, for example, has interesting parallels to Superfund, but no real discussion of the parallels and differences occurs. The concern with radon emanating from tailings probably gave rise to broader national concerns with radon, but the problem is only discussed in relation to tailings. Mogren also avoids seriously wrestling with the problem of measuring and communicating risk. That said, Warm Sands does provide comprehensive coverage of the material it focuses on and stimulates the reader to make connections for himself or herself. It is an appropriate choice for a graduate class on environmental policy or history.	6
Hugh S. Gorman, associate professor of environmental policy and history at Michigan Technological University, has written Redefining Efficiency: Pollution Concerns, Regulatory Mechanisms, and Technological Change in the U.S. Petroleum Industry. (Akron, Ohio: University of Akron Press, 2001).

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