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Errata

On p. 828 of the June 2007 issue, the title of Sharon Block's book was erroneously listed as Rape and Secular Power in Early America. The book's correct title is Rape and Sexual Power in Early America. The editors regret the error.

On pp. 1280 and 1281 in the October issue, several diacritical marks were incorrectly typeset in the paragraph beginning "In chapters seven and eight, ..." and ending "... after the reburial of Nagy on June 16, 1989." The paragraph should have read thus:

In chapters seven and eight, which provide a useful day-by-day account of the Soviet and Hungarian decision-making process in 1956, we see Kádár at the height of his opportunism. Kádár agreed with Prime Minister Imre Nagy on the need for a full break with the old Rákosi-Gerő regime after he was appointed the new first secretary on October 30, 1956. Chosen suddenly by the Soviet elite to head a harsher, post-invasion regime, knowing the intervention was already underway, Kádár succumbed to a combination of fear and ambition. His belief in party unity and loyalty to the USSR prevailed. He certainly would not "opt for martyrdom" like Nagy. As Gough writes, "To view siding with the Soviet Union as a betrayal is to use a moral calculus alien to Kádár.... [T]here was nothing in his thinking that made Soviet intervention wrong in itself" (p. 97). As he later warned Alexander Dubček in 1968, Nagy himself had not been a "counter-revolutionary," but had been "overtaken by events" (p. 164). Although initially acting as Leonid Brezhnev's "broker and soft cop" in the 1968 crisis, in contrast to hardliners Walter Ulbricht and Władysław Gomułka, Kádár ultimately joined Warsaw Pact forces in the invasion of Czechoslovakia when Dubček rejected a call from Brezhnev for yet another multilateral meeting (p. 167). The ever pragmatic Kádár "knew that Hungarian living standards were dependent on Soviet goodwill" (p. 169). Goulash communism and the "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM) boosted Kádár's popularity by easing foreign trade restrictions, giving limited freedom to the workings of the market, and allowing a limited number of small businesses to operate in the services sector (p. 161). In contrast to the wasteful Ceauşescus of Romania, Kádár was known for his modest lifestyle, probably stemming from his poverty in childhood. All he wanted was "a bed of my own and shoes that don't leak in the winter" he once told his girlfriend Piroska (p. 15). Other factors contributing to Kádár's popularity include his peaceful abdication (again, in contrast to Ceauşescu), his sincere regret for the tragedy of 1956, especially regarding Nagy, and his death just three weeks after the reburial of Nagy on June 16, 1989.

The editors regret the errors.

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