Michelle Brattain

Race, Racism, and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to the Postwar Public

In December 1949, with the Holocaust still a raw, immediate memory, an international group of scholars gathered in Paris to author a final authoritative rebuttal to Nazi-style scientific racism. Organized under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the project reflected postwar liberal optimism about the power of internationalism and science itself to prevent human tragedy, as well as a collective sense of remorse. Just thirty years earlier, according to a project director, "Europeans could still regard race prejudice as a phenomenon that only affected areas on the margin of civilization." The war had been "a sudden and rude awakening." Like many contemporary social scientists, the project directors believed that Nazism, and racism more generally, had "thrive[d] on scientifically false ideas and ... ignorance." Education as a remedy for racism was a liberal article of faith shared by many scientists, as well as many of the American and European functionaries in UNESCO. Charged by the United Nations with creating a "programme of disseminating scientific facts designed to remove ... racial prejudice," UNESCO leaders proudly, and somewhat naïfively, declared in 1950 that UNESCO now had "the will and the means to make available to everyone the achievements of science."¹ For science, they believed, had already produced the correct antiracist knowledge about race when it traded in the old "scientific racism" of cataloguing, and occasionally fabricating, innate racial differences for a new paradigm emphasizing an environmental and genetic understanding of human variation.² Although many scientists remained blind to the subtle racism permeating the predominantly Western scientific establishment, a large number were newly committed to "breaking the bioscientific tie of race, blood, and culture" that had enabled wartime genocide and now threatened postwar unity.³ Accordingly, the first project assembled experts in Paris to "define the concept of race" itself. The resulting statement went so far as to declare that race was more "social myth" than "biological fact," and the term might be dispensed with altogether.⁴

But the statement project, which involved more than one hundred scientists directly and many more indirectly, as well as various diplomats and UN member states, soon became mired in transnational scientific and political controversies and ultimately, and perhaps predictably, fell short of its ambitious goals. Project directors discovered that little consensus existed beyond agreement about the wrongness of Nazism, and scholars who had begun to challenge the scientific basis of the race concept itself proved to be in an increasingly embattled minority. Within a year, scholarly criticism forced UNESCO to assemble a second gathering to rewrite the statement. Although a majority of scientists had rejected the premises of scientific racism some years earlier, the second statement project revealed how much the categories, premises, empirical records, and authority of an older, supposedly discredited body of work once dedicated to measuring difference continued to influence the science of race. Most postwar scientists favored dissemination of a more politically and scientifically palatable definition of race, and few could be fairly described as "racist" by postwar standards. In the end, however, most proved unwilling to question the validity of race as a natural category. The second statement recanted the first group's social constructivist position, returned to a biological definition of race, and, significantly, also affirmed older scientific traditions (and languages) by noting differences between "non-literate" and "more civilized" people on intelligence tests.⁵ Although the final statement was clearly a rebuttal to a certain style of scientific racism, it was not the straightforward repudiation of racial thinking that UNESCO planners had initially envisioned.

UNESCO's project presents an interesting and revealing case study in the history of race, racism, and antiracism, and an ideal place to engage criticism about how this history is, and should be, done. Scholars are now beginning to challenge historians to move beyond the insight—and, some lament, now largely ceremonial observation—that race is a social construction to do the neglected work of historicizing race and racism. As Thomas Holt has observed, there is a tendency to treat racism either as a unified, timeless, autonomous phenomenon attributed to human nature or as simply ignorance of some truth about what race really is.⁶ UNESCO contributors, who typically subscribed to the latter approach, went forward to create a new, and newly flawed, social construction. Even less historical attention has been given to historicizing antiracism, although as UNESCO's project shows, movements to dislodge racism are equally contingent, opportunistic, political, and grounded in the same social formations as racism itself.⁷ Understanding how race was reconstituted as a biological deterministic entity, at a time when scholars were united against Nazi-style scientific racism and the nonacademic world seemed unusually receptive to antiracism and the authority of science, is essential to postwar historiography. But in a more general sense, the UNESCO story also provides an opportunity to explore the essential relationship between the race concept and racism, a problem, as Barbara J. Fields warns, that historians ignore at the risk of reifying the very thing they hope to reveal as an ideological construct. We now have a rich literature that exposes and interrogates political and cultural practices of racism— including white supremacy, anti-miscegenation laws, segregation, and the construction of particular racial identities such as whiteness, the Irish, the Mediterranean, or the Negro—but few of these works examine the historical nature of the race concept(s) that gave these particular practices their form.⁸ The history of race science represents a notable exception, but there the evolution of scholarly race concepts is rarely considered in relation to popular consumption of ideas about biology, inheritance, and innateness.⁹ In other words, while we know that races mattered, we seldom ask what historical actors believed race was, and how that notion permitted racist practices. This is especially true in the history of the late twentieth century, when ideas about human variation more closely resembled those common today. But simply documenting archaic uses of race does not represent a full embrace of the implications of thinking of race as a social construction unless we also consider, carefully and critically, the implications of how we treat race in our own historical work. Here the race statement project offers a useful allegory about the shortcomings of simply exposing the "errors" of past usages of the concept without considering the nature and deployment of the concept itself both in the past and in our own thinking.

Although the UNESCO statements have often been cited as evidence of just how influential the new universalist, antiracist consensus had become in the postwar life sciences, the legacy of this "improved" science was ambiguous.¹⁰ What actually seems to have replaced scientific racism was a stalemate over what had become the default assumption, or null hypothesis, about racial differences. In spite of the inherent difficulty of interpreting alleged racial differences, the vexed nature of existing evidence, and the slipperiness of the race category itself, the majority of academic participants nevertheless presupposed that race and racial differences existed. As a result, the debate replicated the logical structure of the most elementary experimental trials, where one claim assumed the status of the "null" hypothesis—the claim by default assumed to be true—and the burden of evidence fell exclusively on those who advocated an "alternative" hypothesis.¹¹ This epistemological dynamic reproduced the limitations of the collective scientific imagination at that moment, precluded a more profound reassessment of the race concept, and inadvertently reconstructed an intellectual space for thinking of race as a legitimate and determinist category of human variation. As Fields recently observed, "the first principle of racism is belief in race." By preserving essential elements of the race concept, postwar antiracism played an important, if unintentional, role in facilitating a highly resistant form of popular racism. Although the evidence considered here is confined largely to the United States and is admittedly limited, it suggests that the many "publics" addressed by UNESCO were an equally important vector in the historical process of synthesizing old and new forms of race and racism into the dominant public discourse. By the end of the decade, scientific racism had reemerged in public discourse as academic and nonacademic proponents seized upon the scientifically validated notion of innate biological differences between races to argue against racial equality. If, as Etienne Balibar has argued, racist ideologies succeed by providing "immediately intelligible ... interpretive keys" to the masses, the UNESCO project revealed many antiracists and racists to be sharing the same keys.¹²

Before the war, while most scientists regarded Nazi scientific racism as "mere nonsense," few were willing to speak out against it publicly. Many scientists in the United States and Britain, for example, had long believed that public advocacy on controversial political issues was incompatible with the "objectivity" assumed to be the hallmark of scientific practice.¹³ When Columbia University anthropologist and well-known antiracist activist Franz Boas attempted to organize a "Scientist's Manifesto" against Nazism in the 1930s, he found scholars more willing to denounce violations of academic freedom than the content of Nazi ideology. By the time war broke out in Europe, a prominent American physical anthropologist declared it too late: "Not only has the horse been stolen, but the barn has also been burned." For antiracist activists such as Boas, however, the need for a scholarly answer to Nazism remained vital.¹⁴ Even if most scientists no longer subscribed to a hierarchy of races, that did not, in Boas's words, "mean that in the general attitude of the American people the question [was] dead." Although World War II ushered in some positive developments in race relations, it was also, as Gary Gerstle has argued, a "race war." The incarceration of Japanese Americans, bitterly racist propaganda in the Pacific, segregation in the armed forces, race riots, and hate strikes revealed the tenacity of racism. The ideology behind racism, when explicitly expressed, most frequently took the form of "white" beliefs about the innate inferiority of people of African descent. A 1939 national survey of Americans, for example, revealed that 71 percent of "white" respondents believed that "Negroes" were inferior in intelligence. Antiracist scholars frequently attributed such beliefs to "widespread ignorance," and Boas, whose own books were burned in Nazi Germany, therefore became a major proponent of popular writing to combat racism. Although he occasionally worried that "only people who agree will read it," most mid-century activists assumed that education was the "basic means of gaining leverage in the fight against ... bigotry."¹⁵

Part of what scientists were forced to address was their own community's responsibility for creating rationalizations for racism and for the lag in teaching what they embraced as more enlightened views. A 1939 study revealed that two-thirds of typical American public school and university textbooks "misuse[d] the concept of `race,'" and 20 percent taught "what amounts to Nazi doctrines about superior and inferior races." The belief in racial differences in intelligence, for example, had once been a matter of "fact" in science. But the studies and data that purportedly demonstrated these differences, particularly the army's notorious World War I pre-induction IQ tests, had been widely discredited among research scholars. By the interwar period, most scholars had embraced an environmental explanation of racial differences in test performance. Many textbooks nevertheless asserted a direct causal connection between race and mental traits. One 1938 text declared, "each race thinks very differently from all other races. That is why the Eastern (Oriental) and the Western (Occidental) peoples find it difficult to understand each other." A 1940 survey of sociology textbooks discovered that many were applying the term "race" in a manner reminiscent of Madison Grant circa 1916, referring to Anglo-Saxons, aliens, Negroes, Jews, and Canadians as races. The contemporary entry on "Races" in Encyclopedia Americana, one American geneticist commented, "could have been written by Dr. Goebbels."¹⁶

Even the war emergency did little to disseminate new ideas about race. In 1941, the American Red Cross segregated blood plasma donations by race in deference to American "tradition," a medically senseless practice that also informed the blood donation policy of the Nazis.¹⁷ A 1943 cartoon-illustrated pamphlet, The Races of Mankind, authored by two Columbia University anthropologists who had picked up "the banner on the race question" after the death of Boas in 1942, was investigated by the House Military Affairs Committee as "propaganda" and subsequently banned by the USO and the U.S. War Department, then destroyed. Its "propaganda" consisted of the observation that northern "Negroes" scored higher than southern "whites" on IQ tests, indicating that environment influenced intelligence.¹⁸ The wartime international discourse about "half-breed" children of soldiers likewise suggested that a bias against interracial sex survived on both sides of the Atlantic, even though scientists had long since ceased to believe that interracial sex was "unnatural" or that mixed-race children were defective.¹⁹

The distance between academic science and public discourse on race had already convinced some scholars of the need to break the nonacademic public's habit of using the term altogether. In 1935, British biologists Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon argued in their popular book We Europeans: A Survey of "Racial" Problems that "with respect to existing populations, the word `race' should be banished, and the descriptive and non-committal term ethnic groups should be substituted." In the United States, anthropologist Ashley Montagu argued against use of the term in any context. In 1941, Montagu "shocked his colleagues" at the American Association of Physical Anthropologists (AAPA) annual meeting by declaring "the whole concept of race to be `utterly erroneous and meaningless.'"²⁰ His Man's Most Dangerous Myth, an introductory text written for a popular audience and a bestseller in 1942, attempted to disabuse the public of the validity of "race" itself. When, eight years later, the first UNESCO race statement made the controversial claim that race was merely a "social myth," it was largely because of Montagu, whose renown as a public expert on race ensured his placement and prominence on the UNESCO panel.²¹

A precocious young scholar born in Britain and trained in the United States under Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas, Montagu had early established himself as a nonconformist in the generally conservative field of physical anthropology. Although red-baiting later forced him out of the academy, in the early 1940s Montagu participated in several prominent scholarly debates about race. He often did so with little humility and, probably as a result, little effect. A 1943 letter of recommendation, for example, described Montagu as "one of the most versatile and brilliant younger men in American anthropology today" but "not always the most tactful person ... [with] considerable facility in annoying people." After the 1941 AAPA convention, anthropologist Ales Hrdlicka remarked that "if all the anthropologists agreed with Montagu and dropped the word race from their vocabulary today, he would be back tomorrow to claim that it was a good word and try to get it reinstated." His reputation as someone unable to "cooperate without contention," in fact, got him barred from the AAPA committee on race relations in spite of his expertise.²²

In the history of science, the rejection of the first UNESCO statement has often been attributed to Montagu's political zealousness and his refusal to adhere to received wisdom in science, but Montagu believed that his arguments were grounded in contemporary science and a critique of physical anthropology. As a regular reader of and correspondent with anthropologists, sociologists, biologists, psychologists, zoologists, and geneticists, he attempted to address the interdisciplinary community of scholars whose work considered race.²³ In Montagu's view, anthropologists had been laboring for a century to "squeeze mankind into races according to complexion and other superficial traits" while taking "completely for granted the one thing which they were attempting to prove, namely the existence of human `races.'" Anthropology had long treated race as phenotype (physical appearance), as though observable features corresponded to some deep, consistent, organic unity within groups. Montagu parodied this method as "averaging the characters of a given group ... giving them a good stirring and then serving the resulting omelet as a `race.'" Race, however, existed only in "the statistical frying pan," cooked up in "the heat of the anthropological imagination."²⁴ Lending credence to Montagu's charge that classification was little more than a "parlor game," anthropologists' method for addressing irregularities in classification schemes had traditionally been to invent more. By 1950, the number of races recognized by anthropologists ranged from four to thirty.²⁵

While many anthropologists addressed the race problem by turning to "culturalist" understandings of difference, Montagu looked to genetics. In a 1942 American Anthropologist article, he urged anthropologists to embrace the "new genetic synthesis," a statistical and genetic approach to human variation that had begun to undermine the old typological categories in biology by the 1930s and would inform the growth of population genetics in the 1950s. Genetics offered anthropologists a way out of descriptive dead-ends, Montagu argued, by providing an account of people as dynamic populations that incorporated mutations, passed them down, and over time manifested superficial differences in appearance. Genetics also suggested the folly of classification based on phenotype, since "race" traits accounted for "probably no more than one per cent" of the total genetic composition of human beings. Race became "static and classifiable only when a taxonomically minded anthropologist arbitrarily delimits the process of change at his own time level." Thus Montagu also defined race as a historical construction, a conceptual snapshot taken at a particular moment by anthropologists. Since "race" preserved the pejorative implications of Victorian scientific racism, Montagu advocated not only a reconceptualization, but a renaming. Man's Most Dangerous Myth conceded that some groups were "physically sufficiently distinguishable from one another" to be classified in some way, but he recommended that it was preferable "to speak of [them] ... as major groups rather than as races, and to speak of the varieties of men which enter into the formation of these major groups as ethnic groups." The choice of terms was "purely arbitrary," he admitted to a fellow anthropologist, but he explained the logic this way: "race evoked a pattern of thought, ethnic group stimulated inquiry and a new trend of thought."²⁶

Although many colleagues appreciated the significance of Montagu's insights, few drew the same conclusions. Columbia University geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky, an occasional collaborator whose own work advocated a similarly genetic conception of race, informed Montagu that although he admired his book, he could not "subscribe to your campaign against the existence of races and for the ethnic groups or divisions or whatever you want to call them." It was not "race" but racism that was the problem, Dobzhansky argued, using a made-up nonsensical phrase to illustrate his point. Scientists could claim that they had proved "the non-existence of races but demonstrated the existence of several glof glubs," but from there it would be a short step to "glof glub discrimination, glof glub pride, and glof glub conflicts." Geneticist J. H. McGregor explained to Montagu that although he disliked "the idea of `higher' and `lower' groups or any hierarchy, and `master race' stuff as much as you do," he still suspected that race might correlate with "innate difference in temperament and aptitudes." Moreover, McGregor agreed with Dobzhansky that if "ethnic group" replaced "race," "it would soon come to be as badly misused." Zoologist Ernst Mayr was more sympathetic, but recommended that another term be used, such as "section, division, series, set, array, [or] group." Almost any term, he warned, like race "has already some other meaning in the language of ordinary life." Mayr's preferred term was "subspecies," the "beauty" of which was that it would have "only the meaning ... given to it by those who have first defined it." However, he doubted that Montagu "could get away with ... such an artificial term" in physical anthropology.²⁷

Nazism did not resolve scholarly differences of opinion about how to deal with "race," but it did make the refutation of racism a "legitimate intellectual stance." The 1950 Statement on Race marked a minor revolution in ideas about the proper role of science.²⁸ Applying science to refute the most common fallacies of racism, the statement declared that "all men belong to the same species, Homo sapiens"; so-called intelligence tests provided no basis for believing in inborn differences in intelligence, temperament, personality or character; and, finally, no biological justification existed for prohibiting intermarriage. Although the statement indirectly addressed Nazism and antisemitism by declaring that national, religious, and linguistic groups were not races, UNESCO, like many contemporary social scientists, "made no distinction" between different forms of racism. Visible differences could be attributed to heredity, the statement acknowledged, but it explained that those genes were few when compared to the "whole genetic constitution of man and to the vast number of genes common to all human beings." The most controversial passages appeared in the last points: "'race' is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth"; and finally, "biological studies" revealed a natural drive among Homo sapiens "toward cooperation." Both assertions bore the imprint of Montagu, who served as rapporteur and principal editor.²⁹ The second claim echoed Montagu's 1949 book On Being Human, which further challenged the premises of Nazism by attempting, although not very successfully in the eyes of his peers, to refute the old Social Darwinian saw about an innate drive toward racial competition.

The first UNESCO statement was but one of several mutually reinforcing anti-racist discourses that emerged in the years immediately after World War II. As Penny Von Eschen has shown, a renewed appreciation of nonwhite peoples' shared experiences of oppression under state regimes defined by race led to the development of an international, anticolonial, antiracist movement. In the United States, this international perspective briefly eclipsed traditional political divisions within the Negro community and united conservative and left-wing rivals behind an international antiracism defined as human rights. As Nikhil Pal Singh argues, this notion of a transnational racial belongingness temporarily elevated a persistent but frequently submerged strand of American thought to the forefront of antiracism in the 1940s. Such coalitions pressured United Nations founders to make the UN an effective instrument of antiracism, accessible to people unrepresented by member nations and empowered to remedy human rights abuses. In the same years, a domestic antiracist discourse emerged in the American Intergroup Relations movement, a diverse coalition of religious, civic, labor, and civil rights organizations and social scientists that publicly targeted racism through propaganda in radio, television, and print advertising. The focus of that movement, evident in the name, was less the concept of race per se than a continuation of wartime efforts to eliminate racial tensions and conflict.³⁰

The critical mass implied by this confluence of antiracist dialogues lends support to Howard Winant's observation that World War II represented a "'break' in the worldwide racial system," and yet each faced considerable challenges as the postwar era rapidly transformed into the Cold War era. The UN's ability to serve as a higher authority in domestic and international racial affairs foundered as human rights issues became entangled in the American-Soviet rivalry, and the demand for human rights itself became tainted in the West as an issue associated with the Soviets and communism. Although Soviet criticism of U.S. civil rights failures provided activists with new political capital, domestic anticommunism also imposed a kind of self-censorship. After 1948, mainstream organizations such as the NAACP "cracked under the pressure and started a slow and steady retreat from the issues of human rights and decolonization," narrowing the conception of antiracist advocacy to a demand for domestic civil rights. Previously progressive organizations such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) abandoned ties to left-wing antiracist collaborators. By 1950, when UNESCO issued its first statement, the Cold War and anticommunism had considerably muted many of the antiracist discourses that had once had the potential to transcend national traditions and politics.³¹

The academic nature of the statement project initially insulated participants from such external, politicized scrutiny, but Montagu's draft faced an exacting peer review.³² While the reviewers were all ostensibly antiracist, their criticisms fell into three basic and sometimes overlapping camps, which echoed responses to Montagu's criticism of the race concept in the early 1940s. The largest number, "agnostics," continued to think that race might correspond to genuine innate differences.³³ Even psychologist Otto Klineberg, for example, known for his exposés of the fallacies of intelligence testing, objected to the draft's claim that there were no "inborn psychological differences between racial groups," calling it "premature." "Pessimists," such as Dobzhansky, doubted the utility and intellectual honesty of eliminating the term. A third group, "enablers," espoused scientific views that provided substantial support for the most common racist stereotypes, but included many antiracists such as Julian Huxley. Huxley suggested that the statement begin by "facing the facts" of the "very considerable distinctness" of racial groups and the likelihood that physical differences would be associated with genetic determinants of "temperament and personality." Huxley referred to "rhythm-loving" in the Negro and the "shut-in temperament of many Amerindian groups" as race traits that might be genetic in origin.³⁴ Nearly all reviewers suggested that the draft statement went too far in its attempt to undermine notions of racial difference. Montagu conceded that the statement might be overly positive, but he resisted suggestions for revision, saying, "I do not, however, care for the negative approach." Moreover, he believed that UNESCO's mission was to promote equality through education and not simply to gather scientific facts. Although he promised to make the final draft "bombproof," the final statement retained "signs of [his] authorship ... unmistakable," in Dobzhansky's words, to friends and enemies.³⁵

The 1950 statement received broad and positive international press coverage, with hundreds of stories, editorials, and radio features, as well as prominent mentions in American newsreels, sermons, public symposia, and television programs.³⁶ But in the scientific community, the statement caused a firestorm. British members of the Royal Anthropological Institute (RAI) published a blistering criticism in the Times. While RAI representatives agreed that discrimination could not be "justified ... by anthropology," they deemed the statement "distinctly controversial," especially "the too simplified statement that `race is less a biological fact than a social myth,'" the proposal to replace "race" with "ethnic groups," and the claim that there was an innate drive toward brotherhood. Editorial notes in the RAI journal, Man, insinuated that the statement was the product of dilettante "equalitarians." Too much "prominence," RAI honorary secretary W. B. Fagg complained to UNESCO, had been given to the "by no means universally acceptable Ashley Montagu," while the panel itself included only two physical anthropologists. "The main attack," Dobzhansky told Montagu, was against "abolishing the term `race' ... and you will remember, my friend, that for the last ten years I have done my damnedest to convince you that this proposition will neither be accepted nor would it do any good if accepted."³⁷

Criticism, on political and scholarly grounds, soon spread. According to UNESCO social science officers, the reaction "in South Africa and ... other countries, especially in Holland, has not been good," and they worried that "the South Africans will attack us on the basis of so-called `scientific inaccuracies.'" The U.S. State Department, deeply sensitized to world criticism of American racial practices, conducted its own editorial review. Resistance also stemmed from whichever academic dogmas were enjoying local currency, and in some nations this meant a dated science akin to the old scientific racism. A Dutch professor criticized the statement in the Elsevier Weekblad with the simplistic assertion that "races are congenitally different."³⁸ In the United States, rivalries between physical and social anthropologists also produced criticism. The AAPA president argued that the statement confused the reality of race with the myths behind racism, a confusion exacerbated by the fact that the version issued by the U.S. State Department had removed the quotation marks in the sentence "For all practical social purposes `race' is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth." He predicted that the statement would fail because the public, "not so easily fooled," would become "impatient with a definition that does not describe what is seen" and that "tends to deny the reality as well as the usefulness of the visible physical differences." American physical anthropologist Carleton Coon claimed that "dozens" of scientists had given the statement "lip service and then tore it apart."³⁹

UNESCO project director Alfred Métraux concluded that the "original sin" was the failure to place "prominent physical anthropologists or biologists" on the panel, leaving UNESCO vulnerable to charges of "empty idealism." He announced that UNESCO would reconvene a second panel of physical anthropologists and geneticists to prepare another statement, to be subjected to a more extensive peer review. Following the advice of anthropologist Margaret Mead, Métraux contacted the statement's critics and explained that few biological scientists had been included because of the committee's concern with "SOCIAL aspects of the race problem."⁴⁰ The second UNESCO statement committee more accurately reflected the state of race science in 1950, but that introduced other problems. Métraux dutifully wrote to professional organizations soliciting nominations, even attempting to avoid Western bias. Reliance on professional organizations, however, introduced its own bias. Scholars belonged to insular, hierarchical communities that measured status by affiliations and credentials that were not always earned by merit alone. Inexplicably, no one seems to have recommended one of the few nonwhite physical anthropologists, W. Montague Cobb, whose published work represented a major challenge to racial determinism.⁴¹ Anthropology was intellectually Eurocentric, influenced primarily by British, German, French, and American traditions of studying the "external `other,'" and expertise was largely confined to Western Europe and the United States. Demographically, Americans were increasingly dominant, but other national traditions did not share the general American tendency to emphasize culture over biology.⁴² Métraux failed to locate an Asian expert and was disappointed to discover that many experts in non-Western institutions were actually Europeans. He considered including medical doctors, but a fellow anthropologist persuaded him that this would expose UNESCO once again "to criticism that people who are not directly concerned with human race are laying down the law for physical anthropologists who are."⁴³

Acknowledged "experts" included scientists whose views spanned the spectrum of ideas about race. Huxley suggested the British geneticist C. D. Darlington, a recommendation that Dobzhansky attributed privately to Huxley's rumored senility, as Darlington was widely regarded as an "out and out racist."⁴⁴ A 1950 article by Darlington, for example, had suggested that genetic differences explained why some groups clustered into certain occupations and determined whether colonized peoples were capable of adapting to European culture—views Métraux deemed "so extreme that they are plainly ridiculous." Darlington could be "rather extreme," Huxley agreed, but he attributed this to discipline rather than prejudice. The geneticist's view was "not always identical with [that of] the social-anthropologist," which "often seems to be coloured by wishful thinking." Huxley recommended Darlington as a hedge against "further sweeping statements about the unprovability of the existence of any racial mental differences, which upset all the natural scientists." Montagu's friends insisted that he be included, and he agreed, if only to "keep a rein on one or two members of the committee."⁴⁵ Métraux chose Columbia University geneticist L. C. Dunn to serve as the 1951 rapporteur. The author of UNESCO's pamphlet Race and Biology and co-author of the popular 1946 book Heredity, Race, and Society, Dunn had ideal credentials. Moreover, he was especially attuned to the political sensitivities of his generation, having aided scholars in escaping the repression of scholarship by Nazism in Germany and Lysenkoism in the Stalinist Soviet Union.⁴⁶

When the second UNESCO group convened in 1951, however, the more immediate problem was an epistemological one of how to deal with the question of racial differences in intelligence, a controversy that recalled critiques of the first statement. Dunn reported that "discussions were marked by a very evident desire, on the part of all, to reach common ground," but the fifth section, on mental characteristics, had been "the subject of much dispute." "Racial" intelligence became ground zero in the debate about difference. Although skepticism had largely displaced the older literature that purported to measure "innate intelligence," many scholars remained wedded to its assumption that some fundamental mental differences must exist. Others were cautious about formulating new claims about the insignificance or nonexistence of differences. The depth of the controversy was permanently inscribed between the lines of the revised 1951 section on intelligence, the longest and undoubtedly the most confusing to a lay reader. The first statement had declared simply in a single paragraph that the anthropologist never used mental characteristics in classifying races, that intelligence tests could not differentiate between environmental and innate capacity, and that given the same opportunities, all groups attained similar levels of achievement. The second statement's discussion of mental characteristics consisted of five paragraphs of seemingly contradictory claims, including that (1) anthropologists do not use mental characteristics in racial classification; (2) scientists' tests had demonstrated mental differences between more and less "civilized" races; (3) some scientists said that intellectual differences were hereditary; (4) some scientists said that intellect and morals were conditioned by environment; and (5) common character attributes of nationalities were produced by socialization and history.⁴⁷ Since the section began with an assertion that mental tests were not used to classify races, many readers would have found it odd that this claim was followed by a discussion affirming test results that had attempted to do exactly that. Section five became a Rorschach blot into which almost any interpretation might be read.

The second group also explicitly rejected the first statement's claim that race was a social myth. The panel, Dunn reported, was "careful to avoid dogmatic definitions of race." But the panel was "equally careful to avoid saying that ... therefore races did not exist," reasoning that "the physical anthropologists and the man in the street both know that races exist; the former from the scientifically recognizable and measurable congeries of traits which he uses in classifying the varieties of man; the latter from the immediate evidence of his senses." Rhetorically equating the visually based intuitions of "the man in the street" with the anthropologist's "scientific" knowledge, the group implicitly affirmed the belief that phenotype revealed something significant about an individual's overall biological inheritance. Panelists agreed that "race" was a loaded term "colored by its misuse ... and ... deliberate abuse," but they could not agree on an alternative. In a compromise, they agreed "to reserve race" for "anthropological classification showing definite combinations of physical (including physiological) traits in characteristic proportions."⁴⁸ Ultimately, that position fell back on the taxonomists' trade as well as the amateur's account of race as a self-evident fact.

With the second panel, UNESCO officers attempted to create consensus by a perverse kind of inclusion—inviting peer review from dozens of scholars representing every sort of scholarly tradition and diluting the influence of iconoclasts such as Montagu. But these academic conventions only exacerbated the problem. After receiving comments from nearly sixty scholars, ranging from "enthusiastic endorsement to sharp or ironical rejection," Métraux had begun to wonder whether "the plan to create a text which might rally the consensus of most scientists was not an utopia ... which might have the opposite effect." In spite of the statement's equivocation on intelligence, for example, that section received considerable criticism. Many suggestions for minor editorial modifications were actually symptomatic of quite different assumptions about the nature of the controversy. Several scientists, for example, had disagreed on the qualifiers included in the sentence comparing racial differences in intelligence: "some members of the group of inferior performance [on intelligence tests] surpass not merely the lowest ranking member of the superior group, but also the average of its members." Another version proposed: "many members of the group of inferior performance ... surpass most members of the superior group." Another suggested that "some ... surpass many."⁴⁹ Others objected to the statement's whole approach to the issue of intelligence. Anthropologist Joseph Birdsell worried that the comprehensiveness of the statement, when paired with its multiple qualifications, might "leave nonprofessional readers with the idea that ... important differences in innate intelligence probably will be demonstrated." Instead he suggested acknowledging that "scientists have never managed to devise a test ... untainted by culture and thus there were no methods capable of measuring innate intelligence." British geneticist Kenneth Mather, on the other hand, argued that even if scientists "know little about [genetical differences in mental capacity] ... this ignorance must not be used as a basis for saying that average differences do not exist." In other words, scientists should not leave the impression that this could not be true.⁵⁰

Métraux also had to contend with critics expressing extreme opinions, including some more readily classified as simply racist, and with renewed hostility to mixing science with politics. He protested to German anthropologist Hans Nachtsheim, who suggested eliminating the entire sentence declaring that all mankind shared an innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development: "It would be better to throw the statement into the wastepaper basket." Caltech geneticist A. H. Sturtevant objected to claims about the harmlessness of racial mixture on the basis of dog-breeding experiments.⁵¹ German anthropologist Hans Weinert's comments concluded: "which of the `gentlemen' authoring this statement would be willing to marry his daughter to an Australian Bushman?"—"an argument usually resorted to," Métraux protested, "not by scientists, but illiterate racists."⁵² Several scholars compared UNESCO's attempts to build consensus to the political machinations of the Nazis and the Soviets. Coon warned that he "did not approve of slanting scientific data to support a social theory, since that is just what the Russians are doing, and what Hitler did." In the end, Métraux gave up on the elusive consensus and opted to publish the original 1951 draft and a volume of the criticisms he received.⁵³

The inclusion of genetics, in which Montagu had invested so much hope for overcoming the disciplinary inertia of physical anthropology, had introduced another snag into the debate. Geneticists were essentially agnostics when it came to race, and this attitude, when paired with some of the discipline's basic assumptions and the general state of the field, made them less flexible when it came to the question of nature vs. nurture. Races were understood by most geneticists as populations with a common gene pool; therefore any heritable trait could, in theory, be more common in one group than another. Moreover, many geneticists who were consulted on the statement argued that empirical evidence that some traits were genetically determined was enough to suggest that all traits were genetically determined. This was not a particularly problematic claim if applied to individuals, but it had sinister implications when applied, as many geneticists insisted that it must be, to groups. In effect, it implied that any observable inequalities between "races"—a considerable number by any measure in this age of imperialism, apartheid, and segregation—could be attributed to innate differences. Genetics also provided traction for the claim that racial differences were natural, rather than a product of social perceptions or flawed measures. Geneticist H. J. Muller argued, for example, that given "the admitted existence of some physically expressed hereditary differences of a conspicuous nature [between races] ... it would be strange if there were not also some hereditary differences affecting the mental characteristics." Those more attuned to the impact of environment emphasized that genes determined only the potential to develop a certain quality, but the upshot when it came to defining race was the same. Geneticists were also staking out disciplinary turf. For Sturtevant, the "argument that environment is the sole determinant" of racial difference was "something that every competent geneticist must protect against." Some of the arguments for racial equality, he complained, "were so obviously contrary to genetical experience as to be positively harmful."⁵⁴

In reality, however, there was little that genetics could empirically illustrate about the genetic content of races in 1951 beyond an extrapolation backward from phenotype and its likely correspondence to genes. In spite of great advances at mid-century, genetics remained largely abstract and theoretical, and quite primitive in terms of empirical investigation. Geneticists could use mathematics to predict gene distributions within populations and to identify genes conforming to a simple Mendelian pattern, but only when a trait could be observed in phenotype, such as albinism. When it came to the direct investigation of genotype, biochemical methods remained too primitive to probe complex traits.⁵⁵ Most geneticists conducted research on simple organisms such as fruit flies and applied their insights to humans at a theoretical level. Claims about innate racial differences were made primarily on the basis of first principles. Sir Ronald Fisher, an internationally respected geneticist and a major contributor to the "new evolutionary synthesis," for example, argued that the statement should read: "scientific knowledge provides a firm basis [rather than "no basis"] for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development." Direct evidence for this claim did not exist, but it was not needed, Fisher suggested, given that one could assume that "such groups do differ undoubtedly in a very large number of their genes."⁵⁶

The criticisms of geneticists and other agnostics exposed the thorniest epistemological challenge to reconceptualizing race: the null hypothesis, a particularly striking metaphor for this history. Normally in statistical tests, the null hypothesis, or default assumption, is that two things are the same (i.e., the difference is "null"), and the burden of proof rests on those who propose the alternative hypothesis, that two things differ. In the case of race, the usual null-alternative relationship was reversed, with difference assumed and the burden of proof falling on those who asserted sameness. By 1951, scientists had systematically exposed the flawed research designs, culturally biased tests, and poorly interpreted data that lay behind older pronouncements about racial differences, but past practice had created a standing assumption that race and innate racial differences existed. Many reviewers acknowledged the absence of good evidence for difference but argued, like geneticist Curt Stern, that it was an overstatement to say that "available scientific knowledge provides no basis for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate (mental) capacities," even though this accurately described the state of the field. Scientific prestige, he argued, could be mobilized to argue "It is not proven!" but it seemed "doubtful" to him whether that prestige could be "used effectively by opposing fatally wrong ideas with [mere] opinions" still under debate.⁵⁷ Anthropologist Carleton Coon likewise warned that it was a mistake to "belittle" the possibility of differences in intelligence "on humanitarian grounds," because if differences were proven, "you are out on a limb"—a risk, perhaps, but only if one assumed that they would be proven someday.⁵⁸

Of course "equalitarians" had not proven, and arguably could never prove, that there were no differences whatsoever between races—the default alternative hypothesis demanded by many critics. But significantly, neither did agnostics offer any proof of a specific genetic component linked to normal intelligence or any reason to believe that this corresponded to race. Therefore, it was not simply a case of the naïfive faith in empiricism that historians normally associate with postwar science, since no one had empirical data. Nor should historians view this as simply adherence to the old Popperian saw of proving the falsity of a prior claim. The assumption about what must be proved in 1951 came down to the historic formulation of the question itself. As Montagu observed in a 1944 letter to Science, "Forty years of psychological testing" had provided no solid evidence for thinking that "the range of inherited capacities" differed in accordance with race. Some scientists might choose to believe that differences between groups "will in all probability be found to be numerous," but he chose to believe "the exact opposite of that."⁵⁹

Some critics countered that the moral question of equality should not depend upon the scientific question of equality. Darlington argued for an embrace of human differences as an opportunity to use "the ineradicably diverse gifts, talents, capacities of each race for the benefit of all races." Coon argued that racial superiority should not matter, because human beings "deserve treatment as equals because of their quality of being human."⁶⁰ No UNESCO consultant would have disagreed, but to rely on such an argument in 1951, when the Holocaust, apartheid, and segregation provided such potent reminders of the failure of human beings to act on that principle, seemed naïfive at best and spurious at worst to many antiracists. Difference did not necessarily translate into inequality, but even if scientists were capable of accepting "racial traits" as value-free observations on human diversity, it was also true that in Western society, "rhythm-loving" and "intelligent" just did not carry the same value.

Although the evidence is limited, reactions to UNESCO's project also offer some instructive insights into the external challenges confronting scientific antiracism after the statement went public. Most participants approached the statement as a straightforward problem of exposition and seemed to assume that the universalist nature of science gave them the expertise and authority to deliver information effectively. Interestingly, in the same years, scholars in sociology and psychology, disciplines not included in this particular UNESCO project, had begun to question one of its basic assumptions: that education served as an effective tool against racism. If, as Theodor Adorno argued in 1950, prejudice stemmed from a personality disorder, no amount of "rational argument" could "have deep or lasting effects upon a phenomenon that is irrational in its essential nature." The level of bickering among UNESCO participants over qualifying articles and specific phrases, however, suggested that they approached the audience as fundamentally receptive, not only capable of reading the statement carefully and literally, but willing to do so. The statement project, as well as UNESCO's broader mission in the postwar era, was premised on the assumption that most racism was corrigible and could be combated by "disseminating scientific facts."⁶¹ But audiences, who brought their own agendas, preconceptions, and predispositions to the reading, proved much less passive and predictable than the simple formula of education-against-racism allowed. Rather, they seemed to engage in a process that Michel de Certeau long ago described as "poaching": singling out elements that held resonance for them as individuals and investing those elements with their own idiosyncratic meanings.⁶²

The first challenge for UNESCO was simply translation. While historians of science have read the UNESCO statement as evidence of a "revolution" in the life sciences, contemporary nonscholars were unlikely to appreciate subtle changes introduced by population genetics and the increased emphasis on environmental determinism.⁶³ When anthropologist Wilton Krogman tested the statement on his neighbors, all college graduates in the arts and sciences, he reported that they simply "did not get it." Labor- and management-relations leaders warned Montagu in 1950 that an average worker would not make it through the first paragraph. Nonacademic reactions to the statement, particularly the fixation on certain passages, also revealed a deep divide between the preoccupations of scientists and those of the public. Krogman's neighbors took "greatest exception" to the section declaring the harmlessness of race mixture, which they interpreted as "'bending fact' to fit political (racial) expediency."⁶⁴ Apparently they did so not on the basis of the literal content of the statement, but on prior assumptions and the statement's failure to convince them otherwise. A similar phenomenon characterized the reactions of United Nations member states. South Africans, who believed that their nation's "300 years" of experience with the "race problem" gave them some authority on it, objected to what they deemed "irresponsible" statements on the race question. The American delegation objected to a related UNESCO pamphlet, What Science Says about Race, because the State Department believed that it included "inaccurate and misleading information about the race problem in the United States." Concerns that the British National Commission might "object to the presentation of some of the facts" because of "the impression they might cause on `colonials'" forced Métraux to pursue a separate peer review within Britain.⁶⁵ None of these objections were based on the science per se or on the criticisms raised in peer review; rather, they were predicated on the political implications of what science might say about race for any given audience.

Similarly, when the Los Angeles County Museum put on an educational exhibit titled "Man in Our Changing World" in 1951, public controversy flared over what were relatively uncontroversial issues among scientists but were long-standing hot buttons for the public. Although UNESCO staff members were delighted to see the statement reproduced in the catalogue and congratulated the curator "for the excellent job of popularization of this very difficult task," the museum had actually censored the content. Deeming it "propaganda," the museum cut several sections, including one on the "admixture of races" and another problematizing the equation of race with skin color. The "admixture" section had been intended to show that race mixing had occurred throughout human history without harmful effects, and in the words of the exhibit copy, "there are no superior or inferior races or race mixtures."⁶⁶ The other section was a clever visual representation of the statement's emphasis on the wider range of variability within each racial group than between racial groups as a demonstration of the fluidity of racial categories. This was a particularly significant innovation, as other traveling museum exhibits, such as Malvina Hoffman's prewar sculptures of the "Races of Mankind," had perpetuated an older typological approach by presenting "race" in the form of literally static bronze figures depicting idealized racial "types."⁶⁷ To graphically illustrate the point, the exhibit incorporated a "race quiz" based on photographs. Accompanying text advised: "most people are surprised to learn that it is often difficult to identify an individual's origin [as] physical features and skin color are not always reliable guides." The curator defended the cuts on aesthetic grounds, but many anthropologists deemed the changes unacceptable. Eliminating the section on "admixture," the Southwestern Anthropological Association protested, "left the [erroneous] impression that the three major races are entirely different and essentially immutable." Montagu, who happened to be in Los Angeles to deliver a talk, protested in person that "it would be far better to have no exhibit at all."⁶⁸

The agnosticism enshrined in postwar scientific antiracism also proved significant to the heated public debate about race that erupted in the United States in the wake of the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision mandating the desegregation of public schools. Brown elicited a furious backlash of scientific racism, which was, ironically, enabled in significant ways by scientific antiracism. The assumption that biological "difference" existed, common to scholars and nonscholars, racists and antiracists, was handily conscripted by segregationists to provide scientific-sounding arguments against integration. In 1956, Columbia University psychologist Frank McGurk presented a survey of several highly dubious "scientific" studies in U.S. News and World Report to demonstrate that Negroes did not have the same capacity for education as whites. Many scholars cried foul, but segregationists "hailed it as definitive proof that school integration violates laws of science and nature."⁶⁹ A disparaging scholarly survey of white supremacist ideology observed in 1959, "Today among the great mass of southern whites, belief in Negro racial inferiority is virtually universal." But even that author could not truthfully declare that this was simply bad science. Rather, he offered only the observation that "contemporary anthropologists and geneticists agree that assertions about Negro inferiority have not been scientifically demonstrated."⁷⁰ One source cited for this uninspiring rebuttal was the UNESCO statement. Armed with the nearly universal belief in the biological reality of race, segregationists found ample support for their views in the scientific literature and an infinitely usable past. In his 1962 book The Biology of the Race Problem, W. C. George, a retired University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor and the president of a North Carolina counterpart to the Citizens' Council, reached as far back as Robert Bennett Bean's infamous 1906 craniometric study of Negro and white cadavers.⁷¹

The new scientific racists also seem to have understood and taken advantage of the logical weaknesses of antiracism. Carleton Putnam, a notorious popularizer of scientific racism although not a scientist himself, is a particularly instructive example. A former airline executive and collaborator with white supremacist groups who inspired a well-financed grassroots movement against integration with his "open letter" to President Eisenhower in several American newspapers, Putnam astutely pointed out that those who advocated equal treatment had never actually argued that men were equal. Whenever one tried to "pin down the man who uses the word `equality,'" Putnam charged, "at once the evasions and qualifications begin." In the late 1950s, Carleton Coon, acting as a secret consultant, advised Putnam that it was unnecessary to cite such controversial sources as Madison Grant, whose name "evokes fascism and racism of a Hitlerian variety" and would alienate readers. Instead, Coon suggested mainstream academics such as antiracist Alfred Kroeber, a former Boas student and professor of anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley, who did "not believe in racial equality in intellect"; Kroeber had committed his views to print, according to Coon, and "no one has challenged him." In Putnam's subsequent book, Race and Reason (1961), the science of difference became the illusory "interpretive key" linking the wishful intuitions and political agendas of segregationists to a seemingly authoritative scientific discourse legitimating racism. Any man "with two eyes in his head," Putnam assured readers, can "observe a Negro settlement in the Congo," compare it "with London or Paris," and "draw his own conclusions regarding relative levels of character and intelligence."⁷²

The reception of resurgent scientific racism is difficult to measure, since it undoubtedly appealed to segregationists fishing for post hoc rationalizations for their opinions. But it is notable that in spite of its marginality in academia, scientific racism garnered substantial institutional support, visibility, and, as a result, probably readership. George's book was bankrolled by the state of Alabama. Putnam's Race and Reason received official state sanction from several southern legislatures. Louisiana purchased five thousand copies of Putnam's book and made it compulsory reading for college administrators, faculty, and students. The Citizens' Council subsidized the printing and distribution of both works at bulk rates. Former Ku Klux Klan leader and Louisiana congressman David Duke, who read Putnam's book in junior high school, cited it as an inspiration that made him "question the egalitarian arguments that I had uncritically accepted ... [and] realize another legitimate and scientific point of view existed." Scientists dismissed such works as "hokum," but as historian George Lewis has pointed out, nonacademic readers did not necessarily understand the nature of sources, and the copiously footnoted claims, moreover, provided a seemingly credible argument that appeared considerably more reasonable than mobs and fire hoses. Putnam attributed his own rejection by the scientific community to the "suppression of the truth" about genetic differences between races, citing the UNESCO statement as a prime example of "equalitarian dogma" driven by misguided humanitarianism.⁷³

The rapid reemergence of scientific racism was perhaps all the more striking given the simultaneous success of another postwar antiracist discourse. Rooted in the Myrdallian notion of universal American rights, the liberal antiracism often associated with the "classical" phase of the American civil rights movement had practically eliminated legal discrimination in the same years. By the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had ruled against segregation in housing, transportation, education, and public amenities. The nonviolent civil rights movement had made the contradictions inherent in the "American dilemma" undeniable and severely undermined the credibility of racial discrimination.⁷⁴ But this did not necessarily signal the change in racial thinking that Montagu and some antiracist scientists had proposed in 1950. It is worth recalling that even the much-vaunted social science brief introduced into Brown v. Board of Education did not primarily attempt to establish the equality of races as an argument for eliminating segregation, but rather focused on the negative psychological impact that segregation had on children.⁷⁵ That racism persisted in the United States was confirmed by a national Newsweek poll conducted immediately after the 1963 March on Washington to probe "How Whites Feel about Negroes." Although most interview subjects supported equal opportunity in employment and education, the poll results revealed the tenacity of beliefs about racial difference. One in three respondents believed that Negroes were "an inherently inferior race"; 71 percent believed that Negroes "smelled different"; 93 percent said they would object to their child dating a Negro; 87 percent disapproved of interracial marriage.⁷⁶ The poll treated "race" as a given and did not probe the source or reasoning behind such views. But the results did suggest that wide acceptance of one antiracist discourse based on the ethical issue of equal treatment of citizens had not necessitated a simultaneous acceptance of the scientific principle of equality of human beings. In effect, the separation of these discourses seems to have permitted Americans to adopt a bifurcated approach to racial equality. One definition applied to the morality of discrimination, and another applied to what people believed race to be.

The separation of human equality from the issue of equal treatment mattered, as it ultimately hampered efforts to create genuinely equal conditions between racially identified groups in the United States. Although cultural attributes allegedly associated with race became increasingly prominent in policy debates in the late 1960s, the question of innate racial difference continued to plague the broader conversation about persistent racial disparities in status, achievement, and income. Many antiracist activists, including Montagu, argued that further ameliorative policies such as affirmative action or the low-income early childhood program Head Start were necessary to deal with inequality attributable to past discrimination rather than ability. Conservative opponents now countered not with defenses of discrimination, but with an argument that "color-conscious" programs constituted "reverse racism," and a suggestion, implicit or explicit, that any enduring inequality of condition reflected inequality of effort or innate ability.⁷⁷ Superficially, the emerging argument in favor of "color-blind" social policy might seem to suggest that two decades after the UNESCO statement, the antiracists and racists had reversed positions. However, color-blind advocates objected primarily to racial classification by law, not the idea that race existed as a biological concept, which was entirely compatible with their politics. Assuming that formal legal equality had eliminated the effects of racism, many accepted the notion that race was not only a valid category but also an explanatory one that determined socioeconomic differences between racially defined groups. "Scientific" accounts of innate differences in ability joined new cultural constructions of race in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as the "black family" or the "model minority," to rationalize inequality and undermine support for racially targeted social policy.

Notably, the same dispute about race and intelligence that stymied the UNESCO deliberations continued to provide fodder for scientific racism. If racially identified groups still did not achieve at equal rates, some argued, then race itself was the cause. In an article in the prestigious Harvard Educational Review in 1969, for example, Berkeley psychologist Arthur Jensen argued against Head Start and other compensatory education programs directed at minorities because, he claimed, racial differences in intelligence were genetic in origin. Although few nonacademics read the article, Jensen became a "cause célèbre," and his ideas, dubbed "Jensenism" by a New York Times Magazine profile, were aired in several popular press outlets, including a Newsweek story titled "Born Dumb?" Some blamed Jensen for the Nixon administration's brazen hostility to compensatory education. In 1970, Jensen and like-minded scientists testified before Congress that genetic differences in intelligence rendered integration useless, if not destructive, to minorities.⁷⁸ Although this was not the only argument bolstering opposition to further civil rights policy, it was a powerful one. Science presented as the "objective" reporting of "facts" about biology rather than personal prejudice remained a potent rationalization for the status quo long after the civil rights movement had stripped bigotry of its cultural legitimacy.

For historians, however, what seems most important about the UNESCO project is not its ultimate failure to reshape American ideas about race—a standard perhaps as naïfive as the pronouncement accompanying its inauguration—but the insights it might provide into how we should study and teach the history of race, racism, and antiracism. Thomas Holt reminds us that understanding racism requires scholars to adopt a conception of "historical transformation" that acknowledges that racism is "never entirely new ... the new is sedimented into the old, which occasionally seeps or bursts through."⁷⁹ A concept of race as natural, timeless, and outside human intervention has undoubtedly been one of the most persistent residues of racism. Even muted by the new emphasis on environmental influences and genetic similarities, race in the hands of the postwar antiracists reemerged as a construct that reified its most pernicious aspects. Historians risk this, too, if we fix race as an uninterrogated category of analysis within our research, and we, like postwar scientists, often do it with good intentions and potentially bad results. To cite a simple but revealing example, many of us regularly "translate" racial terms uttered by historical subjects such as "Negro," "Caucasian," and "Oriental" into the more contemporary, and presumably less "racist"-sounding, "African American," "white," and "Asian." But if race is a social historical construct, then "colored" uttered in 1950 is not the same as "African American" spoken in 2007. By using the words interchangeably without acknowledging the history that actually links them, we risk implying that each term is defined by the same ahistorical essence or that people are defined by phenotype rather than historical experience. Part of the problem, as Barbara Fields has argued, lies in the tendency to use racial terms interchangeably to describe social constructs and the people who are affected by them. This is true in spite of the fact that we know, for example, that the designation of a subject as "white" by his or her contemporaries has more to do with the site and moment of utterance than with any physical quality possessed by that subject.⁸⁰ Historians cannot stop studying race or using racial designations, but we should find ways to do so that refuse to fix or obscure their meanings. What was remarkable in the UNESCO project was its capacity to reveal race as a historical construct in these two distinct senses: by exposing how past "misuses" served as rationalizations for inequality, and by exposing race itself as a temporal, ephemeral phenomenon dependent on the people who invested it with authority and meaning. Although UNESCO's statement did not ultimately embrace a social constructivist view, it did produce a document that acknowledged implicitly that race had once been one thing and now it was another.

Historians have come to the consensus that race is a social construction, but a number of current phenomena, such as race-specific medical research, the racial identification of genomic types, and the current fad of individual DNA testing, suggest that many people outside the humanities and social sciences have not.⁸¹ Although scholars have produced powerful critiques of the racial thinking implicit in such practices, historians who use race as an analytic category have generally paid more attention to explicitly racist uses of race, as when the idea served to rationalize slavery, imperialism, segregation, or extreme forms of racism; or to archaic uses, such as the shifting boundaries of whiteness and its past exclusion of the Irish or others now considered simply white. If we make good on our mantra about social construction, however, historians have a unique contribution to make to contemporary discourse on race as a more general ideological category as opposed to simply particular racial types. A historical understanding of race and its relationship to racism and antiracism not only clarifies our objects of study, but demystifies discussions about racial identity, makes race a social category capable of doing constructive political work, and exposes the ahistorical conceit behind "color-blind" policies. Unless we problematize race in all its forms, including contemporary and seemingly more benign biological applications, we risk contributing to the confusion. What race was is not what race is, but understanding how it has been constructed in the past is essential to understanding and contributing to debate about its current construction.

My debts incurred in the course of writing this essay are far too great to acknowledge here, but some are particularly outstanding. A Library Resident Fellowship at the American Philosophical Society Library in 2003 provided invaluable support, and the APS staff were nothing short of remarkable. I am also especially grateful to Mahmoud Ghander at the UNESCO Archives in Paris. My colleagues Denise Davidson, Peter McDade, Christine Skwiot, and Michael Sloan generously read early and long drafts. C. Loring Brace, Krystyn Moon, and Jonathan Prude provided particularly helpful readings. I am also extremely grateful to the readers at the AHR for their careful reading, generous comments, and extraordinarily helpful suggestions. Above all, I would like to thank Andrew Milne for countless readings, insightful criticism, and everything else, too.

Michelle Brattain is Associate Professor of History at Georgia State University. She is the author of The Politics of Whiteness: Race, Workers, and Culture in the Modern South (Princeton University Press, 2001). She is currently working on a book manuscript titled What Race Was: Popular and Scientific Constructions of Race in the Postwar United States

Notes

¹ "Background Paper 104," July 19, 1950 (first 2 quotations), 323.12 A 102, Statement on Race, UNESCO Archives, Paris, France [hereafter UNESCO Papers]. UNESCO's papers are organized by file numbers rather than boxes. File 323.12 A 102, "Statement on Race," covers all the documents associated with the statement and cited in this essay, which are subdivided into folders by date. UNESCO, The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry (Paris, 1952), 6 (third quotation); "UNESCO and Its Programme: The Race Question," pamphlet (Paris, 1950), 2–3 (fourth quotation).

² "Scientific racism" refers to a particular scientific tradition associated with typological and hierarchical approaches typical of nineteenth-century physical anthropology. In noting a shift away from scientific racism, I am not in any way suggesting that racism was somehow removed from science. Indeed, I argue precisely the opposite below. However, there was a qualitative change in the way that anthropologists, sociologists, biologists, and geneticists looked at human variation after World War I, which became the dominant view in the interwar period. In the social sciences, there was a greater emphasis on environment as a cause of human variation, intergroup relations, and prejudice. In the biological sciences, scholarship shifted toward a more complex understanding of human inheritance rooted in population genetics. Although some scholars continued to promote a biologically determinist, hierarchical understanding of race, they moved from the center to the margins of academic communities. On these intellectual shifts, see George W. Stocking, Jr., Race, Culture and Evolution, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1982); Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800–1960 (Hamden, Conn., 1982); Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States between the World Wars (Cambridge, 1992); Donna Haraway, "Remodeling the Human Way of Life: Sherwood Washburn and the New Physical Anthropology, 1950–1980," in George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., Bones, Bodies, Behavior: Essays on Biological Anthropology (Chicago, 1988), 206–259; Lee D. Baker, From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896–1954 (Berkeley, Calif., 1998); Philip Gleason, "Americans All: World War II and the Shaping of American Identity," Review of Politics 43 (1981): 483–518; Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York, 1991), 187–211. On the persistence of scientific racism, see William H. Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research (Urbana, Ill., 1994); I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court: Social Scientists and the Defense of Segregation, 1954–1966, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge, La., 1969); Barry Mehler, "Beyondism: Raymond B. Cattell and the New Eugenics," Genetica 99, no. 2/3 (1997): 153–164; Russell Jacoby and Naomi Glauberman, The Bell Curve Debate: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, 1995); Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York, 1981); John P. Jackson, Jr., Science for Segregation: Race, Law, and the Case against Brown v. Board of Education (New York, 2005); William H. Tucker, The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund (Urbana, Ill., 2002).

³ Donna Haraway, "Universal Donors in a Vampire Culture: It's All in the Family—Biological Kinship Categories in the Twentieth-Century United States," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (New York, 1996), 344.

⁴ Although many activists attempted (unsuccessfully) to pressure the UN to address racism within its human rights mission, UNESCO did not acknowledge any such influences. It linked the origin of the statement project to a request from the UN Economic and Social Council and the UNESCO leadership's desire to complete a similar, but aborted, 1934 project by the League of Nations' counterpart to UNESCO. "Action by UNESCO," in UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science: Race and Science (New York, 1961), 493–494. In the United States, Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York, 1944) popularized a psychological and moral interpretation of prejudice and encouraged an emphasis on education, but not all social scientists agreed, as discussed below. During and immediately after the war, however, many activist scholars gravitated toward education even if they had doubts about its effectiveness. Walter A. Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938–1987 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990); John P. Jackson, Jr., "Blind Law and Powerless Science: The American Jewish Congress, the NAACP and the Scientific Case against Discrimination," Isis 91, no. 1 (March 2000): 89–116; Stuart Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties (New York, 1997). Final quotations from Introduction and "Statement of 1950," in UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science, 494, 499.

⁵ "Statement of 1951," in UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science, 504.

⁶ Barbara J. Fields argues that many scholars explicitly identify race as a social construction but reify the concept by invoking it as "both a coherent analytical category and a valid empirical datum." Fields, "Of Rogues and Geldings," American Historical Review 108, no. 5 (December 2003): 1397–1405, quotation 1399. See also Fields, "Whiteness, Racism and Identity," International Labor and Working Class History 60 (2001): 48–56; Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Race in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 18–19.

⁷ Notable exceptions include Holt, The Problem of Race in the Twenty-First Century; Alana Lentin, "Racial States, Anti-Racist Responses: Picking Holes in `Culture' and `Human Rights,'" European Journal of Social Theory 7, no. 4 (2004): 427–443; Alastair Bonnett, Anti-Racism (London, 2000); Richard H. King, Race, Culture, and the Intellectuals, 1940–1970 (Washington, D.C., 2004); Jenny Reardon, Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in an Age of Genomics (Princeton, N.J., 2005), 17–44.

⁸ The literature on the social construction of race and racial identity is voluminous and continues to grow, making it difficult and perhaps risky to generalize. Matthew Frye Jacobson and George Fredrickson, for example, regularly draw out links between cultural practices and ideas about human variation. Holt also examines the fallacies about race and biology inherent in twentieth-century racism. I think it is fair to say, however, that most recent historical attention has been directed toward the cultural, political, and economic aspects of race, even if biological ideas occasionally play a supporting role. Some notable examples of this literature include Barbara J. Fields, "Ideology and Race in American History," in J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson, eds., Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward (New York, 1982), 143–177; Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race," Signs 17 (Winter 1992): 251–274; David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (London, 1991); Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890–1940 (New York, 1998); Ian F. Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York, 1996); Peggy Pascoe, "Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of `Race' in Twentieth-Century America," Journal of American History 83, no. 1 (1996): 44–69; Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America (Oxford, 2001); George M. Frederickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton, N.J., 2002).

⁹ In the history of science, in addition to the works cited above in note 2, see Joseph L. Graves, The Emperor's New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium (New Brunswick, N.J., 2001); C. Loring Brace, "Race" Is a Four-Letter Word: The Genesis of the Concept (New York, 2005); Alice Littlefield, Leonard Lieberman, and Larry T. Reynolds, "Redefining Race: The Potential Demise of a Concept in Physical Anthropology," Current Anthropology 23, no. 6 (December 1982): 641–655; Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (New York, 1989); Melbourne Tapper, "An `Anthropathology' of the `American Negro': Anthropology, Genetics, and the New Racial Science, 1940–1952," Social History of Medicine 10, no. 2 (1997): 263–289; Alexander Alland, Race in Mind: Race, IQ, and Other Racisms (New York, 2002); Reardon, Race to the Finish.

¹⁰ On the significance of UNESCO as an indication of changes in ideas about race, see Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 341–343; Elazar Barkan, "The Politics of the Science of Race: Ashley Montagu and UNESCO's Anti-Racist Declarations," in Larry T. Reynolds and Leonard Lieberman, eds., Race and Other Misadventures: Essays in Honor of Ashley Montagu in His Ninetieth Year (Dix Hall, N.Y., 1996), 96–105; Haraway, "Universal Donors," 344; Graves, The Emperor's New Clothes, 150–151; Robert Proctor, "Three Roots of Human Recency: Molecular Anthropology, the Refigured Acheulean, and the UNESCO Response to Auschwitz," Current Anthropology 44 (2003): 213–239; Neil MacMaster, Racism in Europe, 1870–2000 (New York, 2001), 171; Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science, 172–176. More recently, Reardon has argued that the UNESCO statement did not represent a clean break from typology, as debates about the appropriateness of racial classification continued. Reardon, Race to the Finish, 34–35.

¹¹ The null hypothesis is a concept used in statistics, usually in contrast to an "experimental" or "alternative" hypothesis. For example, in a test of a drug's effectiveness, the drug might be administered to one group, and a placebo administered to another control group. The null hypothesis would be that there is no difference between the effect of the drug and the placebo, and the alternative hypothesis would be that the drug has a significant effect not observed in the control group. What is important here is that the null hypothesis is the claim assumed to be true at the outset of an inquiry. This is discussed in more detail below.

¹² Fields, "Of Rogues and Geldings," 1405; Etienne Balibar, "Is There a `Neo-Racism?'" in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London, 1991), 19.

¹³ Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge, 1988), 293–299; Elazar Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Nazi Racism, 1933–1939," in Stocking, Bones, Bodies, Behavior, 180–205; Robert Proctor, "Nazi Medicine and the Politics of Knowledge," in Sandra Harding, ed., The Racial Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future (Bloomington, Ind., 1993), 344–358; Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience, 114–115; Mark Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918–1941 (Durham, N.C., 1994); John P. Jackson, Jr., "Creating a Consensus: Psychologists, the Supreme Court, and School Desegregation, 1952–1955," Journal of Social Issues 54, no. 1 (1998): 143–177.

¹⁴ Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Nazi Racism," 180–205. That anthropologist was Earnest A. Hooton, as quoted on 203.

¹⁵ Boas as quoted in ibid., 203; Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 203–220; Roper Survey cited in Mildred A. Schwartz, Trends in White Attitudes toward Negroes (Chicago, 1967), 19; Boas quoted in the New York Times, July 17, 1939. Final quote from Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience, 280. On antiracist propaganda during World War II, see Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice, 41–49.

¹⁶ "Charge School Texts Teach Misleading Nazi Doctrines," Science News Letter 36 (September 9, 1939): 171. Prior claims about racial intelligence were based on the World War I army tests administered to 1.75 million GIs. Psychologists initially claimed that the tests demonstrated racial differences in mental ability, but the results soon bolstered a non-hereditarian view of intelligence among scholars, as differences correlating with economic backgrounds, language, and region provided strong evidence for the role of environment. For contemporary criticism, see F. L. Marcuse and M. E. Bitterman, "Notes on the Results of Army Intelligence Testing in World War I," Science 104 (September 6, 1946): 231–232; Otto Klineberg, Race Differences (New York, 1935). See also Daniel J. Kevles, "Testing the Army's Intelligence: Psychologists and the Military in World War I," Journal of American History 55 (December 1968): 565–581; Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, 224–233; Brewton Berry, "The Concept of Race in Sociology Textbooks," Social Forces 18 (March 1940): 413; Theodosius Dobzhansky to L. C. Dunn, March 10, 1947, Series I, Box 6, Dobzhansky Correspondence, 1946–47, L. C. Dunn Papers, American Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia, Pa. [hereafter Dunn Papers].

¹⁷ "Actions Lie Louder Than Words: Red Cross's Policy with Regard to Its Blood Bank," Commonweal 35 (February 13, 1942): 404–405. On the Red Cross, see S. Sloan Colt to Ernest Alexander, December 30, 1941, and Walter White to Henry Stimson, December 30, 1941, Box A15, Group II, American Red Cross Blood Donor Refusals, 1941–43, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter NAACP Papers]; "Science News in Review," New York Times, June 14, 1942; "Red Cross to Use Blood of Negroes," New York Times, January 29, 1942. For the contemporary science on blood, see Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, Race: Science and Politics (New York, 1945), 174–175; Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (1942; repr., Walnut Creek, Calif., 1997), 359–368; Melbourne Tapper, In the Blood: Sickle Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race (Philadelphia, Pa., 1999). On the cultural and legal use of "blood," see Eva Saks, "Representing Miscegenation Law," Raritan 8 (Fall 1988): 24–44; Pascoe, "Miscegenation Law," 44–69; Lopez, White by Law; Virginia Domífinguez, White by Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana (New Brunswick, N.J., 1986).

¹⁸ R. A. Pathe, "Gene Weltfish," in Ute Gacs et al., eds., Women Anthropologists: A Biographical Dictionary (New York, 1988), 375; Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, Races of Mankind, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 85 (New York, 1943), Box A 465, Group II, Pamphlets—Non NAACP, Races of Mankind, NAACP Papers; The Races of Mankind, Special Committee on Military Affairs, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., Investigations of the National War Effort Pursuant to H. Res. 30 (Committee Print, 1944); "Races of Mankind: Campaign against the Benedict Pamphlet," Commonweal, March 17, 1944, 352; "Army Drops Race Equality Book," New York Times, March 6, 1944, 1.

¹⁹ See, for example, Masurao Hosokawa to "Christian Friends in America," n.d., Box A 642, Group II, U.S. Army Brown Babies Born in Europe, 1945–1949, NAACP Papers; Harold A. Moody, article from "The World's Children," March 1946, reprinted in Sylvia McNeill, Illegitimate Children Born in Britain of English Mothers and Coloured Americans: Report of a Survey (London, n.d.), original pamphlet, ibid.; John Otto Reinemann, "The Mulatto Children in Germany," Mental Hygiene 37 (July 1953): 367; Yara-Colette Lemke Muniz de Faria, "Germany's `Brown Babies' Must be Helped! Will You? U.S. Adoption Plans for Afro-German Children, 1950–1955," Callaloo 26 (2003): 342–362. On the scientific debate about mixed-race children, see Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York, 1985), 75; Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 168.

²⁰ Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon, We Europeans: A Survey of "Racial" Problems (London, 1935), 7–8; "Anthropologists," Time, April 21, 1941, 58 (second quotation), clipping in subject files, Anthropology, Series IV, Box IV-5, Ashley Montagu Papers, American Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia, Pa. [hereafter Montagu Papers].

²¹ Gerstle, American Crucible, 192; John P. Jackson, Jr., and Nadine M. Weidman, Race, Racism, and Science: Social Impact and Interaction (New Brunswick, N.J., 2004), 198.

²² Clyde Kluckhohn to Prof. Carl Joslyn, May 7, 1943 [cc'd to Montagu], Corresp. KEA–Kol, "Kluckhohn, Clyde," Montagu Papers; Ales Hrdlicka as quoted in "Anthropologists," Time, April 21, 1941. On the AAPA committee, see Montagu to William Gregory [Pres. AAPA], June 26, 1942, and Gregory to Montagu, July 1, 1942, both in Corresp. GOR–GU, I-18, "Gregory, William K.," Montagu Papers. See also Andrew P. Lyons, "The Neotenic Career of M. F. Ashley Montagu," in Reynolds and Lieberman, Race and Other Misadventures, 3–22.

²³ Barkan, "The Politics of the Science of Race," 96–105. As Barkan notes, there was no one field of "race" studies. Although scholars in several disciplines addressed race, it was not central to any disciplinary canon. Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 4–5.

²⁴ Ashley Montagu, "The Genetical Theory of Race and Anthropological Method," American Anthropologist 44 (July–September 1942): 369–375, quotation 370; Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, 3rd ed. (New York, 1952), omelet quotations 37–38.

²⁵ For example, Montagu's four major groups and the thirty postulated in Carleton S. Coon, Stanley M. Garn, and Joseph B. Birdsell, Races: A Study of the Problems of Race Formation in Man (Springfield, Ill., 1950). "Parlor game" from Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, 36.

²⁶ Montagu, "The Genetical Theory of Race," 374, 372 (first two quotations); Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, 5 (third and fourth quotations); emphasis in original. Final quotation of Montagu as paraphrased in Wilton Krogman to Ashley Montagu, December 6, 1950, Corresp. KON–KU, I-22, "Krogman, Wilton M.," Montagu Papers; emphasis in original.

²⁷ L. C. Dunn and Theodosius Dobzhansky, Heredity, Race and Society (New York, 1946); Dobzhanksy to Ashley Montagu, May 22, 1944, and J. H. McGregor to Montagu, March 1, 1943, Corresp. Dobzhansky, Montagu Papers; Ernst Mayr to Montagu, April 2, 1943, Corresp. Mai–Mea, "Mayr, Ernst," Montagu Papers.

²⁸ Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 345. The committee included Ernest Beaglehole, New Zealand; Juan Comas, Mexico; L. A. Costa Pinto, Brazil; E. Franklin Frazier, United States; Morris Ginsberg, United Kingdom; Humayun Kabir, India; Claude Lévi-Strauss, France; and Ashley Montagu, United States. UNESCO correspondence did not indicate the process for selection of these scholars. It is notable, however, given criticism of the subsequent committee, that the first was more diverse.

²⁹ "Statement of 1950," in UNESCO, The Race Concept, 496–501, quotations 30, 501; Reardon, Race to the Finish, 25–26.

³⁰ Penny Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997), 69–95; Carol Anderson, "From Hope to Disillusion: African Americans, the United Nations, and the Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1947," Diplomatic History 20, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 531–563; Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 214–224. Although intergroup materials more frequently stressed conflict reduction, one film, Brotherhood of Man (1946), produced for the United Auto Workers, adapted material from the wartime pamphlet The Races of Mankind; Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice, 41–62.

³¹ Howard Winant, The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice (Minneapolis, 2004), xiii; Anderson, "From Hope to Disillusion," 563. On the interplay between the Cold War and American civil rights, see also Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War, Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955 (New York, 2003); and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (2005): 1233–1263. On the CIO, see Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935–1955 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997); Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton, N.J., 2003), 114–140. On the AJC and other groups, see Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice, 161–178.

³² UNESCO later became the target of limited, localized anticommunist crusades in the 1950s, although it was not the race materials but the agency's alleged intent to inculcate "one-worldism" and secular education (i.e., "atheism") that elicited the ire of conservatives. "Los Angeles Bans UNESCO Program," New York Times, January 21, 1953, 33; Michelle Nickerson, "Women, Domesticity, and Postwar Conservatism," OAH Magazine of History 17 (January 2003): 17–21; Thomas Aiello, "Constructing `Godless Communism': Religion, Politics, and Popular Culture, 1954–1960," Americana: The Journal of American Popular Culture (1900–Present) 4 (Spring 2005), http://www.americanpopularculture.com/journal/articles/spring_2005/aiello.htm (accessed October 22, 2007); Harvin Moore, Jr., "UNESCO: 3\c Worth of Poison," American Mercury 76 (August 1955): 151–154.

³³ Agnostics did, however, represent a sea change that had taken place in the interwar years as scholars became increasingly suspicious of the old typological categories. The emergence of doubt itself was a significant development within the sciences. For an appraisal of the significance of this shift in academia, see Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism; Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science.

³⁴ Otto Klineberg to Robert Angell, January 25, 1950; Theodosius Dobzhansky to Angell, January 17, 1950; and Julian Huxley to Angell, January 26, 1950, 323.12 A 102, UNESCO Papers. See also J. H. McGregor to Ashley Montagu, March 1, 1943, and Dobzhansky to Montagu, May 22, 1944, Corresp. Dobzhansky, Montagu Papers; Curt Stern to Montagu, March 9, 1950, Corresp. Coo–Cy, I-8, "C—MISC," ibid. On Huxley's racial views, see Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 179–185, 235–248.

³⁵ When the social science director objected to the final claim about universal cooperation, Montagu replied, "Sorry, that is a fact," and referred the director to his book On Being Human (1950). Ashley Montagu to Robert Angell, April 5, 1950, May 1, 1950, and February 13, 1950, 323.12 A 102, UNESCO Papers; Jackson and Weidman, Race, Racism, and Science, 198. Final quote from Theodosius Dobzhansky to Montagu, January 26, 1951, Corresp. Dobzhansky, Montagu Papers.

³⁶ Douglas H. Schneider to Max McCullough, January 4, 1951, UNESCO Papers; "All Human Beings," Time 56 (July 31, 1950): 34.

³⁷ Letter to Editor, the Times, July 24, 1950, copy, and W. B. Fagg to Alfred Métraux, September 7, 1950, UNESCO Papers. See also comments in Man 50 (October 1950): 138 and Editor's Note, Man 51 (January 1951): 17; Theodosius Dobzhansky to Ashley Montagu, January 26, 1951, Corresp. Dobzhansky, Dobzhansky (Fourth Folder), Montagu Papers.

³⁸ Alfred Métraux to Ashley Montagu, March 2, 1951 (first two quotes), UNESCO Papers. On the U.S. State Department, see John Hope Franklin to Walter White, July 2, 1952, and Max McCullough to Homer S. Brown, June 12, 1952, Box A640, Group II, UN Unesco 1950–1954, NAACP Papers; Métraux to Editor "Elsevier Weekblad," Amsterdam, Netherlands, February 27, 1951, UNESCO Papers. The author, whom Métraux refers to simply as "Prof. J.A. van Hamel," was likely Joost Adriaan van Hamel, the author of contemporary books on the "Polish problem," peace, and war. Although the center of gravity in South African scholarship had begun to shift away from biological determinism, political leaders greeted UNESCO's interventions with "unease." On South Africa, see Saul DuBow, Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa (Cambridge, 1995).

³⁹ T. Dale Stewart, "Scientific Responsibility," n.d., typescript of article for American Journal of Physical Anthropology, UNESCO Papers; Carleton Coon to Mrs. Dees, February 8, 1961, Box 10, General Correspondence, A–F 1961, Carleton Coon Papers, National Anthropological Archives, Suitland, Md. [hereafter Coon Papers]. On Coon, see John P. Jackson, Jr., "'In Ways Unacademical': The Reception of Carleton S. Coon's The Origin of Races," Journal of the History of Biology 34 (2001): 247–285.

⁴⁰ Alfred Métraux to Ernest Beaglehole, April 23, 1951 (first quotation), "51" Statement Part I, UNESCO Papers; Métraux to Melville Herskovits, November 7, 1950, UNESCO Papers; Métraux to M. Maheu, January 22, 1951, ibid.; Mead to Métraux, November 6, 1950, and Métraux to Mead, November 9, 1950, ibid.

⁴¹ Haraway also notes the absence of Cobb. Haraway, "Remodeling the Human Way of Life," 214. Cobb, a former vice-president of the AAPA, had published extensively on race and physical anthropology, including a 1936 article in the aftermath of Jesse Owens's Olympic victory, challenging the notion that race determined athletic ability, and thus undermining a significant strand of biological determinism. His work as a whole, however, was not easily categorized in terms of how it might have supported a campaign against racial stereotypes. In a 1939 publication, he suggested that slavery might have introduced a selective pressure on traits such as musical ability. But there was no discussion, either positive or negative, of him in the UNESCO correspondence concerning panelists. On Cobb, see Lesley M. Rankin-Hill and Michael L. Blakey, "W. Montague Cobb (1904–1990): Physical Anthropologist, Anatomist, and Activist," American Anthropologist 96 (1994): 74–96.

⁴² George W. Stocking, Jr., Delimiting Anthropology: Occasional Essays and Reflections (Madison, Wis., 2001), 281–302, quote 288; Fredrik Barth et al., One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology (Chicago, 2005).

⁴³ Harry Shapiro to Alfred Métraux, February 6, 1951, "51" Statement Part I, UNESCO Papers.

⁴⁴ Theodosius Dobzhansky to Ashley Montagu, February 24, 1951, Box I-11, Corresp. Dobzhansky, Montagu Papers; Dobzhansky to Alfred Métraux, February 13, 1951, "51" Statement Part I, UNESCO Papers.

⁴⁵ Cyril D. Darlington, "The Genetic Understanding of Race in Man," UNESCO Social Science Bulletin 2 (1950): 479–488. Alfred Métraux to Theodosius Dobzhansky, February 21, 1951; Julius Huxley to Métraux, February 23, 1951; and Ashley Montagu to Métraux, March 7, 1951, UNESCO Papers.

⁴⁶ By 1951, Lysenkoism—the Soviet suppression of Mendelian genetics, so named for the director of the Institute of Genetics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, T. D. Lysenko—had became shorthand for the manipulation of science for political ends. Most Western scientists had accepted the Mendelian concept of transmission of traits by genes in the 1930s, and in doing so, abandoned the older Lamarckian idea that traits acquired in a lifetime were transmitted to the next generation. But Lysenko embraced the latter as more compatible with Stalin's dictum that science should serve materialist analysis. After 1948, unrepentant dissenters from Lysenko were fired from their positions, were exiled to Siberia, disappeared, or died under mysterious circumstances; books on genetics were banned, textbooks were sanitized of its influence, classes were canceled, and labs were closed. For contemporary commentary, see Josef Brozek, "Extension of Political Domination beyond Soviet Genetics," Science 111 (April 14, 1950): 389–391; H. J. Muller, "Science in Bondage," Science 113 (January 12, 1951): 25–29; Robert C. Cook, "Walpurgis Week in the Soviet Union," Scientific Monthly 68 (June 1949): 367–372; E. W. Caspari and R. E. Marshak, "The Rise and Fall of Lysenko," Science 149 (July 16, 1965): 275–278; and Julian Huxley, Heredity East and West: Lysenko and World Science (New York, 1949). On Dunn, see L. C. Dunn to George A. Jervis, March 9, 1949, and Dunn to Milton C. Winternetz, April 1, 1949, Box 22, Series I, "Nachtsheim, Hans," Dunn Papers; Dunn oral history typescript, 703–735, Box 28, Series II, Dunn Papers.

⁴⁷ L. C. Dunn to Alfred Métraux, July 12, 1951, Box 25 Science-US, Series 1, UNESCO #3, Dunn Papers; UNESCO, The Race Concept, 13–14.

⁴⁸ L. C. Dunn, "Report on Meeting of Physical Anthropologists and Geneticists for a Definition of the Concept of Race," Paris, June 4–8, 1951, UNESCO Papers.

⁴⁹ Alfred Métraux to L. C. Dunn, January 25, 1952, UNESCO Papers.

⁵⁰ Joseph Birdsell, Comments re 1951 Statement, n.d., and Kenneth Mather, Comments, n.d., UNESCO Papers.

⁵¹ Alfred Métraux to H. Nachtsheim, March 8, 1952, and A. H. Sturtevant to Métraux, April 30, 1952, UNESCO Papers.

⁵² As quoted in German: "Welcher von den Herren, die die Deklaration unterschrieben haben, geneigt ware, seine Tochter mit einem Buschmann, einem Australier c.a. zu verheiraten?" Métraux to Nachtsheim, March 8, 1952, UNESCO Papers.

⁵³ Carleton Coon to Alfred Métraux, October 25, 1951, UNESCO Papers; emphasis in original. See also "Views of Professor Walter Scheidt, Hamburg," n.d., ibid.; A. H. Sturtevant to H. J. Muller, cc'd to Alfred Métraux, Hans Nachtsheim, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and Boris Ephrussi, April 15, 1952, ibid.; and Métraux to Alfred Summers, April 1, 1953, ibid. The final publication, in 1952, was UNESCO, The Race Concept.

⁵⁴ William B. Provine, "Geneticists and Race," American Zoologist 26 (1986): 857–887; Reardon, Race to the Finish, 30–31. For a geneticist's view of race, see Dobzhansky's comments on the 1951 statement, n.d., UNESCO Papers. Dobzhansky, however, suggested that environment had a very strong impact on how genetic inheritance was expressed. See his 1945 letter "What Is Heredity?" Science 100 (November 3, 1944): 406. H. J. Muller to Alfred Métraux, November 20, 1951; A. H. Sturtevant to Muller, April 15, 1952 (first quotation); and Sturtevant to Métraux, April 30, 1952 (second quotation), UNESCO Papers.

⁵⁵ Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics, 193–237.

⁵⁶ On Fisher, see Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 220–228. The new evolutionary synthesis was the integration of modern genetics (including mathematical modeling and population genetics, which were Fisher's main contribution) with Darwinian thought. For an account of this synthesis by one of its prime participants, see Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), and Mayr, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). R. A. Fisher to Alfred Métraux, October 3, 1951, Box 25 Science-US, Series 1, UNESCO #3, Dunn Papers; emphasis added.

⁵⁷ Curt Stern to Alfred Métraux, October 1, 1952, UNESCO Papers.

⁵⁸ In 1962, Coon's Origin of Races would make just such an argument, claiming that Homo erectus had consisted of five races that evolved into Homo sapiens at different times, thousands of years apart, and suggesting that this explained racial differences in achievement. The book and Coon's refusal to denounce racist uses of it were widely criticized by his colleagues, and he became increasingly marginalized in academia. In the 1950s, however, Coon was an influential physical anthropologist. A professor of anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania and curator of ethnology at the University Museum from 1948 to 1963, he was awarded the Wenner-Gren Viking Fund Medal in Physical Anthropology in 1952, was named to the National Academy of Sciences in 1955, and served as president of the AAPA in 1961–1962. Jackson, "'In Ways Unacademical,'" 247–285; Carleton Coon to Alfred Métraux, October 25, 1951, UNESCO Papers.

⁵⁹ Ashley Montagu, "Comments on Comparative Studies in Human Biology," Science 100 (October 27, 1944): 384. On the influence of Karl Popper, see Novick, That Noble Dream, 298–299; Steve Fuller, Kuhn vs. Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science (New York, 2004); William A. Gorton, Karl Popper and the Social Sciences (Albany, N.Y., 2006).

⁶⁰ C. D. Darlington, as quoted in UNESCO, The Race Concept, 27; Carleton Coon to Alfred Métraux, October 25, 1951, UNESCO Papers.

⁶¹ Theodor Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950), 973; Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice, 54–61, 66–77; Jackson, "Blind Law and Powerless Science," 89–116; Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience, 288–289; United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution, as cited in UNESCO, The Race Concept, 6. Another contemporary UNESCO pamphlet on race prejudice similarly identified ignorance as the primary cause. While acknowledging psychological factors, the pamphlet suggested that they were probably "most useful in explaining extreme cases of prejudice." Arnold Rose, "The Roots of Prejudice" (1951), reprinted in UNESCO, The Race Concept, 393–419.

⁶² Michel de Certeau, "Reading as Poaching," in de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, Calif., 1984).

⁶³ Haraway describes the UNESCO statement as evidence that "a palace coup had indeed taken place in the citadel of science." Barkan cites the appearance of the statement as evidence of the "revolution in the concept of race" that had occurred between World War I and 1950. John P. Jackson, Jr., and Nadine M. Weidman assert: "The revolution was now complete." Haraway, "Universal Donors," 344; Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, 342; Jackson and Weidman, Race, Racism, and Science, 201.

⁶⁴ Wilton Krogman to Alfred Métraux, February 1, 1952, UNESCO Papers; parentheses in original. Ashley Montagu to Robert Angell, April 5, 1950, ibid.

⁶⁵ On South Africa, see C. N. Berkeley to the Director-General, October 8, 1952, UNESCO Papers. American delegates pressured UNESCO to delay publication of What Science Says about Race until they were satisfied with the final product. The first version under this title was never released in the United States. The State Department's explanation is given in Max McCullough to Homer S. Brown, June 12, 1952, and John Hope Franklin to Walter White, July 2, 1952, Box A640, Group II, UN Unesco 1950–1954, NAACP Papers. On the British National Commission, see Alfred Métraux to Kenneth L. Little, April 21, 1952, UNESCO Papers.

⁶⁶ Douglas Schneider to Robert Ariss, September 17, 1952, UNESCO Papers. Opposition from members of the museum's board of governors nearly resulted in the whole exhibit's being canceled. On the internal struggle within the board, see Howard Shorr, "'Race prejudice is not inborn—it is learned': The Exhibit Controversy at the Los Angeles Museum of History, Science and Art, 1950–1," California History 69 (1990): 276–283; Exhibit Description, Box 6, AAA President's [Howell] Files, "Man in Our Changing World Exhibit and LA County Museum," American Anthropological Association Papers, National Anthropological Archives, Suitland, Md. [hereafter AAA Papers].

⁶⁷ Hoffman's sculptures, commissioned in 1929 and functioning as the representation of race at the Field Museum for the following thirty years, were widely reproduced as small-scale replicas circulated during World War II, and appeared in photographs for the C. S. Hammond Company's World Atlas and the World Book Encyclopedia from the 1940s to the 1960s. Marianne Beatrice Kinkel, "Circulating Race: Malvina Hoffman and the Field Museum's Races of Mankind Sculptures" (Ph.D. diss, University of Texas at Austin, 2001).

⁶⁸ Exhibit Description; Officers and Members of the Southwestern Anthropological Association to C. F. Gehring, December 6, 1951; Memo, Walter Goldschmidt, December 12, 1951; Ashley Montagu to R. M. Arles, January 10, 1952; and "Summary Report re `Man in Our Changing World,'" January 13, 1952, Box 6, AAA President's [Howell] Files, "Man in Our Changing World Exhibit and LA County Museum," AAA Papers.

⁶⁹ McGurk's article reviewed six studies of black and white intelligence test performance since 1935 and compared the results to the World War I army IQ tests. He argued that social and economic opportunities had greatly improved for black Americans since World War I, but the gap in test scores remained relatively constant between the 1910s and 1950s. Therefore, he concluded, the gap must be caused by innate differences rather than environment. Frank J. McGurk, "A Scientist's Report on Race Differences," U.S. News and World Report, September 21, 1956, 92–96. Quotation from Newby, Challenge to the Court, 73–76. In 1963, several "experts" on racial intelligence testified on behalf of white parents seeking to prevent school integration in Savannah, Georgia. Ruling in favor of the segregationists, the presiding judge's decision cited McGurk, among others, and was reprinted in full in U.S. News and World Report before being predictably overruled by the U.S. Court of Appeals. Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research, 151–169; "Mixing Schools: Why One Federal Court Refused," U.S. News and World Report, May 27, 1963, 88–90.

⁷⁰ James W. Vander Zanden, "The Ideology of White Supremacy," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (June–September 1959): 385–402, quotations 397, 386.

⁷¹ On George, see Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research, 162–166; George Lewis, "'Scientific Certainty': Wesley Critz George, Racial Science and Organised White Resistance in North Carolina, 1954–1962," Journal of American Studies 38, no. 2 (2004): 227–247; W. C. George, The Biology of the Race Problem (New York, 1962). On Bean, see Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, 77–82.

⁷² Balibar, "Is There a `Neo-Racism?'" 19; Carleton Putnam to President Eisenhower, October 13, 1958, New York Times, January 5, 1959, clipping, Box A 257, Group II, Public Relations, Putnam, Carleton Letter, NAACP Papers; Carleton Putnam, Race and Reason: A Yankee View (Washington, D.C., 1961); Coon to Putnam, June 17, 1960, and August 4, 1960, Box 10, General Correspondence, L–Sh 1960, Coon Papers.

⁷³ Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research, 157–162; Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954–64 (Urbana, Ill., 1971), 168–171; "Virginia Debates Negro Abilities," New York Times, February 18, 1962, 62; David Duke, My Awakening (1998), chap. 5, http://www.davidduke.com/awakening/chapter05_01.html (accessed October 22, 2007); Lewis, "'Scientific Certainty,'" 227–247.

⁷⁴ The "classical" phase of the civil rights movement, so named by Bayard Rustin, is the well-known narrative of legal and nonviolent protest directed at winning American civil rights that began with Brown v. Board of Education (1954), included many of the best-remembered public protests, and culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As Hall and Singh have argued, this truncated narrative distorts the history of the movement by privileging one antiracist narrative over many, obscuring the intellectual diversity and internationalist strands of black politics, and contributing to the perception of a movement delegitimized and in decline after 1965. I would add that uncritical narratives touting the success of ending legal discrimination have obscured the persistence of other kinds of racism. Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1233–1263; Singh, Black Is a Country, 1–14, 38–57.

⁷⁵ Many, if not most, of the social scientists who signed or were cited in the brief submitted in support of desegregation in the Brown case embraced environmental explanations for alleged racial differences. But the primary emphasis of the brief, aptly titled "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation," was two arguments: (1) segregation caused psychological damage to children, and (2) integration succeeded when it was consistently and firmly enforced by authorities. The brief did dismiss intellectual inferiority as an argument for segregation, noting that "available scientific evidence indicates that much, perhaps all, of the observable differences ... may be adequately explained in terms of environmental differences," but this section amounted to just two short paragraphs of the eighteen-page brief. Intelligence, it argued, provided a rationale for grouping children by ability regardless of race, but it was not a valid argument for segregation. "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation," Minnesota Law Review 37 (May 1953): 427–438. On the Brown brief, see John P. Jackson, Jr., Social Scientists for Social Justice: Making the Case against Segregation (New York, 2001), esp. 160–161; Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research, 138–179.

⁷⁶ "How Whites Feel about Negroes: A Painful American Dilemma," Newsweek, October 21, 1963, 44–55.

⁷⁷ On "color-blind" conservatism, see Singh, Black Is a Country, 10; Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement"; Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society (Berkeley, Calif., 2003); J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999); K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton, N.J., 1996); Stephen Steinberg, Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy (Boston, 2001); Nancy MacLean, "Freedom Is Not Enough": How the Fight over Jobs and Justice Changed America (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).

⁷⁸ There were other academics who sought to provide scientific explanations of innate racial equality in the mid- to late 1960s, including Dwight Ingle, William Bradford Shockley, Hans J. Eysenck, and Raymond B. Cattell. Jensen, however, was one of the most successful in garnering public and political attention. An excellent survey of the new scientific racists appears in Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research, 180–268. On Jensen, see Arthur S. Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" Harvard Educational Review 33 (1969): 1–123; L. Edson, "Jensenism, n.: The Theory That IQ Is Largely Determined by the Genes," New York Times Magazine, August 31, 1969, 10–11, 40–47; Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics; Gould, The Mismeasure of Man; N. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin, eds., The IQ Controversy (New York, 1976); Graham Richards, "Race," Racism and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History (New York, 1997); Jonathan Marks, Human Biodiversity: Genes, Race, and History (New York, 1994); Jackson, Science for Segregation.

⁷⁹ Holt, The Problem of Race in the Twenty-First Century, 23.

⁸⁰ Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color; Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York, 1995); Lopez, White by Law; Michelle Brattain, "Miscegenation and Competing Definitions of Race in Twentieth Century Louisiana," Journal of Southern History 71, no. 3 (August 2005): 621–658.

⁸¹ See, for example, Reardon, Race to the Finish, 74–97; Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, Joanna Mountain, and Barbara A. Koenig, "The Meanings of `Race' in the New Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities Research," Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics 1 (2001): 33–75. On individual DNA testing, see "Out of Africa—But from Which Tribe?" Washington Post, October 19, 2006, A3; Patricia J. Williams, "Emotional Truth," The Nation 282 (March 6, 2006): 14.

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