| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 112.5

You have not been recognized as a subscriber to the AHR online. About 313 words from this article are provided below; about 695 words remain.

If you are a individual member of the American Historical Association, you may:: • login here if you have already registered for online access.; • Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.
• Set up your online account for the first time. AHA members can go to the AHA individual membership section to locate their member numbers.
If you are not a member of the American Historical Association, you can:: • Join the AHA and receive many member benefits including print and electronic issues of the American Historical Review.
• Purchase a research pass to gain two hour access to the entire History Cooperative web site. You will have full access to current issues of the American Historical Review (104.3-present). Note: the Research Pass does not provide access to JSTOR's holdings of the American Historical Review.
Instititutions can:: • Subscribe to this journal and receive print and electronic issues.
• Activate your existing subscription so that we recognize your IP number ranges.

| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 112.5 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Asia

Balázs Szalontai. Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964. (Cold War International History Project Series.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2005. Pp. xxiii, 343. $60.00.
Studying North Korea's history is a frustrating task since no other modern state has been as secretive. Thus Balázs Szalontai's readable history of North Korea focusing on the period from the death of Joseph Stalin to the fall of Nikita Khrushchev is welcome since it is based on previously unexamined sources from the Hungarian National Archives. Szalontai found that officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Education who had contact with North Korea during this time paid considerable attention to that country's internal affairs, and he bases much of his book on their reports.	1
The author does not appear to have uncovered any major new information or revelations about North Korea. His sources largely confirm what is already known, but they do add interesting details. He uses them to support his argument that P'yongyang after the Korean War, even before 1956, acted quite independently despite its heavy reliance on Soviet aid. Szalontai carefully describes the extent and limits of Soviet influence throughout this period. For example, the Kim Il Sung regime persisted in giving priority to heavy industry, generally resisting Moscow's pressure to invest more in agriculture or in developing its mining sector. The Soviet Union did exercise some leverage, such as in 1959, when it managed to force the North Korean press to publish articles about Khrushchev's visit to the United States. But Kim Il Sung successfully avoided de-Stalinzation efforts, limited Soviet films and cultural imports, and displayed an independent streak in his foreign policy. After 1960, Soviet influence declined further, and by 1964 Soviet leaders largely refrained from making comments about North Korean internal affairs.	. . .

There are about 695 more words in this article. Please log in (or, if you are not yet an authorized user, please go to the User Setup page) to gain full access rights. Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.