AHR Conversation: Religious Identities and Violence

PARTICIPANTS:

Philip Benedict, Nora Berend, Stephen Ellis, Jeffrey Kaplan, Ussama Makdisi, and Jack Miles

Philip Benedict Nora Berend Stephen Ellis Jeffrey Kaplan Ussama Makdisi Jack Miles
There are few topics that challenge the analytical capabilities of historians more than religion and violence. When the two subjects are combined, the challenge is only increased. How do historians, whether secular-minded or believers, discuss the often extreme, obscure, or alien manifestations of religious belief? How do we understand violence in its many forms without lapsing into explanations that merely evoke the irrational? And how should we explain religiously motivated violence—or violence that seems to be inspired by religious beliefs or authorities? These and other questions are at the heart of this AHR Conversation on "Religious Identities and Violence." Although the discussion, for obvious reasons, often turned to the contemporary situation in the Middle East, the participants were careful to draw from their knowledge of past historical experience. Most insistently, they warned against taking either religion or religious violence out of its historical context and treating it like a timeless, isolated phenomenon. The participants are Philip Benedict, an early modern European historian who has written widely on Calvinism and the Wars of Religion; Nora Berend, a medievalist who specializes in the religious history of Hungary and Eastern Europe more generally; Stephen Ellis, a historian of modern Africa who has written on religion and politics; Jeffrey Kaplan, who has published on religion and violence from a global perspective; Ussama Makdisi, a scholar of Ottoman and Arab history who has also written on American involvement in the Middle East; and Jack Miles, a journalist and scholar with wide knowledge of religion and religious affairs. The Conversation took place over the summer and fall of 2007.
AHR Editor: To discuss the connections between religion and violence is to open up a very large territory for our consideration. To start, it might be best to confront an issue that often arises when the topic is discussed, especially in more public venues. This is the assumption that religious violence is really not fundamentally about religion—that other interests, claims, or identities of an economic, ethnic, political, or even psychological nature are at stake. What this assumption seems to imply is that religion can be reduced or referred to something else, some other layer of identity or interest. And yet in recent years, historians and social scientists have clearly become more open to what we might call the "irreducibility" of religion as an identity and affiliation. So my first question relates precisely to this issue: How should we think of religion in relationship to other social identities? How "irreducible" is it?	1
Philip Benedict: I certainly endorse the idea that in most situations in medieval and early modern Europe, religious violence is "really" about religion. This may be less true of more recent times. I wonder, however, how consistently useful it is to think of religion as a social identity in medieval and early modern Europe. Situations certainly existed in which people assigned religious labels to one another and/or thought of themselves as part of a religious group, most obviously in religious borderlands or in regions where multiple religious groups lived alongside one another. But the insight first provided by Wilfred Cantwell Smith and subsequently refined by a number of historians, namely that it was only over the course of the late Middle Ages, and especially in the wake of the Reformation, that the concept of "religion" took on something approaching its modern sense of an organized set of beliefs and practices about the divine rather than an attitude of piety toward the gods, is an important one to keep in mind. 1 And while it is certainly true that many forms of religious violence in late medieval or early modern Europe were directed against neighbors assigned some fixed label such as "Jews," "Huguenots," or "Papists," incidents of religious violence may have been especially likely to occur at moments when new beliefs were spreading into an area and the religious situation was far too fluid to be neatly defined. So when public scenes of disrespect to the consecrated host sparked violent Catholic retaliation in France around 1560, the violence was motivated by outrage against those so depraved as to attack God's body, but the clash cannot be usefully analyzed as one between two groups with fixed social identities. The violence was all about rival beliefs and their public manifestation and defense—a clear matter of "religion" as a symbolic system. To go from there to speaking of religion as an irreducible identity is a linguistic step it probably isn't useful to take.	2
Stephen Ellis: Religion varies from one society to another, so something that we consider today as belonging to the sphere of religion may not have been thought of that way by our ancestors. However, one thing that seems to be common to religion in every historical time and place is the perception of an invisible world that exists alongside the visible one. Sometimes the invisible world is even thought to suffuse the visible world. A person brought up in such an intellectual environment is likely to develop a distinctive view of the world in which events or trends that have an obvious material explanation—a road accident, say, caused by a vehicle with faulty brakes—may be considered also to have a cause in the invisible world. When it comes to trends that affect an entire society, such as a war, a plague, or a famine, people typically develop a rather dense explanation that includes political, economic, and religious elements. Hence the perception by intelligent people, quite capable of sophisticated analysis, that a plague not only might be caused by germs, but might have a religious explanation as well. In this sense, historians are well advised to take the religious thought of other times and places seriously. That does not exclude being fully aware of political operations, for example by holders of political power who may deliberately invoke religious arguments or religious institutions in the service of a policy aimed at controlling material resources. Perhaps this provides us with a way to think about religious identity as well. The concept of a religious identity is clearly one that has a connection to politics, in the sense of the manipulation of control over resources. In today's world, it is generally possible to distinguish the religious and political aspects of conflicts in which religious identity appears to play a key role. It may well be that in certain societies in the past, however, such a distinction between religion and politics was less easily thinkable.	3
Nora Berend: I agree that it is unhelpful to talk about "irreducible" religious identity. This is not the same as saying that religious identity is necessarily a cover for other interests or motives. Just as religion is part of society, so is religious identity part of social identity. 2 It is interrelated with other aspects of identity rather than being a discrete entity. Religion as a phenomenon as well as particular religions changed over time. For example, as Christianity spread with the conversion of whole societies, it also adapted to the societies it penetrated. Scholars even talk about the Germanization of early medieval Christianity to highlight the scale of the changes linked to the adaptation of Christianity to new populations. 3 What was accepted and what was not (therefore what was "Christian") was continuously redefined. Examples include but are not restricted to dietary regulations, the emergence of new tenets and practices such as the cult of saints, and new organizational structures such as centralization under the papacy. 4 Christianity also split into a number of competing branches (Catholicism and so-called "heresies," then Protestantism and so on), each laying claim to be the "true" Christianity. So the content of religious identity correlates with the social context: social customs, which differ radically in different periods, are part of religious identity. An early medieval monk could utter ritual curses and beat the relics of a saint to remind the saint of his duty to protect the community that looked after the relic; in the fourteenth century, a controversy developed over whether it is heretical to claim that Christ lived in complete poverty. 5 The Christian identity of many earlier people has often been called into question by modern Christians whose criteria are so different; yet both identified themselves as Christians. Religion therefore is always part of a whole society, and religious identity is inseparable from the social context.	4
I also agree that historically types of group identity changed, but I would like to take issue with the idea that it may not be useful to think of religion as a social identity in the Middle Ages. The meaning of "religion" certainly changed over time, since modifications in religion reflect social transformation, but socially constructed religious identity existed in the Middle Ages just as much as, say, in the nineteenth century, even if in different forms. Religious identity may dominate or be more or less important compared to other social identities, but there is no single model even within one period or society. Medieval society was not uniformly religious; the "Christian Middle Ages" is a modern concept. 6 For example, wars in medieval Iberia started out as opportunistic warfare not just between Christians and Muslims, but also between adherents of either religion. Over the course of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, this warfare was redefined as a religious war, the Reconquista. Even though realities continued to be more complex and both war and alliances cut across the religious divide, the rhetoric increasingly focused on a just war against the enemies of the faith. 7 Complex social institutions such as military orders were established around this idea; a member of such an order had a religious identity, but I do not think one could argue that this was not a social identity. Any formulation of religious identity was also open to competing interpretations. For example, in the thirteenth century, popes and kings both subscribed to the idea that kings were defenders of Christendom, but they had rather different ideas about what this meant. 8	5
Jack Miles: The cover photograph in today's Los Angeles Times [June 15, 2007] shows a Hamas jihadi in the familiar black stocking mask, holding a gun in one hand and a Qurˀan in the other, standing atop a desk in the Gaza headquarters of the Preventive Security Service, one of four security agencies run by Fatah. There can be little doubt that this man believes his fight is about Islam, but do we?	6
I sense that those at this electronic table do not share this view. Philip Benedict endorses the idea "that in most situations in medieval and early modern Europe, religious violence is `really' about religion." He adds the qualification "This may be less true of more recent times." Can we agree, though, that if it was true once, it is possible in principle and may be true again in a given situation?	7
While writing on the Balkans for the Los Angeles Times in the 1990s, I was struck by one way in which this conflict differed from that in Northern Ireland, with which at the time a good many commentators compared it. I had some familiarity with the Northern Ireland conflict through members of my extended family who live there. (A third cousin of mine was interned by the British.) What struck me was that in virtually every case of a Serb attack on a Muslim town in Bosnia, the first two acts of the invaders were to burn down the mosque, and if there was a library or archive, to burn that down as well. By contrast, the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland never burned down each other's churches, schools, or libraries. Pubs were the more usual target. Closer to that conflict, moreover, one only sometimes heard the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant" used as prime designators. More often, one heard of Unionists (or Loyalists) and Nationalists (or Republicans). This may surprise inasmuch as this conflict at least to some extent has continued the early modern wars of religion that Philip Benedict alludes to. Perhaps by the time of the Act of Union, colonialist wealth mattered rather more than religion, but religion surely mattered to Cromwell in an earlier stage of the conflict. In any case, by the late twentieth century, we were dealing with irredentist nationalism vs. residual colonialism rather than with religion, and the identities of the combatants were only secondarily established by their religious affiliation.	8
So, then, sometimes yes and sometimes no. Hamas, with its operative standing on the Gaza desk, is engaged in genuine religious warfare. Sunnis and Shiˁas in Iraq, who bomb each other's mosques and funerals, would seem to be engaged in genuine religious warfare as well. And how do we determine the difference? Just what is it that we encounter when we encounter religion in a form that cannot be reduced to some more tangible consideration such as territory?	9
I submit that there are two elements: one lateral or social, the other vertical or transcendent. As to the social element, what we now call religion is what the Western world first called church. The church was a social novelty in that it functioned rather as an ethnic group (the New Israel) but had a creedal rather than genealogical criterion for membership. One had to join it as one did not have to join either Greco-Roman international polytheism or any of the empire's national blends of ethnicity and myth. This social construct, though "religion" was not the word for it at its creation, remains close to what is meant by "a" religion not just in the West but wherever Western influence has been strongly felt. It is the combination of this social construct with transcendence—the intractable "invisibility" factor to which Stephen Ellis alludes—that creates the matrix for religious violence. Without the transcendence, martyrdom would never seem worth it. Without the social construct, martyrdom would be as unthreatening and inconsequential as private suicide.	10
Ussama Makdisi: To suggest that religion is an "irreducible" identity strikes me as a blunt response to the relatively recent call to take religion or religious thought "seriously." I think we all agree that religious identities are complex and have changed enormously over time, and that it is unhelpful to think of religion in essentialist terms. In other words, the problem we seem to be facing is not so much to analyze religious identity as a dynamic manifestation of a specific context (which we in this group appear to encourage). Rather, the problem seems to be whether we should attempt to bridge the gap that exists between those who believe in one religiously exclusivist way of viewing the world and those who believe in a secular view of the world, and also between those who espouse narrow orthodoxies and those who embrace a wider ecumenism. As to the point that was made by Philip Benedict, that religious violence in the medieval world was—perhaps—more about religion than the "more recent times," I am not sure. Religious violence in the modern world does, of course, depend on the context as much today as it did in medieval history. But to suggest, as does Jack Miles, that Hamas is "engaged in genuine religious warfare" is, I think, to the miss the point about Hamas completely: they are engaged in political warfare, in a struggle for power and a form of liberation, in which religion, or religious idiom, is but one of several important strands that constitute Pales-tinian Islamist identity. My point is that they are as aware of this as we are. Certainly, we cannot and should not ignore religion. But the Qurˀan held aloft by the Hamas fighter to which Jack refers is simply one picture, illustrative more of the choice of an American newspaper editor than of the situation on the ground in Gaza. The picture was probably chosen because the fighter was holding a Qurˀan, whereas the vast majority of images of Hamas fighters conveyed in the Arab media that I am following here in Beirut do not have them holding up Qurˀans. This brings up a more general point: Why is it that when we are talking about the Middle East, and the Islamic world more generally, we privilege the "religious" over the far more (or at least equally) obvious and plausible secular factors and explanations? Why do we ignore the fact that what is at stake in Gaza, for example, has virtually nothing to do with "religion" or "Islam" in any abstract or textual sense, and far more to do with nationalism, colonialism, occupation, racism, and corruption? Why, in other words, do we see the "medieval" when it comes to the Middle East, and ascribe to it an unbroken continuity with its medieval past, whereas we don't when it comes to the West?	11
Jeffrey Kaplan: Some years ago, I taught at the University of Helsinki. Wonderful place!! I took with me the assumption, drilled into me as orthodoxy in the course of my education, that by the eighteenth century, a watershed had occurred in the human psyche. The world had been gradually "demagicalized" to the extent that secularity was at least an option—that causation could be accepted as accidental and that events might conceivably be random and unrelated. At this time, I envisioned something along the lines of the first edition of Norman Cohn's description of bewildered urban migrants in his Pursuit of the Millennium, men who would literally be unable to function if their religion-centered zeitgeist were significantly disturbed. 9 In Helsinki, though, I came to know a fellow University of Chicago alum, an Assyriologist by trade, who was engaged in a project of translating and digitizing existing fragments of Assyrian texts. He took the opposite view, holding that given sufficient time to adapt to technological change, an Assyrian could probably successfully make the transition from his own time to the modern world. As proof, my colleague offered an impressive number of letters, each at the beginning of the text invoking the gods with great piety, but many revealing the same streaks of cynicism, indifference, or doubt that would be familiar to each of us in our own everyday lives. It took many evenings and untold liters of beer for me to come around to his view, but my faith in the academic apprehensions of the religious certainties of others was never quite the same again. Especially if those others were in distant historical epochs or cultural milieus. Religion, as Jack Miles notes, is certainly a motive force in history, but is certainly seen in quite different ways by co-religionists, or even by members of seemingly tightly knit radical or combatant groups. Their actions are, in the view of the actors, certainly categorized as "religious" (although the Islamic doctrine of "tawhid" rather rounds the circle by sacralizing all aspects of life—political, economic, social, etc.). And from the perspective of the outside observer, it would be hard to argue with this contention. It is all "religion," after all. It has textual sources, and its dreams and visions are shaped by the hermeneutical legerdemain of religious authorities freely chosen by each believer. Of course, the texts may be retrieved quite selectively, and the formal religious training of those doing the retrieval may be—in the eyes of more orthodox/conservative/moderate/co-opted or simply Westoxicated Muslims (to borrow from Jalal Al-e Ahmad)—quite wanting. 10 But in all cases, what we are seeing is ineluctably and authentically religious production and is understood as such by the faithful of all ideological hues.	12
We are, of course, speaking at a very high level of generality. What I find of greater fascination than whether the wave of violence we are experiencing is perceived by its perpetrators as religious is how the precise tone and content of the religious vision appears to the individual actor. From the textual complexities of the eschatological visions written of by religious scholars on one end of the spectrum, to the simple vision of sweet-breasted huris among flowing springs and scented gardens on the other end of the spectrum, to the vast and highly individualized "stuff of dreams" in between these two extremes—both visions are authentically religious, but beyond this observation, they can hardly be said to greatly resemble each other.	13
The Editor's question, in sum, should remind us of the necessity of approaching the topic of religious violence with great sensitivity to the insider/outsider dimensions of the issue. I hope that our discussion will, to the best of our ability, highlight both—bringing to bear our own scholarly approaches, but with a sensitivity to the authenticity of the lived experience of those whose lives we wish to better apprehend through our interchange.	14
AHR Editor: Several different positions have already been staked out in this conversation, and I would like to keep them in play while moving on. My own formulation regarding religion as an "irreducible" identity has been contested by several of you. The question was meant to suggest the specificity or even singularity of religious identity, which I believe most of us recognize, although most of us would be quick to qualify this assertion by noting, as several of you have, the interrelatedness of all identities. Stephen Ellis, however, has reminded us of the otherworldly aspect of religion for many throughout history, suggesting a distinctiveness that cannot easily be compared or related to other experiences. Nora Berend has queried Philip Benedict's claim that religion as an identity was an early modern phenomenon, pointing to "socially constructed religious identity ... in the Middle Ages." Jack Miles, for his part, wonders about Philip's skeptical aside regarding the link between religion and violence in more recent times. Ussama Makdisi's comment challenges Jack's assumption that religion is at the heart of even "jihadist" militancy. Finally, Jeffrey Kaplan implicitly challenges us all to think about the subjective, interior aspect of religious experience (where, I might add, the "irreducible" might be relevant as a self-description).	15
A common theme in most of these comments is the historicity of religion. Indeed, Jeffrey's comment introduces, only to dismiss, the notion of the Enlightenment as an instrument of secularization, which still leaves us with the question of how religion has changed and can change according to context, period, and culture. How do we understand the ebb and flow, the changing strength of religion as having a more or less fundamental purchase on people's identity across time? Ussama's comment should force us to examine our oft-voiced privileging of the "religious," as opposed to other interests and identities, when thinking about the Middle East or Islam. Do we likewise too easily do the same when thinking about the more distant past? And what might this imply about our analytical capacity to deal with "religion"?	16
Jack Miles: Let me begin by conceding the broad legitimacy of the question but then proceed to challenge the validity of what it assumes about the present moment. The late Wilfred Cantwell Smith once wrote, "Believers talk about God. Unbelievers talk about religion." Historians are, by this definition, all unbelievers. The grounds for their unbelief are methodological and surely familiar to the participants in this conversation. Though some believe that they need be unbelievers only when functioning as historians, even then they may often look on the past as "another country" where—just as in some actual, contemporary other countries—God or the gods are invoked as they never are by Western historians themselves. Moreover, the resort to religion as an explanatory hypothesis in these temporally or culturally remote locations might seem, in principle, to come more readily to hand than it does when explaining more proximate locations. I think here of the old archaeologist's advice that when you can't figure out what a building is for, call it a temple.	17
That said, I do not believe that, in fact, when dealing with the contemporary Middle East or with the ummah as a whole, Western historians, journalists, or policymakers have readier recourse to Islam as an explanation than they have, say, to Christianity when dealing with Europe or the United States. In fact, I believe the opposite to be the case. What we see is a refusal to honor as authentic the invocations of God or religion offered in these locations as the grounds for action, and an insistence on looking past such invocations to the "real" grounds that the benighted actors themselves fail to grasp.	18
Let me offer a rather humble illustration. The September–October 2006 issue of the Columbia Journalism Review includes a review essay by Bill Berkeley entitled "Know Thine Enemy: A Rash of New Books by Persian Writers Offer the West a Chance to Re-Imagine Iran." Berkeley has no pronounced thesis. His goal is to introduce complexity rather than eliminate it. But here are the "pull quotes"—words lifted from the text of the article and printed in red block letters by the editor to give the gist and attract the reader: (1) "Are the ruling mullahs truly religious, or do they merely use religion for power?" (2) "To understand Iranian politics, the book to read is not the Koran but Machiavelli." (3) "For all its bluster, most experts on Iran insist, the Iranian leadership is not irrational." The import of the essay is, ultimately, to eliminate Islam as even one explanatory factor among many and to seek explanation without remainder in considerations of money and power. I submit that Berkeley's procedure is typical of contemporary journalism about Islam and consonant with much "normal history," in which religion—far from being privileged—is marginalized. The marginalization typically comes about by the translation of religious motivations into nonreligious ones.	19
What is true of journalism is true as well of political policy. Early in the Iraq War, Attorney-General John Ashcroft said, "This is not a religious war. This is a freedom war." President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were relentless in invoking the antinomies of freedom/oppression and democracy/tyranny rather than ever employing the language of religion/irreligion, much less of Christian/heathen. The factors they considered when forming policy were, like those in Berkeley's review essay, resolutely secular. They never expected that in administering occupied Iraq, they would find themselves forced to defer to the judgment of an Ayatollah Ali Sistani when scheduling Iraq's first post-invasion elections. To extend such deference in the United States to any American Christian leader would be unthinkable. (Recall the easy indifference of the administration to declared opposition to the invasion by all Roman Catholic and mainstream Protestant leadership, including that of the Methodist and Episcopal denominations to which the president and his wife owe nominal allegiance.) At the level of policy formation, this "methodological atheism," this refusal as a matter of policy to regard Iraq as the scene of past and possibly of future religious strife, this determination to conceive that country ("this young democracy") as and only as the scene of past tyranny and future freedom—all this has cost the world dearly.	20
And it does not seem to be changing under the impact of impending defeat. Who can forget Jeff Stein's op-ed in the New York Times, "Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?" 11 In the very recent past, the word "theology" was popular slang for inconsequential quibbling or meaningless theorizing. I submit that that attitude, rather than any privileging of religion in general or Islam in particular, continues to define the discourse of our day. Perhaps at the deepest level, the bias—shared by historians, journalists, and policymakers—is toward material explanation over ideological. To be sure, cui bono is a consideration always worth raising. The study of classical antiquity has been invigorated by a determination to look for self-interested, material explanations for, e.g., the spread of Christianity around the Roman Empire. Carried to an extreme, however, the hermeneutic of suspicion toward all invocations of an ideal, not just religious invocations, can end in a culturally induced blindness to the sometimes very material consequences of adherence to an ideal. To speak more plainly, sometimes people really mean it; and when they do, it pays to take them seriously.	21
Nora Berend: It is true that there is a fairly pervasive trend to depict people in past societies as more at the mercy of the environment and having less control over their lives and therefore being more religious than men and women in the present. Although it is easy to pick holes in this claim, it is not entirely without merit, but I think it would be more useful to shift the line of argument. Rather than asking if people in the past were more religious (or more sincere in their religiosity), we should focus on the loss of power for religious institutions created by the rise of mass secularization. Such secularization is indeed a fairly recent phenomenon in the history of society. In analyzing the ebb and flow of the strength of religion in determining people's identities, instead of referring to more religiosity in the past, less in the present, we should introduce some distinctions, most crucially between the issues of the sincerity of personal beliefs, on the one hand, and the political-institutional context, on the other hand. In other words, we should distinguish between personal beliefs, which in any period may be sincere or insincere, and the vested interest of religious institutions. The latter will obviously be a much stronger determinant of at least outward conformity in states based on institutional religious power than in secular states.	22
I agree with Jack that "sometimes people really mean it," but in that case we still need to analyze why they do. Do they "mean it" more in societies governed by religious institutions? To complicate the picture, I do not think that strong personal religiosity necessarily corresponds to the strong power of religious institutions in a society. It is very helpful to have recourse to analytical categories from sociology and social scientists here, whether we think of religion as an answer to death or more generally as a system of compensators. As Stark and Bainbridge pointed out, as long as people are unable to get all the rewards they want, religion will continue; while secularization erodes the power of established denominations, it opens the way for sects and cults, and I think in part this also explains fundamentalist resurgence. 12	23
A person's religious beliefs or lack of them is surely the result of a complex web of factors: socialization, fashion, conformity to or on the contrary rebellion against the norm (whether that norm is religious or secular in a given society), rebellion against the previous generation's standards, social and peer pressure, religious or secular prescriptions and their enforcement by a state or political power. The domination of religious institutions, tied to political and economic interests, is an interrelated but distinct matter. Such domination may lead people sincerely to believe the religious tenets propagated by these religious institutions and specialists, but there are historical moments when we can clearly distinguish how the interests of the institutions determined social conformity. For example, the conversion of central and northern Europe in the tenth and eleventh centuries proceeded mainly from above. Rulers, together with ecclesiastics, made sure of the conformity of the population to Christian regulations. Laws were issued to this effect, which focused on behavior: for example, people had to go to mass on Sundays and listen without murmuring, because otherwise they were flogged. 13 The emphasis was not on the sincerity of belief, but on conformity, and of course this conformity can be a powerful means of making societies "religious." Here is a final example that brings together these lines of analysis and demonstrates the potential complexity of analyzing "religion." A Christian woman in medieval Spain swore that she would rather become a Muslim than marry the man she was promised to. The case went all the way to the papal court, because her words were taken to constitute a binding oath, which would have led to her apostasy. How "religious" was this woman? Did she "mean it," or was she simply very angry? The Catholic Church, the religious institution that provided a basic framework for society at the time, took her words at face value as concerning her willingness to leave the Christian religion. This set the institutional machinery in motion. In a secular society, the same words might have been treated as a joke, while the woman's religious beliefs might have been just as sincere or insincere in either type of society.	24
Philip Benedict: Big questions! Rather than responding directly to all of the Editor's three questions, I'd like to try to nudge the conversation in another direction. A common theme in the first round of comments, as mentioned, was the historicity of religion. What this means to me is that as we try to understand violence in the name of religion, or conflicts where religious identities are one of the sets of labels to distinguish friend from foe that are in play between the contending sides—and I assume that the purpose of this conversation is to advance that enterprise—we should try to avoid talking about "religion" as a thing. We need to talk about different specific religions at different specific moments in time, and more precisely yet about the beliefs and currents within these religions at any given moment. Religious violence does not ebb and flow because religion en bloc has more or less hold on people. It ebbs and flows in relation to the degree of credence and legitimacy accorded specific religious beliefs that justify force to defend something considered sacred, and in relation to the frequency with which situations arise in which believers feel that they are compelled to fight for these beliefs. As I have written in a recent essay, "to understand the motivations of religious conflict, it is necessary to unpack the black box we label `religion' and identify the specific beliefs or attitudes that particularly encouraged or discouraged people to act in ways that provoked conflict." 14 It is equally important to understand the circumstances in which religious conflicts are particularly likely to arise. This is the approach adopted by Norman Housley, for instance, in his excellent Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536, which seeks to identify, first, the situations in this period in which religious warfare was particularly likely to arise (in the borderlands between Christianity and Islam; in the conflicts touched off by the Hussite movement in Bohemia), and then the beliefs, tropes, and practices that accompanied and legitimated it (crusading bulls and symbols, sectarian apocalypticism, national messianism, the conviction that defending doctrinal truth against external assault was one of the fundamental ends of secular government). 15 The Reformation, in turn, would bring new situations where religious violence was particularly likely to erupt, notably those moments when Protestant ideas first began to spread widely within communities, especially communities that defined themselves to a significant degree as sacral communities. At the same time, it led, for complex reasons, to the gradual abandonment of other practices that once widely justified religious violence, most surprisingly the issuing of crusading bulls for conflicts against Christian heretics, which rarely accompanied sixteenth-century wars between Catholics and Protestants and disappeared for good after 1600.	25
I have the feeling from our first round that all the participants in this discussion would pretty much agree with this analytical approach. (Dissent, of course, is welcome!) If I'm right, then it seems to me that our conversation can best advance by identifying specific beliefs that have justified violence in the name of defending the sacred within different eras and religions and tracing how and why they either gained or lost persuasive power over time. It might also help to identify the situations in which religious violence tended/tends to arise within different civilizations and parts of the globe and what might account for changes in the frequency with which such situations present themselves across the centuries. Of course, to do this, we also need to have some useful working definition of what does and doesn't constitute a religious war or religious riot. On that last, I found Jack Miles's comparative observation about the Northern Irish and Bosnian situation—namely that in the former region places of worship were rarely objects of attack, while in the latter they were often the first places attacked—most illuminating, and perhaps also illustrative of a broader analytical point worth making. One helpful approach to labeling something as religious violence is phenomenological: to look at the character of the violence and the people and objects singled out for attack.	26
In early modern European religious violence, churches were often targets of the violence. They might be attacked in several ways. One recurring pattern involves the attempted destruction of entire churches, whether by fire or by sack. In seventeenth-century France, this was often done in triumph when the Protestants lost their rights to worship in a given community, or else, earlier in the century, as a warning that a Protestant temple was not wanted in a predominantly Catholic community or that a Catholic religious order was not wanted in a predominantly Protestant community. The message here was: you are not a legitimate part of our community. Another rite of violence was the attack on specific features of church decoration or furnishing: altar rails in the English Revolution, images of saints within and without churches at the initial moment of the Reformation or during conflicts like the French Wars of Religion. The message here was: these specific objects are contrary to the pure worship of God and must be purged from our churches. The attacks on churches or mosques in Bosnia would seem clearly to be sending the first message, the much-publicized Taliban destruction of the Bamiyan statues of the Buddha in Afghanistan perhaps the second. In the internal conflicts in Palestine right now, are places of worship, religious symbols, or clerics being attacked with any regularity? If not, then Ussama Makdisi's point that publishing a photo of a Hamas fighter holding up a Qurˀan tells us more about the choices of American editors than Hamas militants is spot on. But that is not to say that the same point could be made if an American newspaper showed a member of a Sunni or Shiˁite militia unit in Iraq holding up a Qurˀan. There shrines are obviously one prime target of attack. Why? In what ways are they attacked, and what does that tell us about this conflict?	27
My initial suggestion that conflicts often classified as religious in medieval and early modern times may more often really have been about religion than those of more modern times was a talking point that I threw out on the basis of a little reading that I did about the Northern Irish and Balkan conflicts a few years ago when I offered a seminar on religious wars. I was more struck then by the differences between these conflicts and the French Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century than by the similarities. Obviously this is the kind of broad hypothesis that needs to be tested and refined by the careful investigation of specific cases, and I'm delighted to see others challenging and refining it. Perhaps we can keep on refining it in a comparative manner by asking about the contemporary Middle East as well: How often in different conflicts are religious buildings or holy places the objects of attack? What are the means of attack and the specific features of the places that are targeted? Asking specific questions like these might be one useful way of continuing the conversation across religious and chronological borders without getting tied up in self-reflexive knots about why the Middle East or the Middle Ages are so often figured as religious.	28
AHR Editor: I'd like to push back a bit on Philip's laudable attempt to "nudge" the conversation forward into the topic of religious violence per se—which in fact I planned to be the focus of our next round. But before we confront this matter directly, I wanted to give us all a chance to comment on what I still believe—pace Philip—to be a legitimate analytical concern. That is, the question regarding the persistence or waning of "religion" in various societies across time and cultures. I'm assuming that we largely reject what we might call a modernization view of this dynamic, whereby it is posited that religion will recede as modernity progresses. But do we then, as seems to be implied by Philip's impatience with my formulation, entirely dismiss notions of development, tradition, or culture as possible bearers of (or obstacles to) religious commitment? This may be to force some of you to a level of generalization that induces intellectual discomfort. And I certainly would agree that we should be careful about resorting to facile generalities that cannot possibly be tested. But I think the issue is legitimate, in part because it informs, often unthinkingly, the approach of many, including many historians. More particularly, it seems relevant when trying to puzzle out one of the most glaring contradictions in the contemporary world with regard to the uneven geographical distribution of religious commitment—that is, its low level in Europe and other industrialized nations and its robustness in the United States.	29
Ussama Makdisi: At the risk of offending Philip's desire not to have us get tied up in "self-reflexive knots," I feel that the larger point I raised about how certain cultures and parts of the world are perceived to be more religious than others, which the Editor reiterated, still needs to be addressed more precisely. I simply do not believe that it is true that, as Jack Miles asserts, "Western historians, journalists, or policymakers" have not overemphasized Islam; the great champion of the Iraq War, the most ardent defender of a "clash of civilizations" ("Islam" against the "Judeo-Christian West"), and one of the most recognized and celebrated (in the U.S.) authorities on Islam (and the modern Middle East, of course!) is none other than Bernard Lewis. His work over the past few decades has been built on a polemic against what he considers to be the inability of the "Muslim" world to face modernity and in a sense to be enraged by it. In Lewis's influential work, he places a great deal of emphasis on the medieval Islamic world to explain current Arab and Muslim attitudes toward the West. He also minimizes the role of Western colonialism in shaping our contemporary world. He does not do this by chance, nor does he do what Philip and Nora Berend argue passionately and in my view correctly for, contextualizing religious violence or even religion more broadly. Is it a coincidence that Lewis, whose academic specialization was the premodern Muslim world, has become the, or at any rate a, leading authority on the contemporary Middle East? What does this mean? I don't think we would accept for a minute, and certainly not celebrate in the manner that Lewis has been, an expert on medieval Christendom, or even early modern Europe, who started publishing polemics about the ills of modern America on the basis of his knowledge of medieval Christendom or early modern Europe.	30
My point is that Lewis can do what he does in large part because of a general perception, evident among historians as well as among most journalists and pundits, and certainly among policymakers, that the West as we understand it has decisively broken with its premodern past, whereas the Islamic world has not. When we analyze figures such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, or even George W. Bush, we do not go around, at least not in mainstream academic journals, quoting verses from the Bible to help us decipher contemporary positions. Nor do we pretend that the medieval Christian world has any immediate or direct bearing on contemporary Christian fundamentalist politics. We are far more careful, nuanced, and contextualized when it comes to analyzing Christian fundamentalist movements than we are Islamic ones.	31
To be clear, I am all for letting the "actors" speak for themselves, but I find Jack's argument about Iraq even less compelling than his argument about Hamas (and to answer Philip's specific question, no, places of worship were not specifically attacked in this last round of fighting—my point is that it would be impossible to analyze this "internal" Palestinian fighting, and the rise of an Islamic movement within Palestinian politics, without including in the analysis the profound implication of the Israeli occupation, to say nothing of the role of various competing Arab regimes, the corruption of Fatah, as well as religious inclinations and beliefs). Since when did the American occupation forces in Iraq "defer" to Sistani on any of the crucial issues that have defined U.S. interests in Iraq and the region (like, say, oil, which Bush has also not really mentioned, although this does not mean it is not important for the U.S. in Iraq)? From the outset, the U.S. language of occupation in Iraq has been replete with religious simplification: terms such as the so-called "Sunni triangle," Saddam as a "Sunni" dictator, the dissolution of a secular Iraqi identity by championing a Lebanese model of sectarian politics, and today endless discussion (which rarely includes Iraqis themselves) of the "historic" Sunni-Shiˁa divide, as if the U.S. occupation were not a major exacerbating factor. More to the point, when Bush and Blair talk about good vs. evil, the "moral" thing to do, the liberation of women, and spreading freedom, they are very much building on assumptions that they—and their respective constituencies in America and Britain—believe to be the essence of a Christian West that is endangered by Islamic fundamentalism, which—again, this is important—most people cannot dissociate from their notions of "Islam." The operative contrast is not, therefore, Christian/heathen but Christian/Muslim.	32
Again, to be clear, I am not suggesting that religion is not important—it is—but for me the real difficulty is how to introduce religion and religiosity into a discussion of the Middle East and elsewhere while also letting actors speak and to the greatest extent possible represent themselves. When it comes to Islam, the Middle East, and/or the Arab world, we are still far from that ideal. Unquestionably, a lot of writing on Islam and the Middle East is still generated out of fear, ignorance, and hostility—we have only to go to any U.S. bookstore to verify this for ourselves.	33
Jack Miles: Professor Margaret C. Jacob of UCLA recently drew my attention to Religion and History, a lively theme issue of the journal History and Theory. 16 The issue is perhaps most noteworthy for a remarkable coincidentia oppositorum. The concluding contribution, by Brad S. Gregory, is entitled "The Other Confessional History: On Secular Bias in the Study of Religion." In it, Gregory identifies the moment in Durkheim's Elementary Forms when the postulate that the miraculous does not occur and the transcendent does not exist hardens into a dogma to that effect. Durkheim's dogma, he further argues, has now so pervaded history as a discipline, going far beyond the status of mere methodological postulate, that we must regard history as a species of religion whose adherents and practitioners, true to their own unproven and unprovable faith, misapprehend and distort the religious beliefs and practices of others. The remarkable coincidence that I note above is that between Gregory's view—transparently an indictment—and the view of Constantin Fasolt in his contribution to this same theme issue. In "History and Religion in the Modern Age," Fasolt steps forward as an unapologetic adherent to something very like the faith that Gregory describes. In a kind of confession, Fasolt concludes that history is, yes, a new species of religion, but he is bold to declare it an improvement on its predecessors. To quote the last sentence of his opening abstract, "History does not conflict with the historical religions merely because it reveals them to have been founded on beliefs that cannot be supported by the evidence. History conflicts with the historical religions because it is a rival religion."	34
Stephen Ellis: I am glad someone has used the word "methodological." It seems to me that we urgently need to consider some questions of method if we are to go any more deeply into the matters we are discussing. Ussama Makdisi has asked why so many commentators emphasize the religious aspect of violent struggles in the Middle East, and even in the Islamic world more generally, rather than lending their attention to the political, economic, or social aspects of these same struggles. Jack Miles, on the other hand, suggests that the religious element might actually be understated by many commentators and politicians. Both Ussama and Jack are referring to contemporary conflicts, but historians have to consider precisely the same point in regard to contests that took place in the past, that is, to decide what is properly considered religious and what is not. We cannot do this unless we have at least an approximate understanding of what religion is—in the context of those particular societies that we, as historians, are seeking to understand, but also in our own time. In other words, we must have at least a working definition of religion. This is no easy matter. I think it has already become clear in our conversation that the nature of religion varies over time. In the seventeenth century, for example, European travelers to Africa quite often wrote that the societies they found there had no religion at all, yet those same travelers described all manner of rituals intended to communicate with an invisible world. The reason so many Europeans reacted this way was generally that they could not identify in African societies any sacred book, any body of dogma, or any class of priests that in their own view added up to a religion. So we need to decide what constitutes "religion" and what does not. Religion changes over time, and yet we don't have much difficulty talking about ancient Greek or Roman religion. This implies that, in spite of all the changes, there is some element in most or even all human societies that corresponds to the word "religion." We need to study the nature and the role of this element in particular contexts.	35
A further issue of method that has already arisen in our conversation concerns the matter of taking religious thought seriously. There is no contradiction between doing this and yet maintaining a secular stance as a historian. In terms of method, it means that two stages are necessary. The first step is to understand the religious thought of the society we are investigating in its own terms, to the best of our ability. The second stage is to interpret what we find, which we do in our own terms. This is pretty much how historians proceed habitually. I don't think it poses any more problem in principle in regard to religion than in regard to other aspects of historical thought or practice. Finally, even if we were to identify a violent struggle as being motivated largely by religious ideology, we still need to ask basic questions about why the struggle turns violent at a particular time and place. Here, political and other issues are almost certain to be on the agenda. If we apply this principle to Palestine, for example, we may ask why a previously political struggle adopts a religious rhetoric at a certain moment.	36
Nora has raised a couple more important points of method. The first of these concerns the matter of sincerity. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what someone "really" believes. (In many circumstances, I am not always sure what I "really" believe myself!) In researching matters of religion, in societies past and present, what we can do is to investigate religious practices, which are visible and may therefore be studied empirically, and religious ideas, inasmuch as the latter are discussed and may be recorded.	37
Another issue concerns the rise of mass secularization. It is increasingly apparent that many of the utopian ideas of the twentieth century were in fact based on a secularized reading of history as having a meaning, which is a distinctly Christian way of thinking about the passage of time. This was pointed out by Eric Voegelin in regard to Nazism more than fifty years ago, and is a point of view one hears with increasing frequency these days. I am thinking of recent books by Michael Burleigh and John Gray. 17 In some senses, even in western Europe, where people go to church less than they did a couple of generations ago, religious ideas and even religious practices remain current, but in a secular guise. This means that we must tread carefully when interpreting fundamentalism in our own time, especially in the former developing world. To some extent, academics are noticing religion where they used to ignore it—it never really went away.	38
Jeffrey Kaplan: The question of "ebb and flow" when applied to the embrace of religious identity speaks to the heart of my body of research, which involves millenarian/messianic violence. This, as participants in this discussion will probably agree, is the rarest form of religious violence, but it is at the same time the most intractable, for it is religious in the eschatological sense—which is in the deepest recesses of the religious consciousness. It is the level at which the question of whether religion is the "real" reason for violent action with which we began this discussion—and which runs as a persistent undercurrent in contemporary policy discussion and in most press accounts—becomes irrelevant. This is a battle that is joined for chiliastic goals which no terrestrial "powers or principalities" have the power to meet, even if they so wished, and without God's direct intercession in history, even the victorious revolutionaries themselves would be unable to institute the perfected "government of God" which the faithful expect them to, in short order, enact.	39
This line of discussion naturally leads to a crisis model, and crises in which faith communities see themselves as sorely tested—as "righteous remnants" holding out in the face of overwhelming power—are timeless. David Rapoport in his early work identified the first religious terrorist movement in the fully modern sense, the Sicarri, to have emerged in the time of Christ (roughly the first century C.E. ). 18 The history of the Peoples of the Book—the three Western faiths of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity are rife with such movements, and in the American context Michael Barkun wrote a rather good book on this process some years ago. 19	40
This is not to suggest that perceived crisis invariably leads to a religious response, nor that even the most religious of responses necessarily eventuates in violence. Indeed, violence of the millennial sort is relatively rare. Once catalyzed, however, it is remarkably like a wildfire. It burns all in its path, and the flame, meant to purify in the mind of the believer, horrifies audiences of the unengaged, often frightens and disgusts the pool of potential adherents, and alarms states into acting against movements not yet ready to stand against such an opponent. Thus a crisis few movements historically survive.	41
To work further with the crisis model in the context of the "ebb and flow" of the "changing strength of the fundamental purchase of religion on people's identity across time," one might well be able to make a rather convincing case for a man or woman choosing to take the road to Martyrs' Square (a case that was undreamed of during the first wave of the Intifada, was intensely difficult to make for a time during the early stages of the al-Aqsa Intifada, but today, for a number of fascinating reasons, is almost normative in Palestine and lauded throughout many sectors of the Arab world). 20 Yet no such defense of the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas was made, nor can such a case be expected. The degree of the crisis does not rule out proportionality; nor does it annul rationality.	42
What I am suggesting, however, is simply a surface-level analysis. "Religion" is a big tent, while crises, as they deepen, divide people into smaller and smaller camps. Relative safety for much of the world is ultimately found in ties that are far more primordial than the generalized concepts of "Muslim," "Christian," or "Jew" could hope to describe. Ties of family, faith, sect, clan, tribe, and region all blend together, and what may be thought of by outsiders as a particularly stubborn or premodern form of xenophobia or religious fanaticism, from the inside in the Islamic world is understood as an organic, beautifully wrought form of "tawhid" or unity.	43
I think Jack may be right that historians are all by nature unbelievers—but only until they spend significant amounts of time in the Middle East. There, historians too talk about God, for God, not religion in the Western academic analytical sense, is imbued into the language and the tradition. More important, the historian is soon humbled by the weight of what he does not, cannot, and will never know. I always tell my students on the first day of term that the Middle East is such a fascinating place because it functions on a number of simultaneous levels. At the surface is what you see and hear. Believe none of that. Then there is something deeper— unknown but knowable. And then something below that and again something below that. Ultimately, there is the truth (not a truth, as we would be satisfied to have it here). But it is known only to God. The broad acceptance in Middle Eastern societies of the existence of a single underlying truth known ultimately only to God, yet perhaps accessible to man, is the essence of religion in all revealed faiths, is it not? Therein lies our essential commonality.	44
But then there is the question of violence, in the pursuit of that truth or in the perception that there are particular religious authorities or autodidacts who are in possession of that truth, and things change again.	45
AHR Editor: So far we have been discussing religion, with all the complexity and ambiguity which that capacious term invites; and in particular we have been trying to deal with the vexed issue of the place of religion in the hierarchy of commitments in different periods and cultures. Along the way, a number of insights and concepts have been introduced, some contested. Some frustration has been expressed with the lack of precision in how we readily assume or imagine religious commitment or a level of religious motivation for different peoples and periods, and not for others. Clearly it would be preferable always to contextualize religion, to specify precisely what we mean when we invoke "religion," to isolate what other competing interests and motivations are at play, and to analyze the forces—institutional, cultural, or ideological—that legitimize, promote, or otherwise canalize religious sentiments and commitments. Might I suggest that part of what we are seeing in this conversation has to do with the difficulties historians and others encounter once they step out of their zones of intellectual comfort where this level of precise analysis can be managed and try to discuss these issues in a venue where it is really very difficult? How, then, do we talk about "religion" across the chronological, cultural, subdisciplinary, and historiographical divides that our different scholarly orientations have created? With difficulty, obviously. But I would suggest that the difficulties generated by our exchanges are themselves interesting and worthy of exploration. Like comparative history, these exchanges should help us both refine our vocabulary for talking about these big issues and identify what is essential in our own analyses.	46
But another way to promote a discussion where the issues are genuinely joined is to move beyond "religion" and into the specific realm of religious violence. Philip Benedict has already helped us think about violence as an indicator of religious commitment when he cited examples of the targeting of religious buildings, structures, or other signs of religious identity. Subsequent comments picked up on this insight. Is it useful to approach religious violence in terms of, shall we say, an inventory of targets, and thus open the door for the kind of cross-cultural and even cross-period comparisons that historical sociology promotes? More than a generation ago, early modern historians began to approach religious violence in an anthropological sense, as "rites of violence," seeing it not as irrational, utterly inarticulate mass behavior but rather as meaningful, purposeful, even didactic forms of collective action. How do you "read" religious violence? Are there aspects of this kind of behavior that make it categorically different from other forms of violent collective action? How precisely can we infer crucial aspects of religious identity or commitment—or passion, for that matter—from the phenomenology of religious violence?	47
Stephen Ellis: There is no such thing as meaningless violence. And if we want to investigate the meaning of violence carried out in the name of religion, I think we should adopt the same approach as in regard to any other sort of violence. An obvious starting point is to consider what the perpetrators—but also the victims—have to say on the matter. Why do they say they are doing these things, or suffering them? As with other forms of violence, it is also useful for historians to look for antecedents of the phenomenon they are studying, to see whether it fits into a historical pattern. We have already discussed some interesting cases where the perpetrators of violence send mixed messages, such as Northern Ireland. There were many cases of people being attacked simply because they were thought to be Catholic or Protestant, and yet churches were not targeted. Random attacks of this sort—"sectarian killings," they were called—corresponded to the fact that many working-class areas in Northern Ireland were segregated, so there was a high chance that a passerby in a particular neighborhood would be someone of the religious identity that fitted the political message that sectarian killers wanted to send. This should perhaps alert us to the possibility that religious identity or religious rhetoric can have a sociological character and can actually be enlisted to serve political causes.	48
In other words, violence that at first sight is religious in nature or motivation may actually not be very religious. Again, we have already had a spirited exchange on this matter with reference to Palestine and the Middle East more generally. Invoking a religious doctrine or symbol does not in itself make an act of violence religious in motivation. I would say that in today's world, even violence that makes use of religious symbolism is very likely to be political. I may take the example of Sudan. For years, the war there was considered by most international commentators to pit the Muslim North of the country against Southerners who either were Christian or adhered to traditional religious forms. This was always a simplistic analysis. The fact that the war in Sudan is currently most violent among populations that are overwhelmingly Muslim suggests that the underlying motivations have all along been more political than religious in nature.	49
Forgive me for repeating myself, but I do not think we can go very far in this line of analysis without thinking what we mean by "religion." I have learned from religious studies that people in the West nowadays tend to consider religion as the location of ultimate meaning. But there are, and have been, many societies in which religion does not have much to do with meaning. In such cases, religion may play an important part in an armed conflict not because the warring parties are concerned with identities and meanings, but simply because they believe that power can be derived from the invisible world, and that religion can therefore be used to enhance military skills. I am interested by the observation that has often been made that European nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries stole the clothes of religion, turning the traditional object of Christian worship into a this-worldly entity such as the nation, or a this-worldly principle such as socialist revolution. This is what writers were referring to when they called Marxism a secular religion. We may thus have violence that is essentially political in nature but is suffused with religious language and symbolism. Think of Irish nationalism, drawing on the symbolism of death and resurrection, with the Easter Rising and the Good Friday agreement.	50
Jack Miles: In principle, where definitions are known to be in contention or to have varied over time, the sensible procedure is simply to state the definition that will be operative in a given discussion or program and then proceed. In practice, when American historians, journalists, and policymakers use the word "religion" without bothering with any opening definition of the term, their use of it seems to me to stand—with one crucial qualification—not far from anthropological functionalism as so influentially crystallized by Clifford Geertz. His definition, in The Interpretation of Cultures, was: "a religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." 21 In a religiously pluralistic society, this definition has had great appeal because it seems to apply to all religions equally, conceding to all a potentially real and durable effect. It has had appeal to academics, who work in a sector of American society where religious belief is often rare and never to be taken for granted, because it allows them to discuss religion without ever taking up the question of whether there is any factuality behind the aura.	51
The great limitation of this definition, and the source of the qualification just mentioned, is that—surprisingly in the work of an anthropologist—it applies as well to a lone man adhering to a secret symbol system that he never speaks aloud as it does to the Roman Catholic Church. To the extent that in common parlance "a religion" implies "organized religion," as in the sentence "I don't belong to a religion," Geertz's definition assumes rather than includes (other than by the use of the plural "men") the social dimension of religion. But since this assumption seems so easily to be shared, accepting Geertz's definition as a working definition for the purposes of this discussion would mean being prepared to ask how a given general conception of reality produces, if it does, moods and motivations tending significantly toward violence.	52
Doing that, we can easily enough do as Stephen suggests and engage, say, nationalism as one instance of a general conception of existence clothed with the aura of factuality and taken as the basis for violent action. We need not confine ourselves to the commonsense instances of religion. In the 1960s, in Italy, I saw a faded old Fascist slogan painted on a Piedmont wall: Noi non discutiamo la frontera, la difendiamo. 22 The slogan obviously calls a halt to reason and invokes an unquestioning patriotism to rationalize its call to arms. Obviously, again, Italy had real interests that could conflict with those of neighboring France, and this invocation of a nationalist faith could coincide with plenty of material motivations. There was nonetheless a distinct and proper power in the nationalist faith, which, in a given case—as in fighting on for a lost cause—could manifest its distinctness. In Europe, the plausibility of this faith has suffered at least as much in the twentieth century as Christianity did in the seventeenth.	53
In the Muslim case now so much on everyone's mind, it will not do to leap from the peak to the plain in a single bound, inferring from verses in the Qurˀan or the Hadith general conceptions of existence supposedly productive of violent moods and motivations in all Muslims. Nor will it do to sweep away such basic differences as that between Sunni and Shiˁa in a statement like the one President Bush made in his 2007 State of the Union address: "The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. Whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent they have the same wicked purposes." No, the differences are deeper than slogans, and there must be a long, careful descent from the peak to the plain. It is at incalculable cost that the Bush administration has so cavalierly dismissed the Sunni/Shiˁa difference. At the same time, when descending to those individual cases, if a definition like Geertz's is the working definition, then credence will be given to a statement like the following, from an interview in the Washington Post with a former officer in Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen who claims now to be the "'general coordinator' between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Omar Brigade, an insurgent group founded ... by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi" and in that capacity to have killed more Shiˁites than he can count: "I personally don't have a hatred of the American people, and I respect American civilization. They have participated in the progress of all the nations of the world. They invented computers. Such people should be respected. But people who are crying over someone who died 1,400 years ago"—referring to Shiˁites and their veneration of a leader killed in the seventh century—"these should be eliminated to clear the society of them, because they are simply trash." 23	54
This statement surely makes at least a prima facie conjunction between, on the one hand, an appropriation of the Sunni tradition within Islam and, on the other, an agenda of violence against Shiˁa Muslims. Though one need not accept the statement uncritically, the burden of proof would seem to be on those who would dismiss it as merely a mask for other, unnamed, material considerations.	55
Jeffrey Kaplan: The Editor's idea of the "rites of violence" in the context of targeting does bring up a fascinating area of investigation. We have known for a very long time that violence targeting religious symbols is a great deal more effective in both breadth and depth of effect on a variety of potential audiences than simple violence against persons. Indeed, I would argue that even mass casualty incidents, for all their shock and brutality, do not leave as lasting an effect in terms of anger, bitterness, and, in the final analysis, the ability to transform a struggle between adherents of conflicting religions into religious violence on the deepest imaginable level as do attacks on structures in which religious communities have invested symbolic meaning.	56
Think, for example, of the profound changes in Judaism wrought by the destruction of the Second Temple and the subsequent diaspora. Judaism—whose very survival seems miraculous at that point—was transformed from a temple-based cult under the guidance of a priesthood to a decentralized faith based on text and a scattered group of teacher/interpreters (rabbis) whose knowledge of text and halacha (Jewish law) held the faith, albeit utterly transformed, together. Closer to our own day, the Indian government's attack on the Sikhs' sacred precincts at Amritsar (Operation Blue Star) catalyzed the extreme radicalization of elements of that faith—especially in diaspora—that we see today and that resulted in the downing of a Canadian passenger plane with great loss of life. The 2005 destruction of the Ayodhya Mosque resulted in communal riots, poisoning the already tense relations between Hindus and Muslims in India, which we can see in the level of confrontation in more distant reaches such as Kashmir. 24	57
Sacrality is more easily invested in structures—in great buildings or in natural features of the environment—than in people, for our lives are fleeting, and in many cultures, some degree of predestination is an accepted fact of life (or death, as the case may be). But structures, humble or magnificent, may serve as a means of connecting the believer or the believing community to the sacred, and are thus invested with great religious power. Americans tend to be rather blasé about such things, frankly. The Constitution and the Super Bowl would be a greater loss than, say, the National Cathedral if terrorists were to strike effectively. But the West is not the Islamic world, and if future historians were to point to a single moment in time when the last tattered shreds of American hopes that some sort of face-saving outcome in Iraq could be salvaged were lost, I am convinced it would be the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. 25 More than all the tit-for-tat atrocities that led up to that moment between the various communities in post-Saddam Iraq, that was the one that tipped the nation clearly and visibly into civil war and made the already ongoing process of neighborhood-by-neighborhood ethnic cleansing a seemingly unbreakable cycle.	58
We target the sacred to most deeply wound our adversaries, but we sacralize the formerly mundane when we ourselves are struck. One has only to visit the Oklahoma City Memorial at the site of the former Federal Building, with its biblical quotations, its religiously inspired designs and biblical imagery, and the crosses that are still laid at the gateways by members of the public. 26 The Oklahoma City bombing is fascinating in this regard: it was not intended as an act of religious violence, but it called forth a religious response and was widely perceived as being religiously motivated. Fascinatingly, Eric Rudolph, the recently captured killer and bomber of abortion clinics—the rescue movement was a small but remarkably violent movement that was deeply religious in nature—also professes no religious motivation for his crimes.