| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 112.3

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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 112.3 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Comparative/World

Charles Gati. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. (Cold War International History Project Series.) Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, and Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 264. $24.95.
Charles Gati's reassessment of the 1956 "Hungarian Revolt" argues that less would have been more. Hungary's aim was to reform, not to abolish the existing system. Had Imre Nagy been able to steer between radical insurgents and Moscow's limited tolerance, had the United States settled for anything less than liberation, Hungary, which "unlike Poland had little or no strategic significance" (p. 5), might have received "limited pluralism" and "semi-independence." Instead of failing the "revolt" could have half succeeded. All the more so, since the Soviets were "not trigger-happy" (p. 4) and both Yugoslavia and, later, Poland were able to steer away from Soviet hegemony. Gati acknowledges that the ultimate responsibility for crushing the revolution rested with Moscow, but most of his fire is directed at "cynical" and impotent American policies and Nagy. In this rich, powerfully argued, and readable book Gati confronts tough questions.	1
He presents a balanced assessment of Nagy's complex personality. Regarding Nagy's performance in the first stage of the revolution, Gati argues that he was a "party apparatchik, who believed that a counter-revolution was taking place and it must be stopped" (p. 150). Had he understood the need to steer between "the insurgents' desires and the Kremlin's fears" (p. 217), a reformist outcome may well have been achieved. Importantly Gati shows that Nagy lost a singular chance to keep events on a peaceful, gradualist track with a disappointing speech on October 23. Yet, the sixteen points demanded extensive change, much of which remained unacceptable for Moscow until 1989.Revolutions and struggles of independence tend to spiral out of the control of moderate leaders.	. . .

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