| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 110.2

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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 110.2 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Asia

Hans J. van de Ven. War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945. (RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia, number 10.) London: RoutledgeCurzon. 2003. Pp. xi, 377. $129.95.
This is an important book, challenging traditional views and getting the reader to think in new ways about many issues in twentieth century China. Hans J. van de Ven challenges what he calls the Joseph Stilwell-Theodore White paradigm that the Chiang Kai-shek regime from the 1920s through the 1940s failed because it was militarily incompetent, corrupt, and authoritarian. He states: "I will put at the center of my account what the Nationalists themselves did to mobilize their country against Japan and against imperialism" (p. 12). The author launches his revisionist work with an excellent historiographical and contextual overview that is clear, direct, and rich in detail. Each chapter includes significant historiographical comments.	1
Because Stilwell's critique of Chiang's regime has served as the foundation of most later historical interpretations, van de Ven revisits Stilwell's role and finds that he was not a good military strategist or tactician and that his intense dislike of Chiang colored reports of what was actually happening in the field. This is not, however, a slashing attack on Stilwell; the author notes, for example, that "Stilwell spent much time agonizing about the reliability of the information available to him" (p. 11), much of which was based on abysmal U.S. military intelligence. In places, van de Ven's analysis is filled with such a wealth of detail that occasional statements about where he is in his argument might bring greater clarity.	. . .

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