| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.3

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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.3 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Canada and the United States

Guy Chet. Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2003. Pp. xviii, 207. Cloth $60.00, paper $18.95.

In an invigorating book, Guy Chet takes steady aim at the legendary portrayal of the prowess of American arms as entailing the rejection of hidebound European military doctrines in favor of a more mobile and tactically offensive style of war. Chet maintains that the colonial era saw not the eclipse but the vindication of European approaches based on combining aggressive strategies with careful and usually defensive battlefield tactics. In military affairs, "the colonies gravitated towards England's cultural and administrative sphere of influence" (p. 6). By contrast, the offensive tactics often favored by French and aboriginal forces were determined "by strategic and logistical weakness" (p. 139; emphasis in original).

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